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Abstract
The dissertation presents a theoretically controlled and historically informed 
inquiry into the formation and dynamics of the European system of states between the 
8th and the 18th Centuries. It combines two methods of research and exposition. First, it 
pursues a comparative-chronological approach by elaborating and contrasting 
historically diverse logics of territorial and international order - exemplified with 
reference to the medieval, the early modem, and, partially, the modem geopolitical 
systems. Second, it adopts a developmental perspective by supplementing the 
systematic-comparative but static account of geopolitical orders with a more narrative, 
yet theoretically hedged, exposition of their incommensurable conflictual dynamics and 
expansionist drives. This processual perspective allows us to address the crucial 
question of the causes behind the passage from one geopolitical order to another.
Contrary to conventional assumptions in the theory of international relations, 
the thesis is that the diversity of geopolitical systems and the reasons behind their 
transformations are bound up with different and changing social property relations in 
the domestic sphere. These social property relations govern the very identity of the 
constitutive actors of any geopolitical system and inform their modes of territorial 
order and foreign policy behaviour. Such a thesis has direct implications for a 
fundamental re-interpretation and re-periodisation of the origins of modem 
international relations, commonly associated with the Westphalian Peace settlements of 
1648. By embedding the demystification of 1648’s essential modernity in the wider 
continuum of European history, the dissertation shows to which degree early modem 
geopolitics remained tied to its medieval roots. The old pre-modem logic of 
geopolitical relations is only challenged with the advent of a new social property 
regime and the articulation of a new state/society complex in late 17th Century 
England, which starts in the 18th Century to transform the state system of the Old 
Regime into a modem system of sovereign states.
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Chapter One
The Myth of 1648: The Conventional Interpretation of the 
Westphalian System of States
Introduction
Research Problem
The contemporary international order - the fragmentation of public political 
power in territorially demarcated sovereign states and the unity of private economic 
power in form of the world market - is neither timeless nor natural. It is a relatively 
recent phenomenon. It is a distinctly modem phenomenon. Its genesis stands in need of 
explanation.
This dissertation provides a new theoretically controlled and historically 
informed inquiry into the formation and dynamics of the European system of states 
between the 8th and 18th Centuries. It combines two methods of exposition. First, it 
pursues a comparative-chronological approach by elaborating and contrasting 
historically diverse logics of territorial and international order - exemplified with 
reference to the medieval, the early modem, and, partially, the modem geopolitical 
system. This comparative perspective allows us to clearly identify fundamental 
differences in their respective forms of co-operation and conflict. Second, it adopts a 
developmental perspective by supplementing the systematic-comparative but static 
account of geopolitical orders with a more narrative, yet theoretically hedged, 
exposition of their incommensurable domestically and internationally conflictual 
dynamics that drive systemic transformations. This processual perspective allows us to 
address the crucial question of the causes behind the passages from one geopolitical 
order to another. More specifically, it enables us to approach the wider macro- 
sociological problem of the making of the modem system of states.
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Research Context
This twofold perspective - comparative and processual - responds to two 
objections raised by John Gerard Ruggie in his critique of Kenneth Waltz’s neorealist 
theory of international politics.1 First, Ruggie argued that while Neorealism might be 
able to theorise the mode of operation of the modern system of states, it fails to 
account for the specificity of pre-Westphalian geopolitical orders. He adduced the 
medieval case to illustrate these differences. Second, Ruggie objected that Neorealism 
contains only a ‘reproductive’, not a ‘transformative logic’, i.e. it fails to provide a 
theory of large-scale systemic change that was able to explain the ‘medieval-to-modem 
shift’.
Ruggie’s critique can be reformulated in the following way. First, given that 
anarchy is the defining feature of diverse geopolitical systems, it does not suffice to 
explain historically radically different outcomes in their respective patterns of conflict 
and co-operation. In other words, the diversity of geopolitical systems cannot be 
reduced to and explained by the universality of anarchy. However, if we accept the 
causal indeterminacy of anarchy, then we are forced to develop a non-systemic IR 
theory in order to explain these variations. This implies that the center of attention 
shifts away from a narrowly defined political science focus to a wider social science 
focus that identifies the social forces that constitute and reproduce political 
communities and geopolitical systems. Second, given the existence of profound 
geopolitical variations, we stand in need of a macro-theory of systemic change that 
does not hide massive transformations in the prevailing forms of political authority and 
territorial order, but that starts from the assumption that these domestic changes are 
bound up with those long-term and large-scale transitions from one system to another. 
This implies that attention shifts to the social sources of these political transformations. 
Consequently, we need a historical sociology of the formation of the modem system of 
states.
1 Waltz 1979; Ruggie 1986, 1993, 1998.
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Agreement with Ruggie’s basic objections against neorealism does not mean 
acceptance of his suggested constructivist alternative. Four points of empirical and 
theoretical disagreement emerged which resulted in a wholesale dismissal of his 
constructivist account and to the adoption of an alternative theoretical framework. 
First, Ruggie argued that differences in geopolitical systems can be explained in terms 
of different property rights. While the medieval system was defined by conditional 
property generating heterogeneous forms of territoriality, the modem system is defined 
by exclusive and absolute private property rights generating homogeneous forms of 
territoriality. He went on to argue, second, that the shift from medieval conditional to 
modem private property titles, dated between the 15th and the 17th Centuries, can be 
explained in terms of a contingent confluence of three ‘irreducible’ dimensions of 
collective experience:
‘These domains included material environments (ecodemographics, relations of 
production, relations of force); the matrix of constraints and opportunities within which 
social actors interacted (the structure of property rights, divergences between private and 
social rates of return, coalitional possibilities among major social actors); and social 
epistemes (political doctrines, political metaphysics, spatial constructs). Each was 
undergoing change in accordance with its own endogeneous logic.’2
However, since Ruggie proposed in essence an institutional account of 
property rights, he failed to identify those social agents that sustained, lived out, and 
changed property titles - not merely as formal institutions, but as politically-maintained 
and actively negotiated social relations. This de-socialisation of property rights 
translated into a non-recognition of their inherently conflictual character and a 
corresponding non-recognition of those class-related social conflicts that transformed 
social property regimes. Third, Ruggie identified only one major systemic shift: the 
medieval-to-modem shift. He thus failed to acknowledge that the medieval system was 
first succeeded by the early modem absolutist-dynastic system of states that was 
subsequently transformed into a genuinely modem international order. This reduction 
of two systemic transformations to one resulted in a non-recognition of the sui generis 
character of the early modem system of dynastic states, prompting a conflation of the 
Westphalian Order with the modem system of states, and engendering a failure to 
specify and explain the social processes that led to the emergence of the modem
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system of states. Fourth, Ruggie also failed to challenge Waltz’s thesis that the mode 
of operation of the modern system of states can be understood in terms of the 
pressures implied by anarchy. In other words, he failed to develop an alternative 
‘reproductive logic’ for modem international relations.
Empirical misjudgements and theoretical failures cannot be dissociated from 
Ruggie’s preferred constructivist approach. For does it suffice to conceive property 
rights or sovereignty exclusively in terms of institutions defined as intersubjective 
conventions that are, by definition, non-coercive and consensus-oriented, or should we 
not conceive them in terms of social relations involving also force and coercion, that is, 
conflict and imposition? Can we simply read off changes in system-structure, 
innovations in regime-formation, or the very formation of the sovereign modem state 
from a series of intersubjective negotiations and agreements among political elites, be 
these changes domestic in origin or the result of a chain of international peace 
congresses? In other words, is it possible to identify broader social forces with 
antagonistic interests that drive political and geopolitical change in domestically and 
internationally conflictual and violent processes? Constructivism’s methodological 
grasp and explanatory scope do not exhaust the empirical and theoretical issues at 
stake.
The Core Theoretical Argument
These research questions prompted the mobilisation and a systematic perusal of 
extra-IR literatures on the identity of historical epochs and the logic behind epochal 
transitions. Here, the core research problem is defined by the long-standing debates on 
the rise of the modem state, including the body of thought on medieval and early 
modem state-building, and on the rise of modem economic relations, including the 
literature on pre-capitalist economic systems and the origins of capitalism. A further 
set of core questions emerged: How to theorise the historically specific relations 
between historically diverse political communities and their economic systems and the 
logic behind their transformations in their relevance for international relations? What is
2 Ruggie 1993, 168-9.
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the nexus between the development of the modem state and, a fortiori, of a plurality of 
states and capitalism? How can we identify the agents of these transformations? What 
are the wider implications for IR theory?
The core theoretical argument, developed in elaboration of the principles of 
Political Marxism and stated at its most abstract, is that the diversity of geopolitical 
systems and their variations in the patterns of conflict and co-operation are predicated 
on the specific identities of the systems’ constitutive units.3 The identity of these 
political units is primarily defined by distinct social property relations, mediating the 
relations between the dominant classes. The time-bound balances of social forces find 
expression in politically-constituted institutions which set the parameters for class- 
specific and therefore antagonistic strategies of action. Political institutions fix social 
property regimes and provide rules and norms for the reproduction of historically 
specific class relations. While politically-constituted property regimes institutionalise 
social conflicts in time and space and set the time-bound absolute limits for strategies 
of actions, they may turn themselves into the object of contestation in times of general 
crisis. Yet, no transhistorical theory of general crisis is available that can be 
superimposed upon the historical evidence. On the contrary, the conditions, the general 
course, and the outcomes of theses crises can only be established through concrete 
historical inquiry. Geopolitical transformations are governed by the variable, but not 
contingent, resolution of these social conflicts that generate new property regimes and 
authority relations that fix the new status quo while providing new rules and norms for 
its reproduction. Changes in property regimes re-structure the identity of political 
communities and their associated forms of conflict and co-operation. Rule-maintenance 
and rule-negotiation - violent or not - are actively played out processes.
This core theoretical argument will be referred to throughout the text as the 
theory of social property relations. It will be deployed as a heuristic device. This 
alternative theoretical point of departure generates a series of new substantive results 
that challenge central assumptions of mainstream IR theory.
3 Core texts of this tradition of thought include Brenner 1977, 1985a, 1985b, 1986, 1989, 
1993; Wood 1991, 1995; Comninel 1987. Cf. also Anderson 1974a and 1974b and Rosenberg 
1994.
13
Composition and Distribution o f  the Argument
The substantiation of the theory of social property relations in its implications 
for IR is distributed over six chapters. The reminder of Chapter 1 sets out critically the 
conventional IR understanding of Westphalia. It shows how different IR paradigms 
converge in dating and defining the advent of the modem system of states with the 
signing of the Westphalian Peace Treaties of 1648. It concludes by suggesting that a 
rectification of that disciplinary foundation myth requires an alternative theoretical 
framework and a broader reconceptualisation of both, the medieval-early modem- 
modern transitions and their respective geopolitical orders.
Chapter 2 presents the theory of social property relations in more detail and 
theorises the specific properties of medieval geopolitics on this basis. The historical- 
conceptual exposition is preceded by a theoretical discussion which examines the IR 
debate on the Middle Ages, demonstrates the insufficiency of existing IR approaches to 
medieval geopolitics, compares and contrasts Max Weber’s and Karl Marx’s notions of 
feudalism, and reformulates the Marxist theorem of the logic of production in terms of 
the logic of exploitation as the core analytical device for pre-capitalist societies. The 
argument is that prevailing social property relations are institutionalised in lordships 
that constitute the core political units of medieval order. Political and geopolitical 
inter-lordly relations are governed by the action-defining parameters set by these 
lordship-based property regimes. Lordships fix determinate class-related and 
antagonistic strategies of action that inform the specific nature of a series of medieval 
geopolitical phenomena: the medieval ‘state’, patterns of expansion, territory and 
frontiers, war and peace, and the structure of early, high, and late medieval geopolitical 
order are internally related to prevailing social property relations.
Chapter 3 offers an empirically informed explanation of the transition from the 
semi-hierarchically structured last pan-European Empire - the Carolingian Empire - to 
the personalised anarchy around the year 1000 and the subsequent emergence of an 
anarchical system of feudal kingdoms. This twofold transformation of medieval 
geopolitics is synonymous with the transition from the early to the high to the late 
Middle Ages. The narrative is theoretically organised in terms of the real history of the 
social relations of lordship. The purpose of this chapter is fivefold: First, it shows how 
structural differences in the constitution of early, high, and late medieval order are
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internally related to differences in their respective property-regimes. Second, it 
demonstrates how class conflicts triggered system-wide crises which led to systemic 
breakdowns and qualitative systemic renewals. Third, it exemplifies how 
chronologically simultaneous, socially combined, yet geographically uneven patterns of 
expansion in the European periphery during the 11th Century were unleashed by a prior 
re-structuration of class relations in the core regions of Frankish Europe. Fourth, it 
argues that the post-millennial fourfold outward-movement, led by Frankish knights, 
established in the European periphery variations in the politically-constituted property 
regimes that had long-term consequences for diverging patterns of feudal state- 
formation in England, Spain, Eastern and Southern Europe, as well as in France itself. 
Fifth, it develops the wider argument that the very constitution of Europe as a political 
pluriverse - a long-term phenomenon which IR tends to take for granted - is linked to 
the crisis-ridden social processes that dissolved the last pan-European Empire around 
the millennium. This dissolution engendered the spread of feudal relations of 
domination and exploitation over the continent, establishing the geographical and 
territorial parameters of contemporary Europe. The implication of this thesis for the 
relation between capitalism and the territorially divided modem system of states will be 
re-examined at a later stage.
Chapter 4 turns to the problem of the origins of the modem state and, by 
extension, the modem system of states. It provides a critique of two dominant rival 
paradigms - the commercialisation model and the geopolitical competition model - on 
the transition to political modernity. The argument is that both macro-paradigms fail 
on theoretical and empirical grounds in their capitalism-driven or war-driven 
explanations of the formation of the modem state and are therefore of little help to 
theorise the origins of the modem system of states.
The commercialisation model suggests that modem state-formation is an 
outcome of the quantitative expansion of trade, the growth of towns, the increasing 
international division of labour, and the rise of the bourgeoisie. The development of 
commercial capitalism, understood in terms of production for and exchange on the 
market, is variously held to have taken place during the high Middle Ages, the 
Renaissance, or the ‘long 16th Century’. However, since this definition of capitalism as 
market exchange is in essence transhistorical, it cannot be squared with the historically, 
chronologically, and regionally specific emergence of the first modem state in Max
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Weber’s sense, nor can it explain the historically specific and regionally confined onset 
of sustained economic growth, permanent technological innovations, and the 
overcoming of the Malthusian trap by steady demographic growth - processes that are 
conventionally associated with the onset of capitalism proper. The chapter thus 
dismisses the definition of capitalism as commercial exchange and develops an 
alternative conception of capitalism understood as a determinate relation of 
production, predicated on qualitatively new social property relations to which a 
specifically modem form of sovereignty is internally related. The genesis of this new 
property regime and state-form is located in and unique to early modem England.
The geopolitical competition model argues that intensified international rivalry 
mediated by war led to pressure for the public monopolisation and centralisation of the 
means of violence, engendering cost increases that prompted innovations in public 
income provisions. These led to new modes of taxation and fiscality and a general 
trend towards the rationalisation, juridification and consolidation of the state 
apparatus, generating eventually the sovereign modem state. Against this strand of 
reasoning, the argument is made that the model starts from, but has no theory of, the 
constitution of Europe as a geopolitical pluriverse, lacks a social theory of war, cannot 
square the universality of war with regional variations in state developments, remains 
confined to an institutional approach, and generally conflates the formation of the early 
modem absolutist state with the genesis of the modem state.
Conventional explanations of the rise of political modernity have focused on 
France as the archetypical case of successful state-formation during the age of 
absolutism. Since France was the major signatory of the Westphalian Peace Treaties 
and since it came, next to Sweden, to guarantee the Westphalian Settlement as a 
Garantiemacht (guaranteeing power), chapter 5 critically re-examines the dominant 
theories of absolutism and offers an alternative explanation of the nature of Old 
Regime France. The argument is that the French polity was neither a modem state, as 
the IR community conventionally assumes, nor a necessary precursor of the modem 
state, as the Neo-Weberian and classical historiographical literature declares. The 
chapter also shows that French absolutism cannot be regarded as a transitional stage 
towards capitalism as the Marxist orthodoxy maintains. Rather, existing pre-capitalist 
social property relations sustained a patrimonial-dynastic state whose developmental 
long-term trajectory was characterised by an economically involutionary and politically
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and geopolitically crisis-ridden logic that, instead of fundamentally changing, rather 
entrenched prevailing class relations. The structure of class relations generated social 
conflicts that threw French society into a downward cycle of recurring financial and 
military crisis that, far from re-structuring property relations in a modem and capitalist 
direction, exhausted the economic potential of the agrarian economy while promoting 
the hypertrophical growth of a non-productive pre-modem state apparatus. The 
chapter exemplifies the pre-modem logic and involutionary dynamic of French 
absolutism with reference to the growth of the patrimonial ‘bureaucracy’ and the 
implications of office venality, the structure of political institutions, the question of 
legislative uniformity, the nexus between the costs of warfare and public finances, and 
the nature of the military constitution of the Old Regime. The general character of 
these institutions demonstrates the absolute limits to the modernising potentials of the 
absolutist state. The chapter ends by suggesting that the involutionary politico- 
economic long-term pattern of development led eventually to the complete financial 
exhaustion and breakdown of French absolutism which, under the impact of 
international military competition and mediated by profound class conflicts, postponed 
ex hypothesis the transformation of the French state in a modem direction to the 
period between the French Revolution and the Third Republic. However, if these 
arguments hold, then we are in a position to fundamentally re-theorise the general 
character of the Westphalian system of states dominated by Old Regime France and to 
refute the IR consensus on Westphalia’s modernity.
Chapter 6 challenges the core, repeatedly reproduced, constitutive IR myth 
claiming that the Westphalian Settlement inaugurated the era of modem international 
relations among sovereign states, and provides a new interpretation of the early 
modem system of dynastic states. It argues that neither (neo-)realism nor 
constructivism recognise nor that they are able to explain the distinctively pre-modem 
specificity of inter-dynastic relations exemplified by such core phenomena like the 
persistence of empire-building, political marriages, dynastic unions, wars of succession, 
dynastic ‘international’ law, circulating territories, inter-dynastic compensatory 
equilibrium, and bandwagoning. It shows how these core features of early modem 
conflict and co-operation are predicated on the persistence of pre-capitalist social 
property relations and dynastic-proprietary forms of sovereignty. The chapter also 
provides a content analysis of the Westphalian Peace Treaties, concluding that the
17
Treaty provisions, far from indicating a breakthrough towards modem principles of 
international relations, evinced restorative tendencies intended to legally codify a return 
to the status quo ante be Hum.
However, if a pre-modem geopolitical order persisted well beyond 1648, how 
then can we explain the onset of specifically modem international relations? The 
answer points to the endogenous establishment of capitalist social property relations in 
late 16th Century England, its effect on the transformation of the English state during 
the 17th Century (the shift from dynastic to parliamentary sovereignty), and its wider 
impact on the continental system of pre-modem states during the course of the 18th 
Century. While this argument is not fully substantiated, the thesis is advanced that 
capitalist- parliamentary Britain adopted the practice of active continental balancing 
and territorial disengagement as new foreign policy techniques, imparting a new 
dynamic to the old system of dynastic states in a mixed case scenario. It is suggested 
that this partial manifestation of Britain’s politico-economic modernity should form the 
point of departure for further research on the general rise and expansion of modem 
international relations among capitalist states.
What conclusions can be drawn from these theses for the general nexus 
between capitalism and the modem system of states? The historical exposition leads to 
the following hypothesis: capitalism and the modem system of states as a political 
pluriverse are not of a pair. They have to be conceptually dissociated. The territorially 
fragmented character of the contemporary system of states is a determinate, not a 
contingent, historical legacy of the pre-capitalist era, reaching back to the class- 
conflicts that dissolved the Carolingian Empire. While the territorial configuration of 
Europe changed over the course of the subsequent centuries, the basic principle of 
multiple territories did not. Capitalism was bom into this system, yet its genesis was 
unique to early modem England. In other words, capitalism requires a state, but not 
necessarily many of it. While the subsequent crisis-ridden and geopolitically mediated 
expansion of capitalism altered during the 19th and early 20th Centuries the political 
regimes of the continental states - from dynastic-absolutist to modem-bureaucratic 
states -, it did not alter the territorially divided nature of the European system of states.
Counterfactually, it is thus possible to argue that if capitalism had emerged in 
the context of an empire, its development would not have required a multiplicity of 
states, though it would have transformed the imperial constitution. If capitalism and a
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polycentric system of states are conceptually to be dissociated, yet historically 
combined, then we have arguably developed a new intellectual basis from which to re­
examine the wider contemporary question of the relation between a capital-driven and 
universalising world-market and the tendency - real or not - towards the transcendence 
not of the state as such, but of a system of states.
The Myth of 1648: The Conventional Interpretation of the Westphalian System 
of States
The Peace Treaties of Westphalia that ended the Thirty Years’ War have 
achieved over time the status of a foundation myth within the modem discipline of IR. 
Cross-paradigmatic convergence on 1648 as marking the origins of modem 
international relations has given the discipline a sense of theoretical direction, thematic 
unity, and historical legitimacy. A subterranean line of tacit acceptance is running 
through the literature, passed down unexamined from IR generation to IR generation. 
Dates cannot lie, and the more distant the dates, the lesser the willingness to uncover 
their social content, context, and meaning. However, chronological periodisation is no 
innocent exercise - a mere pedagogical and heuristic device to plant markers into the 
uncharted flow of history. It entails assumptions about the historical duration and, 
therewith, identity of specific epochs and geopolitical orders as it implicates IR 
theories on the adequacy of criteria adduced to theorise continuity or discontinuity of 
international orders. Consequently, agreement on 1648 as marking the origins of the 
modem system of states implies follow-up claims on the persistence of the Westphalian 
order spanning the period between the mid-17th Century and contemporary times. 
While few IR scholars would argue that 17th Century European politics can be directly 
compared with 20th Century international politics, most would agree that the 
fundamental principles of geopolitical order have not changed in the course of the last 
350 years.
According to the conventional interpretation in IR, shared by realists and 
constructivists alike, the Westphalian Treaties constituted a decisive turning-point in 
the history of international relations. After 1648, formalised relations between modem
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sovereign states superseded the criss-crossing relations between heterogeneous feudal 
conflict-units and the hierarchical claims of Empire and papacy.4 The consolidation of 
exclusive sovereignty resting on the internal monopolisation of the means of violence 
translated into exclusive control by central rulers of the instruments of foreign policy, 
viz. control of the army, diplomacy, and treaty-making. By the mid- 17th Century, only 
central rulers in charge of these prerogatives became subjects of international law, 
based on mutual recognition to the exclusion of rival domestic centers of power. With 
the arrogation of the means of violence by multiple sovereigns and the concomitant 
establishment of bounded territoriality, the field of politics was formally differentiated 
into distinct domestic and international spheres, based on internal political hierarchy 
and external geopolitical anarchy. After the Westphalian Settlement, non-territorial 
political actors (city-states, city-leagues), feudal lords, and other corporate actors 
‘dropped out’ of international politics. International relations came to be 
institutionalised in permanent embassies, co-ordinating international affairs through 
regular diplomatic intercourse, governed by codified and binding diplomatic protocols, 
culminating in the regular convocation of multilateral congresses. At the same time, 
political sovereignty and the discourse of raison d ’Etat secularised international 
relations by undermining the power of religion as the dominant mode of legitimacy, 
curtailing the universalising ambitions of the Roman Catholic Church. The separation 
between politics and religion and the concomitant idea of self-determination entailed 
the recognition of the principle of peaceful coexistence among legally equal members 
of international society, embodied in a code of international law which acknowledged 
mutual recognition, non-interference, and religious toleration. Henceforth, universal 
conceptions of empire or res publica Christiana gave way to the workings of the 
balance of power as the natural regulator of competitive international relations in a 
multipolar anarchical environment. In the period between the Peace of Westphalia 
(1648) and the Peace of Utrecht (1713), the international states system started to 
display modem forms of international relations.
4 Realist scholars include Gross 1948, 28-9; Morgenthau 1985, 293-4 and 328-9; Gilpin 1981, 
111; Holsti 1991, 20-21 and 25-6. Constructivists include Ruggie 1986, 141-49, 1993, and 
1998; Kratochwil 1986 and 1995: Krippendorff 1985, 272-81; Wendt 1992, 414; Spruyt 1994, 
3ff; Giddens 1985, 83-121. Cf. also Arrighi 1994, 36-47. English School authors include 
Butterfield 1966; Wight 1977 and 1978; Bull 1977; Armstrong 1993, 30-40.
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Paradigmatic IR Perspectives
Neorealist and Realist Perspectives: 1648 as the Majestic Portal to International 
Modernity
In the neorealist tradition, the significance of the Westphalian settlement is 
played down on theoretical grounds. Its fundamental thesis of a basic invariance in the 
conduct of conflict-units, regardless of their identity and the nature of the international 
system provided that it is multipolar and thus anarchical, precludes a recognition of 
1648 as a fundamental break in the logic of international relations. Markus Fischer’s 
account of feudal Europe concludes with the assertion that the actual practice of feudal 
actors ‘supports the neorealist view that conflict and power politics are a structural 
condition of the international realm - present even among individuals in a stateless 
condition.’5 If anarchy defines medieval geopolitics even in the presence of 
hierarchical, communal, and universal discourses, then Westphalia cannot, by 
definition, depart from this principle. On a spectrum of principles of geopolitical order 
defined by the absolute ends of anarchy and hierarchy, Westphalia constitutes only a 
reaffirmation of the timeless logic of anarchy, supporting the neorealist thesis of 
transhistorical structural continuity.
While the realist tradition also embraces the general theorem of the long-term 
logic of anarchy, it recognises 1648 as the decisive turning-point in the history of 
international relations, institutionalising anarchy under conditions of a modem system 
of sovereign states. While the basis of anarchy has changed, i.e. while we may discern a 
discontinuity in the constitutive actors of the system and thus a change in the form of 
anarchy, its logic remains unaltered. Within the classical Realist tradition, one of the 
earliest and most authoritative statements came from Hans Morgenthau.
‘The modem system of international law is the result of the great political 
transformation that marked the transition from the Middle Ages to the modem period of 
history. It can be summed up as the transformation of the feudal system into the 
territorial state. The main characteristic of the latter, distinguishing it from its
5 Fischer 1992, 428.
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predecessor, was the assumption by the government of the supreme authority within the 
territory of the state. The monarch no longer shared authority with the feudal lords 
within the state territory of which he had been in a large measure the nominal rather than 
the actual head. Nor did he share it with the Church, which throughout the Middle Ages 
had claimed in certain respects supreme authority within Christendom. When this 
transformation had been consummated in the sixteenth century, the political world 
consisted of a number of states that within their respective territories were, legally 
speaking, completely independent of each other, recognizing no secular authority above 
themselves. In one word, they were sovereign. (...).’6
The constitution of modem territorial states translated, according to 
Morgenthau, directly into the formulation of rules for modern international relations. 
‘A core of rules of international law laying down the rights and duties of states in 
relation to each other developed in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. These rules of 
international law were securely established in 1648, when the Treaty of Westphalia 
brought the religious wars to an end and made the territorial state the cornerstone of 
the modem state system.’7 Morgenthau explicitly equates absolutist sovereignty with 
modem sovereignty. ‘The modem conception of sovereignty was first formulated in 
the latter part of the sixteenth century with reference to the new phenomenon of the 
territorial state.’8
Leo Gross, equally regards 1648 as the decisive cesura which divided the 
medieval world characterised by universalism and hierarchy from the ‘modem’ world 
characterised by pluriversalism and anarchy.
‘The Peace of Westphalia, for better or worse, marks the end of an epoch and the 
opening of another. It represents the majestic portal which leads from the old into the 
new world.’9
Subsequent international peace settlements - 1713, 1815/18, 1919, and 1948 - do not 
dislodge the underlying state-centric, positivistic, and voluntaristic logic of modem 
international law as originally laid down in Munster and Osnabriick, but merely refine 
and entrench its basic maxims in an evolutionary manner. The Peace of Westphalia, as 
Gross’ title indicates, lasted at least three hundred years, that is, until the time of his 
publication in 1948. His evaluation of the Treaty under the impact of World War II as
6 Morgenthau 1985, 293-4
7 Morgenthau 1985, 294.
8 Morgenthau 1985, 328.
9 Gross 1948, 28.
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a ‘disorganization of the public law of Europe’10 is followed by a call for a return to an 
organic conception of the international community of states, based on the objective 
natural law doctrines of ins gentium as formulated by Vittoria.11
While the evaluative premises of these scholars may not concern us here, it may 
be argued that these two canonical interpretations of 1648 - Morgenthau’s and Gross’, 
often cited and re-cited - have set to a considerable degree the parameters for the 
contemporary IR discourse on Westphalia’s essential modernity. Let us further 
reconstruct the transmission of the myth of 1648.
In Robert Gilpin’s scheme, which divides world-history into a pre-modern cycle 
of empires and a modern system of power-balancing among nation-states characterised 
by a succession of hegemonies, the break to modernity is located, though somewhat 
ambiguously, in the 17th Century.
‘(...) imperial orders constituted merely a system of states, not what Hedley Bull 
characterized as an international “society”. International conflict was at once economic, 
social, political, religious, and civilizational. This was true until the Treaty of 
Westphalia (...).’12
Henceforth, international relations are institutionally insulated from non-political 
determinants of foreign affairs and regulated by a succession of hegemons within a 
wider anarchical system of modem states.
For Kalevi Holsti 1648 marked equally a turning-point in the history of 
European international relations.
‘The Peace of Westphalia organized Europe on the principle of particularism. It 
represented a new diplomatic arrangement - an order created by states, for states - and 
replaced most of the legal vestiges of hierarchy, at the pinnacle of which were the Pope 
and the Holy Roman Emperor.’13
His later qualifications concerning the terms and implications of the Treaty do not so 
much challenge its modem anarchical consequences based on mutually recognised legal
10 Gross 1948, 29.
11 4 Instead of heralding the era of a genuine international community of nations subordinated to 
the rule of the law of nations, it led to the era of absolutist states, jealous of their territorial 
sovereignty to a point where the idea of an international community became an almost empty 
phrase and where international law came to depend upon the will of states more concerned with 
the preservation and expansion of their power than with the establishment of a rule of law.' 
Gross 1948, 38.
12Gilpin 1981, 111.
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sovereignty, than its failure to go beyond the mere establishment of a system of states - 
its failure to establish an effective system of peace. Westphalia ‘(...) did not provide a 
set of authoritative principles, effective system of governance, or conflict-resolving 
institutions upon and through which the aspiring dynasts of the postwar period could 
conduct their mutual relations on a pacific basis.’14
The ‘English School V Antedating Westphalia
While the English School views the Westphalian settlement less as a sudden 
rupture, but rather as one moment in a series of transformative processes which 
characterised the period between the Council of Constance (1414-18) and the Treaty 
of Utrecht (1713) on the road from pre-modem to modem international relations, it 
retains a strong sense of the centrality of 1648.
For Martin Wight, Westphalia marks not so much the beginning of the modem 
system of states, than its perfection after a long period of gestation and maturation.
‘If we say that the states-system becomes apparent in the later seventeenth century or 
early eighteenth century, we are left with the task of providing a description for the 
European system between the Council of Constance and the Congress of Westphalia. 
And however we describe it, this system has a greater resemblance to the states-system 
that succeeds it than it has to the medieval system that precedes it. The real break, 
prepared through the fourteenth century, becomes manifest in the fifteenth.'15
Thus, ‘at Westphalia the states-system does not come into existence: it comes of 
age.’16 While Wight’s chronology thus antedates the origins of the modem system of 
states to the late Renaissance period, we may note that even within his own 
interpretive framework an unresolved contradiction remains between his second 
(mutual recognition among states) and his third criterion (accepted hierarchy among 
them) of international modernity. While it remains unclear in which sense accepted 
hierarchy can be associated with the modem doctrine of formal legal inter-state 
equality - unless we commit a category error and introduce ‘Great Powers’ whose
13 Holsti 1991,25.
14 Holsti 1991,26.
15 Wight 1977b, 151.
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ranking is based on political power and not on law the movement from a hierarchical 
to an egalitarian principle, inscribed into the reciprocal recognition of sovereignty, is by 
his own reasoning not achieved before the Congress of Vienna. ‘From the fourteenth 
to the eighteenth centuries it was assumed that the states of Western Christendom fell 
into a hierarchy.’17 If this was the case, and we believe it was, would this not, at a 
minimum, qualify Westphalia’s pretension to inter-state modernity?
Holzgrefe also leaves little doubt that the origins of modem international 
relations theory have to be sought in the shift from late medieval and early Renaissance 
notions of a community of mankind {ius gentium) to absolutist - meaning for 
Holzgrefe: modem - notions of international public law {ius inter gentes) - gentes 
organised in sovereign states. The main criterion, adduced to determine this medieval- 
to-modem shift, is seen in the state’s monopoly of military force, from which exclusive 
international treaty-making powers and diplomatic representation are deduced. The 
decisive ‘transformation of European political relations’ occurred ‘between 1450 and 
1550’18 and finds international recognition in 1648.
‘By the mid-seventeenth century both the states’ de facto monopoly of military force and 
their exclusive right to exercise that force were widely established and accepted. Even 
the sovereign principalities of the historically anachronistic Holy Roman Empire had 
their right to wage war explicitly recognized in the Peace o f Westphalia f 9
Constructivist Perspectives: 1648 as the ‘Usual Marker'
While constructivist writers criticise Neorealism and Realism for failing to 
specify the determinants of fundamental geopolitical change, they nevertheless concur 
with them on the conventional chronology of the medieval-to-modem shift as they 
provide an identical description of the general properties of the Westphalian Order.
For John Gerard Ruggie, whose account revolves around the construction of 
modem exclusive territoriality, only one fundamental shift - disregarding for the 
moment his thoughts on a possible shift from a modem to a post-modern international
16 Wight 1977b, 152. Cf. also 1977a, 42-3. On Wight’s conflation of absolutist sovereignty 
with modem sovereignty cf. Wight 1966b, 20-21.
17 Wight 1977b, 135
18 Holzgrefe 1989,22.
19 Holzgrefe 1989, 16.
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system - in the structure of the international system has occurred, namely ‘the shift 
from the medieval to the modem international system’.20 However, in Ruggie’s case - 
setting him apart from the majority of historicising IR scholars the criteria adduced 
to account for this shift are not sought in the external properties of the system’s 
constitutive units, but in their internal properties, that is, first and foremost, in their 
internal property rights.
‘(...) The early modem redefinition of property rights and reorganization of political
space unleashed both interstate political relations and capitalist property relations.’21
That this transformation was not brought about by 19th Century England, but rather by 
17th Century France, is made clear by Ruggie’s citation of Perry Anderson. ‘The age in 
which “Absolutist” public authority was imposed was also simultaneously the age in 
which “absolute” private property was progressively consolidated.’22 Although the 
Peace of Westphalia is not elevated in Ruggie’s account to the position of the 
cataclysmic denouement of outdated medieval international practices, it is 
acknowledged as ‘the usual marker of the inception of modem international 
relations’,23 and remains as such unchallenged. In his theoretically informed narrative, 
the transformation in the organisation of political space is clearly situated in the 
Renaissance period,24 sometimes even earlier, viz. after the end of the Hundred Years’ 
War. The modem state, in Ruggie’s words, ‘was invented by the early modem 
Europeans. Indeed, it was invented by them twice, once in the leading cities of the 
Italian Renaissance and once again in the Kingdoms north of the Alps sometime 
thereafter.’25
20 Ruggie 1986, 141. Cf. also Kratochwil 1986. ‘The historical interest [sc., in the problem of 
the function of boundaries in territorial and nonterritorial social orders, B.T.] is rooted in the 
need for a better understanding of those changes that led to the emergence of the European state 
system in the 17th century, after the demise of the medieval empire.’ Kratochwil 1986, 51. ‘The 
Treaty of the Pyrenees (...) inaugurated the first official boundary in the modem sense (1659).’ 
Kratochwil 1986, 33.
21 Ruggie 1986, 148.
22 Ruggie 1986, 143. My own account of absolutism, developed in chapter 5, diverges therefore 
not only from Ruggie’s but also from Anderson’s.
23 Ruggie 1993, 167.
24 ‘It is the last of these space-time frames [sc. the Renaissance, B.T.] that concerns me here, 
because it also marks the transformation that produced the modem mode of organising political 
space; the system of territorial states.’ Ruggie 1993, 147.
25 Ruggie 1993, 166.
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Hendrik Spruyt’s study does equally not diverge from the conventional dating 
of the origins of the modem system of states.
‘At the end of the Middle Ages, the international system went through a dramatic 
transformation in which the crosscutting jurisdictions of feudal lords, emperors, kings, 
and popes started to give way to territorially defined authorities. The feudal order was 
gradually replaced by a system of sovereign states.’26
Three theses set him apart from previous writers. First, the causes for systems change 
have to be identified in the causes behind unit changes. Second, the rise o f the first 
modem state - France - antedated Westphalia by about two hundred years. Third, 
during the intervening period, once the non-territorial feudal organisation of political 
space as well as the hierarchic claims of Emperor and Pope had passed, institutional 
competition selected the sovereign state over and against synchronic rival political 
organisations (city-states, city-leagues, independent communes) as the most successful 
organiser of social life. Its success was finally internationally legally recognised in 
1648. ‘My discussion ends at about the time of the Peace of Westphalia (1648), which 
formally acknowledged a system of sovereign states.’27 In this perspective, the rise of 
the Capetian monarchy exemplifies the development of the modem, territorial, and 
sovereign state. He concurs with Joseph Strayer that ‘in France the basis of a 
sovereign, territorial state had been laid by the beginning of the fourteenth century’,28 
that is, even before the outbreak of the Hundred Years’ War. Thus, Spruyt agrees that 
1648 saw the international codification of the European-wide victory of the sovereign 
state after a long period of competitive institutional selection. The emergence of the 
first modem state is thus not dated in the absolutist period, but between the 14th and 
the 15th Centuries - a period which most historians would describe as experiencing, 
after the state-threatening crisis of the Anglo-French war, the consolidation of the 
French feudal monarchy.
Anthony Giddens sets his discussion of the Westphalian system of states within 
the context of the nature of the absolutist state. While choosing to abstain from
26 Spruyt 1994, 3.
27 Spruyt 1994, 27. Cf. also p.29 and his remarks on 1648 in footnote 125 on p. 257.
28 Spruyt 1994, 79. Cf also his qualification: ‘It would be too much to suggest that we find 
modem France in the 1300s. There was still a protracted war with England to come, years of 
religious turmoil, and domestic opposition by cities, nobility, and clergy. Nevertheless, we do 
already find the essential traits of modem statehood.’ Sic! Spruyt 1994, 79.
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theorising the transition from feudalism to absolutism in order to highlight the generic 
properties of the absolutist state in Weberian typological-comparative fashion, he is 
evasive in his assessment of its nature.
'In terms of the development of a novel type of reflexively monitored state system, then, 
absolutism began to prise open the discontinuities that separate the modem world from 
prior epochs. Absolutism still retained large elements of the feudal order that preceded it, 
and was more different from the nation-state system that was its heir than it is from 
feudalism.'29
While absolutism is thus regarded as essentially ‘transitional’30, modem sovereignty is 
held to be in place by the 17th Century and combined with the novel properties of a 
‘reflexively monitored state system’, defined by standing diplomacy, a congress system, 
bounded territoriality, and the balance of power. While we see thus only an incipient 
transition towards modem international relations, Giddens leaves no doubt that the 
further evolution towards geopolitical modernity is bound up with the (gradualist?) 
development of the French state. ‘Absolutist France is the first example of a state that 
played a directive role in European politics without becoming a transnational entity of 
the old type, and thus genuinely ushered in the beginnings of the modem era.’31 
However, without a processual theory of state formation which clearly sets out the 
criteria which allow us to define political and geopolitical modernity, Giddens’ account 
remains ambivalent.
Giovanni Arrighi: Westphalia under Dutch Hegemony
Arrighi’s account of the Peace of Westphalia is embedded in a wider 
Braudelian-Gramscian theory of the development of the modem capitalist world- 
economy. He starts from the assumption that the cycle of capital accumulation 
operative at the micro-level of the firm (MCM’) can be transposed to the macro-level 
of the international system in order to explain the dynamic behind a series of 
hegemonic cycles of capital accumulation on an international scale.32
29 Giddens, 1985, 93.
30 Giddens 1985,98.
31 Giddens 1985, 104.
32 Arrighi 1994, 6-9.
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The basic logic of these succeeding cycles can be summarised as follows: The 
rise of a hegemon is bound up with internal technological and organisational 
innovations which prompt a phase of material expansion. Inter-capitalist competition 
and declining returns to these innovations coupled with catching-up processes by 
rivalling powers lead to a displacement of the center of accumulation to finance, 
prompting a phase of financial expansion. This constitutes a shift from fixed and 
inflexible productive capital into flexible financial capital. The exhaustion of this 
second phase of capital accumulation and the rise of a nascent rival hegemon leads to 
systemic crises which are resolved by hegemonic war in favour of the new hegemon, 
which has successfully re-structured its technological and organisational mode of 
production and administration. A new cycle of hegemonic expansion and capital 
accumulation sets in.
Four systemic cycles of accumulation spanning modem history can be 
distinguished, operated by a succession of hegemons, which each time define a ‘long 
century’, change the structure of international relations, and expand the geographical 
scale of the capitalist world-system.
‘A Genoese cycle, from the fifteenth to the early seventeenth centuries; a Dutch cycle, 
from the late sixteenth century throughout most of the eighteenth century; a British 
cycle, from the latter half of the eighteenth century through the early twentieth century; 
and a US cycle, which began in the late nineteenth century and has continued into the 
current phase of financial expansion.’33
This scheme rests on a very distinct Braudelian definition of capitalism. Capitalism 
does not refer to a specific economic relation of production between capital and wage- 
labour, but refers to the ‘top layer of the hierarchy of the world of trade - a 
monopolistic ‘anti-market’ - from which a ‘middle layer of the market economy’ and 
the ‘bottom layer of material life’ are distinguished.34 Capitalism proper denotes 
exclusively the former. This notion of capitalism is understood to require state power 
(a fusion of state and capital), so that the concentration, accumulation, and expansion 
of capital is inherently a political process mediated by inter-state competition for 
mobile capital. The expansion of capital is thus a distinctly political and geopolitical 
process, which implicates the structuring and restructuring of the system of states,
33 Arrighi 1994, 6.
34 Arrighi 1994, 24.
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predicated on a capitalist hegemon, which constitutes a bloc of governmental and 
business organisations. In this perspective, ‘the really important transition that needs to 
be elucidated is not that from feudalism to capitalism but from scattered to 
concentrated capitalist power.’35 While this account evokes Weberian themes of the 
state as a ‘power-container’ which is the precondition for the successful expansion of 
capitalism, it introduces furthermore the Gramscian idea of hegemonic power.
Each international system is thus not simply structured by inter-state 
competition for mobile capital, but requires a ‘world hegemon’ which defines the rules 
of international conduct, order, and minimal co-operation. Thus, hegemonic systemic 
cycles of accumulation are not simply defined by the rise and decline of states within 
the framework of an ivariant system of states, but imply that the very organisational 
structure, mode of operation, and geographical scope of the system is restructured 
under the aegis of each new hegemonic leader. Hegemony, in the Gramscian sense, 
implies thus not only coercion, but also leadership of ‘the system of states in a desired 
direction’, so as to pursue a perceived ‘general interest’, both among domestic subjects 
as well as among a group of states, as well.36
While Arrighi’s account is open to many fundamental criticisms - his definition 
of capitalism, his prioritisation of the logic of circulation in abstraction from the logic 
of production, his failure to theorise technological innovations in relation to the sphere 
of production, his failure to relate social change to class conflict, his failure to theorise 
the domestic causes underlying hegemonic rise and decline, and his bias towards 
theorising the nature of the pre-British international system predominantly with respect 
to the alleged hegemonic role played by oligarchic merchant republics rather than by 
the preponderance of dynastic-absolutist states -, his attempt to explain the 
Westphalian moment fails even on his own terms.
While the alleged hegemonic role of the Italian city-states, supervising a proto­
capitalist world system, is already qualified by Arrighi’s admission that it remained 
‘enmeshed’ in a medieval feudal world and ‘never attempted individually or collectively 
a purposive transformation of the medieval system of rule’, the United Provinces are
35 Arrighi 1994, 11.
36 Arrighi 1994, 29.
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assigned the task to ‘transform the European system of rule to suit the requirements of 
the accumulation of capital on a world scale.’37
“It was under these circumstances [sc. the intensification of the European power struggle 
between France and the Habsburg Imperial House, B.T.], that the United Provinces 
became hegemonic by leading a large and powerful coalition of dynastic states towards 
the liquidation of the medieval system of rule and the establishment of the modem inter­
state system. (...) This reorganization of political space in the interest of capital 
accumulation marks the birth not just of the modem inter-state system, but also of 
capitalism as world system.’38
This account is questionable. First of all, to what extent was the Thirty Years’ 
War a hegemonic war? Its depiction as a hegemonic war which ushered in the decline 
of the preceding hegemon - the Italian city-states - and the rise of the new hegemon - 
the Dutch provinces - does not square with the real nature of the power struggle 
among two blocs of territorial-absolutist states, amongst which France emerged 
victorious. The story of Dutch independence was minor in relation to the conflicts 
which re-structured relations between the German Empire, France, the House of 
Habsburg, and Sweden.
Second, to which extent did Holland consciously manage the transition from 
‘systemic chaos’ to ‘ordered anarchy’ so as to become world-hegemonic? While the 
Dutch provinces achieved, of course, independence, it does not follow that hegemony 
in Arrighi’s interpretation of the Gramscian term, implying the adoption and imposition 
of a new mode of international organisation and governance, was achieved and 
enforced by Holland. Holland, by Arrighi’s own admission, never reaped the fruits of 
its alleged world-hegemony. ‘The Dutch never governed the system they had created. 
As soon as the Westphalia System was in place, the United Provinces began losing its 
recently acquired world-power status.’39 The series of post-Westphalian Anglo-Dutch 
commercial wars and Louis XIV’s repeated attempts to conquer Holland certainly 
minimise Arrighi’s over-optimistic characterisation of 17th century Holland. If France 
and England failed to subjugate the Dutch, Holland certainly failed to impose its 
ascribed world-hegemony on them. The two dominant post-Westphalian powers
37 Arrighi 1994, 39/40.
38 Arrighi 1994, 43 and 44.
39 Arrighi 1994, 47.
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became, of course, France and Sweden which came to supervise the Treaty provisions 
in their quasi-hegemonic roles as guaranteeing powers (Garantiemdchte).
Third, to which degree was Holland’s rise bound up with innovations in the 
field of production and organisation - Arrighi’s first phase of material expansion? 
Holland, as Arrighi explicates himself, emerged as a European power not so much 
because of innovations in productive technology, than because of its ability to 
monopolise the carrying-trade in the Atlantic and the Baltic, so as to establish itself as 
a major entrepot40 In this sense, Holland’s rise was not predicated on any internal 
productive innovations, than the result of commercial profit-taking. Those 
organisational advantages which Arrighi adduces - military reforms - testify not so 
much to Holland’s rise as a capitalist power, than to its ability to turn its trading profits 
into military innovations, protecting and re-producing its monopolistic control over the 
circuits of seaborne long-distance trade. This political response was prompted by the 
persisting logic of political accumulation pursued by its dynastic-absolutist 
territorialising neighbours.
Holland’s post-Westphalian hegemony, in short, is a myth. It neither re­
structured international relations in the direction of a modern system of states, nor did 
it change the age-old commercial logic of unequal exchange sustained by military 
power.
Stephen Krasner’s Dissolution o f Westphalia into Historical Contingency
Curiously, for a discipline which traces its scientific pedigree back to 1648 and 
which celebrated its 350th anniversary at its annual convention in 1998, there is only 
one serious theoretical engagement and detailed historical interpretation of the Peace 
of Westphalia itself. It yields rather startling conclusions.
‘The conventional view that the Peace of Westphalia of 1648 marks a turning point in 
history is wrong. The Peace of Westphalia was not a clear break with the past: political 
entities with exclusive control over a well-defined territory existed well before the Peace, 
and feudal and universal institutions, which were eventually extinguished, continued well 
after it.'41
40 Arrighi 1994, 133ff.
41 Krasner 1993, 235.
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One merit of Krasner’s analysis lies in uncovering the essentially medieval, backward- 
looking character of the Treaties.
‘The provisions of the Peace itself reflected medieval conceptualizations more than 
modem ones. [Sc. They, B.T.] dealt primarily with feudal issues such as hereditary 
succession in specific German principalities, the system by which the Holy Roman 
emperor was elected, representation in the diet and imperial courts of the empire, and 
fiefdoms in northern Germany for the victorious king of Sweden.’42
Another merit lies in unsettling the conventional claim that the Treaties established 
internal sovereignty of the signatories. Rather, 1648 laid down the rules for a system of 
interstate as well as inner-state peace. ‘The treaties did not sanction the right of rulers 
to do whatever they pleased with regard to the practice of religion within their own 
territories. The Peace dictated a set of internal practices for much of the Holy Roman 
Empire (...).’43
However, Krasner fails to draw out the theoretical implications of his empirical 
corrections. First, Krasner tends to dissolve IR theory into history. His observation 
that ‘modem’ institutions of state sovereignty antedated and that feudal institutions of 
political domination outlasted the Westphalian settlement does not absolve him from 
theorising these regional differences in the domestic structure of pre- and post- 
Westphalian political communities. These differences are too easily ascribed to the 
‘untidiness’ of history and the dyachronic temporalities of regionally diverse 
developmental trajectories in state-formations. Three questions impose themselves. 
First, what was the generative grammar of feudal forms of political authority? Second, 
what is the generative grammar of modem sovereignty? Third, how can we theorise 
the regionally diverging and dyachronic passages of European state-formation? As 
with pre-modem forms of political authority,44 Krasner fails to identify the generative 
grammar of modem sovereignty. In the period of the transition to a modem system of 
states, ‘heterogeneity and irregular change, rather than the working out of some deep 
generative grammar, have characterized institutional developments in Europe.’45 This 
neglect goes hand in hand with a denial that regionally specific transitions from
42 Krasner 1993, 236. Cf. also ‘In sum, the Peace of Westphalia was not a decisive break with 
the past. It codified existing practices more than it created new ones.’ Krasner 1993, 246.
43 Krasner 1993, 244.
44 The medieval world did not possess ‘a deep generative grammar’. Krasner 1993, 257.
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medieval to early modem to modem forms of organising international political 
authority and geopolitical space can be theorised.
‘Chance and power, fortuna and virtu, launched local historical trajectories, especially 
in England and northern Italy, that led in practice to political entities that could assert 
practical control over a given territory.’46
Although allusions are made to the two grand macro-sociological paradigms of the 
emergence of the modem state - the military technodeterminism thesis and the 
commercial development thesis -,47 in Krasner’s perspective, we see four largely 
undifferentiated centuries of contestation and counter-contestation of sovereignty, so 
that the setting up of the European Community, for example, obeys virtually the same 
logic as earlier historical attempts of transcending the principle of state sovereignty. 
Consequently, the article ends thus with a call for abdicating large-scale theorisation of 
the sources of systems change and a methodological retreat into historical contingency. 
‘No deep structure is evident in the heterogeneous and fluid character of political order 
from the Middle Ages to the present.’48
Second, his concluding statement that the positive content of sovereignty was 
and is always a ‘contested’, and ‘contingent and pliant’49 social practice, and his 
inference that the Peace settlement therefore is over-valued in its foundational 
significance, rests on a serious conceptual error. At Westphalia, so Krasner, there has 
been no agreement
‘on the scope of authority that could be exercised by sovereign states. The positive 
content of sovereignty, the areas over which the state can legitimately command, has 
always been contested. The claim to exclusive control over a given territory has been 
challenged both in theory and in practice by transborder flows and interference in the 
internal affairs of states.’50
In a related article, Krasner classifies these transborder flows and interferences, 
compromising Westphalia, as conventions, contracting, coercion, and imposition.51 
The historical examples adduced to compromise a strict conception of ‘Westphalian’
i
45 Krasner 1993, 247.
46 Krasner 1993, 257.
47 Krasner 1993, 246 and 261.
48 Krasner 1993, 261.
49 Krasner 1993, 238.
50 Krasner 1993, 236.
51 Krasner 1995, 116.
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sovereignty as exclusive control over and autonomy within a territory mistake both, 
contraventions based on force (coercion and imposition) as well as consensual 
interstate practices (conventions and contracting), for fundamental challenges to the 
very principle of sovereignty. This is questionable.
Logically, with regard to contraventions (coercion, imposition), these only 
qualify as such on the basis of a prior multilateral agreement on the principle of 
sovereignty as a ground-rule in interstate relations. To draw an analogy, a criminal act 
is only recognised, penalised, and de-legitimated as such on the basis of a prior inter- 
subjective agreement on a positive code of penal law. An infringement of the penal 
code does not call it into question, but rather affirms it. Social practices need a prior 
politicisation or codification for a subsequent de-legitimation of deviant behaviour. 
That contraventions occur and re-occur, does not invalidate the general principle but 
rather activates it.
With regard to Krasner’s second class of sovereignty-compromising social 
practices (conventions and contracting), the same logical exercise holds. The character 
and consequences of international conventions and contracting depends on a prior 
domestic definition of the scope of sovereignty. In other words, the effect of 
‘transborder flows’ and ‘interference in the internal affairs of the state’ depends upon 
whether a state has agreed to allow for these practices. Again, their mere existence 
only acknowledges state policies in the form of controlled - and in principle revocable 
and reversible - delegation of political powers to international organisations or other 
bilateral or multilateral bodies. Conventions and contracting are outcomes of the 
practical domestic definition of state sovereignty, and do, as such, not undermine the 
basic constitutive principle, but are predicated upon it.
•  •  52Sovereignty, then, does not mean and has never meant, as Krasner insinuates , 
‘autonomy’ nor does or did it imply an internationally recognised codification of its 
‘positive content’. If it was so, there could not be international politics. Krasner 
commits a classical category error which lies in conflating sovereignty as a practical 
category with sovereignty as a constitutive category, that is, failing to distinguish 
between sovereignty as public policy and sovereignty as a constitutive rule of 
international order.
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Conclusion: Towards a Historical Sociology of the Making of the Westphalian 
Systsem of States
To conclude, whether we look at neorealist, realist, ‘English School’, 
constructivist, or world-systemic approaches, or whether we look at writings of the 
first IR generation or at contemporary texts, we find recurring agreement on 
Westphalia’ essentially modern character. The only notable exception - disregarding 
for a moment Rosenberg’s objections - is provided by Krasner’s interventions. 
However, by arguing for the essential simultaneity of modem and medieval political 
institutions before, during and after Westphalia, Krasner fails to advance both, 
coherent explanations of regional developmental diversity as well as ‘generative 
grammars’ of medieval, absolutist, and modem forms of geopolitical order and their 
respective ‘international’ relations. Indicatively, although in most of the preceding 
readings, strikingly pre-modem concepts abound - territorial monarchy, absolutism, 
mercantilism, dynasticism, wars of succession -, they did not prompt any of these 
eminent scholars to probe their time-bound historical meanings in their implications for 
IR, nor to uncover their social determinants. What unites the authors discussed is one 
common basic error, namely the conflation of absolutist sovereignty with modem 
sovereignty. Converging interpretations of the Westphalian Peace settlement as 
inaugurating the era of modem inter-state relations have led to the construction of a 
disciplinary foundation myth.
The reason for IR’s misinterpretation of Westphalia’s modem character lies in 
the application of misleading criteria. It is, as Justin Rosenberg has argued in his 
critique of Martin Wight,53 the external marks of sovereignty, rather than the inner 
nature of Westphalia’s constituent parties to the Treaty, which led to the discipline’s 
failure of 1648’s correct conceptualisation and periodisation. In Wight’s case, it 
appears that this failure is bound up with an approach which puts social-scientific
52 ‘The Westphalian state is a system of political authority based on territory and autonomy.’ 
Krasner 1995, 45.
53 Rosenberg 1994, 43.
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model-building before historical investigation, thereby reversing the logic of historical 
research. Wight first constructs six internal marks of ‘our states-system’ - ‘sovereign 
states, their mutual recognition, their accepted hierarchy, their means of regular 
communication, their framework of law, and their means of defending their common 
interests’54 - and then proceeds to ‘scan’ European history for their first appearance, 
dating it between the Council of Constance (1414-18) and the Congress of Utrecht 
(1712-13). It is not Wight’s choice of events which should raise doubts here - indeed, 
they are plausible, yet not compelling, candidates for satisfying Wight’s criteria -, 
rather it is the very historical indeterminacy which such approach invites. For, by 
Wight’s definition, as Rosenberg noted, the internal marks of the modem system of 
states are equally discernible in ‘ancient Greece, China in the period of the Wairing 
States or India before the Moghul conquests’.55 In order to avoid such indeterminacy, 
Rosenberg thus called for a fundamental shift in the mode of inquiry from the formal 
attributes of systems of states to the social nature of its constitutive actors and their 
international relations, thus allowing a clearer grasp of the unique identities of 
respective geopolitical orders.
The wider sources of this misinterpretation are twofold. On the one hand, IR 
readings of Westphalia and early modem politics in general rely on largely uncritical 
acceptance and adoption of the traditional historiographical literature on absolutism. 
This literature, as laid out in chapter 5, is today largely contested, if not altogether 
outdated. On the other hand, IR approaches - irrespective of whether we are looking at 
the Realist or at the post-Realist literature - tend to operate with a theory of the 
modem state deriving predominantly from Max Weber and a theory of the formation of 
the modem state deriving predominantly from Otto Hintze. These classical sociological 
interpretations had, however, already wrongly informed the older historiographical 
tradition.
In their readings of the historiographical literature on absolutism as seen 
through the lenses of Weber’s and Hintze’s writings on the modem state, IR scholars 
tend to focus exclusively on the external marks of sovereignty (state monopoly in the 
means of violence, exclusive territoriality, exclusive external representation (treaty- 
making powers)) to the neglect of its internal characteristics. Max Weber, however,
54 Wight 1977b, 129.
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did not only put forward an external definition of the state revolving around the public 
monopoly of the means of violence, he also developed an internal definition of it, 
revolving around the proprietary separation of state bureaucrats from the means of 
administration and violence. Whereas progress towards the former marks was made in 
the leading Western polities by the 17th Century, the latter marks (with the exception of 
England) were only achieved much later, usually in the 19th Century. It is precisely the 
abstraction from Weber’s internal definition of the modem state which misled both, the 
older historiographical tradition on absolutism as well as the contemporary IR 
discourse on the absolutist epoch. The chronological disjunction in the determination 
of the emergence of the modem state in Europe, resulting from the non-distinction 
between external and internal sovereignty, has created an optical illusion. This is IR’s 
illusion; this is its foundation myth. However, if we take Weber’s internal definition 
seriously and re-interpret it on the basis of Karl Marx’s focus on the relations of 
exploitation in the form of specific social property relations, we will be in a position to 
come to an adequate understanding of the radically pre-modem character of the 
absolutist state and the meaning of 1648 for a re-periodisation of state-systems.
This research program requires however a broader inquiry into the overall 
development of the Westphalian system of states. The real significance of 1648, while 
marking a qualitative breakthrough in the organisation of international relations over 
and against medieval geopolitics without constituting a turning-point towards 
international modernity, can only be disclosed when embedded in the wider historical 
continuum that spans the transformation from medieval to early modem international 
relations.
55 Rosenberg 1994, 44.
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Chapter Two
Geopolitical Relations in the European Middle Ages: History and Theory
‘One thing is clear: the Middle Ages could not live on 
Catholicism, nor could the ancient world on politics. On the 
contrary, it is the manner in which they gained their livelihood 
which explains why in one case politics, in the other case 
Catholicism, played the chief part.’56
Introduction
After Ruggie’s invocation of the ‘medieval case’, the European Middle Ages 
attracted closer attention by IR scholars as a ‘testing-ground’ for established IR 
theories. Two sets of questions emerged. On the one hand, a comparative approach 
sought to pass judgement on whether medieval geopolitical organisation followed the 
modem logic of international anarchy or whether it presented a geopolitical order 
sufficiently distinct to warrant theoretical innovation. On the other hand, a processual 
approach, interested in the origins of the modem system of states, came to inquire into 
the medieval roots of the modem state and the logic behind its post-medieval 
universalisation in form of a global system of states.
The following two chapters reflect this double problematique by setting out a 
coherent theoretical framework which is able to spell out the systemic logic of 
medieval geopolitical order (chapter 3) and to identify the patterns of agency which 
drove the medieval world beyond its own limits (chapter 4).
This chapter, elaborating on Robert Brenner’s theory of social property 
relations,37 offers a distinct approach on how to theorise changing geopolitical orders. 
The thesis is that the nature and dynamics of international systems are governed by the
56 Marx [1867] 1976, 176.
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character of their constitutive units, which, in turn, rests on specific property relations 
prevailing within them. Medieval ‘international’ relations and their alterations over the 
centuries preceding the rise of capitalism have to be interpreted on the basis of 
changing social property relations. The dynamics of medieval change, however, are 
bound up with contradictory strategies of reproduction between and within the two 
major classes, the lords and the peasantry.58
The argument is that due to peasant possession in the means of subsistence, the 
feudal nobility enforced access to peasant produce by political and military means. 
Since every lord reproduced himself not only politically but also individually on his 
lordship, control over the means of violence was not monopolised by the state, but 
oligopolistically enjoyed by a landed nobility. Consequently, the medieval ‘state’ 
constituted a political community of lords with the right to armed resistance. 
Interlordly relations were therefore inherently non-pacified and competitive.59 Forced 
redistribution of peasant surplus and competition over land occurred along three axes: 
(1) between peasants and lords, (2) among lords, and (3) between the collectivity of 
lords (the feudal ‘state’) and external polities. Consequently, the type of geopolitical 
system which emerged was one of constant military rivalry over territory and labour 
between lords, and within and between their ‘states’. The geopolitical dynamic of 
medieval Europe followed the zero-sum logic of territorial conquests. The form and 
dynamic of the medieval ‘international’ system arise directly out of the generative 
structure of social property relations.
The theoretical implications of the social property approach for the discipline of 
IR go decisively beyond the case study of the Middle Ages. We suggest that its 
explanatory value and critical purchase is applicable to all geopolitical orders, be they 
tribal, feudal, absolutist, or capitalist in character. In each case, a definite set of 
property relations generates specific geopolitical authority relations governing and 
setting limits to inter-actor rationalities. By implication, we aspire not simply to trace 
the correspondence between property forms and international systems. We seek to 
uncover the dynamics of these systems in class-related strategies of reproduction, both
57 Brenner 1977, 1985a and 1985b, 1986 and 1987. For a related argument in IR, see 
Rosenberg 1994.
58 The term lord (nobility) refers generically to all members of the land-holding ruling class, 
secular and ecclesiastical.
59 Brenner 1985b and 1986.
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within polities and between polities. Property relations explain institutional structures 
that, in turn, condition conflictual relations of appropriation explaining the dynamics of 
change. ‘Internal’ changes in property relations, themselves subject to ‘external’ 
pressures, alter external behaviour. This perspective combines a substantive theory of 
social and international inter-action with a theory of sociopolitical structure. This, we 
suggest, should be achieved by a full historically-informed account of the subtle 
interplay between the constraining structures of property and authority relations and 
the consequences of goal-oriented, yet bounded and antagonistic, agency which 
animate and change these social relations.60 Therewith, we offer a starting point for a 
theory of large-scale geopolitical transformation.
Such a notion of social change seeks to recast the debate on whether 
economics ‘determines’ politics or the domestic the international or vice versa.61 The 
problem is that reflection on the interrelation between these spheres or ‘levels’ only 
sets in after their historical constitution, that is, after they have become differentiated in 
capitalist societies. The common methodological temptation is to play out one reified 
sphere against another - archetypically either an economistic Marxist or a Weberian 
politicist account - without asking how they emerged in the first place and how they 
flow back into the reproduction of society as a whole. Similarly, analyses of pre­
capitalist geopolitical systems suffer from projecting the familiar vocabulary of states 
and markets, the domestic and the international, into differently structured pasts.62 
Much of the following argument revolves around the non-distinction between these 
spheres under medieval property relations, suggesting the analytical obsolescence of 
contemporary state-centric IR concepts. We argue, in turn, that the modem 
differentiation of society into these spheres is intimately related to the genesis of 
capitalist private property - a process of social struggle which left the direct producer 
(the peasant) propertyless.
For if, as we suggest, conditional property defines medieval authority relations 
and geopolitics, then modem private property defines capitalist sovereignty and the
60 For the epistemological issues involved see Teschke and Heine 1996.
61 Classically discussed in Gourevitch 1978; recently Thomson 1994, 17.
62 On the ‘disembedding’ of the capitalist market from socio-political ‘normative’ principles, 
see Polanyi 1944. From a conservative angle, see Brunner’s critique of the modem ‘disjunctive 
mode of thinking’, Brunner 1992, chap. 2; for the correct interpretation, see Wood 1995.
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contemporary international order.63 Briefly, by separating peasants from their means of 
subsistence and establishing a free labour market, a ‘free’, contractual, and ‘purely 
economic’ labour relation was created for the first time in history between producer 
and employer. On the basis of absolute private property and ‘free’ wage labour, the 
labour relation can in principle dispense with direct political coercion. Economy and 
state become differentiated. Capitalist sovereignty - the pooling of political power in an 
‘abstract’ state - marks the constitutive unit of contemporary international politics. The 
type of international system that emerges and its geopolitical logic exhibit a completely 
different pattern to its medieval and absolutist predecessors. After the violence-ridden 
historical constitution of the capitalist system of states, international accumulation 
among capitalist societies, because it occurs primarily between private economic 
actors, is logically no longer directly and necessarily tied to a state-led politico-military 
and territorial process.
On the basis of changing social property relations, we contest not only the 
explanatory relevance of ahistorical and systemically induced rational-actor 
assumptions of neorealist provenance, but also Realism’s methodological 
individualism, be it of critical-Kantian lineage or of classical Machiavellian persuasion. 
We also seek to expose the limits of constructivist interpretations revolving around the 
inter-subjectively established meanings of social phenomena and the power of 
discourses. The theory of social property relations mounts furthermore a direct critique 
of Weberian and current Neo-Weberian historical sociology - which has made 
important inroads into IR -64 and of some of the more determinist, economistic and 
structuralist versions of Marxism. Finally, our outline of how medieval property and 
authority structures and dominant forms of agency are dynamically related presents a 
substantive alternative to Alexander Wendt’s formal adaptation of structuration 
theory.65
63 Feudal conditional property is distinguished from absolute private property in that it requires 
the performance of specified political services.
64 Discussed in Halliday 1994, 74-93 and 124-46; Jarvis 1989.
65 Wendt 1987 and 1992.
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The chapter is divided into five major sections. Section one assesses the more 
recent IR debate on the Middle Ages. Against the background of Max Weber and Karl 
Marx’s theories of feudalism, section two provides a theoretical foundation for the 
constitutive nexus between the political and the economic in feudal society, mediated 
by relations of exploitation and institutionalised in property forms. Section three offers 
a positive account of how the agency-and-structure problem can be addressed in the 
framework of medieval society by demonstrating the dialectical nexus between 
medieval conditional property and resulting contradictory strategies of reproduction 
amongst the two major classes, characterising medieval ‘international’ society as a 
‘culture of war’. Section four proceeds to submit a phenomenology of medieval 
‘international’ institutions (state and domination, territory and frontiers, war and 
peace) by systematically relating their political form  to their social content. Section 
five seeks to clarify diverging structuring principles of geopolitical organisation in the 
early, high and late Middle Ages. The chapter concludes with a reflection on the 
theoretical relevance of social property relations for post-feudal international systems 
and the emergence of the European system of states.
The IR Debate: The Middle Ages between Neorealism, “Critical Theory”, and 
Constructivism
Ruggie’s critique of Neorealism provoked a neorealist reply by Markus Fischer, 
which incited a sharp constructivist critique by Rodney Bruce Hall and Friedrich 
Kratochwil. This was followed by a short rejoinder by Fischer, an almost simultaneous 
constructivist interpretation by Hendrik Spruyt, and a further constructivist 
substantiation in a separate article by Hall.66
Let us first look at Fischer’s attempt to validate the explanatory power of 
Neorealism in its application to the Middle Ages. His article intends to be an 'empirical 
contribution' to the debate between Neorealism and 'Critical Theory' in which the latter 
is held to sustain the view that a 'normative discourse of understandings and values
66 Fischer 1992; Hall and Kratochwil 1993; Fischer 1993; Spruyt 1994a and 1994b, 34-57; 
Hall 1997.
43
entails corresponding practices1.67 Medieval moral doctrine, cosmological conceptions 
of order, the code of chivalry, and the rites of vassalic homage are invariably taken to 
constitute such a normative discourse. They are construed as prescribing political 
unity, functional co-operation, communal relations and modes of just conflict 
resolution among feudal actors. Based on an analysis of relations among nobles in 11th 
Century Maconnais - a region in southern Burgundy - Fischer concludes that violence, 
self-help, and power-balancing were endemic. The overriding structural logic of 
anarchy ensured that feudal conflict-units 'in essence behaved much like modem 
states'.68 The claim was dismissed that differences in the constitutive units of a system 
and communal trans-actor discourses were consequential for alternative forms of 
geopolitical behaviour.
Fischer’s article suffered from the start in that the author was not prepared to 
meet Ruggie’s challenge of showing how the ‘medieval-to-modem shift’ was to be 
comprehended within the Neorealist grammar. Yet, even on its own terms, the piece 
has since been duly criticised,69 and it seems that only Fischer’s trivialised perception 
of Critical Theory allows for the possibility of simply confronting utopian 'medieval 
discourses' with more material 'actual practices'.70 Hall and Kratochwil’s critique, for 
example, exposes particularly well Fischer’s methodological sleight of hand. Yet, their 
critique should be read with care for it relies on an overly pronounced constmctivist 
reading of the self-perceptions of feudal actors. For example, it does not suffice to 
denounce, through the intermediation of such not undisputed authorities as Norman 
Cantor and Susan Reynolds, Marc Bloch’s writings as ‘structuralist’ and crypto- 
Marxist, only to discard them in favour of the mentalite-paradigm. What is more, Hall 
and Kratochwil’s reply is itself riddled with questionable assertions. In spite of their 
dismissal of the form of structuralism that is allegedly pursued by Bloch, they have no
67 Fischer 1992, 427-28.
68 Fischer 1992, 428.
69 Hall and Kratochwil 1993, 479-91; Ruggie 1993, 150.
70 In Habermas' work the very possibility for 'undistorted communication' as a logic of social 
action arises historically with the advent of a specifically bourgeois 'public sphere', which he 
traced to the experiences of 17th and 18th Century England and France. Even though the 
institutional parameters are then set for open discourses, their effect on politics, not to speak of 
international politics, is no foregone conclusion. Habermas explicitly denied the Middle Ages a 
public sphere in the sense of a pre-political locus of reasoned argumentation other than being a 
forum for noble ostentation. Habermas 1989, 5-9.
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qualms in supporting the work of Georges Duby, who is approvingly cited for noting 
that
‘thirty or forty successive generations have imagined social perfection in the form of 
trifunctionality. This mental representation has withstood all the pressure of history. It is 
a structure.’71
However, if what IR scholars should really be interested in is ‘to explain variation,’72 
then constants such as the mentality structures of thirty or forty successive generations 
will logically drop out of any theory of social change. Even if its was only a metaphor, 
how credible is Duby’s suggestion that ‘an image of the social order endured in France 
for a millennium’?73 Since the mentalite or the conventionality of intersubjective claims 
constitutes for Constructivists the main ‘variable’ for historical development, are we to 
infer that nothing ever changed in France for a thousand years? Hall and Kratochwil 
are less bothered by structuralism per se than by the focus on the structures o f  
exploitation and domination in the feudal agrarian economy from which ideological 
structures are abstracted.
This points to a deeper theoretical failure in Hall’s constructrivist account of 
moral authority as a power resource in feudal Europe. As in Fischer’s study,74 Hall 
mentions the preceding terminal crisis of the late Carolingian Empire during the Feudal 
Revolution that ushered in a new mode of exploitation based on serfdom and banal 
lordships, but it is not theorised in its consequences for the profound revolution in 
monastic and papal ideological orientation and moral lore.75 Theorisation only sets in 
after the real reasons of this ecclesiastical redefinition of meaning have been narratively 
externalised. What would have been required is precisely what Hall demands - namely, 
a prior understanding of ‘a situationally specific or historically contingent structure of 
coconstituted identities and interests’ - but fails to provide.76 It is difficult to see how 
these identities and interests and their changes can be determined without a systematic 
exposition of the conflicts over clerical sources of income derived from lordships,
71 Hall and Kratochwil 1993, 485.
72 Hall and Kratochwil 1993, 489.
73 Duby 1980, 5. What Duby is really concerned with in his Three Orders is the establishment 
of a new ‘mode of production’ during the crisis of the feudal Revolution around the year 1000 
and the concomitant ideological changes by the clergy in its wake. See Duby 1980, 153.
74 Fischer 1992,440.
75 Hall 1997, 605-6.
76 Hall 1997, 594.
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endowments, and tithes. Constructivists, precisely because the social and material 
reasons for changes in identities and interests remain outside their methodological 
purview, lack the theoretical tools with which to understand the emergence, 
dominance, and demise of a specific discourse. If Fischer is faulted for drawing on a 
one-sided literature stressing interests and structures, it is not quite clear why we 
should fare better with an equally one-sided literature stressing subjectivities such as, 
for example, the religious motivations of the crusaders. Maintaining that
‘a desire for a share of the spoils on the part of the many of the crusaders is something
for which we were able to find little support in the crusading literature we studied,77
has perhaps more to do with the selection than with anything else. There is, in fact, an 
extensive corpus of writings78 which neither tries to explain the Crusades abstractly in 
terms of pure greed nor pure religious motives, but seeks to combine the religious 
moment with an account of preceding land-scarcity, noble overpopulation and 
changing aristocratic property and family structures in the late Frankish heartlands 
around the millennium. These pressures intertwined with the interests of the post- 
Gregorian papacy which came to appear as a major international actor in the 11th 
Century. Religion cannot be a sufficient cause to explain why the Frankish knights of 
the mid-11th Century set out to conquer the European non-Frankish periphery, for the 
governing classes of England and Ireland were already Christianised when the Franko- 
Norman lords came, dispossessed, and killed them.
A short excursion into the history of inter-noble relations suggests that 
Fischer's case-study marks a conjunctural episode in the 'international relations' of 
medieval Europe - a power vacuum which constitutes simultaneously the transition 
from the early to the high Middle Ages in the Frankish successor principalities. It is by 
no means representative of the Middle Ages as a whole. The following explanation of 
the competitive conduct of Burgundian castellans is not grounded in the mechanical to 
and fro between conflict-units, but in the concrete reproductive needs of lordships in 
times of heightened economic hardship.79 At the same time - contra Hall and 
Kratochwil - such a perspective allows us to see how the emergence of a specific
77 Hall and Kratochwil 1993, 488 [my italics, B.T.].
78 Cf. footnote 83.
79 Many lords turned into castellans in the 10th and 11th Centuries as they fortified their manors 
in form of the small, but high stone-castle which supported their regime of terror.
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ecclesiastical discourse is related to sharpened inter-noble altercations in the 11th 
Century in the old Carolingian heartlands, i.e. the lands between and around the Rhine 
and Rhone rivers.
A critical-theoretical perspective80 on the doctrine of the Three Orders81 would 
interpret it as a reaction by the local clergy to an attack on its very bases of income 
brought about by increasing lordly encroachments on ecclesiastical lands and 
treasures.82 The dissemination of the lore of the trifunctional order presented the 
conscious policy of an economically threatened part of the ruling class that was not 
arms-bearing and therefore defenceless over and against marauding lords. If the 
motivation was all too clear, its intention was to pacify lordly aggressiveness internally 
and to deflect it into external conquest. This occurred not only in the form of the 
Crusades, but also in the simultaneous outward movements of the Norman Conquest 
of England, the Spanish Reconquista, and the German Eastern Settlement, processes 
of noble land grabbing which all began in the 11th Century.83 Lordly proclivities to turn 
into lawless castellans have themselves to be set in the wider crisis of the 10th and 11th 
Centuries in the Frankish heartlands of Europe. The ‘Feudal Revolution’ - in 
medievalist parlance - sealed the demise of the Carolingian Empire.84 This 
continentwide crisis was in turn itself an outcome of the late Carolingian monarchs’ 
inability to provide their aristocratic followers with the wherewithal of expanded 
personal reproduction as the opportunities for external conquest dried up from the 
middle of the 9th Century onward.85 As a counter-strategy, dissatisfied lords began 
usurping formerly public offices, turning them into patrimonies that implied 
hereditability, and enserfing a hitherto free peasantry. Such privatisation of the 
formerly kingly power of command - the ban - by innumerable minor lords broke not
80 Our understanding of Critical Theory derives from the early Frankfurt School. Horkheimer 
1972.
81 In the 11th Century, monks formulated the doctrine that society was functionally divided into 
three orders. Knights fought, the clergy prayed, and peasants labored.
82 Flori 1992.
83 Bartlett 1993. Bartlett attributes European knight-led successful aggressiveness primarily to 
technological innovations in weaponry. Yet, his multi-faceted account lends itself to a different 
interpretation; see the critique in Wickham 1994; Duby 1977a and 1977b; Delbriick 1982, 
225-312; Elias 1994, 292-8; Flori 1986.
84 The revolution thesis was first developed by Duby 1980, 147-166. It makes now the subject 
of a lively discussion among medievalists. See Poly and Boumazel 1991; Bisson 1994; White 
1996; Wickham 1997; Reuter 1997.
85 Reuter 1985 and 1990.
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only the public office-structure but also the more informal feudo-vassalic chains 
between lord and overlord. Banal lords turned into quasi-sovereign units.86 Once 
public power was completely personalised, they began to compete among themselves 
for land, labour and treasure in the period of feudal anarchy proper.
Such complete fragmentation of public power is not generic to feudal political 
relations, but a latent possibility and a sign of systemwide crisis. By the same token, 
Fischer would be hard pressed to show why the power-struggle among castellans did 
not - in line with Neorealist axioms - generate a new equilibrium amongst its 
components, offsetting eventually lordly rivalries. For, according to Waltz, anarchy is 
equivalent not to endless warfare, but to the ‘invisible hand’ that regulates the 
disequilibrating ambitions of any one actor.87 To be sure, hostilities finally abated - not 
because the banal system self-stabilised, but because it vanished wholesale.
Counterfactually, a string of historical questions follow:88 Why did anarchy not 
constitute the organising principle within the preceding Frankish Empire? How was it 
that disintegration of public authority did not proceed nearly as far in the Eastern 
Kingdom, where the Ottomans managed to restore unity and where the duchies 
established themselves after the Investiture Contest as the primary political units within 
a wider conception of Empire? Finally, how, after the 11th Century crisis, did feudal 
states overcome their internal interlordly rivalries and begin to reconsolidate 
themselves on more centralised principles? In other words, the anarchy between the 
castellans turned into the hierarchy of the French kingdom which, of course, found 
itself simultaneously engulfed by the wider anarchy of the emerging feudal states 
system. The barren assumption of anarchy is immaterial in explaining these momentous
86 Hilton 1990, 160. Until the 10th Century only the emperor and kings were banal lords in that 
they exclusively wielded the power of command, taxation, and adjudication in their realms. 
During the period of feudal anarchy, minor lords usurped these functions of kingship and 
became consequently banal lords in their small territories.
87 Rosenberg 1994, chap. 5. Waltz’s systems theory is, of course, directly predicated upon a 
micro-economic theory of rational choice under free market conditions. Although classical 
political economy and Neorealism have both roots in liberal traditions of thought in which 
rational choice is compromised by systemic considerations, harmony qua balance operates on 
the built-in assumption that in processes of ‘dynamic adjustment’ entire nation-states might 
vanish as entire businesses do. And indeed, Waltz concludes that the security optimum is 
achieved in a bipolar condition - a historical conjuncture that converges not unsurprisingly with 
the duopolistic state of US-Soviet relations in world politics at the time of Waltz’s publication, 
adding a Panglossian gloss to the book.
88 Compare Hall and Kratochwil 1993, 486-7.
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variations in medieval inter-actor relations and the mere pointer to self-seeking human 
nature is equally void to account for such restructuring of medieval power. In line with 
general systems theory, Neorealism has no intellectual tools to account for the 
system’s emergence, reproduction, and death.
Finally, according to Spruyt’s account of the feudal mode of political 
organisation, we are faced with a decentralised, non-hierarchical and non-territorial 
form of rule based upon personal bonds,89 The explanation for this form of geopolitical 
order which Spruyt adduces is however, following Max Weber,90 couched in terms of 
the military origins of feudalism, not in terms of its internal generative logic. Thus, 
although we learn that bonds between lords are militarily necessary for protection, we 
do not learn who had to be protected against whom and why. Although we learn about 
the nobility, the Church and the Empire, we do not learn about the constitutive units of 
political authority within them, the deep causes of decentralisation and non-hierarchy, 
and the geopolitical dynamic between these units. In other words, as long as the 
politico-military structure is not understood as the coercive carapace which fixed 
property relations between lords and peasants, Spruyt’s account remains limited to an 
institutional description of the medieval international system. It lacks a coherent 
explanation of the generative structure and specific inter-actor dynamics of the feudal 
order.
To recapitulate, in the orthodox neorealist tradition the Middle Ages present 
merely a variation on the transhistorical theme of anarchy. Ruggie’s modified version 
seeks to shift the explanatory kernel for the form of medieval international relations 
away from the systemic level to property rights and their transformation without being 
much concerned with unfolding their social content that explains the pervasiveness of 
violence in medieval inter-actor relations. Fischer stresses the salience of medieval 
power politics yet ties it back - in an inconsistent manner - either to human nature or to 
systemic pressures without shedding much theoretical light on the social nature of 
feudal Realpolitik in general nor on the historical rise and fall of the Maconnais banal 
system in particular. Hall and Kratochwil seek to explain geopolitical variation in 
ideational terms, but they fail to uncover the sociomaterial determinants of interest and
89 Spruyt 1994a, 34-42.
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identity formation. Spruyt, in turn, offers an institutional description of the feudal 
mode of political organisation without tying it back to the generative structure of 
medieval society and its war-prone geopolitical dynamic.
If we now assume that although the modem and the medieval systems were 
both anarchical, yet, there are profound differences in the forms of anarchy - in the 
very actors who were qualified to participate in 'foreign affairs' and in their geopolitical 
rationalities - we simply cannot deduce such differences from the self-same condition 
of anarchy. Our task is to synthesise the fragmented findings of IR scholars by 
retrieving and understanding the constitutive nexus between the medieval form of 
conditional property (structure) and the dominant form of lordly rationality (agency). 
This premise stands in need of a prior clarification of its theoretical rationale.
Theoretical Foundations: The Relation between the Economic and the Political- 
in Feudal Society
We proposed that the key to understanding much of medieval inter-actor 
relations resides in determinate property-relations which underwrite these political 
relations. We will now set the IR discussion into the ‘debate’ between Max Weber and 
Karl Marx on the nature of feudalism to clarify the medieval nexus between political 
violence and property relations. We will then show how this nexus heips us to make 
sense of the levels-of-analysis problem and the agent-structure relation for feudal 
society.
Max Weber versus Karl Marx: Type o f Domination versus Extra-Economic 
Compulsion
One way to approach the controversial issue of feudalism resides in theorising 
the relation between 'the economic' and 'the political' in medieval society - mirroring
90 Weber [1922] 1968a, 1077-8.
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the problematique of the relations between the different levels-of-analysis in IR.91 A 
fairly consistent and dominant line of reasoning running through the literature - 
essentially inspired by the work of Max Weber and Otto Hintze - identifies feudalism 
as a phenomenon of the political sphere.92 Weber, especially, in an analogy to Marx’s 
economic significance attributed to possessing the means of production, elaborates on 
the political significance of possessing the means of administration for the decentralised 
form of the patrimonial state.
‘All states may be classified according to whether they rest on the principle that the staff 
of men themselves own the administrative means, or whether the staff is “separated” 
from these means of administration. (...) These political associations in which the 
material means of administration are autonomously controlled, wholly or partly, by the 
dependent administrative staff may be called associations organized in “estates”. The 
vassal in the feudal association, for instance, paid out of his own pocket for the 
administration and judicature of the district enfeoffed to him. He supplied his own 
equipment and provisions for war, and his subvassals did likewise. Of course, this had 
consequences for the lord’s position of power, which only rested upon a relation of 
personal faith and upon the fact that the legitimacy of his possession of the fief and the 
social honor of the vassal were derived from the overlord.’93
As a specific system of government or a hierarchical-military relationship between 
carriers of political power, feudalism falls within the confines of political science, 
constitutional history or a sociology of types of domination. ‘[Occidental] feudalism 
(Lehensfeudalitai) is a marginal case of patrimonialism that tends toward stereotyped 
and fixed relationships between lord and vassal.’94 For all their erudition and 
meticulous conceptual differentiation, these accounts generally tend to abstract from 
the agrarian social basis on which these forms of political power rest. While Weber 
was, of course, not blind to the economic implications of feudalism,95 economic issues, 
and in particular the legal status and conscious agency of the peasantry, remain 
theoretically epiphenomenal or indeterminate in their influence on the political 
constitution of feudalism. In particular, the Weber-Hintze tradition dissociates the
91 Singer 1961; Hollis and Smith 1990.
92 See Weber [1922] 1968a, 255-66 and 1070-1110, esp. 1090-92; Hintze 1968.
93 Weber [1919] 1946,81.
94 Weber [1922] 1968a, 1070.
95 ‘The full fief is always a rent-producing complex of rights whose ownership can and should 
maintain a lord in a manner appropriate to his style of life. Primarily seigneurial rights and 
income-yielding political powers, that is, rent-producing rights, are conferred upon the warrior. 
In the feudal Middle Ages the gewere of a piece of land belonged to the recipient of the rent.’ 
Weber [1922] 1968a, 1072-3.
51
‘forms of government and domination’ from the processes of lordly reproduction with 
which these were obviously connected. This observation, however, does not imply a 
plea for an equally abstract consideration of 'the economy1. It rather serves as a 
reminder that below the political ‘level’ of relations between lords, feudal society 
exhibited a second ‘level’ of political relations between lords and peasants, governing 
the specific modes of surplus appropriation.96
The broader epistemological crux is that Weber’s method of ideal-type 
formation is, on a strict methodological reading, not only barred from unearthing the 
social content of feudal domination, it is also inherently incapable to even think the 
broader problem of historical change since it lacks a dimension of historical time. Ideal- 
types are constructed by surveying the historical evidence, deciding on the basis of an a 
priori subjective value-orientation (Wertbezug) - which cannot be inferred from the 
material itself - on a culturally significant (.Kulturbedeutung) social macro­
phenomenon, interpolating its most distinctive typological traits, and regrouping them 
through a process of abstraction in a purified ideal-type.97 Its ‘ideality’ bears no 
normative significance. For practical research purposes, these distilled ideal-types serve 
the heuristic function of being either employed to measure the distance between any 
concrete empirical case and its pure ‘ideal’, or to compare ideal-type A with ideal-type 
B (say, the feudal and the modem bureaucratic modes of administration), so as to 
clarify their differences in the sharpest way possible. Yet, the problem of social change 
remains excluded from this procedure. Theodor Adomo and many others noted that
‘if I handle the concept of ideal-type as strictly as it was articulated by Max Weber in 
his essays on categories (Kategorienaufsatz) in his Wissenschaftslehre, then it is devoid 
of any tendency to transform itself into another, since it is an ad hoc invention, 
construed as something completely monadological, in order to subsume certain 
phenomena.’98
Weber’s analysis of feudalism presents merely a nominalist ideal-type of domination - 
which is by definition both static as well as of non-causal status - fleshed out within the
96 Brenner 1987.
97 Weber [1904] 1949a, [1913] 1968b, [1918] 1949b.
98 Adomo 1993, 207 [my translation, B.T.]; cf. Mommsen 1974. Mommsen later modified his 
stance without changing his essential judgement. Mommsen 1989. Ideal-type formation stands 
in stark contrast to the principles of dialectical concept-formation which yields
52
parameters of a sociology of administrative organisation, abstracted from society at 
large. Max Breuer suggested in the context of Weber’s work on modem bureaucracy 
that Weber’s conception is
‘organisation-, not society-centered: it does not proceed from a theory of social 
structures and processes, but from a closed and determinate administrative system, 
which is compared with other less closed systems.’99
In other words, Weber’s historical sociology serves first and. foremost a comparative 
purpose, constructing ideal-types under which the most diverse historical and 
geographical cases can be subsumed and stored away. This is, of course, not without 
scientific value, but it implies the transformation of history as an open process into 
history as a data base furnishing the evidentiary mass for a series of ideal-types, 
systematised in a typological casuistry. This, however, is the death of history as 
becoming. Consequently, Weber bars himself from providing an encompassing 
conception of feudalism - genetically, substantively, and reproductively - understood 
methodologically as a dialectical totality in motion. And it is this blindness to the 
underlying dilemmas of Weber’s methodology which turns so many Anglo-American 
Neo-Weberian historical sociologies of universal history into theoretically uncontrolled 
and eclectic exercises.100
Conversely, some strands of Marxism interpreted feudalism economistically as 
a non-dynamic agrarian mode of production. The lack of sustained economic growth is 
explained in terms of underdeveloped forces of production, inefficient use of land, and 
negligible trade. However, a one-sided concentration on economic issues, e.g. in the 
form of a long-term tendency of the rate of lordly rents to decline,101 sits uneasily with 
a prevalence of political and military aspects in medieval society, which disrupted and
Bewegungsbegriffe (concepts of movement), which, precisely because they contain dynamic 
contradictions, point to their very transcendence. Heine and Teschke 1996.
99 Breuer 1991, 25 [my translation, B.T.]. Certainly, Weber, the historian, did not always 
comply with the self-imposed methodological rules of Weber, the epistemological social 
scientist. In the historically satiated sections of Economy and Society, we find many allusions 
to and remarks on transitional tendencies from one type of domination to another. But these 
suffer the status of fleeting remarks, have no systematic place in his theory of social-scientific 
cognition, and lack thus a coherent meta-theoretical foundation which spells out the principles 
for a theory of historical process and social change.
100 Cfi, for example, Poggi 1978, Giddens 1985, Mann 1986, Collins 1986.
101 Bois 1984; Kula 1976.
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contravened this tendency decisively. Therefore, some Althusserian Marxists have 
revised such undue pre-eminence given to economic considerations and argue for 
'treating the state as an independent social force' in feudal societies.102 Whether the 
stress is on 'the economic' or the 'political' in Marxist traditions of thought, this 
simplified polarising perspective has led many to question the capacity of Marxism to 
unify 'the political' and 'the economic' in a coherent theoretical account of feudal 
society as a totality.103
In the wake of the Anglo-American Weber-Renaissance, some contemporary 
Weberian sociologists of power have drawn the wider conclusion that Marx might 
have correctly identified the primary source of social power in capitalist societies as 
residing in the ownership of the means of production.104 In traditional societies, 
however, the locus of social power shifts back to possession of the means of violence. 
This finding goes typically hand in hand with a typology of sources of social power - 
usually political/military, economic, ideological/normative, and cultural. Historical 
processes are then explained by a pluralist and multi-causal account informed by this 
typology.105
To summarise, Neorealists, Weberians, and Neo-Weberians concur in stressing 
the primacy of political, administrative, and military aspects in feudal society in the face 
of which Marxian conceptualisations are held to be either reductionist, determinist, 
mono-causal, and functionalist, or simply dismissed as irrelevant, deficient or 
incommensurable in their concern for ‘the economy’.
Against this alleged incommensurability, attention was re-directed in the wake 
of the debate on the transition from feudalism to capitalism to Marx's writings on pre­
capitalist societies.106 Here, Marx specified the constitutive role of political power as 
expressed in various forms of 'extra-economic surplus appropriation' under conditions 
of direct possession of the means of subsistence by the immediate producer:
,02Gintis and Bowles 1984, 19; Haldon 1993.
103 Poggi 1988,212.
104 Giddens 1985.
105 Mann 1986, 379-99. Mann’s argument that each society is co-determined by autonomous 
ideological, economic, military and political spheres is virtually meaningless in its significance 
for the Middle Ages. Cf. Poggi 1978, chap. 2; Collins 1986.
106 Sweezy, Dobb et al. 1976.
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“It is clear, too. that in all forms where the actual worker himself remains the 
“possessor" of the means of production and the conditions of labour needed for the 
production of his own means of subsistence, the property’ relationship must appear at the 
same time as a direct relationship of domination and servitude, and the direct producer 
therefore as an unffee person - an unfreedom which may undergo a progressive 
attenuation from serfdom with statute-labour down to a mere tribute obligation. The 
direct producer in this case is by our assumption in possession of his own means of 
production, the objective conditions of labour needed for the realization of his labour and 
the production of his means of subsistence; he pursues his agriculture independently, as 
well as the rural-domestic industry associated with it. (...) Under these conditions, the 
surplus labour for the nominal landowner can only be extorted from them by extra- 
economic compulsion, whatever the form this might assume. (...) Relations of personal 
dependence are therefore necessary, in other words personal unfreedom, to whatever 
degree, and being chained to the land as its accessory - bondage in the true sense.’107
This passage identifies the crucial nexus, mediated by extra-economic compulsion, with 
which the feudal relation between 'the economic' and 'the political', indeed: their actual 
fusion can be comprehended. This stands in sharp contrast to the configuration of the 
political and the economic - now differentiated as the state and the market - in 
capitalist societies.
‘The abstraction of the state as such belongs only to modem times, because the 
abstraction of private life belongs only to modem times. The abstraction of the political 
state is a modem product. In the Middle Ages there were serfs, feudal estates, merchant 
and trade guilds, corporations of scholars, etc.: that is to say, in the Middle Ages 
property, trade, society, man are political, the material content of the state is given by its 
form; every private sphere has a political character or is a political sphere; that is, 
politics is a characteristic of the private spheres too. In the Middle Ages the political 
constitution is the constitution of private property, but only because the constitution of 
private property is a political constitution. In the Middle Ages the life of the nation and 
the life of the state are identical.’108
In feudal society, property-relations are such that the noble class reproduces itself 
primarily by forced appropriation of peasant-surplus through administrative, military, 
and political means. Seen from this angle, the primacy conceded in the Weber-Hintze 
tradition to the political sphere rests on an abstraction in which the political form is 
emptied of its economic content and granted autonomous causal or typological status 
in the process. Yet, it is precisely this political sphere in which the struggles over
107 Marx [1894] 1981, 926-7; cf. also Anderson 1974a, 147 and 1974b, 403; Brenner 1977, 
1985b; Wood 1995; Comninel 1987, 166-8; Gerstenberger 1990, 504.
108 Marx [1843] (1975), 32.
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surplus are played out between the nobility and the peasantry as well as among the 
nobility itself.
The putative incommensurability thesis turns out to be an illusion. Theorising 
the identity of the political and economic within a conception of totality does not 
simply offer an alternative to Weberian ideal-typical and pluralist accounts. It presents 
a real advance in terms of explanatory power and epistemological rigor vis-a-vis one­
sided abstractions. It also offers a way to think the levels-of-analysis problem in IR for 
feudal society. ‘Extra-economic compulsion' in the form of specific political modes of 
surplus appropriation constitutes the central analytical principle for an understanding of 
feudal societies. It does not only clarify the relation between 'the political' and 'the 
economic', but also enables us to grasp the peculiar form of the feudal ‘state’, medieval 
territory, property, the meaning of peace and war, and medieval geopolitical 
expansion.
From the Logic o f Production to the Logic o f Exploitation
The retrieval of the term extra-economic compulsion requires a further 
clarification of one of Marx’s master-concepts: relations of production and its place in 
a theory of the state. In a seminal passage, Perry Anderson systematically developed 
the implications of extra-economic coercion as the differentia specifica distinguishing 
all non-capitalist from capitalist societies.
‘all modes of production in class societies prior to capitalism extract surplus labour 
from the immediate producers by means of extra-economic coercion. Capitalism is the 
first mode of production in history in which the means whereby the surplus is pumped 
out of the direct producer is ‘purely’ economic in form - the wage contract: the equal 
exchange between free agents which reproduces, hourly and daily, inequality and 
oppression. All other previous modes of exploitation operate through extra-economic 
sanctions - kin, customary, religious, legal or political. It is therefore on principle always 
impossible to read them off from economic relations as such. The ‘superstructures’ of 
kinship, religion, law or the state necessarily enter into the constitutive structure of the 
mode of production in pre-capitalist social formations. They intervene directly in the 
‘internal’ nexus of surplus-extraction, where in capitalist social formations, the first in 
history to separate the economy as a formally self-contained order, they provide by 
contrast its ‘external’ preconditions. In consequence, pre-capitalist modes of production 
cannot be defined except via their political, legal and ideological superstructures, since 
these are what determine the type of extra-economic coercion that specifies them. The
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precise forms of juridical dependence, property and sovereignty that characterize a pre­
capitalist social formation, far from being merely accessory or contingent epiphenomena, 
compose on the contrary the central indeces of the determinate mode of production 
dominant within it. A scrupulous and exact taxonomy of these legal and political 
configurations is thus a pre-condition of establishing any comprehensive typology of pre­
capitalist modes of production. It is evident, in fact, that the complex imbrication of 
economic exploitation with extra-economic institutions and ideologies creates a much 
wider gamut of possible modes of production prior to capitalism (...).,1<)9
This extraordinary passage engendered a theoretical volte-face in Marxist thinking on 
pre-capitalist social formations, which was as liberating as it was potentially fraught 
with a series of unresolved theoretical corollaries.
On the one hand, Anderson’s re-theorisation turned the orthodox Marxist 
theorem - vulgar, trivialised or dogmatically distorted as it may have been -, which 
postulated in various guises that economic structures determine political 
superstructures, on its head. Thereby, in one bold stroke, it immediately rendered the 
entire political history of medieval societies amenable to a meaningful Marxist 
interpretation, both in institutional as well as in developmental terms. Institutionally, 
property now became the principium medium between economy and state, or rather, 
the institutional expression of the political construction of the economic.
‘The immediate producers and the means of production - comprising both the tools of 
labour and the objects of labour, e.g. land - are always dominated by the exploiting class 
through the prevalent property system, the nodal intersection between law and economy: 
but because property relations are themselves directly articulated on the political and 
ideological order, which indeed often expressly governs their distribution (confining 
landownership to aristocrats, for example, or excluding nobles from trade), the total 
apparatus of exploitation always extends upwards into the sphere of the superstructures 
themselves.’110
Developmentally, Anderson recalled that ‘secular struggle between classes is ultimately 
resolved at the political - not at the economic or cultural - level of society. In other 
words, it is the construction and destruction of states which seal the basic shifts in the 
relations of production, so long as classes subsist.’111
On the other hand, Anderson’s turn left some problems unaddressed. First, 
taken to its extreme, Anderson’s radicalisation of the consequences of extra-economic
109 Anderson 1974b, 403-4.
110 Anderson 1974b, 404.
111 Anderson 1974b, 11.
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coercion would imply that researchers would face as many pre-capitalist modes of 
production as there were different pre-capitalist political communities. In fact, since 
hardly any two pre-capitalist polities were constitutionally or institutionally identical, it 
would follow that every single political community would constitute a mode of 
production in its own right. This move inflates not only the term mode of production, 
whose stringency or analytical utility was partly due to its relative spatio-temporal 
generality, it rendered it theoretically meaningless. Any meso-criterion which is able to 
discriminate between the individuality of single pre-capitalist polities and the generality 
of pre-capitalist modes of production was lost. Even conditional property would fail as 
a meso-criterion since it is compatible with a range of constitutionally very different 
feudal political communities. However, a typology or taxonomy which assigns to each 
singular polity the status of a type is by definition not a typology, since no process of 
abstraction is required. Here, historical uniqueness and scientific concept are one.
Second, some formulations in Anderson’s theoretical exposition lend
themselves to a de-emphasis on class-conflict as the driving movens of historical
development. While it is correct to say that social conflicts find ultimately political and
institutional expressions, these remain themselves permanent objects of contestation. In
other words, once the state has been conceived as a political institution which fixes or
‘seals shifts in the relations of production’, Anderson’s historical narrative tends to
read like a conventional, though brilliant, political history of European national and
international relations in which war and diplomacy are not sufficiently integrated with
prevailing class conflicts. To avoid this incipient reification of the ‘state’, the feudal (or
absolutist) state must itself be seen as a class-relation. Let us recall that Anderson’s
overall research-guiding interest is motivated by an attempt to explain the rise of
capitalism. Given that capitalism was specific to the European experience, and given
furthermore that non-European regions also knew core features of feudal modes of
production, part of the explanation, as Anderson suggests, must be sought in the
specificity of the political legacy of European antiquity contained in the medieval
political organisation.112 Since Anderson identifies the revival of Roman law as a
necessary, though not sufficient, condition for the late early modem transition to
capitalism, political outcomes are no longer directly inferred from the resolution of 
*
112 Anderson 1974b, 420 and 424-5.
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class conflicts. In this scenario, the ‘legal superstructure’, revitalised by the reception 
of Roman law, does then indeed determine the type of extra-economic coercion. But in 
Anderson’s rendition this turns out to be more a process of state-led imposition, than a 
process of class-divided contestation.113 While a judgement on the relative validity of 
these two alternatives cannot be passed in the abstract, we will show later that 
Anderson’s option for absolutist France as the home-ground of the rise of capitalism is 
intimately connected with these theoretical premises. Yet, there is an alternative.
Third, if feudal societies were really characterised by a fusion between the 
political and the economic mediated through social property relations, then it would 
follow that the entire vocabulary of base and superstructures, of relations of 
production and modes of production becomes itself questionable. The retention of this 
terminological apparatus imparts a false sense of structural similarity between feudal 
and capitalist societies, both being theorisable with the help of the same categories.
Given these unresolved issues, we suggest that a further conceptual shift from 
the term ‘relations of production’ to the term ‘relations of exploitation’ might yield 
greater analytical precision while avoiding an overly ‘politicist’ reading of European 
pre-capitalist history. A focus on the logic of exploitation would overcome the residual 
danger of conceiving the pre-capitalist ‘state’ and ‘economy’ as two separate 
institutional spheres and foreground the class-mediated nexus between political force 
and economic appropriation. It would thus maintain awareness of the essential 
relationality of feudal forms of social configurations. By retrieving the crucial idea that 
the ‘state’ never conclusively fixes or institutionalises a given set of class-relations, it 
implies that property is always a permanently contested social relation, defined, 
defended and re-negotiated by the ‘state’ in the face of active, conscious, and constant 
pressures of the direct producers. In other words, a shift to the term relations of 
exploitation and its associated social contradictions keeps the moment of historical 
contingency and change, which is always latent in the unpredictable resolutions of class 
conflicts, alive and in perspective. While these reformulations cannot resolve the long­
standing dispute over structure and agency, extending on a spectrum from absolute 
determination to absolute voluntarism, a possible dialectical via media would remain
113 Anderson 1974b, 429.
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sensitive to the historical processes by which determinate social structures generate 
social discontent. During these periods of crisis, transcendence, that is institutional or 
structural change, is itself never a necessary, but always a possible outcome, dependent 
upon the respective degree of class organisation and the unpredictable resolution of 
social conflicts. In analytical parlance, while social structures constitute permissive 
causes, class conflicts constitute efficient or proximate causes. Therewith, the historical 
process is not transformed into a typology of different clashing polities, but remains 
suspended as a conflict between possible alternatives, and therewith faithful to the idea 
of open history. In short, a shift towards relations of exploitation would resist 
conceptual reification, teleological and functionalist tendencies, and historical closure.
Does this shift from the logic of production to the logic of exploitation, and the 
concomitant significance attributed to intra-ruling class conflict as a decisive movens of 
general development, contain a slide towards a Neo-Weberian perspective? The 
answer must be in the negative. First of all, in societies where direct producers possess 
the means of production, the economic process of production precedes the political 
process of exploitation, defined by rents in kind or in cash. In other words, the moment 
of exploitation is not economically built into the relation of production. In fact, with 
the partial exception of corvee labour - i.e. direct peasant labour on the lord’s 
desmesne -, there is virtually no physical relation of production between lord and 
dependent peasant. In principle, production proceeds independently from any lordly 
interference or economic management. In short, the processes of production and 
exploitation are separated both in time and in space.
Second, any attempt to rescue the term relations of production for pre­
capitalist societies would face severe difficulties to ‘derive’ the form of the state from 
existing relations of production at any given point in time and space, for the pre­
capitalist ‘state’ does, of course, uphold them. For Marx, the state is not an institution, 
but quintessentially a relation:
‘The specific economic form in which unpaid surplus labour is pumped out of the direct 
producers determines the relationship of domination and servitude, as this grows directly 
out of production itself and reacts back on it in turn as a determinant. On this is based 
the entire configuration of the economic community arising from the actual relations of 
production, and hence also its specific political form. It is in each case the direct
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relationship of the owners of the conditions of production to the immediate producers - a 
relationship whose particular form naturally corresponds always to a certain level of 
development of the type and manner of labour, and hence to its social productive power - 
in which we find the innermost secret, the hidden basis of the entire social edifice, and 
hence also the political form of the relationship of sovereignty and dependence, in short, 
the specific form of state in each case.’1,4
Yet, even this passage, often adduced to show evidence of an embryonic Marxian 
theory of the state,115 is not unequivocal. Apart from the questionable techno- 
determinist ‘correspondence’ of social relations with ‘methods of labour’, relations of 
exploitation cannot grow out o f ‘production itself understood as a pre-political or pre- 
social activity - a metabolic process between man and nature mediated by the forces of 
production -, nor does it make sense to conceive of feudal relations between direct 
producers, who are in effect in possession of their means of production, and lords as a 
relation between the ‘owners of the conditions of production to the direct producers’. 
Still, it is no exaggeration to suggest that Marx sketches here the essential contours of 
the theoretical nexus between the forms of surplus appropriation and the form of the 
state. In other words, the ‘state’, or the political, is not external to the property 
relation, i.e. the process of exploitation, but co-constitutes and reproduces it, provided 
we theorise the ‘state’ as a class relation in the first place. For example, feudal social 
relations in 10th Century Burgundy and those in 12th Century Anglo-Norman England 
were both defined by serf-lord relations. Yet, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to 
‘derive’ the variation in the form of regionally prevailing states from existing ‘relations 
of production’. In the first case, serf-lord relations were compatible with extreme 
political fragmentation based on the regime of banal lordships; in the second case, serf- 
lord relation were compatible with a tightly integrated and centralised feudal pyramid 
culminating in the English king. In other words, outside of a dynamic historical 
account of the formation of a specific set of politically constituted social property 
relations on the basis of a specific resolution of preceding class conflicts which become 
temporarily institutionalised in political and legal forms, it is indeed difficult to show 
compellingly that a given state form can be logically deduced from existing relations of 
production, short of excessive generalisations.
1,4 Marx [1894] 1981,927.
115 Comninel 1987, 168; Rosenberg 1994, 84.
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Third, class is not an economic category, but a political category, which fixes 
the unequal distribution of property titles which guarantee reproduction. This is not 
only true for capitalist societies, where the capital-relation is based on a prior political 
act of separating the direct producer from his means of subsistence - a relation which is 
subsequently reproduced and maintained by the capitalist state through law and order - 
, but a fortiori for pre-capitalist societies. Here, under conditions of direct peasant 
possession of the means of production, a distinction between classes is only possible by 
their differential access to politically constituted titles to and ownership of the means of 
coercion. In feudal societies, intra-ruling class conflicts, both domestic as well as 
geopolitical, are therefore not conflicts over the maximisation of power among elites, 
but conflicts between and among politically accumulating classes over the means of 
extra-economic coercion.
The primacy allotted to the term ‘relations of exploitation’ does therefore not 
approximate Weber’s concept ‘mode of domination’. It rather ‘contains’ the substance 
of the Weberian approach, undermines its theoretical rationale - i.e. ideal-types 
formulated at the level of the political -, and provides a more encompassing 
explanation of socio-political relations and their changes.
To conclude, in order to resist the potential pitfalls of Anderson’s new 
perspective, we thus suggest a theoretical framework for feudal societies which 
revolves around the logic of exploitation as mediated by determinate social property 
relations. While class conflict remains the primum mobile of history, its logic has to be 
extended as revolving essentially around four axes: (1) between peasants and lords 
(class conflict), (2) amongst lords (intra-ruling class conflict), (3) between the 
collectivity of lords (the feudal ‘state’) and ‘external’ lordly communities (inter-ruling 
class conflict), and (4) amongst the peasantry (intra-producing class conflict). 
Together, these horizontal and vertical lines of conflict proceed from and generate 
anew a definite balance of class forces in time and space, which itself governs and 
filters the rhythms of war and peace. In other words, political organisation, conscious 
social activity, remains the strategic locus which conditions institution-altering forms of 
agency. From this angle, the argument that intra-ruling class conflict constitutes a 
separate order of reality - the sphere of politics proper - understood in Weberian terms 
as the status-driven competition for power among elites, collapses. Equally, the logic
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of horizontal geopolitical relations cannot be causally attributed to a further 
independent sphere of reality conceived as a self-enclosed level (the geopolitical), as 
Neorealists and Neo-Weberians maintain.116 Finally, the proposition that peasant life 
and peasant culture could be equally confined to a distinct self-contained sphere, 
turning into the object of ‘history from below’ divorced from political history, would 
be infirmed. Let us proceed to translate this model of property and contradictory forms 
of collective social agency into a series of more concrete propositions.
The Structure-Agent Problem in Feudal Terms: Lordship and Contradictory 
Strategies of Reproduction
We now have to specify the basic unit comprising the political and the 
economic in feudal society. Only then can we demonstrate how this unit governs 
specific forms of social action that pervade, animate, and possibly change the structural 
set-up. In other words, we will now set out how the agent-structure problem can be 
thought of in feudal society.117
Lordship as Conditional Property (Structure)
The basic unit of such fusion of the economic and the political is to be found in 
the institution of lordship. It is central to recall time and again that the lordship was not 
simply an agrarian economic enterprise, but a 'unit of authority' in which ties between 
men were not mediated via 'freely' entered contracts between private persons, but 
stipulated through political power: domination.118 The 'economic' was inscribed into 
the 'political'. Men were ascribed to a lord. The striking peculiarity of medieval 
property, then, resides in the fact that property rights were political rights of 
governance as much as economic rights of tenure; in fact, they were inseparable. This
116 Mann 1986; Hobson 1998.
117 Wendt 1987.
1,8 Bloch [1931] 1966, 236. Compare Kula [1962] 1976, 9.
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non-separation is precisely captured by the Latin term potestas et utilitas 119 Mere 
property rights to land were meaningless if they did not include authority over the 
people who cultivated it, because peasants possessed their means of subsistence and 
were therefore under no internal compulsion to rent from or work for the lord in order 
to survive. This contrasts to capitalist property where ownership of land is 'real' 
because it constitutes a value, precisely because cultivators no longer possess their 
means of subsistence and are correspondingly compelled to rent from or work for 
landlords.120
Yet, although lords wielded political power they did not, as a rule, constitute 
sovereign mini-states. Classically, they held their land in tenure as a fief that carried, 
next to specific rights of exploitation over the producing peasantry, military and 
administrative duties to the land-granting overlord.
'Land, in fact, was not "owned" by anyone; it was "held" by superiors in a ladder of
"tenures" leading to the king or other supreme lord.’121
The specific legal status of land has thus been variously described by jurisprudence as 
conditional property or usufruct (<dominium utile), whereas the overlord retained 
nominally the overlordship (<dominium directum). This meant that the fiefholder had no 
right to dispose freely of ‘his’ land, but could only enjoy its exploitation for definite 
purposes.122 Property was conditional.123
This brings us back to the question of how the pretension to lordship was 
asserted, both over and against overlords and rival lords and a subjected peasantry. 
Otto Brunner classically distinguished the character of lordship from great estate 
through an interpretation of the medieval concept of Gewere (domain). It refers to 'the 
actual possession and use of a thing, with the presumption of a property right in it'.124 
Decisively however, the lord exercised politically legitimate violence in the realisation 
of these rights over and against non-complying peasants and rival lords. In contentious
119 Kuchenbuch 1997.
120 Marx [ 1867] 1976, 873-907 and [1894] 1981, 917-50.
121 Berman 1983, 312.
122 Ganshof 1964, 144-46.
123 Anderson 1974b, 25.
124 Brunner 1992, 209. On Gewere compare Berman 1983, 313.
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cases, this could be his own overlord. In the last instance, his arms-bearing status 
asserted his political lordship. Gewere
'presupposed the "lawful force" - namely the protection and safeguard that a lord 
exercised in defense of his domain, not simply as an owner of property, but literally as 
the lord of his lands. (...) We see here a constitutional structure that recognized the use 
of force by members of the legal community against each other, with no state of the 
modem sort to claim a monopoly of legitimate force, and with every member of the legal 
community having a measure of executive power.’125
It is crucial to recognise that ‘domestic’ violent resistance was not criminalised but 
inscribed in the feudal constitution. It was legitimate and lawful if the overlord failed to 
comply with his obligations vis-a-vis his feoffee and vice versa. Such break-up of the 
monopoly of violence had profound consequences for the nature of the medieval state, 
its form of territoriality, the meaning of war as feud and the entire structure of political 
power and ‘international’ organisation. To conclude, we now start to see why 
medieval property is central to understand conceptually and historically those 
institutions central to IR.126
Contradictory Strategies o f Reproduction (Agency)
From these concrete settings, we can now proceed to outline the dominant 
forms of medieval agency. Let us rehearse the preconditions for class-specific and 
therewith conflicting feudal strategies of reproduction. Medieval society constituted a 
system of agrarian production for use-values and simple commodity-production based 
upon peasant labour.127 Its most fundamental sources of wealth were land and labour. 
The means of production (land, tools, life stock, dwellings) were in possession of the 
direct producers, so that peasant communities formed subsistence communities. In this 
context, what were the major forms of social action?
125 Brunner 1992, 210. Compare Holzgrefe 1989, 12.
126 We disagree therefore with Krasner who maintains that the medieval world did not possess 
‘a deep generative grammar’. Krasner 1993, 257.
127 Production was largely for direct consumption and barter and not for exchange on the 
market. Although long-distance trade in luxury goods existed throughout the period and took on 
renewed vigor in the 12th Century, inter-urban trade did not alter the social relations of 
exploitation in the country-side. Merrington 1976.
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Let us first turn to the noble class.128 The arms-bearing lord stood in a double- 
edged position between a subjected peasantry tilling ‘his’ estate and competing rival 
lords, vying for land and labour. To survive in this competitive situation, lords (1) 
maximised feudal rents by a direct squeeze of the peasantry - the intensification of 
labour. Alternatively, nobles (2) cultivated land internally through land reclamation; or 
(3) colonised and settled land externally, usually in connection with warfare and 
conquest; or (4) conquered neighbouring regions, established client-states, or exercised 
suzerainty over such regions without direct occupation but under conditions of annual 
tribute-payments. Furthermore, they engaged (5) in direct internecine warfare, either 
by direct conquest and annexation or through cavalcades, plunder, pillage and the 
demand of ransom money. Finally, lords (6) conducted dynastic marriage-policies in 
order to amass lands and to increase their income bases.
These lordly strategies of reproduction have here been set out analytically. 
Historically, not every single lord engaged 'rationally' in such strategies. Yet, the ruling 
class as a whole reproduced itself by conforming to such 'systemic' pressures of 
domination. Such bounded rationality tells us something about the absolute limits of 
social action under specific property-relations.129 In times of crisis and social struggle, 
of course, the very institutions of surplus-extraction were at stake. Depending on the 
resolution of these conflicts, new forms of bounded rationality sprang into existence. 
What all six feudal strategies implied however, in one form or the other, was 
investment in the means of violence. Robert Brenner subsumed such violent strategies 
under the general concept ‘political accumulation’.130
128 The following paragraphs are inspired by the work of Brenner 1985b; 1986, 27-32; and 
1987, 173-8; see also Gerstenberger 1990, 503-7 and Duby 1974.
129 In IR, the classic rationality assumption has been compromised by Keohane’s notion of 
‘bounded rationality’. Keohane 1984, 110-32. The broader epistemological crux is that 
rational-choice theory makes propositions about efficient means but remains silent on the ends. 
They appear as given constants. If we historicize rationality and set it within specific property- 
relations, we can also make propositions about preferences themselves and can call past 
behavior rational which in a contemporary perspective would pass as irrational; e.g. noble 
conspicuous consumption becomes only meaningful when embedded in definite social 
structures. See Godelier 1972, 7-30.
130 Brenner 1985b, 236-42.
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The success of lordly strategies of reproduction was suspended between the 
internal cohesion of the members of the non-producing class and the collective 
resistance of the producing class. As a rule, peasant strategies of reproduction stood in 
irreconcilable contradiction to the interests of the lords. With the integration of peasant 
rationality into the overall equation, an encompassing picture emerges of clashing 
forms of collective agency in medieval society.
Living in subsistence communities, the peasantry - crucially! - was 
economically independent, i.e. non-market dependent. Peasants had no need to sell 
their labour-power as wage labour or to rent out nor to invest productively in 
agriculture under pressures of market competition and its price mechanism. Under 
these circumstances, since the peasantry was under no internal economic compulsion 
to render dues, it developed a specific form of economic rationality that should not be 
dismissed as irrational, but corresponded precisely to feudal conditions of social action.
1. Being self-sufficient and given that food formed the main part of total 
consumption (yet was in uncertain supply), peasants engaged in strategies of 
risk minimisation by diversifying agricultural products cultivated on their 
plots. In marked contrast to capitalist rationality, non-specialisation in rural 
produce ensued.
2. Non-market dependency translated into the reduction of labour-time, which 
meant striking a balance between lordly demands and socio-culturally 
established needs of the peasant and his family. Again, non-profit oriented 
economic rationality constituted the essence of everyday life.
3. Risk minimisation led to early marriages, a high rate of peasant reproduction, 
and land division upon inheritance.
4. Against lordly demands, peasants organised in communities, developed forms 
of collective class organisation to resist lordly encroachments, or withdrew 
their labour power through flight.
A ‘Culture o f War ’ based upon Political Accumulation
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The fortunes of reproduction depended on the collective ability of both, 
peasants and lords, to redistribute peasant-produced surplus as circumscribed by 
respective balances of class forces. Whereas peasant reproduction as a rule generated 
economic stagnation, the material needs of the lordly class instantiated a systemic 
pressure to build up military power. Unsurprisingly, development of agricultural 
technology was relatively lethargic, whereas military innovations based upon 
systematic investment in the means of violence were, throughout the Middle Ages and 
beyond, spectacular.131 Thus, the quest for military might ensured the successful 
maintenance of an established aristocratic mode of life. Violence and chronic warfare 
were the raison d'etre of the noble class. The pursuit of the martial profession was the 
dominant form of rationality amongst the land-owning, arms-bearing and ruling class. 
Characteristically, lordly expanded reproduction took the form of system-wide 
‘extensive-territorial’ conquests.132 Contrary to Gilpin’s argument, horizontal political 
expansion over territories and labour as sources of income defines the essence of 
feudal geopolitical expansion.133 The various processes of 'political accumulation' 
drove the socio-political dynamic of feudal society. They reveal the hidden meaning of 
the Middle Ages as a ‘culture of war’. At the same time, it turns out that ‘international’ 
inter-lordly relations do not follow any transhistorical systemic logic to be theorised in 
abstraction from the social relations of lordship. Feudal property structures and 
dominant forms of social action are dialectically mediated.134
A Phenomenology of Medieval 'International* Institutions
131 A whole literature takes this epi-phenomenon as the point of departure to argue in various 
shades for a military techno-determinism towards either the modem territorial state, capitalism 
or ‘the rise of the West’. Tilly 1990; Parker 1988; Downing 1992. Although the ‘Military 
Revolution’ has been situated in early modernity, it has been argued recently that continuity in 
military innovations stretches back to the high Middle Ages. Ayton and Price 1995.
132 Merrington 1976, 179.
133 Gilpin 1981, 108-9.
134 Constructivists tend to base their structure-agency accounts on Giddens’ structuration 
theory. Giddens 1984. In terms of epistemological systematicity, the Hegelian-Marxist 
dialectical idiom conceptualizes the problem of action-in-structure (or praxis-in-concretion) in 
a more coherent way. Heine and Teschke 1996.
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This section determines the character of a series of medieval ‘international’ 
phenomena by seeking ‘the evidence of social relations contained in every single social 
phenomenon.’135 By systematically relating political form to social content, we 
demonstrate the validity of the dialectical claim that ‘every aspect of society acquires 
meaning when linked to the wider specific praxes through which society reproduces 
itself and can only be comprehended in this context.’136
The \'Medieval State V Tensions between Localised Appropriation and Centralised 
Authority
The sovereign state was an unknown entity in the Middle Ages.137 Political rule 
bore the name of domination. Since every lord appropriated individually, medieval 
polities faced the problem of squaring lordly geographical particularism with the 
security needs of central self-organisation.
What are the implications of individualised lordship for the form of medieval 
states? With the exception of the 10th and 11th Centuries, not every lordship 
constituted a ‘mini-state’. Lordships were generally linked via feudo-vassalic relations 
as expressed in the classical feudal pyramid to an overlord. Such relation was 
established through a synallagmatic ‘contract’ between lord and vassal. Its decisive 
characteristic lies in its inter-personal and reciprocal nature specifying proprietary and 
personal rights and obligations between the two ‘contracting’ parties. Amongst these 
obligations auxilium et consilium - military assistance and political advice - were the 
most prominent. Thus, medieval ‘states’ rested upon a series of inter-personal bonds 
between the members of the land-holding class. They presented ensembles of lordships.
Crucially however, the fief-holder was not a mere functionary or official of the 
‘state’, but a fully-fledged political lord. He did not represent the ‘state’ nor was his 
status delegated or derived from it, but the ‘state’ was the sum-total of the lordly class 
- the self-organisation of the ruling nobility. While a strict historical semantic would 
seek to avoid the use of the terms sovereignty or state in this context, for comparative
135 Heine and Teschke 1997, 459.
136 Heine and Teschke 1997, 462.
137 Gerstenberger 1990, 500-9; Quaritsch 1970; Ehler 1961.
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purposes it is didactically suggestive to say that sovereignty was therefore ‘parcelised’, 
‘divided’, or that each lord was a ‘fragment of the state’.138 But since the feudal ‘state’ 
lacked an abstract institutional existence outside of the life-spans of individual rulers, 
since it was neither a corporate entity nor a ‘legal person’, it is more precise to define 
the political in terms of concrete praxis of personalised domination (‘personate 
Herrschaftspraxis').139 From a different perspective, Weber commented that
‘feudalism is a “separation of powers”, but unlike Montesquieu’s scheme, which 
constitutes a qualitative division of labour, it is simply a quantitative division of 
authority.’140
German constitutional historians termed this unique phenomenon a 
Personenverbandsstaat (a state of associated persons),141 in order to clearly demarcate 
it from the Weberian rationalised state (rationale Staatsanstalf) or the institutional- 
territorial state (institutioneller Flachenstaaf). It follows, furthermore, that since the 
medieval world ignored a ‘state’, it also ignored an ‘economy’ and a ‘society’ as 
separate institutions with autonomous mechanisms of social integration and 
developmental logics. These three institutions, as Hegel and Marx suggested, are 
specific and unique to the age of capitalism.
Yet, further corollaries follow from the inter-personal character of medieval 
domination for ascertaining what belongs to the sphere of the political. Given that 
domination was personal, noble families - dynasties - became perforce the ‘natural’ 
transmitters of political power. Consequently, dynastic family politics - noble 
marriages, problems of inheritance, and laws of succession - became a general 
politician of the first order, structuring directly inter-lordly and geopolitical relations at 
large. By implication, the biological accidents of noble sexual reproduction were 
tantamount to the reproduction of the political.
Given this purely interpersonal relationship among politically independent 
actors which were not answerable to a legally codified set of abstract administrative 
laws, it should not surprise that notions of fealty were at a premium. The well- 
documented corporeal rites of homage, the act of investment, and the associated highly
138 Anderson 1974a, 148 and 1974b, 15; Brenner 1985b, 229; Wood 1995, 39.
139 Gerstenberger 1990, 500ff.
140 Weber [1922] 1968a, 1082.
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refined code of honour are testimony to this precarious ‘non-rationalised’ mediation 
between plural, land-based, and independent political wills. The specific inter-vasallic 
ethos of fealty and honour expressed precisely the structurally missing de-politicisation 
of lords as bureaucrats. ‘The result was to generate an aristocratic ideology which 
rendered compatible pride of rank and humility of homage, legal fixity of obligations 
and personal fidelity of allegiance.’142 The doctrine of the king’s two bodies captured 
precisely the dual identity of the king’s physical body with its theocratic and divine 
character.143 Contra Constructivism, it would seem to be intellectually questionable to 
stress this discourse, mentalite, or mode of legitimation in dissociation from the socio­
economic content of feudal relations. Thus, due to this inter-personal set-up of 
relations of domination, public power was territorially fragmented, de-centralised, 
personally dispersed, and only loosely held together through the bonds of vassalage.144
Such a configuration of medieval power was no static affair. To the extent that 
lordly localised appropriation required a policing group of armed retainers, lords found 
themselves simultaneously in competition with their own overlords and other rival 
lords. Based upon this underlying contradiction, two dynamic processes of feudal 
centralisation and de-centralisation can be observed time and again in the history of the 
European Middle Ages.145
First, strong unifying forces are discernible wherever a competent warlord set 
out to lead his co-ruling nobles into successive cycles of campaigning and the 
subsequent redistribution of conquered land and the wider spoils of war (slaves, 
women, hostages, treasure, tributes, armaments) among his contented warriors. In a 
sense, there is a self-regenerating logic to these cycles of conquest and redistribution, 
for they fostered loyalty to the supreme warlord and provided simultaneously the 
means and manpower for further campaigning. The reputation and standing of Charles 
Martel, Henry Plantagenet, and Otto I, to name but a few, and the relative stability of 
their respective polities were directly predicated upon such dynamic mechanisms of
141 Mayer 1963, 290; Mitteis 1975, 5.
142 Anderson 1974b, 410-11.
143 Kantorowicz 1957.
144 Compare Hintze 1968, 24-25.
145 Anderson 1974a, 151-2; Weber [1922] 1968a, 1038-44; Elias 1974, 275-86; Le Patourel 
1976, 279-318; Brenner 1985b, 239; Haldon 1993, 213.
71
political accumulation. Dialectically, however, military success always contained the 
seeds of fragmentation. Those nobles who had flocked to a supreme warlord in order 
to generate a tightly knit military unit and who came to receive large estates for their 
services now turned into potential rivals of their erstwhile leader. As long as the latter 
could plausibly prove his military prowess, strategic competence and punitive capacity 
vis-a-vis rebellious magnates, these continued to peg their fortunes to their warlord. 
Otherwise, they used their newly acquired landed power base to either establish their 
independence or to challenge him directly.
Second, in this case, an inverse cycle of intra-ruling class altercations set in, 
inviting external exploitation by foreign tribes of such internal weaknesses. Corroding 
central state-power lead to regionalisation, which, in short, meant the end of ruling 
class solidarity. Customarily, these processes went hand in hand with the usurpation of 
public offices; they are visible, for example, under Louis the Pious and his even weaker 
successors. Internal redistribution of land and rights of jurisdiction became the logical 
alternative to external conquest. In other words, the possibility of central government 
always rested on a compromise - a fragile alliance for mutual gain - between the 
members of the lordly class. The perennially brittle nature of the medieval ‘state', 
therefore, rests on this internal predicament: How to organise political power in the 
force field between centrifugal tendencies of localised appropriation and centripetal 
tendencies of political consolidation and noble self-organisation over and against the 
peasantry and for purposes of external defence or conquest.
Domination was patently not asserted on a day-to-day basis by the sharpness of 
the lord's sword. The sub-discipline of historical semantics has carefully distinguished 
the peculiar form of domination from other notions of political power.146 Domination 
refers to the actual practices of rule inseparable from the body of the incumbent. Its 
meaning, therefore, includes all those social practices which kept dependants in a 
subordinate position and demonstrated a lord’s faculties of rule to his co-rulers.
Theocratic privileges, miraculous healing powers, and charismatic gestures of 
leadership were part and parcel of domination.147 Rule was mediated by a peculiar 
sphere of noble representation: conspicuous consumption, largesse, the maintenance of 
luxurious households and the lavish display of symbols of power are not to be
146 Moraw 1982
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dissociated from the business of domination. Medievalists have elaborated at length on 
the significance of the imagery for the rites of medieval power.148 Especially the 
circulation of gifts was an essential part of inter-noble class consciousness and a clear 
indicator of social might.149 Therefore, interpreting these aspects of representation 
pejoratively as irrational extravagance, subjective prodigality or medieval mysticism is 
misleading. Rather, the political economy of symbolic reproduction reveals how 
ostentation and conspicuous consumption served as a clear pointer for both noble 
peers and dependent peasantry to the social power and extractive capacities of the 
lord.150 To this extent, there is nothing mysterious about symbolic representation, even 
for ‘the structuralist hardened by a more materialist historiography’.151
The Political Economy o f Medieval Territory and Frontiers
We have come to think of states as exercising sovereignty over a spatially 
specified and territorially consolidated area with clear-cut boundaries. Modem 
territoriality is exclusive and uniform in terms of its administration. The diplomatic 
institution of ‘extra-territoriality’ and the principle of non-intervention are the classical 
upshot of this form of international organisation. The Middle Ages confront us with an 
inverse image. As a rule, medieval territory was co-extensive with the ruler’s ability to 
enforce his authority claims. Thus, we have to turn to the techniques of exercising 
political power under conditional property relations in order to understand the 
constitution of medieval territoriality.
The first thing to note is that a clear distinction between internal and external 
within feudal Europe cannot be drawn. Wherever the fief constituted the basic cell of 
political territory, authority claims by respective overlords to this territory were 
mediated, better: mediatised, through the vassal. The vassal’s will, however, was not a 
bureaucratic instance to be sanctioned through codified written procedure, but 
expressed political power. Personal loyalty had to be maintained on a day to day basis
147 Gerstenberger 1990, 501-2.
148 Bloch 1973; Kantorowicz 1957; Duby 1974, 48-57.
149 Ganshof 1970, 43.
150 Habermas 1989,5-9.
151 Hall and Kratochwil 1993, 485. NB: Neorealism is here the villain!
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through the paraphernalia of medieval patronage. The problem was compounded when 
the feudo-vassalic chain stretched over more than two links, so that the rear-vassal 
owed first allegiance to his direct overlord and only secondary or no allegiance to 
whoever occupied the apex of the feudal pyramid. In this instance, a part of the 
territory was completely removed from the royal reach yet formed neither an exclave 
nor a part of a third state.
Where territoriality itself stands on shifting grounds, its assertion requires the 
lord’s physical presence. In this respect, the peripatetic nature of the royal households 
is indicative of the structural difficulty of maintaining effective state authority over the 
territory. Yet, ceaseless royal mobility was shadowed on a smaller scale by ceaseless 
mobility on the part of lesser lords. Few enjoyed lordship over a territorially compact 
area. Most estates were scattered over far-flung territories, reflecting the vicissitudes 
of military acquisition and the politics of land-partition upon inheritance. Consider, for 
example, the case of those Franco-Norman knights who followed William the 
Conqueror to the shores of England. After the conquest, the eradication of the Anglo- 
Saxon land-holding class, and the subsequent re-distribution of dispossessed land 
among the barons of the invasion army, many lords found themselves masters over an 
incongruous body of estates. In addition to their ancestral homelands in Northern 
France, they now had to ensure the running of their newly granted lands in England, 
and, in the course of the conquest of the British Isles, of their lordships in Wales, 
Ireland, or Scotland.152 To this extent, William’s incessant trans-maritime voyages 
were mirrored by the migrations of his greater barons. Anglo-Norman lords were 
essentially ‘cross-Channel lords’.153 State-territory was coterminous with the land- 
holding patterns of the ruling class.
The institutional organisation of political power over medieval territory was not 
uniform. Whereas an administrative distinction between center and periphery within 
modem states is meaningless, frontier regions in medieval states - the marches -154 
exhibit certain symptomatic traits over and against the center. Ethnic, religious, 
natural-topographical, or linguistic aspects were secondary in determining the 
‘demarcation’ of frontier regions. The extension of medieval territory followed the
152 Bartlett 1993. 57; Given 1990. 91-152.
153 Frame 1990, 53.
154 Smith 1995: Mitteis 1975, 66.
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opportunities of military conquest, that is, political accumulation. The administration in 
the periphery reflected a careful balancing act between the eradication, 
accommodation, or co-optation of the local conquered nobility, the needs of newly 
established conquest-lordships, and the wider security interests of the ‘state’. This 
created another dilemma for feudal overlords: To the degree that marcher-lords had to 
be invested with special military powers of command in order to deal effectively with 
unruly neighbours, they became, by the same token, semi-autonomous.155 More often 
than not, they abused their privileges for the build-up of regional strongholds. For 
example, the liberties enjoyed by the Anglo-Norman lords of the March of Wales, set 
between native-controlled Wales and the English kingdom, persisted well into the 16th 
Century, even though the victorious Edwardian campaigns (1282-3) had sapped their 
raison d ’etre centuries earlier. In the Welsh Marches, the king’s writ was devoid of 
force.156 Under these conditions, where did state territory start and where did it end?157 
Not surprisingly, therefore, modem linear borders historically have been preceded in 
Europe by zonal frontier regions contested by semi-independent lords. This does not 
mean that lines were not drawn on the geopolitical map. The Treaty of Verdun (843) 
divided the Carolingian Empire into three clearly demarcated territories. Although this 
gave some degree of legitimacy for the respective rulers to claim the allegiance of 
‘their’ local lords, it had to be practically negotiated and enforced from case to case.
To sum up, feudal territoriality can best be visualised in terms of concentric 
circles of central power projection. Only the sporadic assertion of royal overlordship 
over semi-autonomous peripheral lords reconstituted a sense of bounded territoriality 
at temporal intervals. As a rule, central claims to authority petered out in frontier zones 
constantly on the verge of secession and busily engaged in their own ‘foreign policies’ 
vis-a-vis adjacent regions. Amorphous medieval territoriality is thus not simply 
explained in terms of a mismatch between insufficient central administrative capacities 
(lack of means of communication and enforcement)158 and spatial extension, but is 
deeply engrained in the land-based political economy of lordships. Feudal 
decentralisation should thus not be understood as the contingent solution to a series of
Werner 1980.
156 Davies 1989, 1990.
157 Smith 1995, 179.
158 Weber [1922] 1968a, 1091.
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economic, technological and institutional absences, but rather as the definite expression 
of the presence of a determinate social property regime, which, in turn, explains why, 
for example, the means of communication and administration were not developed, 
given that feudal relations of exploitation did not exert a systematic pressure to invest 
in and thus to develop these means. Medieval political geography is the story of the 
cohesion between and fragmentation of feudal lordships - a phenomenon of ruling class 
organisation.
War and Peace: Medieval Feuding as Legal Redress
Given that political power was dispersed amongst a multiplicity of political 
actors, and the criterion defining a political actor was his arms-bearing character, the 
problematique of war and peace can only be understood as embedded in a diffuse 
oligopoly in the control of the means of violence. Against this background, the lines of 
demarcation between pacified domestic politics, and essentially hostile international 
relations, between criminal law and international law, become blurred. In fact, they are 
impossible to draw. What are the implications of such organisation of political power 
for the modes of conflict-resolution, for questions of war and peace in the Middle 
Ages?
War as Feud. The answer to this question lies in an interpretation of the 
feud.159 It receives primacy of attention since it mediated exemplarily the 'internal 
economic' contradictions of the ruling class into 'external political' conflicts by dint of 
inter-noble competition. The focus on the feud does not imply, of course, that all 
medieval wars were inter-lordly feuds. Only conflicts among feudal actors took the 
form of feuds. What is central here is that public peace always stood on the shaky 
grounds of the noble right to armed resistance. Since the right to resort to arms was 
part and parcel of conditional property, legitimate feuding was exclusively restricted to 
the noble class. Although monarchs attempted time and again to outlaw feuding in
159 Brunner 1992; White 1986 and 1996; Geary 1986.
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letter, they rarely succeeded (England was the partial exception) in enforcing the peace 
of the land in practice.
Noble 'self-help' was not a state of emergency, civil war, or the sudden re- 
imposition of a pre-contractual Hobbesian state of nature into an otherwise pacified 
society. Nor was it a Waltzian form of reactive power-maximisation to be inferred 
from international anarchy. It was a generally acknowledged and permissive form of 
jurisdictional redress seized by an aggrieved party.160 All secular nobles had the right to 
settle their disputes by force of arms - both in cases of failed arbitration and, ironically, 
successful arbitration. In this case, the execution of the sentence was the responsibility 
of the vindicated party in the absence of an overarching executive.161
Can we then distinguish meaningfully between the status of the feud and the 
status of war in the European Middle Ages? Brunner suggested that within Christian 
Europe contemporaries distinguished between feuds and war only by the magnitude of 
the conflict in question, not by the principle underlying both forms of violence.162 He 
backed up this interpretation by pointing out that warfare (legal feuding), both between 
minor lords and between powerful monarchs, was conducted according to the same 
formal proceedings. Notwithstanding the frequent transgression of these prerequisites 
and limits, we are here faced with a mode of conflict-resolution that (1) was exercised 
within ‘states’ as between ‘states’; (2) was regarded as a form of legitimate and 
jurisdictional form of redress; (3) was therefore not covered by some incipient 
international law; and (4) can only be adequately interpreted when set against the 
background of decentralised political power based upon the necessity of localised 
appropriation. To be sure, for superficial observers, these modes of conflict-resolution 
could constitute a self-help system in which might generates right, but only at the price 
of abstracting from its social rationale and a concomitant coarse equation of modem 
interstate wars with medieval feuds. In the Neorealist perspective, it does indeed not 
matter whether the object of inquiry refers to urban gang-warfare or the classical age 
of the European Concert of Powers. In the dark night of Neorealism, all cows appear 
to be grey.
160 Brunner 1992, 24.
161 Brunner 1992, 28; Bloch 1961, 360.
162 Brunner 1992, 33-5.
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The Many Peaces. As there was no ‘international’ concept of war, there was 
no ‘international’ concept of peace. Within ‘states’ and between ‘states’, lords stood 
principally in non-pacified relations to each other. They were agents of war and peace. 
Since the authorities who sponsored peace were ‘functionally differentiated’, those 
efforts reflected the hierarchy of peace-makers (the king’s peace, the Peace of God, the 
Peace of the Land, the peace of towns, the peace of lords) and were geared towards 
the pacification of inherently bellicose inter-lordly relations. The vocabulary of anarchy 
and hierarchy does not suffice to grasp such a unique state of affairs. The mechanisms 
of peace making, in turn, were as variegated as the diversity of feudal public actors. 
Let us exemplify this diversity of peace-making under feudal property-relations by 
looking at the activities of the bishops in the 10th Century.
Efforts to establish peace and order during the Feudal Revolution were 
everywhere initiated and orchestrated by regional bishops. The episcopal peace 
movements, evidently, were thus not motivated by abstract considerations of non­
violence or moral theology, nor even of compassion for a hard-hit peasantry that bore 
the brunt of lordly marauding: instead, they were a direct reaction to lordly 
encroachments on Church land and treasure.163 In the absence of royal protection, the 
immunities granted to the Church were now without legal and military protection. In 
this precarious situation the clergy, the only part of the non-producing class that bore 
no arms, developed a long-term secular interest in establishing modalities of peace to 
maintain their socio-economic basis. Alternatively, bishops began to arm themselves. 
However, the most effective means in their hands were privileged access to the means 
of spiritual reproduction. More drastically, the monopoly over the means of salvation 
provided the preferred ecclesiastical lever for interference in worldly matters for the 
pre-Gregorian Church: excommunication.164 To be sure, we should not be misled by its 
spiritual connotations, for it was not simply the moral capital of the praying class, but 
an effective means of exclusion from the legal community, usually with devastating 
social and material consequences. Deprivation of the Holy Communion was analogous 
to the loss of citizenship today.165
163 Flori 1992, 455-6; Brunner 1992, 15; Duby 1980.
164 Poly and Boumazel 1991, 154.
165 Berman 1983, 114; Geary 1986, 1119-20.
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What then did the pax dei and the treuga dei entail? The bishop-led peace 
movements did not intend to nor were they in a position to outlaw feuding, since noble 
demilitarisation would have undermined the very raison d'etre of the knightly mode of 
life. Rather they aimed to restrict and regulate the law of the fist by specifying 
exemptions to warring, first in terms of persons and objects (Peace of God), later in 
terms of time and space (Truce of God).166
In summary, the peace movements were a conscious strategy of appeasement 
on the part of the unarmed clergy and an attempt to contain the feudal crisis of the 
10th to 12th Centuries by those most afflicted before newly consolidated monarchies 
set themselves to work to restore peace by public means. Their example elucidates the 
non-state character of peace making in the Middle Ages.
Feudal ‘International Systems9: Beyond Anarchy and Hierarchy
What was the structuring principle of ‘international’ organisation in the 
European Middle Ages? Waltz, Ruggie, Fischer, and Spruyt agreed on the anarchic 
nature of the Middle Ages.167 We will now qualify this assertion and fine tune the 
anarchy/hierarchy problematiqne using a more detailed historisation of structures of 
lordship.
One of the weaknesses of the debate on the Middle Ages in IR is that none of 
its participants deemed it to be necessary to specify his statements in time and space. 
About which Middle Ages are we talking? If we focus on the changing forms of 
lordship, we have a criterion at hand which allows us to draw out visible differences 
between the medieval centuries without renouncing their essential identity. For these 
alterations in lordly property rights flow from social relations that underlie changing 
geopolitical contexts: feudal empires (650-950), feudal anarchy (950-1150), feudal 
state-system (1150-1450). In other words, the degree to which political powers of 
extraction were wielded in the hands of the land-holding class conditions the 
organising principle of feudal ‘international’ orders.
166 Bisson 1977.
167 Waltz 1979, 88; Ruggie 1986, 141; Fischer 1992, 461 ff.; Spruyt 1994a, 13.
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Banal, Domestic, and Landlordship
The literature distinguishes broadly between three dominant forms of lordship 
in the European Middle Ages.168
Banal lordship refers to what could most readily lay claim to medieval public 
state authority, namely royal powers of command, public taxation, punishment, 
adjudication and decreeing. Being authorised to wield the powers of the ban conferred 
the most encompassing form of domination and exploitation to the incumbents, 
constituting what Duby called the ‘master class’ within the medieval ruling class.169
Domestic lordship was the prevalent form of domination on the classical 
bipartite manor of Carolingian times. Here, the lord’s land was divided into a 
seigneurial demesne to be tilled by slave-labour and specified peasant services, and into 
surrounding peasant-plots cultivated independently by the tenured peasant. The ‘lord’s 
men’ had no access to public courts, nor did they have to pay taxes of a public 
character, but they were exclusively subject to the disciplinary measures of manorial 
control.170
Landlordship emerged in various regions of Western Europe from the late 12th 
to the late 14th Century. Here, the personal character - both between lord and vassal 
and between lord and peasantry - receded in favour of the proprietary character of the 
holding. The continental West European peasantry became enfranchised (the end of 
serfdom) and managed to fix its rents in peasant charters.171 Lords forfeited their 
power of command and taxation. The demesne and therewith, labour services lost 
importance in relation to rents in kind and increasingly in cash (monetarisation).
Conditional Hierarchy, Personalised Anarchy, Territorial Anarchy
168 Duby 1974, 174-7; Comninel 1992. German terminology distinguishes Leibherrschaft, 
Banngrundherrschaft, and Abgabengrundherrschaft, Rosener 1992, 10-13.
169 Duby 1974, 176.
170 Bloch 1966, 70.
171 Brenner 1996.
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We will now set out how specific lordship constellations translated into 
diverging structuring principles of early, high, and late medieval ‘international’ 
systems.
The Carolingian Empire was built upon a combination of banal lordship, 
wielded by the Emperor and his public officials (missi, counts), domestic lordship 
wielded by lesser lords in the exploitation of their estates, and free and arms-bearing 
peasant proprietors. In specifying the internal structure of the Empire, we find a weak 
presumption of hierarchy. All noble land was handed out by the Emperor, fiefs were 
nonhereditary, the Church was still politically integrated into the Empire, and the 
power of the ban overrode lordly rights. Having said that, the assumption of hierarchy 
must be relaxed because the Emperor was not simply head of state; he was the 
supreme vassalic lord and was bound in this capacity by the reciprocal terms of the 
vassalic contract. The hierarchy of authority claims was further eroded through the 
spreading institution of immunity which exempted ecclesiastical estates from any state 
interference.172 Therefore, one must speak of conditional hierarchy. Although a 
variety of competing autonomous sources of law coexisted next to royal law, 
conditional hierarchy flowed from the Emperor’s overriding politico-military and 
theocratic authority over his imperial aristocracy and lesser lords. Talk of conditional 
hierarchy rests, of course, on the assumption that the Empire can be conceived as an 
‘international system’ in the first place. To the degree that it was made up of a 
multiplicity of semi-independent political actors, whose ultima ratio was the lawful 
recourse to arms, bound together through a series of interpersonal contracts, we 
contend that this is justifiable.
This brings us to the problem of ‘external sovereignty’ defined as the exclusive 
capacity to conclude international treaties, declaring war, and having diplomatic 
representation. Although only the Emperor could perform these functions in the name 
of the Empire, Carolingian magnates equally engaged in these forms of international 
relations, not only with ‘foreign political actors’, but also amongst themselves.173 
Finally, we have to inquire into the relation of the Empire to its surrounding polities 
and great powers. Here, a string of neighbouring polities were bound to the Franks 
either through vassalage or through tribute-payments, without being at any time
172 Quaritsch 1970, 190-96.
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incorporated into the Empire. They were subjected to Carolingian suzerainty. Some 
polities, however, were outside the sphere of Frankish influence (Byzantine Empire, 
the Califat of Cordoba, and the kingdoms of the British Isles). In this wider 
geopolitical perspective, neither hierarchy nor formal anarchy can be maintained. With 
the exceptions of the latter polities, the Frankish Empire was hegemonial.
In the wake of the cessation of Frankish expansion, the Empire disintegrated 
from the mid-9th Century onwards into its constituent building-blocks: lordships. In 
this process, local lords began to usurp the kingly power of the ban. They ‘privatised’ 
high justice, taxed their ‘subjects’, territorialised their fiefs, patrimonialised their lands 
through the introduction of hereditability, and subjected the remaining free peasantry 
to serfdom.174 The merger of banal lordship and domestic lordship during the Feudal 
Revolution converted the estate into a fully independent seigneurie. This 
chronologically and territorially uneven process culminated in the 11th Century but 
was geographically confined to the Western Kingdom due to the persistent 
opportunities of conquest offered by the eastern frontier.175 What was at one time an 
internally consolidated polity turned into a multiplicity of petty conflict-units. 
Widespread feuding and the militarisation of the country-side unleashed ‘feudal 
anarchy’. The castellans and knights rose to power. The French king became one 
small-scale actor among many. The predominance of this power-configuration led 
medievalists to talk of the ‘second feudal age’ and ‘parcellization of sovereignty’.176 If, 
for the sake of argument, we consider this political constellation an ‘international 
system’, then we have to call it an anarchy among ‘functionally differentiated’ actors - 
an anarchy based upon changes in the proprietary patterns of the land-holding class. 
Since, however, the fragmentation of political power cascaded down the ladder of 
territorial districts to the smallest possible conflict-unit, the castellan or even the 
knight, we propose to call this pattern a personalised anarchy. Every lord was his own 
conflict-unit.
Finally, a new separation of banal and domestic lordly power emerged during 
the period of reconsolidating feudal states in the late 12th Century and after. Whereas
173 Mattingly 1988, 23; Ganshof 1970.
174 Bonnassie 1991.
175 Elias 1994, 281; Leyser 1968, 31.
176 Bloch 1961; Mitteis 1975.
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banal lordship was re-appropriated by greater magnates and eventually monopolised by 
a few kings, landlordship became the basis of reproduction for the nobles on the land. 
‘Bastard feudalism’ transformed lordly military services into money payments to the 
overlord. In France, lords were increasingly drawn into the service of greater 
magnates. The reconstitution of higher royal courts, in turn, was a result of 
competitive processes between feuding lords. By the 13th Century, competition had 
given rise to a re-territorialisation of banal powers in the hands of a dozen still 
competing principalities, among which the Capetians emerged eventually victorious in 
France.177 Although vassalic relations among the bigger conflict units (even the king of 
England remained nominally vassal to the king of France until the 15th Century) still 
compromised an exclusive notion of territoriality, their significance receded to the 
degree that feudal services were successively replaced through the tax/office structure 
by more centralised states. This meant the emergence of feudal nonexclusive territorial 
anarchy in the late Middle Ages. The non-exclusivity of this form of territoriality must 
be stressed, since landlords retained substantial political powers over their peasants, 
emergent towns, based upon urban law, freed themselves from seigneurial control, and 
the reformed papacy now asserted its authority claims through transnational canon law.
To conclude, domestic lordship in connection with a kingly monopoly of the 
ban underwrote early medieval empire building, which endured as long as the Franks 
successfully conquered surrounding tribes. The structuring principle is here a 
conditional form o f hierarchy (internal conditional hierarchy, external limited 
hegemony). Furthermore, the heyday of ‘feudal anarchy’ was based on strongly 
personalised banal lordships. Personalised anarchy brought to the fore the inherently 
fragile basis of feudal state formation under localised conditions of appropriation 
(internal hierarchy, external personalised anarchy). Finally, we maintain that the 
separation of banal lordship and landlordship allowed public power to be re- 
territorialised. From this transition nonexclusive territorial anarchy emerged between 
the units of the feudal state system (internal conditional hierarchy, external 
heteronomous anarchy).
177 Hallam 1980.
Conclusion: Geopolitical Systems as Social Systems
This chapter provided an analysis of the nature of medieval geopolitical 
relations and medieval political core-phenomena in order to expose some fundamental 
shortcomings of current IR theory. Let us summarise its positive implications and 
theoretical challenges for the wider contemporary IR discourse.
We started with the assumption that the character of international systems 
expresses the nature of their constitutive units which are themselves predicated upon 
determinate social property relations. We showed how historicising neorealists and 
constructivists have failed (1) to understand the generative structure of medieval 
geopolitical order, (2) to theorise the major antagonistic strategies of action that 
determine an inherently bellicose geopolitical dynamic, (3) to account for internal shifts 
in system structure within the European Middle Ages, (4) to conceptualise the time- 
bound social character of major medieval political and ‘international’ institutions, 
beginning with the ‘state’. Furthermore (5), we suggested that neorealists failed to 
specify how the emergence of the modem states system is to be theorised within the 
parameters of a structuralist IR theory. We also (6) pointed to some limits of 
constructivist readings of medieval discourses and self-understandings in the absence 
of their social grounding in processes of reproduction.
This prompted us to go beyond a description of medieval institutions by 
unpacking feudal conditional property as a social relation among lords and between 
lords and peasants. This relation is institutionalised in the lordship - the constitutive 
unit of feudal order - establishing political access to peasant-produce. Induced by 
collective peasant resistance and the needs of external conquest and defence, lords self- 
organise in a ‘state of associated persons’. The ‘state’ guarantees noble property and 
lordly survival. Lordly reproduction follows the logic of political accumulation, being 
both an ‘economic’ (lord-peasant) and a geopolitical (lord-lord) process. However, the 
nexus between lordly individual appropriation and the legitimate right to resist, fixed in 
the noble right to bear arms, precludes a state monopoly in the means of violence. 
Inter-lordly relations are then by definition neither ‘international’ and therewith 
anarchic, nor domestic, and therewith hierarchic. ‘Sovereignty’ is parcellized amongst
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politically appropriating lords. We thus unfolded the historically bounded meanings of 
the medieval ‘state’, territoriality and frontier, war-as-feud and peace, hierarchy and 
anarchy, and deduced the competitive geopolitical rationality of feudal actors from 
property relations.
The theory of social property relations does not only vindicate the common 
objection to Neorealism’s lack of a generative grammar and transformative logic, but 
questions its very assumption that there is a distinct international level in medieval 
Europe which can be meaningfully theorised in abstraction from the internal properties 
and reproductive logic of feudal society. The state and the market, the domestic and 
the international are not yet differentiated 'into separate spheres. This opens up the 
question of the genesis and constitution of the modem international system.
For how should we understand the passage from medieval parcellized 
‘sovereignty’ to modem absolute sovereignty? The concept of sovereignty is 
historically connected with absolutism and the Westphalian states system. Let us 
unravel its social property regime. French absolutism was built upon a combination of 
widespread peasant property in land and ‘private’ property in state offices held by the 
old nobility and a new office-holding state-class.178 Although serfs no longer pay 
politically enforced rents to their lords, absolutist appropriation continues to be a 
political process for taxes are politically enforced on free peasants by the state. Despite 
the pooling of military power in the absolutist state, state and economy remain 
undifferentiated. The relation between the producer (free peasant) and the non- 
producer (state) remains politically constituted. The personal element of domination 
persists since absolute power is not invested in the state, but in the person of the king. 
‘Z, 'Etat, c ’est moi ’ connotes sovereignty as the personal property of the king.179
As in the feudal case, this translates immediately into a specific geopolitical 
dynamic of the absolutist states system. International accumulation proceeds politically 
through war and marriages between dynastic states. State-sponsored mercantilism and 
not the capitalist policy of free trade marks the leading economic doctrine of the age.
178 Brenner 1985b.
179 Rowen 1961, 1969, 1980.
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Against conventional IR assumptions,180 absolutist sovereignty, and therewith the 
Westphalian states system and its territorial geopolitical logic, are thoroughly pre­
modem institutions.181 Early modem international relations remain locked in the zero- 
sum game of political accumulation.
On the basis of the non-modernity of absolutist sovereignty, we have yet again 
to go a step further. If the parcellization of ‘sovereignty’ under feudalism expresses the 
politico-military nexus between serfs and lords, and if absolutist sovereignty expresses 
the politico-military nexus between free peasants and king, then, modem sovereignty 
presupposes de-politicising this nexus. Only after historically accomplishing this de­
politicisation can sovereignty be pooled in an abstract state above economy and 
society. This process is intimately connected to the transformation of politically 
constituted property into private property and the concomitant transformation of free 
peasant proprietors into wage labour.182 Since the labour-relation is henceforth based 
upon a private, ‘non-coercive’ contract, accumulation turns into a ‘purely’ economic 
process. Therewith, the economic becomes disembedded from the political.183 A 
‘purely’ political state, based upon the monopoly of the means of violence, and a ‘free’ 
market, based upon the commodification of all factors of production, spring into 
existence. Contrary to Ruggie’s assertion, ‘modem’ sovereignty expresses precisely 
the separation between private property and public authority.184 However, if this 
argument holds, it follows that in the leading European nation-states the ‘decaying 
pillars of the Westphalian temple’ already lay in ruins in the 19th Century, if not earlier.
If private property marks the constitutive principle of capitalist sovereignty, 
then international anarchy - contrary to what constructivists argue - is more than ‘what 
states make of it’.185 The ‘critical-theoretical’ claim that ‘sovereignty is a practical 
category’186 applies only to the state’s functional dimension, not to its constitutive
180 Krasner questions effectively many assumptions on Westphalia’s essential modernity. Yet, 
rather than specifying modem sovereignty’s deep generative structure, he dissolves its content 
as a permanently contested, and thus ‘contingent and pliant’ social practice. Krasner 1993, 
238.
181 Rosenberg 1994, 135-39.
182 Brenner 1985b, 284-91.
183 Polanyi 1944. Indeed, the first capitalist state turns out to be England, Wood 1991.
184 Ruggie 1986, 143.
185 Wendt 1992.
186 Ashley 1984, 273.
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dimension.187 In other words, the generative structure of capitalist property-relations 
sets absolute limits to what a community of co-reflective statesmen can practically do. 
The secret of the state lies outside its own sphere of influence. This then points to the 
question of whether the present international system of sovereign states is necessarily 
linked to the persistence of private property. What can be maintained is that although 
anarchy endures, the primary dynamic of inter-action between the advanced capitalist 
states is no longer military competition over territory as a source of income.
By identifying social property relations and their conflictual contestations as 
constitutive of all international systems and their distinct geopolitical dynamics, we 
advance a theory of IR that combines a transformative logic with a principle of 
generative structure. Thus, the argument goes decisively beyond current assumptions 
in IR, be they of neorealist, realist, constructivist, or ‘critical-theoretical’ persuasion.
While this concluding comparative sketch on the difference between the 
modem and the pre-modem state has important periodological consequences for IR 
theory by calling Westphalia’s modernity into question, it only theorises the state in the 
singular. Yet, the differentia specifica of the European experience resides precisely in 
the formation of a plurality of states and their coexistence in a recognised and 
multilaterally regulated system of states. The prior question which has therefore to be 
addressed is how it is that states emerged in Europe in the plural. To answer this 
question, we have to turn to the logic behind the decomposition of the last pan- 
European empire: the Carolingian Empire.
187 Thomson 1995, 224.
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Chapter Three
From Hierarchy to Anarchy: The History of the Social Relations 
of Lordship (c800 - c!350)
‘The feudal mode of production, itself wholly “pre-national” 
in character, objectively prepared the possibility of a multi­
national state system in the epoch of its subsequent transition 
to capitalism.’188
Introduction: Theorising Systemic Change in IR
The Transition from Imperial Hierarchy to Royal Anarchy as a Problem fo r  IR 
Theory
This chapter provides an explanation of the 10th Century shift in European 
geopolitical order from hierarchy to anarchy. This shift is synonymous with the 
transition from the early to the high Middle Ages. The course of this transformation in 
system-structure can be divided into three major phases. The break-up of the 
Carolingian Empire (1) in the 9th Century gave rise to the politically highly fragmented 
banal regime (2) during the crisis of the Year 1000, which was itself transformed 
through the re-consolidation of public authority by feudal kings (3) in the course of the 
post-crisis centuries. The outcome was an anarchic system composed of plural feudal 
kingdoms. These polities were organised along inter-personal bonds, not exclusive 
territorial jurisdictions, and characterised European geopolitical order until the 14th
188 Anderson 1974b, 412. Yet, while the fragmented character of feudalism prepared the 
multilateral character of the modem system of states, the predatory logic of absolutism reduced 
the number of European states decisively during the early modem Europe. If it was not for the 
onset of capitalism in Britain, the Absolutist system of equilibrium qua partition and 
compensation might well have generated another European Empire.
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Century crisis, laying the basis for the political pluriverse which came to consolidate 
itself during the early modem period as the European system of states.
The Carolingian Empire was the last European political community which laid 
claim to universal domination in contemporary Latin Europe. Although Arab Spain, 
the British Isles, Scandinavia and eastern Europe remained outside its sphere of 
influence, the Frankish polity comprised the lands of Western and Central Europe 
under one political authority, regarded itself as Rome’s legitimate successor, blended 
religious and political might in a theocratic conception of imperial power, and 
constituted the hegemonic actor in early medieval European politics. The process of its 
dissolution and the subsequent re-consolidation of political authority in plural and 
altered forms confronts IR Theory with a series of theoretical challenges regarding its 
rationale, origins, timing, form, dynamics, and consequences.
However, the relevance of this shift from imperial hierarchy to royal anarchy is 
not confined to its case-study character for IR as an example of fundamental structural 
change. Rather, the break-up of the Frankish Empire had profound long-term 
implications for regionally-diverging long-term trajectories of European regime- 
formation and the general spatial configuration of the modem state system as a multi­
actor system. On the one hand, this shift resulted in a sustained process of extra- 
Frankish geopolitical expansion which prefigured the long-term geopolitically divided 
character of Europe as a non-imperial system of states demarcated along dynastic lines. 
On the other hand, the specific experiences of post-expansionary state-formation were 
to a decisive degree pre-structured by the social forms of post-millennial expansion.
The non-neorealist IR literature has so far focused on the ‘medieval-to-modem 
shift’ as a fundamental change in the structure of international order from feudal 
heterogeneity to modem state-based anarchy. This shift, however, was not only 
preceded by this earlier epochal transformation of geopolitical order - similar in 
historical magnitude and theoretical importance -, but took place in an international 
context which was decisively shaped by this prior epochal change from hierarchy to 
anarchy. This poses three problems for IR Theory and social theory at large: First, how 
to account for this shift in systems structure? Second, given that the Westphalian Peace 
Settlement was set in an already pre-existing system of multiple dynastic polities, what 
are its implications for a re-interpretation of the meaning of 1648? Third, given that the
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rise of a system of states was not logically or historically connected to and preceded 
the onset of capitalism, what is the effect of capitalism on the state system and, 
inversely, what is the effect of the state system on the expansion of capitalism? This 
chapter attempts to answer the first question and explores thereby the pre-history of 
the making of the early modem system of states.
The argument, which will be fully drawn out in chapter six, is that when 
Europe underwent its ‘medieval-to-modem shift’ during the early modern period, it 
was already fragmented into a plurality of political communities. Although these 
communities did not represent modem sovereign states, but rather, in their system- 
defining majority, patrimonial-absolutist polities headed by dynastic families, their 
territorial identities - consolidated through absolutist practices of rule - established 
during the preceding seven centuries were already pronounced enough to form the 
building-blocks for the Westphalian conception of international order. Ex hypothesis, it 
follows that 1648 did not mark the beginning of a modem anarchical system of ‘states’, 
but rather the culmination of a period of plural feudal-absolutist state-formations, 
whose origins can be traced back to the dissolution of the Carolingian Empire and, in 
particular, to the resolution of the 10th Century crisis. The Westphalian Peace Treaties, 
as we will argue in chapter six, did not alter the prevailing mode of territorial and 
geopolitical organisation and the international rules of diplomatic conduct, but 
enshrined and recognised the cumulative developments of the preceding seven 
centuries of competitive and plural state-formations. Thus, the dominant signatories at 
Munster and Osnabriick did not represent modem states as defined by Max Weber, but 
embodied dynastic conceptions of sovereignty as the private property of kings. While 
Westhalia codified the multilateral recognition of Europe as a political pluriverse, it did 
thereby not establish modem international relations or modem territorial order. To this 
extent, 1648 was more of an end, than a beginning.
Theoretically, the anarchical character of the modem system of states can 
neither be posited as a trans-historically given nor can it be tautologically derived from 
international competition per se. It cannot be exhaustively explained by the 
conventionality of a series of international peace treaties, nor, indeed, deduced from 
the ‘logic of capital’. In order to substantiate the thesis that the basis for a multi-actor 
Europe was already laid in the period between the 9th and the 11th Century, this 
chapter, informed by the theory of social property relations, sets out by inquiring into
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the nature of the Carolingian Empire and the reasons behind its collapse. For it is 
around the millennium that a new type of social relations of lordship spread throughout 
the Frankish heartlands, which was - according to our thesis - decisive for the long­
term social and political development of various European regions. The ‘Feudal 
Revolution’,189 the not undisputed term for this general transformation, established a 
new mode of political domination and economic exploitation, spawning a series of 
closely interrelated novel phenomena. Socially, it changed the status of the direct 
producers from slavery and free peasantry to serfdom; politically, it ushered in a 
prolonged crisis of public governance resulting in the feudalisation of political power; 
militarily, it gave rise to an internal differentiation within the nobility associated with 
the emergence of the knightly class; and geopolitically, it marked the point of departure 
for a surprising display of noble ‘political accumulation’, resulting in four expansionary 
outward movements driving the late Frankish lords over the borders of the Carolingian 
core lands into hitherto unconquered regions. In a time-span of eighty years, the post- 
Frankish knights asserted their land hunger by setting out to conquer the British Isles 
(Norman Conquest, 1066), Southern Italy (1061) and the eastern Mediterranean (First 
Crusade, 1096-99), the Iberian peninsula (Reconquista, 1035), and large stretches of 
the lands east of the Elbe-Saale line (Deutsche Ostsiedlung, 1110). Out of the 
millennial crucible of the ‘Feudal Revolution’, lordship-based political communities 
spread all over Europe which had a lasting influence on the various regional processes 
of state-formation throughout late medieval and early modem times. These knight-led 
expansionary movements were not completed until the 15th Century and established the 
institutional and geographical parameters for the international organisation of the 
European early modem system of states.
Recapitulating the Explanatory Framework
189 Cf. the survey article by Bisson 1994 and the debate in Past & Present between Barthelemy 
1996, White 1996, Wickham 1997 and the reply in Bisson 1997. Although the majority of 
medievalists, following the lead of Duby (1978, 147-66), has accepted and substantiated 
Duby’s thesis of a ‘Feudal Revolution’ or ‘mutation feodale’ to highlight the deep cesura in 
social and political relations around the millennium (cf. Poly and Boumazel 1991 and Bois 
1992), the ongoing debate features now a small revisionist current which contests its 
chronology and extent (Barthelemy 1996).
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‘How is the unique dynamism of the European theatre of international 
feudalism to be explained?’190 Clearly, on first sight, these processes were violence- 
driven. Yet, the pure logic of geopolitical competition does not exhaust their social 
rationale, origins, timing, nature, dynamics and consequences. In the previous chapter, 
we suggested an interpretation of the role of political violence and geopolitical 
competition revolving around the centrality of extra-economic compulsion in socio­
economic orders in which the direct producers are in possession of the means of 
subsistence. Political violence, so visible in the 10th and 11th Centuries, demonstrates 
the crisis-potential of an economic order in which struggles over access to and the 
redistribution of peasant-produced agrarian surplus between lords and peasants and 
among lords constitute the dominant social dynamic behind large-scale social and 
geopolitical change. It follows that in European feudal societies the geopolitical 
dynamics of their major agents, be they small lords or powerful monarchs, cannot be 
dissociated from their direct reproductive concerns. The essential unity of the political 
and the economic (potestats et utilitas) in feudal society explains the recurrence of 
feuds and war as rational forms of reproduction and therewith constitutive features of 
European pre-capitalist international relations. Feudal ‘international’ relations are then 
no more external to outlined strategies of reproduction than are ‘domestic’ relations. 
The internal and external aspects of ruling class behaviour can both be deduced from 
the prevailing agrarian property settlement.
Consequently, lordly investments were, as a rule, not geared towards the means 
of production, but towards the means of exploitation which secured the conditions of 
surplus extraction, the persistence of bonded forms of labour, and, by the same token, 
the competitive edge in the conflicts over inter-lordly redistribution. The nexus 
between extra-economic appropriation and investment in the means of violence 
constitutes the social rationale behind outstanding medieval military innovations, the 
build-up of elaborate military equipment, and the ubiquity of war in medieval times.191 
Thus, although feudal societies have been portrayed to be relatively lethargic in 
economic and technological terms, their inner contradictions, fates and fortunes 
appeared most strikingly in the military and political realms. Since access to land and
190 Anderson 1974b, 402.
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labour constituted the highest good in feudal society, politically conducted violent 
struggles over such access translated a fortiori in what IR theorists would call 
geopolitical processes of conquest and expansion. An answer to Perry Anderson’s 
question must therefore be sought in the internally competitive inter-personal structure 
of European feudalism based on de-centralised modes of agrarian exploitation, which 
never allowed a conclusive monopolisation of political power in one paramount center 
of imperial sovereignty.
On the basis of these theoretical premises, this chapter challenges directly 
dominant IR theories. In particular, it shows, firstly, the insufficiency of neorealist 
attempts to theorise international relations at the level of systemically-induced 
geopolitical inter-actor relations in abstraction from wider social relations. Secondly, it 
tries to refute realist axioms which deduce geopolitical competition essentially from a 
transhistorically conceptualised Hobbesian nature of man, by showing how a 
historically specific attitude towards war and violence was inextricably bound up with 
historically specific property relations. Thirdly, it argues that constructivist approaches, 
which base their explanations of variations in foreign policy behaviour on discursively 
negotiable, and thus alterable, conventions and leaming-processes amongst conflict- 
units, tend to underrate those non-negotiable structural interests which govern identity- 
formation and set determinate limits to their voluntary alterations. Fourthly, the 
chapter responds to the question of how IR Theory can theorise both, systemic 
continuity as well as profound and epochal transformations in the very structure of 
international order and its constitutive rules of international politics. In this, it advances 
more than just a comparative historical sociology of successive geopolitical orders by 
providing a historically-informed explanation of the reasons behind as well as the 
timing, dynamics and consequences of the general revolution of the year 1000. In other 
words, this chapter theorises the passage from the early to the high Middle Ages as a 
historical continuum with a view to its geopolitical implications.
Methodological Reorientation: From System to Process
191 Systematically theorised by Brenner 1986, 27-32
93
In order to trace and comprehend these dynamic processes, this chapter 
employs an alternative methodological stance. In the preceding chapter, I have set out 
the sui generis meanings of such medieval key-concepts as ‘state’, domination, power, 
war, peace, violence, property, territoriality, and geopolitical relations as they arise out 
of definite social relations between the two major classes. The mode of exposition 
adopted a conceptual level of abstraction which captured the respective specificity of 
these macro-phenomena within the generality of the feudal order.
This chapter, in contrast, seeks to translate or dissolve these medieval forms of 
social life into the real flow of history. The consequent change in perspective, from a 
comparative-systematic to a developmental approach, mandates a stylistic shift from a 
largely phenomenological-conceptual to a more narrative mode of exposition. 
Conceptual stasis has to yield to processual dynamics. This stylistic shift, however, 
intends to maintain the rigours of social-scientific inquiry by seeking to advance a 
historically informed and theoretically controlled exposition of the real history of the 
social relations of lordship.
Such seemingly unfathomable historical flux is animated and pervaded by 
contradictory strategies of lordly and peasantly reproduction as outlined in the section 
‘the Structure-Agent Problem in Medieval Terms’ of the preceding chapter. Medieval 
class-related rules of reproduction constitute, of course, not simply free-floating modes 
of securing material reproduction in the social metabolism with nature. They cannot be 
changed at will or randomly. Rather, these modes of action flow from, are embedded 
in, and re-enter definite structures of domination and exploitation: the institutions of 
lordship. It is within these varying forms of lordship that the antagonistic interests of 
the direct producers and the non-producers are negotiated, played out, and temporarily 
resolved. The range of social action within the institutions of lordship is therefore finite 
as long as the latter do not turn themselves into the object of contestation. This means 
inversely that these structures of lordship do not impose absolute, that is, timeless and 
unalterable, limits to social action. Although they are constantly and wilfully 
reproduced, they are themselves not immune to dispute and should thus not be ‘frozen’ 
or reified into insuperable ‘iron cages of obedience’ - to use an anachronistic term. 
Bounded voluntary action and action-defining social institutions form a dialectical 
nexus, open to qualitative transformations. For, whereas the everyday form of social
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conflict in the European Middle Ages assumes the routine appearance of quantitative 
alterations in the levels of rents - be they in kind, labour, or cash - , in times of 
sharpened conflict over the distribution of income, the very institutions of extraction 
are at stake. In other words, whereas the routine form of social inter-action appears as 
competition and negotiation on the basis of a tacitly accepted or openly recognised set 
of non-negotiable rules, rule-maintenance can be transmuted into rule-contestation. 
The conditions of structural change take the form of general social crisis. It is then that 
qualitative alterations occur in the structural relations between lords and peasants. Out 
of the competitive and precarious force-field of contradictory social interests, change 
arises in history.
The timing and direction of historical change is unpredictable and only 
retrospectively intelligible. Yet, as shown in this chapter, the respective balances of 
class-forces in time and space, the internal degree of cohesion and solidarity within 
each class - lords and peasants - is decisive in accounting for the success or failure in 
the establishment of new institutions of reproduction and domination. It is only when 
the character of multiple ‘de-subjectified’ structural long-term influences - be they 
demographic, technological, geopolitical, or commercial - is understood as an outflow 
of definite social property relations, and when their impact upon human action is 
fractured through the conscious decisions of historical agents, that the course of 
history acquires a definite direction and therewith a retraceable meaning. History is 
therefore neither accidental and contingent, nor determined or preordained, but 
nevertheless susceptible to rational understanding and critique. History, according to 
Hegel, is the resolution of contradictions. Philosophy maintains the indeterminacy of 
these resolutions. Social Science adopts the role of Minerva’s owl and lays bare their 
retrospective necessity. This chapter, then, seeks to set out how class-related 
contradictory strategies of reproduction changed the course of European history and, 
especially, the geopolitical configuration of power in the period between c.800 and 
c.1350.
Thus, while adopting a more narrative style in this chapter, we attempt to 
control the mass of historical evidence within a determinate theoretical framework, so 
as to arrive at an overall reinterpretation of this period in its implications for IR theory. 
Section one sets out the nature of the Carolingian Empire and the forms of Frankish
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geopolitical expansion. Section two explores the demise of the Carolingian Empire and 
the subsequent re-configuration of relations of domination during the ‘Feudal 
Revolution’ of the 10th and 11th Centuries in form of the banal regime. Section three 
shows how the new post-crisis social property settlement in the late-Carolingian core 
regions created social conditions conducive for feudal expansion, that translated into 
the fourfold geopolitical outward-movement of the post-Frankish lordly class. In 
particular, it lays out how the resolution of the 11th Century crisis affected the radically 
diverging experiences of long-term state-formation in France and England, which, in 
turn, were instrumental for their respective early modem state forms. The conclusion 
draws out the wider implications for IR theory of the constitution of a feudo-dynastic 
multi-actor system which came to characterise the post-millennial political geography 
of Europe. The dissolution of history into dynamic process shows how the period 
between c.800 and c.1350 should not be seen as an abstract succession of international 
systems, but as a crisis-ridden historical process in which geopolitical relations arise 
out of and flow back into the reproduction of concrete, but changing, societies.
The Carolingian Empire
In order to comprehend the significance of the epochal shift which set in 
around the year 1000 and to specify its main agents, we briefly have to outline the 
nature of the Carolingian Empire.
The Patrimonial Nature o f the Frankish State
In its zenith, the Carolingian Empire (8th and 9th Centuries) embraced the whole 
of Gaul (including Septimania and Brittany), western and southern Germany (including 
Saxony, Frisia and parts of the middle Danube region), the north-eastern Iberian 
peninsula, and Lombardian Italy. Institutionally, the Carolingian polity rested on a 
peculiar combination of more public ‘Roman’ elements and more feudal inter-personal
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‘Germanic’ elements.192 In its post-coronation heyday, it evinced a remarkably 
pronounced public ofFice-structure -  operated by counts and vice-counts which 
overarched nascent feudo-vassalic inter-lordly relations which grew in the 9th Century 
at the expense of public officialdom.193 The ‘offices’ of the state were staffed by 
appointed officials overwhelmingly drawn from the Frankish imperial aristocracy or co­
opted from conquered nobles - be they counts, bishops, abbots or royal vassals - 
whose term of office ceased on imperial deposition or on their death. Counts kept 
social order in presiding over courts, supervised royal estates, collected taxes and 
enforced the royal levy.194 The count system was supplemented by the office of the 
missus, the gem in the Carolingian non-bureaucratic state.195 Missi were temporary, 
but plenipotentiary, royal inspectors originally entrusted with the judicial, fiscal and 
military supervision of landed counts, being empowered to override comital decisions 
or to penalise comital public abuses and miscarriages. In shuttling between the 
peripatetic imperial court and their local districts, these landless missi formed the main 
pillar of imperial public governance, central control and statehood around the year 800. 
Although Frankish officers reproduced themselves like later vassals from the profits of 
public jurisdiction and the rents of their granted lands (comitatus), their offices were 
initially revocable and non-hereditary, allowing for a relatively extraordinary degree of 
medieval centralised public power.
This office structure was directly dependent upon a strong institution of 
kingship, epitomised by the king’s monopoly of the ban - the power to tax, command, 
decree, and adjudicate. Kingship itself was dynastic, hereditary, and personal, that is 
patrimonial in character. The kingdom was regarded as the king’s private property. At 
the same time, the pre-Gregorian papacy remained politically subordinate to the 
Emperor, while Church lands were integrated into the realm. Ecclesiastical 
organisation and control lay in the hands of the reigning dynasty and was systematically 
employed in the build-up of the Imperial Church System (Reichskirchensystem).196 Its
192 Anderson 1974a and Mitteis 1975, 7-23.
193 Mitteis 1975, 53-72; Ganshof 1971a; Nelson 1995.
194 Nelson 1995,410-14.
195 ‘Ce pouvoir [sc. le pouvoir missiatique, B.T.] etait la delegation par excellence des 
pouvoirs royaux sur le plan militaire et civil, par lequel le bannum, le ban royal qui 
incarnait ses pouvoirs royaux, pouvait etre transmis en dehors de la presence physique du 
souverain.’ Wemer 1980, 220.
196 Wemer 1980.
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positions were customarily staffed with royal favourites and dependants. Crucially and 
in decisive contrast to post-millennial feudal polities, the Carolingian monarchy was a 
theocracy. The institutions of the political sphere did not operate independently from 
those of the religious sphere. The temporal and the spiritual were one.
In principle, however, the term political centralisation presents an anachronism 
in the context of medieval polities. As in most medieval ‘states’, the Empire had itself 
virtually no central administration, no centralised judiciary, nor a centrally administered 
fiscal system.197 Medieval kings did not govern or administer via well-entrenched 
bureaucracies - they reigned. The practice of domination was inseparable from the 
physical body of the lord. Medieval rule meant personalised rule. In this respect, the 
peripatetic nature of the Emperor and his entourage, perambulating between various 
palatinates and enjoying rights of residence at the courts of the higher nobility, is itself 
indicative of the structural difficulty of exercising effective and permanent trans­
personal state-authority under conditions of localised political appropriation in the 
absence of a state-monopoly in the means of violence.
Frankish Dual Social Property Relations
The comparatively extraordinary degree of internal stability, peace and public 
order during Charlemagne’s reign was predicated upon a distinct social property 
regime giving rise to a class-constellation which fostered the conditions for successful 
external aggression, which, in turn, sanctioned the internal institutional set-up of the 
Carolingian Empire.
Domestically, the coexistence of a hierarchical internal command-structure 
culminating in the king and more reciprocal feudo-vassalic relations was based upon a 
distinct two-tiered social property regime. Firstly, local lords had absolute authority 
over their dependants on the classical Carolingian bi-partite manor,198 which was 
divided into the lordly desmesne worked by slaves and serfs personally bound to such 
domestic lords, and into tenements cultivated by the same peasants for their own 
subsistence. Secondly, a substantial though decreasing number of free and arms-
197 Ganshof 1971a.
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bearing peasants was exclusively subject to and taxed by royal counts recruited from 
the privileged imperial Frankish aristocracy.199 The outcome of this dual property 
structure was a distinct division of political competencies and powers of exploitation 
between monarch-cum-imperial aristocracy and local lordly class which tended to 
dampen inter-lordly competition in the exploitation of a differentiated peasantry. 
Schematically, we witness a king/Emperor directly taxing via his counts a free allodial 
peasantry, next to a local lordly class extracting rents in labour and in kind from slaves 
and serfs on their manors. This division in the exploitation of the peasantry generated a 
viable system of class alliances in which the free peasantry remained protected over 
and against the ambitions of local lords by dint of kingly institutions, generating for the 
king a permanent source of income which left the immediate estates of local lords and 
their bonded forms of labour untouched. Thus, the natural tensions between imperial 
aristocracy and local nobility remained latent.
Yet, this class constellation was labile and contained of necessity the seeds for 
intra-ruling class conflict. It was within the nature of the medieval ‘state’ that public 
officials were not remunerated by the public purse qua salary, but had to secure their 
reproduction through the political profits accruing from their public functions, notably 
through the collection of judicial fines. In this respect, Carolingian officers were never 
state-functionaries, but full-blown physical representatives of the king wielding the 
power of the ban in proxy. In addition, the grant of an office went hand in hand with 
the grant of a landed endowment, so that ‘public’ agents were simultaneously ‘private’ 
lords, drawing on independent sources of income and being thus in a position to 
maintain armed retinues. In order to counter the threat of secession, Carolingian rulers 
increasingly demanded a feudal oath in which the prospective incumbent promised 
fidelity and service in return for conditional land-holding. These personal and informal 
ties (vassalage) added another layer of central control, but could not remove the basic 
problem of the identity of office and independent power-base. Decisively then, the 
removal of a disloyal count, for example, depended in concretu upon the overlord’s 
actual power to separate the office-holder from his lordship (comitatus) in a feud. In 
other words, the separation of the official from his means of administration, which 
defines according to Max Weber the essence of modem bureaucracy, was never
198 Duby 1968, 28-58; Verhulst 1995, 488-99.
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effectuated. Thus, it is this constitutive and precarious nexus between office or service 
and land which underwrote much of the inter-personal state-form and internal power- 
struggles of all feudal states.
Frankish ‘Political Accumulation ’
Yet, it would be a methodological mistake to dissociate the relative stability of 
the Carolingian polity from the state-maintaining implications of Frankish strategies of 
political accumulation within the wider system of geopolitical relations. Externally, the 
latent conflict between the imperial aristocracy and lesser lords - and therewith the 
persistence of the powerful Frankish polity - was cushioned by dint of relentless 
Merovingian and Carolingian cycles of conquest,200 pegging the land-holding class to a 
supreme warlord continuously engaged in the systematic redistribution of conquered 
land and the wider spoils of war (tribute, treasure, women, slaves, arms, cattle)201 
amongst his contented and loyal imperial and local aristocracy. The Empire was a 
conquest state, its economy to a large degree a ‘war economy’ so that the authority of 
the kingly ban remained unchallenged as long as the king or Emperor succeeded in 
providing his aristocratic followers with extended opportunities for personal 
enrichment. Routinely, every spring the Frankish kings gathered their vassalic host to 
set out for summer-long campaigns driven by the collective aggressiveness of the 
Frankish ruling class. Thus a self-regenerating cycle of campaigning, subsequent re­
distribution of the spoils of war, and renewed inter-ruling class solidarity was kept in 
motion. In one word, the fortunes of the Frankish ruling class - and thus the Frankish 
state - rested to a large extent upon the political economy of war. At the same time, 
punitive expeditions had to be undertaken by the Frankish aristocracy against 
subjugated but rebellious peoples, ruled by ethnically diverse and sometimes pagan 
aristocracies in deadly battle with the Frankish invaders even after their incorporation
199 Dubyl974, 31-47; Goetz 1995, 451-480.
200 Haldon describes this cycle lucidly for the Merovingian kingdoms. Haldon 1993, 213.
201 Reuter 1985; Bonnassie 1991a; Duby 1974, 72-6; cf. Hilton’s review of Duby: Hilton 
1974. Tellingly, offensive wars were the reserve of the mounted imperial aristocracy, whereas 
the free peasant militia was only mobilised for defensive purposes in the face of enemy 
invasions in which was nothing to gain but all to lose.
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into the Empire. Consequently, large stretches of the Carolingian polity resembled 
zones of military occupation rather than truly integrated regions (especially in Saxony, 
Brittany, and Acquitaine). However, so long as the Empire was itself successfully 
conquering and expanding as a war-economy - i.e. until about the Treaty of Verdun 
(843) which sealed the partition of the Empire - and so long as intra-ruling class 
solidarity was cemented through the circulation of war-generated ‘gifts’, a relatively 
stable pattern of public governance is recognisable during the ‘Carolingian 
Renaissance’, tolerated by a conniving aristocracy in accord with an Emperor - 
competent, broad-minded and generous in victory, yet unrelenting and harsh in the face 
of insubordination.202
Thus, the interface between internal social property settlement and resulting 
expansionary strategies of political accumulation provides the social rationale behind 
the nature and dynamics of the Carolingian state. Within the confines of the Empire, 
conditional hierarchy within the channels of command reigned amongst the members of 
the ruling class. Adjacent smaller polities like Bohemia, Pannonia, Croatia, the 
Benevento, or Brittany had to yield to Frankish hegemony through regular tribute 
payments.203 Only the greater polities - the Byzantine Empire, the caliphate of 
Cordoba, the Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian kingdoms, and the Abbasid caliphs of 
Baghdad -  remained outside of Frankish control, yet in fairly close ‘diplomatic 
relations’. In this, it is symptomatic for the non-existence of bounded territoriality 
under feudal property relations that ‘the ambassador employed on a foreign mission, 
and the royal or imperial commissioner [the missus, B.T.] despatched on a mission 
inside the realm, were two species of the same genre’.204 While the Carolingian Empire 
never enjoyed the degree of centralisation of its Roman predecessor, Latin Europe 
remained until the 9th Century politically unified in the form of an expanding feudal 
Empire.
202 James 1982, 158. How Charlemagne dealt with recalcitrant nobles is well-exemplified by 
the infamous blood-bath on the banks of the Aller where the Franks massacred four thousand 
free Saxons during Charlemagne’s protracted conquest of Saxony.
203 Ganshof 1970, 19-55.
204 Ganshof 1971b, 164.
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Explaining the Transition from Hierarchy to Anarchy
The Demise o f the Carolingian Empire
At about 850, however, the opportunities for external conquest dried up.205 
Offensive campaigns turned into defensive wars. Vikings, Hungarians, and Saracens 
made deep inroads into the heartlands of the Carolingian Empire and turned the logic 
of plunder against the Frankish lords. This was partly due to what may be called an 
early version of imperial overstretch and a corresponding mismatch between 
geopolitical ambitions and the resources available for the enforcement of the Pax 
Carolina, further restrained by cumbersome logistics unable to match the requirements 
of long-distance strategy.206 This turnabout in Carolingian war-fortunes was also due 
to a recovery in strength and vitality by neighbouring peoples, itself not to be 
dissociated from changes in the internal modes of social organisation and domination 
of these tribes.207
Under conditions of weakened imperial authority, dissatisfied lords started to usurp 
public offices as a counter-strategy, built up personal entourages of warriors holding 
land from them, and began to patrimonialise ‘their’ fiefs. Following the cessation of 
victorious expansion, the itinerant missi inspectors became sedentary and their 
functions were often delegated to or appropriated by land-based counts and margraves. 
Administrative districts gradually lost their public character and turned into territorial 
principalities through their transformation into non-revocable hereditary fiefs.208 Royal 
temporary posts held ex officio entered into family property to be handed down from 
generation to generation. The imperial aristocracy of service turned into a feudal 
aristocracy of its own right.
These developments caught the imperial state in a pincer-movement. On the 
one hand, faced with the imminent threat of barbarian incursions, Charles the Bald and 
Louis I reacted by granting a series of great decrees, conceding greater autonomy and
205 Reuter 1985 and 1990.
206 Delbriick 1982,24.
207 Duby surmises that the attacks were the result of a transition in Scandinavia from tribal 
societies to monarchic states. Duby 1973, 114.
208 Cf. Delbriick 1984, 79-80.
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flexibility to counties in the financing and self-organisation of defence measures against 
the successive waves of Viking, Hungarian, and Saracen raids.209 These concessions 
laid the foundations for the build-up of the great principalities which came to dominate 
the late 9th and 10th Centuries. Furthermore, late Carolingian kings found themselves 
under pressure to grant immunities to the great abbeys, dioceses and secular royal 
vassals, exempting them from taxes and public duties, transferring these sources of 
income to magnates themselves. This move seemed to be motivated by the concern to 
place effective power into the most reliable, i.e. non-secular, hands. The granting of 
immunities was effectively a trade-off between exemption from taxation for royal 
favourites in return for their informal support and loyalty - a policy which turned out to 
be thoroughly counter-productive. For here, in ecclesiastical lordships as in 
laylordships, the same pattern imposed itself. In the Western Kingdom, immunities 
granted to bishops were arrogated as non-alienable rights by territorial princes and 
counts; in the eastern Kingdom, the bishops disconnected themselves from imperial 
suzerainty and came to see themselves under the growing impact of the political 
antagonism between Emperor and papacy at most as mere vassals of the Emperor.
On the other hand, to the degree that the spoils of war dwindled and that the 
Franks were now themselves constrained to pay tributes to the Normans, the nobility 
had to rely more and more on land and the native peasantry as primary sources of 
profit - land which had not only to be protected against foreign aggression but also 
against the demands of public exactions. Furthermore, its labour-force was no longer 
replenished by a constant stream of captured slaves. In this context, the malcontented 
local nobility developed a long-term interest in ‘privatising’ public political powers in 
order to strengthen its political hold on the peasant population. Regional lords entered 
into a period of open structural contradictions with their nominal overlords, the post­
imperial states. Internal re-distribution of titles to wealth became the logical alternative 
to external conquest. The conversion of landholding rights effected a decisive shift in 
the inter-noble balance of power to the disadvantage of the king. The fief was no 
longer seen as a reward for loyal services, but, once ‘privatised’, came to constitute the
209 ‘The invasions, together with the quarrels of the rival kings, had carried war to the heart of 
the Frankish world, and it therefore became necessary nearly everywhere to set up great 
military commands similar to those which had always existed on its borders.’ Bloch 1961, 395. 
Cf. also Duby 1973, 112-20.
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material basis and precondition for its lord’s claim to participate in public affairs. The 
ensuing paralysis of central power, predicated upon such a collapse of inter-ruling class 
solidarity, was, of course, itself conducive to the success of Norse inroads, penetrating 
the Continent by pushing up its navigable rivers, looting towns and laying waste the 
country-side.210 An inverse cycle of domestic inter-ruling class altercations, inviting 
external exploitation of such weaknesses and contributing to further internal corrosion, 
came to mark the latter half of the 9th Century. Tom between pressures from below 
and pressures from outside, the late Frankish kings willy-nilly continued to alienate and 
therewith to de-territorialise public authority until their own power-political position 
was eventually completely eroded and reduced to an empty nominal claim.
The ‘Feudal Revolution ’ o f the Year 1000 and the Rise o f the Banal Regime
The dissolution of monarchical power and the rise of the principalities were but 
one step in the slide towards political and territorial fragmentation, for the Frankish 
magnates found their rights now contested in turn by minor lords, contributing to the 
further erosion of public governance. Similar patterns prevailed: What had been 
delegated as office or prebend by a territorial lord was usurped by the local incumbent 
as a patrimonial right. In a chronologically sequenced and geographically uneven 
process (c900 - cl050),211 public power cascaded down the ladder of political units - 
from dukes, to margraves, counts, vice-counts - until even the least landed lord, the 
castellan, had appropriated the erstwhile regalian power of the ban. Castellans, often 
exercising control over but a tiny territory of few villages and half a dozen small
210 ‘The Norman’s military successes were the result not simply of their own savage courage 
but principally of the difference of the Franks among themselves, the dissolution of the empire, 
and the civil war.’ Delbriick 1982, 86.
211 Bloch 1966, 79; Fourquin 1975, 378-9. The classical case study is Duby 1953. The 
territorial and chronological unevenness of this process of fragmentation must be stressed. In 
the Eastern Kingdom, fragmentation of public power set in later and never went so far as in the 
Western Kingdom, due to persistent opportunities of conquest in connection with the ‘open’ 
eastern frontier. Reuter 1985. 93; Leyser 1968, 31. More generally, the powerful dukedoms 
and counties in the marches were better able to resist the complete fragmentation of public 
power due to their tighter internal organisation in the face of threats of invasion. In north­
western France, ‘greater territorial lordships survived only where, as in Anjou and Normandy, 
the public security once defended from urban strongholds could be transformed into (or revived 
as ) structures of personal fidelities in strategically distributed castles.’ Bisson 1994, 16-7.
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lordships, transformed their banal lordships into quasi-sovereign mini-states, 
independent of royal or comital sanction and control.212 This meant the ‘privatisation’ 
of public justice, territorialisation of fiefs, wilful taxation and the general subjection of 
the remaining free peasantry to the status of serfdom.213 Towards the end of the 10th 
Century, the thoroughly individualised rise of banal lordships began. The ‘Feudal 
Revolution’ came into its own.214 The usurpation of the regalian powers of the ban - 
the encompassing right to command, tax, punish, adjudicate and decree - by castellans 
constituted thus the end-point of a protracted sequence of political devolution down to 
ever smaller territorial units. ‘The commander of the castle garrison would take upon 
himself responsibility for peace and justice over the whole territory - in other words, 
the precise functions of kingship.’215 Castellanies grew at the expense of the state. 
Castellans became for two centuries (c950 - cl 150) the prime actors in medieval 
political life, benefiting from the general crisis of governance and forming henceforth 
the territorial nuclei on the power-political geo-strategic map. Once public power was 
completely individualised, castellans turned upon themselves in fierce inter-lordly 
competition over the appropriation and enforcement of lucrative former public rights, 
unleashing general anarchy and violence in post-Carolingian Europe. Especially 
ecclesiastical lordships, which had derived their immunities from taxation by means of 
royal grants, found themselves attacked by lay banal lords, contesting their rights to 
agrarian profits and commercial monopolies.216 The ‘Feudal Revolution’217 sealed the 
demise of Carolingian public power. Conditional hierarchy gave way to ‘feudal 
anarchy’. Generalised feuding in the absence of overarching authority resulted in a 
thorough re-distribution of arable land and the consolidation of new dynasties, some 
arising out of old Frankish families, some having more humble knightly origins. The 
former empire-wide dual property structure, based on a land-wide public tax-regime in 
combination with a lordship-centered rent-regime, was transformed into a single, yet
212 ‘Counts, castellans, knights were not merely landowners with tenants but sovereigns with 
subjects.’ Hilton 1990, 160.
213 Bonnassie 1991a and 1991b.
214 Cf. Duby 1978, 150 ff; James 1982, 187-96; Bisson 1994; White 1996; cf. also 
Anderson’s short rendition in Anderson 1974a, 156-7.
2,5 Duby 1973, 172; cf. alsoHallam 1980, 13-18.
216 Duby 1962, 189
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geographically fragmented, property settlement, based on wilful surplus-extractions in 
numerous independent banal lordships.
The story of the rise and fall of Carolingian state formation can be told, as by 
John Haldon, in terms of the structural inability to establish and maintain trans-personal 
bureaucracies in Max Weber’s sense,218 residing in the failure to de-privatise the means 
of administration and coercion, that is, to separate the office - physically as well as 
legally - from the incumbent. Yet, the deeper reasons for this failure cannot be 
understood within the conceptual parameters of a Weberian political sociology of 
administrative institutions. The short flowering of the missi and the public comital 
office was a conjunctural, not a permanent, phenomenon, intimately linked to the 
proprietary regime and the war-fortunes of the Carolingians. The possibility of central 
government rested always on a compromise - a short-term alliance for mutual gain - 
between the members of the Frankish ruling class, governed less by the prowess of a 
charismatic leader than by his ability to provide his co-rulers with the wherewithal of 
expanded personal reproduction and to permanently assert his superiority and 
leadership by displays of power and largesse, big-stick-policies and gift-giving. Yet, to 
the extent that political appropriation of agrarian surplus depended upon at least a 
modicum of armed force at the locus of production, lords had to be arms-bearing and 
in control of land, providing the two essential pre-requisites of medieval power. This 
constellation rendered the medieval state inherently fragile, non-bureaucratic, 
territorially dispersed and perennially prone to disintegration.
The dissolution of the Carolingian Empire has therefore to be understood in 
terms of a power-struggle amongst the lordly class over land and labour in times of 
reproductive crisis. It brought to the fore the inherently fragile constitution of one of 
the most powerful medieval states under conditions of individualised and localised
217 Duby 1980; Poly and Boumazel 1991; cf. also the recent debate in Past & Present initiated 
by Bisson 1994 and the responses especially by White 1996, Wickham 1997, Reuter 1997, and 
the rejoinder by Bisson 1997.
218 ‘The reasons for the failure [sc. to develop an independent bureaucracy, B.T.] lie in the 
intensely personalized nature of political power relationships, in which service was to an 
individual rather than to a corporate body or conceptually reified institution such as the state.’ 
Haldon 1993, 215. However, this explanation just begs the question why precisely political 
relations were perforce inter-personal under feudal property relations. Without conceptualising 
the nexus between the inter-personal character of the relations of domination amongst lords and 
the necessity of personal domination over producers which are effectively in possession of their
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lordly appropriation in response to peasant possession of the means of subsistence. It 
follows that the explanation for the degree of self-organisation of the ruling and arms- 
bearing class - the form of the ‘state’ - has thus to be embedded in definite property 
regimes, governing inter-lordly re-distributional struggles in response to the deeper 
cycles of land and labour scarcity. In this respect, the fate of the Carolingian Empire is 
but another instance of the contradictory logic of medieval state-building.
A New Mode of Exploitation as Precondition for Feudal Geopolitical Expansion
While the 10th Century is often portrayed as the nadir of medieval political 
organisation, the late 11th Century ushered in a period of pronounced knight-led 
geopolitical expansion which drove the post-Carolingian lords into the non-Frankish 
European periphery, establishing everywhere feudal structures of domination and 
exploitation.
The Norman Conquest, the Spanish Reconquista, the German Ostsiedlung 
(Eastern Settlement) and the Crusades exemplify paradigmatically the form and 
dynamics of feudal geopolitical expansion in times of individualised lordship. Before 
we set out these four spectacular outward-movements in more detail, we have to 
inquire into the social preconditions which gave rise to such display of feudal vitality. 
These are, so our thesis, grounded in profound changes in noble social property 
relations subsequent to the ‘Feudal Revolution’. In particular, the ascent of banal 
lordships triggered a range of important and interconnected alterations in agrarian 
labour relations, in the internal composition and military outlook of the land-holding 
class, and in noble family structures and inheritance laws.
Predatory Lordship and the Rise o f Serfdom
means of subsistence, Haldon is not in a position to connect convincingly medieval state form 
and mode of surplus-extraction.
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During the critical period of general political disintegration around the 
millennium, the protective link between a hitherto free and allodial peasantry and royal 
public power was cut, delivering the peasantry to the mercy of their immediate 
castellans. High and low justice, hitherto shared between clearly distinguishable 
competent courts, collapsed now into a monopoly of justice, respectively held by 
countless - in both senses! - minor lords. And justice without the chance to appeal is 
justice denied. ‘This almost unrestricted exercise of rights of jurisdiction armed lords 
with a weapon of economic exploitation whose potentialities seem limitless.’219 Since 
all three forms of lordship - domestic, land and banal - were now amalgamated in the 
hands of one lord, those peasants tilling his lands, whether of slave, servile, or free 
status, were indiscriminately subjected to the immediate jurisdiction, i.e. power, of the 
encastled banal lord. They turned into serfs.220 The usurpation of banal rights translated 
into a heavy-weighing apparatus of exploitation based on the erstwhile kingly right of 
confiscation. Formerly public taxes, now arbitrarily stipulated and collected by one and 
the same lord, involved such exactions as the payment of tallage (taille) - a tax levied 
on personal protection nominally offered by lords -, the granting of the right of shelter, 
board and lodging (gite) to the banal lord - a pretext for arbitrary lordly feasting and 
pillaging at the expense of the peasantry -, obligatory carting duties and ploughing 
services, and judicial fines, especially fines levied on the transfer of property. 
Additionally, lords began to coerce peasants to pay for the use of seigneurial facilities 
(banalites) - commercial monopolies which forced the peasants to grind their com at
219 Bloch 1966, 79.
220 1 follow Duby’s interpretation of the end of slavery as resulting from class struggle through 
the imposition of banal lordship on all peasants, whether servile or non-servile, dating it at 
around the year 1000. ‘But in the second half of the eleventh century the words servus and 
francus and their equivalents fell little by little into disuse in most French provinces. They 
disappear from manorial inventories and deeds of gift because the appropriation by private 
lords of royal power deprived these words of any perceptible economic significance. All that 
mattered for the lord of the ban and for his officials was the fact that they were workers, which 
brought all peasants residing in the territoiy of each castle within the powers of the sire and his 
authority to raise taxes.’ Duby 1968, 188. Duby’s interpretation has been canonized by 
Fourquin 1975. Cf. also Bois 1992 for a different account and the review by Verhulst 1991. In 
an excellent survey article, Bonnassie, by first refuting systematically arguments which peg the 
decline of slavery to the christianisation of the country-side, to changes and difficulties in the 
recruitment of slave-labour, to the introduction of new productive technologies, or to economic 
growth in conjunction with demographic pressures, has forcefully re-instated Duby’s 
explanation and chronology of the end of slavery and the beginnings of feudalism as a serf-
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the lord’s mill, to bake in his ovens, to store grain in his bam, to press grapes and 
apples at the lord’s press, and to buy the lord’s wines before the new vintage 
(banviri)221 Lay lords even began to monopolise tithes, antagonising in the process 
bishops and abbots which developed counter-strategies of income protection in form of 
the peace movements. To conclude, the right to judge was tantamount to the right to 
command, and the right to command came to constitute the foremost source of lordly 
income. All these essentially wilful exactions, unchecked by superordinate authorities, 
bore down on the peasantry alongside conventional rents which it kept paying in labour 
or kind as tenants. What had some measure of legitimacy when applied within 
customary limits degenerated into a state of predatory lordship - the pure imposition of 
the lord’s will, backed up by sheer force.
Military Innovations and the Origins o f the Knightly Class
This crisis-ridden political constellation went hand in hand with changes in the 
military order and innovations in military technology during the 10th and 11th 
Centuries.222 The old Carolingian light cavalry and the free peasant armies gave way to 
the rise of the heavy cavalry of the knightly class, the de-militarisation of the formerly
based mode of production, associating its rise causally with the class struggles during the 
‘Feudal Revolution’ and the ascent of banal lordship. Bonnassie 1991a.
221 Duby 1962, 224-6; Bloch 1966, 79 ff.; Fourquin 1975, 386-94.
222 The general nexus between pre-capitalist social property relations and investment in the 
means of coercion is convincingly theorised in Brenner 1986, 27-32 and exemplified for this 
period by Bartlett: The military elite’s ‘defensive armament consisted in a conical helmet, a 
coat of mail and a large shield; offensive arms included spear, sword and perhaps a mace or 
club; indispensable for offensive action was the heavy war-horse. These men were heavy 
cavalry because they were fully armed and, in particular, because they had the expensive mail 
coat. (...) They were heavy because they were clad in iron. A powerful force was one that was 
‘all of iron’. The mail coat must have been the most valuable single object that a knight owned 
and it is not surprising that they were sometimes pawned by knights in need. At a time, when 
many agricultural implements were still made of wood, when the tool on which human survival 
turned, the plough, was often still made of wood or only tipped with iron, here were men who 
were dressed in iron. It represented a staggering investment. The full gear of an armatus or 
loricatus required approximately 50 lb of iron. When an army such as that raised by Otto II in 
the 980s included around 5,000 loricati, the iron carried by the heavy cavalry alone totalled 
125 tons. The figure is all the more striking when we consider that, in this period, a German 
forge might produce only 10 lb of iron in a smelting process taking two or three days. (...) The 
heavy horsemen of the Middle Ages lived in the wheat age but looked like men of the steel age.’ 
Bartlett 1993, 61.
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free peasantry, and the wide-spread appearance of new small, but high, stone castles 
designed for local power protection 223 These castles, dotted in a dense pattern - often 
within mutual visibility - over the entire post-Carolingian heartlands, symbolised the 
power of defiant castellans and manifested the thorough power-political fragmentation 
around the millennium. Embedded in this new military topography, outright random 
use of violence through hostage-taking, plunder and looting became the order of the 
day. In these circumstances, castellans and other banal lords began to assert their 
authority with the help of retinues of armed and mounted men, forming what Bisson 
called a ‘terrorist police force’.224 These marauding bands were the armed executioners 
of the lord’s will, riding cavalcades against a helpless peasantry, policing the country­
side, sharing booty and smashing peasant resistance.
‘Armed, pretentious and poor, the knights clung to their stoned-off space, talking of 
weapons and deeds, of strikes, of demands; of lucrative stratagems more than of 
management or incomes. Ransom was a device of the keep from the outset; notoriously 
exemplified in the coups of the Vikings and Saracens, it became a seigneurial as well as 
a military technique, readily convertible into protection money.’225
These lordly practices came to be known in the sources as ‘bad customs’ (mala 
consuetudines). ‘They are no longer the expression of a more or less legitimate power, 
but they constitute the elements of a patrimony and the opportunity for profit.’226
At the same time, those mounted war-bands which had gathered around banal 
lords in their functions as a ‘terrorist police force’, now came to receive compensations 
for their fighting services through land grants or the hand-out of treasure.227 Recruited 
from rather humble social backgrounds, these formerly non-noble retainers and body­
guards, serving as the violent accomplices and executives of an encastled and 
predatory nobility, crystallised into the knightly class and came to form the lower 
nobility. The very military outlook of the knightly cavalry, heavily armed and fully 
armoured fighters on horsebacks - forming virtually self-sufficient moving castles -, 
reflected precisely the fragmentation and individualisation of political power during this
223 Bartlett 1993, 65-70.
224 Bisson 1994, 16.
225 Bisson 1994, 17-8.
226 Poly and Boumazel 1980, 33.
227 ‘Taking with one hand, receiving with the other, the knights were the real hub of the 
seignorial economy, the driving wheel of the system of exploitation.’ Duby 1978, 155.
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period of medieval history. Their later exaltation as the bearers of the code of chivalry 
conceals their rather this-worldly origins and purposes. These knights, the most 
dynamic element in the new political set-up, came to dominate a by now militarised 
country-side during the extended period of inter-lordly feuding. The knightly class 
emerged thus out of the crucible of ‘feudal anarchy’ and the general crisis of early 
medieval governance 228 We will see later how instrumental these knights were in the 
translation and resolution of internal contradictions into external orientations.
Changes in Noble Proprietary Consciousness, the Introduction o f Primogeniture, and 
the Making o f Noble Excess Cadets
Although the patrimonialisation of fiefs and the concomitant encastellation of 
central Europe was a geographically and chronologically uneven process, it 
engendered profound changes in noble proprietary consciousness, inheritance law, and 
family forms prior to the late 11th Century geopolitical processes of conquest. In the 
standard perspective on post-millennial knightly expansion, demographic growth is 
singled out as the prime cause behind outward pressures. Let us inquire further into the 
social pre-conditions of geopolitical accumulation beyond general assumptions of 
demographic growth. We have seen the formation of the knightly class in relation to 
the usurpation of banal powers by ever lower-ranked nobles. Let us trace now how 
demographic growth is fractured through alterations in the political economy of 
aristocratic kinship structures, most notably in the rules of land succession subsequent 
to the privatisation of the ban. In other words, how did the nobility react to the 
territorialisation of family power and the multiplication of its peers?
As a rule, these proprietary changes triggered radical re-orientations in family 
consciousness and inheritance law amongst the aristocracy. Hitherto, the concept of a 
clearly demarcated noble family with vertical genealogies, whether matrilineal or 
patrilineal, was virtually non-existent. The adequate frame of reference was provided 
by the kindred or the aristocratic kin-group with horizontal rather than vertical 
lineages. Such family pattern reflects the pragmatics of living off the patronage of a
228 Duby 1977c.
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greater lord or even the king in fairly free-floating attachment to his ‘house’ 
(Konigsnahe).229 The non-hereditary character of noble land-holding during 
Carolingian times aborted the formation of tighter self-sufficient family structures. 
Following the territorialisation of family power after the usurpation of the ban, family 
patterns changed from loose collateral kindreds to clearly defined agnatic (patrilineal) 
family descent-groups.230 Changing property-titles led to a heightening of aristocratic 
family consciousness over inheritance patterns and a corresponding tightening of 
lineage in favour of agnatic primogeniture.231 Thereby, proprietary indivisibility of 
territory and thus the territorial integrity of ancestral family seats was to be guaranteed. 
Hereditability of lordships and fiefs spawned constrictions in the rules of land 
succession and wider family law. Kindreds turned into dynasties. Henceforth, we find 
the particle of origin ‘d e \ ‘von’, and ‘o f  in dynastic family names next to the adoption 
of toponymic surnames and heraldic emblems even among the lower landed nobility - a 
clear pointer to the making of a new distinct social identity of the noble class 
henceforth rooted in ancestral family seats. However, constrictions in succession laws 
in favour of primogeniture created precisely the problem of landless nobles excess 
cadets. They were to play a crucial role in the process of feudal expansion.
Conquest of Nature - Conquest of People
229 Tellenbach 1978, 208. ‘Whereas the early medieval noble family often lacked a permanent 
residence or at least an ancestral seat, it could produce a new centre in the form of a new 
family convent.’ Goetz 1994, 470.
230 In a series of articles, Duby explored the ‘correlation’ between the rise of banal lordship and 
changing noble family forms. He could show that documentary evidence for the introduction of 
clear-cut patrilineal genealogies was chronologically co-eval with respective usurpations of the 
powers of command by single dynasties and the introduction of hereditability and 
primogeniture. The further Duby descended in the noble hierarchy, the more recent was the 
establishment of primogeniture, reflecting the chronologically sequenced devolution of the ban 
from king, to princes, to counts, castellans, and finally to landed knights. Cf. Duby 1977b, 
1977c, 1977d, 1994a, 1994b (Here is the reference to the ‘correlation’, p.l 19). For the wider 
debate see Reuter 1978 and Bisson 1990.
231 ‘From 1030 there begin to be signs of primogeniture in castellan families. Finally, from 
1025 the rights of sole legitimate descent become established. (...) At the moment of the crisis 
of feudalism, between 1020 and 1060, family relationships appeared to be seriously under 
strain and it is as if in response to these tensions that the closure of the lineage takes place.’ 
Poly and Boumazel 1980, 108.
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In the context of demographic recovery in the 11th Century, the effect of 
primogeniture combined with growing land-scarcity in the post-Carolingian heartlands 
and led to two typical responses in economies based upon coerced agrarian 
production. Internal expansion, the conquest of nature, went hand in hand with 
external expansion, the conquest of people.
On the one hand, Frankish Europe entered into an important phase of internal 
colonisation and large-scale land reclamation and land-clearances. The impetus behind 
the extension of the arable correlates typically with labour-intensive agrarian 
economies and is itself an upshot of limited pressures for productive technological 
innovations and substantial productivity-gains under pre-capitalist coercive labour- 
relations.232 Although advances in agrarian techniques were made in post-millennial 
Europe in the form of the dissemination of the iron-plough, the water-mill, improved 
hamessing-techniques and field-rotation, these innovations were not inscribed in a 
logic of systematic investment in the means of production by an entrepreneurial class 
and did not make part of a self-perpetuating and self-substituting cycle of agrarian 
technological revolution fanned by capitalist re-investments driven by the competitive 
reduction of labour-costs. In short, these innovations were in themselves unable to 
keep pace with demand promoted by an ever-growing population. Mostly on the 
initiative of lords, eager to broaden their rural income-basis or to establish themselves 
for the first time as independent landed nobles, woods, marches, swamps, wastelands, 
alluvial lowlands and even lakes and parts of the sea - through polder-making in 
Flanders - vanished to make room for ploughland. Bloch describes this period of 
unprecedented large-scale land-clearance ‘the most considerable addition to the total 
area under cultivation in this country [sc. France, B.T.] since prehistoric times’.233 
Internal colonisation changed the rural landscape of feudal Europe and entered into a 
mutually reinforcing cycle with an ever-increasing population.
On the other hand, however, given that the scope for land-reclamations within 
the borders of the old Frankish Empire was finite, internal colonisation - the conquest 
of nature -, was accompanied and supplemented by external colonisation, the conquest
232 Brenner 1986, 27-32.
233 Bloch 1966; Fourquin 1975; Rosener 1992.
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of foreign peoples.234 For the closure of lineage in favour of the oldest son immediately 
posed the chronic question of the provision of the wherewithal for noble cadets. And it 
was precisely these younger sons, the ‘youths’, who most ‘naturally’ began to look 
beyond the narrow confines of their homelands.235
‘Companies of youths (...) formed the spearhead of feudal aggression. Always on the 
lookout for adventure from which “honour” and “reward” could be gained and aiming, if 
possible, “to come back rich”, they were mobile and ready for action with their emotions 
at a pitch of war-like frenzy. In an unstable milieu they stirred up turbulence and 
provided manpower for any distant expedition.’236
Especially the most densely populated and cultivated area between the Loire 
and the Rhine produced those aristocratic supernumeraries which tended to seek 
independent landed resources to found and support a dynasty.
‘Younger sons and daughters were ejected from the paternal household and patrimony: 
unmarried daughters were placed in convents, while cadets entered the Church, assumed 
a life of adventure in the retinue of some lord, or set out for the Holy Land.’237
Thus, external colonisation is not merely the direct result of overpopulation and 
overcrowding, but was mediated and radicalised via exclusionary inheritance patterns 
due to changes in property titles through the imposition of banal lordship. Henceforth, 
we can discern an accelerated geopolitical circulation of knightly cadets.
Many cadets and younger children were of course sent to abbeys and 
monasteries, leading a life of celibacy. This was indeed the fate of most daughters of 
noble birth who were not married off into other lay aristocratic families. However, it 
would be a profound mistake to detach the reproduction of ecclesiastical lordships 
from the general logic of the political economy of lordships. For the practice of
234 ‘By 1050 or so, however, the situation had become fixed in many parts of Europe; there was 
no one left to dominate except rivals of the same status. At that point, looking elsewhere might 
well seem more attractive.’ Wickham 1994, 140.
235 Duby first submitted a sociology of such 11th and 12th Century ‘youths’, referring to that 
period in a noble man’s life between his dubbing - usually in his early twenties - and that stage 
where ‘he put down roots, became the head of a house and founded a family - which occurred 
often not before his forties.’ Duby 1977a, 113. In empirical studies, those youths re-surface 
time and again as the makers and breakers of pan-Frankish conquests. Cf., for example, Davies 
1990, 33-4.
236 Duby 1977a, 115.
237 Evergates 1995, 17.
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convent placement did not constitute an unlimited outlet to relieve population 
pressures since the family of the prospective novice had to donate gifts, mostly in form 
of land, upon entry of their offspring. Furthermore, ecclesiastical lordships were not in 
a position to sustain an infinite number of non-producing monks and prelates without 
facing sooner or later serious economic hardship themselves.238 And the clergy, to be 
sure, was amongst the most ambitious to accumulate landed endowments in far-off 
places under the papal banner with the pretext to spread Roman liturgy. Indicatively, 
even those countries which were already christianised before the millennium - i.e. 
Ireland and England -, but which lacked the tight political integration into, hierarchised 
subordination to, and direct economic exploitation and control by the post-Gregorian 
power-politically more aware Church, found themselves subjected to the same ravages 
of conquest and colonisation as their pagan co-victims
A further modification has to be observed with regard to the structural 
preconditions for the great aristocratic outward-movement of the late 11th century. 
Following Bartlett, aristocratic overpopulation was less a feature of the higher than of 
the lower nobility, and in particular of the knightly class whose origins we have traced 
back to the ascent of banal lordship in its capacity as a ‘terrorist police force’ clamping 
down on an enserfed peasantry.239 What distinguished this segment of the arms-bearing 
class was its overwhelmingly non-landed character which fared uneasily with its 
permanently militarised status and aggressive martial profession. Eager to climb up the 
feudal social ladder and to gain the highest goods in feudal society - land and labour -, 
the knights were trapped between impoverishment and adventure, pegging 
consequently their fortunes to greater war-leaders in the pursuit of conquest 
enterprises - be it the Pope, the Emperor, kings or greater territorial princes. For,
238 Evergates comments that in the 12th Century, ‘so many women entered convents, in fact, 
that many institutions by the end of the century had exhausted their meager endowments. In
1196, for example, Celestine III ordered Heloise’s convent of the Paraclete to downsize through 
attrition to sixty nuns; shortly afterward the well-known convent of Avenay was restricted to 
forty nuns because it was “burdened by debts owed to creditors”, a complaint common in the 
thirteenth century. The Cistercian convent of Fervaques even sought Innocent Ill’s protection 
from the “nobles and powerful men” who reacted violently when their relatives were refused 
admission.’ Evergates 1995, 18.
239 ‘The rise of a class of knights, originally fairly lowly and often without land, Combined with 
the impact of primogeniture and dynasticism, may have overloaded the system to such an 
extent that expansionary movement abroad was natural response.’ Bartlett 1993, 48. Cf. 
already Ganshof 1970, 69.
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‘the way to make a fortune was not, of course, to launch out into the void. A young and 
ambitious knight would offer his services to a likely looking prince and hope that his lord 
would have success and be willing to share some of its profits.’240
The opportunities offered to knights by conquest extended to the summit of the feudal 
pyramid itself: the royal title. Over the next two hundred years, new kingdoms sprang 
up in the Frankish periphery - Castile, Portugal, Bohemia, Jerusalem, Cyprus, Sicily, 
Thessalonica -, to be manned by fresh dynasties inspiring many an ordinary knight to 
dare his life beyond the borders of Latin Christendom. Strikingly, Bartlett reckons that 
from the fifteen monarchs to be found in 1350 Latin Christendom, ‘only three families, 
the Folkunger of Sweden, the Danish royal house and the Piasts of Poland, were not of 
Frankish descent’.241
It is here, then, that we have arrived at that point where the most active social 
group of the post-millennial century enters with aplomb and panache the ‘international’ 
historical stage: the knightly class, whose precarious economic position in conjunction 
with its over-militarised status predestined it as the most likely candidate for external 
aggression. Yet, the differentiation of the ruling class into lower and higher nobility did 
not mean that it was the exclusive historical task of the knightly class to engage in 
large scale external conquest, but it meant that the magnates of the old Frankish 
families, who had survived in the ex-marcher lordships of the Carolingian periphery 
(especially in Normandy, Catalonia, and Saxony), found now a willing and militarily 
able ally, who would be prepared to undertake such unlikely and unheard of ventures 
as the conquests of England, Spain, Eastern Europe and the Crusades.
Summarising the Argument
We may advance the following explanatory interpretation of the passage from 
the early to the high Middle Ages which gave rise to a socio-political constellation 
propitious to geopolitical expansion, in whose train the period of imperial hierarchy
240 Bartlett 1993, 36
241 Bartlett 1993, 41. ‘By the late Middle Ages 80 per cent of Europe’s kings and queens were 
Franks.’ Bartlett 1993, 42.
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was eclipsed in favour of a multi-actor Europe.242 Once Charlemagne’s successors 
were no longer in a position to guarantee the incomes of their aristocratic followers 
through grants of land, offices, benefices or the provision of slave-labour and the wider 
spoils of war, these magnates took it upon themselves to appropriate those political 
powers (the rights of the ban) which secured the diversion of that part of the ‘national’ 
income, which hitherto used to flow directly into the public purse, into their own 
pockets. The collapse of the Carolingian war-economy and the subsequent crisis in the 
re-distribution of revenues flowing from politically constituted profits removed the 
protective layer of public power in the relations between lords and free peasants and 
translated into unmediated lordly access to peasant surplus and corresponding higher 
exactions via individualised banal lordship. The obverse side of the rise of the banal 
regime was generalised serfdom and a thorough feudalisation, i.e. fragmentation, of 
power relations. At the same time, the arrogation and effective realisation of banal 
rights necessitated heavy militarisation of encastled lords by means of the formation of 
mounted executive forces - the knights - , ushering in a break-down in ruling class 
solidarity in form of sharpened inter-lordly competition over land, labour, and 
privileges. ‘Feudal anarchy’ resulted in the withering away of late Carolingian 
patrimonial state-structures.
In the aftermath of the re-structuring of political power, the end of slavery, and 
the general conversion of free allodial peasants into serfs, demographic recovery 
swelled the ranks of the ruling and producing classes. A process of internal
242 Bartlett’s fascinating account advances a threefold explanation for Frankish geopolitical 
expansion, granting pride of place to superior military technology, while being more 
hypothetical about the impact of changing aristocratic inheritance practices on the origins of 
landless cadets and the wider social rationale behind the pattern of aristocratic land-grabbing. 
Bartlett 1993, 18-23, 43-51 and 60ff. Wickham takes him to court for not inquiring sufficiently 
into the internal socio-political transformations within the late Frankish kingdoms associated 
with the ‘Feudal Revolution’, antedating the actual outward movement. Wickham 1994. For an 
alternative ‘multicausal’ account cf. Mann 1986, 373-415. Without mentioning the decline of 
the Carolingian Empire and the ‘Feudal Revolution’, the author’s main conclusion on this 
period is that the 11th Century saw ‘an embryonic transition to capitalism’. Mann 1986, 409. 
Cf. the critical review by Wickham 1988. Ertmann, in turn, while choosing to neglect the serf- 
based dynamics of the contemporary agrarian economy, surmises that post-millenial economic 
expansion was due to the ‘appearance of an agricultural surplus during the 900s’, but warns 
that ‘the exact origins of this surplus remains in some dispute’. He then argues that ‘a 
favourable climatic shift may have played a role’, and finally endorses Guy Bois’ thesis that 
‘the collapse of central authority permitted the economy to establish, perhaps for the first time,
117
colonisation and land reclamation set in, vastly expanding the area under cultivation in 
the Frankish heartlands of Europe. However, the extension of arable land did not keep 
pace with the rate of demographic reproduction. Population growth assumed a 
particularly acute form within the land-holding class due to a tightening of inheritance 
customs in favour of primogeniture precipitated by preceding alterations in property 
relations to the benefit of territorially-defined families. While primogeniture ensured 
the indivisibility of family property, it tended to exclude younger sons from dynastic 
family seats, bringing about the appearance of non-landed aristocratic excess cadets - a 
phenomenon especially prominent among the lower nobility: the knights.
The very extension and diversification of the ruling strata, featuring now a 
knightly class aspiring itself to land as the economic basis of maintenance and status, 
added a particularly restless, highly militarised, audacious and aggressive element to 
the composition of the nobility. These knightly cadets were the most decisive bearers 
and executioners of late 11th Century geopolitical expansion, for by around 1050 the 
redistribution of arable land within the post-Carolingian core areas came to a halt. 
War-lords had to look elsewhere to satisfy their thirst for land and booty either for 
themselves or for their growing numbers of knights. This phase marks the origins of 
feudal expansion based on a radically feudalised and militarily individualised, i.e. 
politically decentralised, society. It is in this dynamic context of heightened inter-lordly 
competition over land and labour that the four great expansionary movements have to 
be placed. The unsatiable feudal scramble for land exploded the fetters of territorial 
self-sufficiency. The transnational Frankish nobility set out to conquer Europe.
Post-Crisis Feudal Expansion as Geopolitical Accumulation
The ascent of individualised banal lordship can thus be interpreted as a 
successful seigneurial reaction, imposing a new lordly mode of political appropriation 
on the peasantry in the face of a crisis of income and status due to a reduction in the 
re-distributive capacities of the Frankish state after the cessation of victorious
a substantial measure of autonomy vis-a-vis the political order’. Ertman 1997, 50-51. Bois’
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conquests. Restrictions in the customs of noble land-succession coupled to the 
resumption of population growth, gathering pace during the 11th century, produced 
aristocratic supernumeraries systematically excluded from their patrimonial inheritance, 
yet eager to achieve or defend their established privileged modes of life, forcing the 
late Frankish knights to engage in territorial political accumulation.
Patterns o f Expansion: Socially Combined and Geographically Uneven Development
From the mid-11th Century onwards, the post-Carolingian nobility pushed 
victoriously into the European periphery. Feudo-vassalic relations were extensively 
introduced and adapted to prevailing eco-social conditions, creating for the first time 
the cultural and geopolitical identity of what contemporaries conceive as modem 
Europe. Starting in the north with the Norman Conquest (1), the Franko-Norman 
ruling class overran Anglo-Saxon England and pushed in the subsequent two centuries 
the Celts into and over the fringes of the British isles during the conquests of Wales, 
Scotland, and Ireland, introducing everywhere its habitual, yet refined, forms of 
economic and political organisation. To the East, the Saxon aristocracy commenced its 
enormous undertaking of the Eastern Settlement (2), feudalising and germanicising 
middle eastern Europe and the southern Baltic fringes up to and including the town of 
Narwa. In the South-West, the Spanish Reconquest (3) began to roll back Arab 
domination to its last continental stronghold, the kingdom of Granda, setting up 
everywhere feudal structures. Finally, in the South and south-east, the Normans 
conquered Southern Italy and Sicily and established for a good century in conjunction 
with the Crusades the feudal Crusader States (4) in the Levant.
Already Hans Delbriick interpreted the chronological simultaneity of these four 
outward movements as being essentially the work of a desperate central European pan- 
knightly class.
‘All of those who are constantly moving upward out of the lower warrior stratum 
approach, in doing so, the status of an aristocracy - one might even say of the ruling 
aristocracy. The Normans, who conquered England, lower Italy, and Sicily, were not by 
their lineage exclusively Nordics, but warriors of the most diverse origins who attached
account is critically examined in Teschke 1997.
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themselves to the nucleus formed by the Normans. The expansion of the hegemony of the, 
German knights over Italy provided many a German knight the opportunity to attain 
higher position and property. The constant progress of the German colonization toward 
the east created ever-increasing areas for new ruling families. The French provided the 
largest contingent for the crusades, which likewise included a colonizing movement. The 
Spaniards, on their peninsula, drove forward against the Moors.’243
This surprising display of feudal vitality presents an integral outcome of the logic of 
political accumulation as the conventional strategy of lordly reproduction - a process 
of land-grabbing, be it by direct conquest, cultivation, or protracted colonisation and 
settlement.
What distinguishes these forms of conquest from Carolingian state-organised 
campaigns is precisely their individualised and fairly spontaneous ‘wild’ manner. 
Whereas the Carolingian warlords had led the imperial aristocracy in their annual 
springtime campaigns systematically against neighbouring polities so as to combine 
individual lordly land hunger with the wider security interests of the state generating 
thus a geostrategic pattern of concentric expansion -, the nature of 11th century warfare 
was much more spasmodic and unorganised, reflecting the essentially ‘trans-national’ 
character of the mobile members of the knightly class. Consequently, those fighters on 
horseback turned either (1) into proverbial ‘knights of fortune’ and ‘robber knights’, 
(2) sold their labour-power as mercenaries to whoever was in need of it and could 
afford it, or (3) flocked to greater warlords embarking upon more far-reaching 
ventures, promising not only plunder and booty but a fortiori the opportunities for 
landed lordships. Consequently, the radiation of aristocratic power was 
characteristically the matter of a ‘transnational’ military class - mobile and restless -, 
rather than the project of a supreme warlord, a state bureaucracy, a nation-in-arms, 
condottieri, or the result of large-scale ethnic migrations244
Although the four expansionary movements hit upon vastly different cultures in 
the peripheral regions and although these cultures knew different forms of economic 
organisation - ranging from sylvio-pastoral, via primitive communal, to highly 
developed settled agrarian (as, for example, in the Hispano-Arab irrigation cultures)
243 Delbriick 1982, 226.
244 Peasants came always into play when the conquerors could not draw on existing producers, 
i.e. in processes of original land reclamation as in parts of the German Eastern Settlement. 
Under these conditions, peasants had to be lured away from their homelands and could often
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and commercial forms - the resultant concrete forms of lordship did not simply 
replicate those of the homelands of the incoming knights. Certainly, as a rule, the 
invaders tended to organise their newly acquired lands according to their traditional 
estates system. Yet, depending on the respective unique encounters between differently 
structured aggressors and differently structured defenders, the outcomes of Frankish 
assertiveness were either (1) expropriation, expulsion or killing of the native ruling 
classes as classically in England, Wales, eastern Ireland, Spain, Brandenburg and other 
German marcher lordships, or (2) assimilation and mutual accommodation through 
intermarriage as in Scotland, Pomerania or Silesia, or (3) the establishment of 
‘clearance lordships’ and new pioneer peasant villages as in eastern Middle Europe, 
setting up new eco-political niches for the migratory nobility. During these processes 
of expansion, a range of political forms of lordships - military lordships, conquest 
lordships, Order lordships - abounded whose nature becomes intelligible within the 
framework of the social and geographical circumstances of clashing societies.
What is central for our purposes is that these socially combined yet 
geographically uneven processes of geopolitical accumulation laid the foundations for 
diverging long-term processes of state formation in different European regions on the 
basis of different constellations of lordly power.
The Norman Conquest and Unitary English State Formation
The Norman Conquest exemplifies such logic of feudal expansion and 
subsequent state-building paradigmatically. The import of feudal social property 
relations was a direct consequence of the Norman Conquest and reflected the form of 
domination prevalent at the time in the dukedom of Normandy.245 The formation of
wring substantial concessions from their new lords in terms of legal status and the level of 
rents.
245 Robert Brenner first pointed to the socially uneven yet geopolitically combined dynamics of 
feudal political accumulation with regard to the Norman Conquest and drew out systematically 
its long-term implications for English medieval class-relations and state-building. Brenner 
1985, 254-5 and 1996, 258-64. Cf. also Marx on the international relations of conquest: ‘A 
similar relationship issues from conquest, when a form of intercourse which has evolved on 
another soil is brought over complete to the conquered country: whereas in its home it was still 
encumbered with interests and relations left over from earlier periods, here it can and must be
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the Norman duchy around the lower Seine valley (840-911) fell precisely in the epoch 
of disintegrating Carolingian public power and the appropriation of banal powers by 
sub-imperial lords. The dukedom of Normandy amalgamated the political structure 
inherited from the Scandinavian invaders centering around a strong chieftain 
demanding retinue, with the initially granted and later usurped public authority of a 
Carolingian count.246 After an intense swirl of feuding (1030-47), William arrogated 
the comital authority of the ban in Normandy and succeeded in restoring internal order 
in his dukedom,247 but was at the same time under pressure to keep his magnates and 
followers at bay. His court became thus the natural locus of government, counsel, 
dispute and conflict-resolution. And it was here, that the plan to invade Anglo-Saxon 
England was deliberated, drawn up and agreed.
From the first, however, the Normans found themselves surrounded by 
competing principalities (Flanders and Brittany) vying for land and domination. What 
privileged the duke of Normandy to expand successfully across the Channel was the 
internal cohesiveness of the native military elite whose members claimed all personal 
kinship with the ducal family, its enormous wealth in land and treasure subsequent to 
the raiding and settlement, the duke’s effective power to collect taxes of a public 
character, to receive judicial fines, to levy tolls and to call out the arriere-ban - indeed, 
his de facto power of royal overlordship, the bannum,248
The Conquest itself rested thus on an in-built predicament in the exercise of 
feudal domination: internal cohesion among the lordly class was predicated upon the 
overlord’s capacity to lead his followers into ever renewed cycles of campaigning, 
generating for this purpose a tightly-knit military unit during campaigns, disintegrating 
after successful conquests due to the politics of land distribution which augmented, in
established completely and without hindrance, if only to assure the conqueror’s lasting power. 
(England and Naples after the Norman conquest, when they received the most perfect form of 
feudal organisation.)’ Marx and Engels 1964, 92.
246 Le Patourel 1976, 13; Hallam 1980, 34-43.
247 Searle 1988, 179-89.
248 Le Patourel 1969 and 1976, 281 ff. According to Searle, Norman kinship did not rest upon 
blood or descent, but upon choice and political strategy, dubbing these personal tied ‘political 
kinship’. Searle 1988, 159. Searle objects against the ‘continuity thesis’, which defends the 
persistence of Carolingian institutions in newly settled Normandy, building her argument on the 
political structure of the immigre Norman aristocracy around notions of ‘warrior kin groups’
(p. 10), without hardly ever mentioning forms of lordship or other Frankish institutions.
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turn, the newly landed lord’s power base so as to transform him into a potential rival of 
his erstwhile leader.249
The imposition of Norman rule upon Anglo-Saxon England followed precisely 
these patterns; yet, post-Conquest disintegration could be avoided.250 Within two 
decades, the Anglo-Saxon land-holding class was dispossessed and killed, its lands re­
distributed by William the Conqueror amongst his leading warriors - the barons. The 
sweeping nature of the Conquest resulted in the imposition of Norman dominion over 
England as a single territorial unit. A tenurial revolution steamrolled the country with 
radical land-holding alterations in terms of ownership, size and constitutional status of 
lordships. Lords came to hold their estates ‘of the king’ - in possession and hereditary 
in character, but not as private patrimonies. The king remained the supreme land­
owner of the entire territory. Just when Frankish Gaul disintegrated into countless 
independent seigneuries, England was unified en bloc by William, adopting the title 
King of England while retaining his ducal title of Normandy. Decisively, distinguishing 
feudal state-formation in England from simultaneous but structurally different French 
and German experiences, the Norman and Plantagenet kings succeeded in retaining the 
monopoly of the ban after 1066. The ban was and remained royal. All land-holding 
Norman nobles had to swear direct fealty to the king (Oath of Salisbury, 1086), so that 
the de-centralising consequences of vassalic ‘mediatisation’251 - so detrimental for 
Capetian France and Salian Germany - were blocked. The ‘King’s Peace’, predicated 
upon the power of the ban, ruled out the continental practices of private feuding by 
providing recognised and legitimate institutions for the settling of disputes over 
questions of land, property and privileges amongst the members of the Anglo-Norman 
ruling class.252
Due to the vast landed resources of the British Isles and the overarching 
authority of William the Conqueror, the expansionary phase of the dynamic of feudal 
political accumulation and, therewith, relative internal ruling class cohesion could be 
sustained well into the 14th Century, and was only then broken by declining kingly
249 For a clear exposition of the constitutive contradictions of feudal political accumulation, see 
Le Patourel 1976, 279-318.
250 Mitteis 1974, 199-212; Anderson 1974a, 158-61.
251 ‘Mediatisation’ implies the subinfeudation of a vassal’s vassal with the crucial proviso that 
the latter did no longer owe any allegiance to the overlord. In Capetian France, the maxim 
prevailed that ‘the vassal of my vassal is not my vassal’.
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fortunes during the Hundred Years Wars and the subsequent ‘civil’ Wars of the Roses. 
By this time, of course, the French king had successfully centralised his lands to such a 
degree that he could match England. Between the 11th and the 14th Century, Anglo- 
Norman lords not only conquered the Celtic fringes (conquests of Wales, Ireland, and 
Scotland)253 but also turned their acquisitiveness against the various fragmented 
duchies in Western France, so as to create under the Plantagenets an Empire which 
reached from the Hebrides to the Pyrenees.254 Simultaneously, martial superiority was 
both cause and effect of the extraordinary degree of centralisation of the English 
kingdom, expressed in the unchallenged monopoly of the royal ban.
Institutionally, kingly power established a supplementary layer of public power 
based upon Common Law operated by revocable sheriffs next to the traditional inter- 
lordly bonds of vassalage. In a way, post-1066 authority relations were based on a dual 
property regime which resembled Carolingian relations of exploitation. Norman lords 
had free hand to deal with their villains (serfs) on their manors, whereas the remaining 
free peasants were taxed by the king and enjoyed free access to public courts. Not 
surprisingly, class struggle typically took the form of peasants contesting their social 
status - villain or free - which acted as criterion for access to different courts: manorial 
or public.255 More generally, since medieval kings had generally an interest in 
maintaining their peasantry as sources of income over and against local lords, they 
recurrently adopted policies of peasant protection upheld in public courts.
The continuity and relative stability of English pre-M* century state-formation 
has to be seen against this background of a fixed two-tiered property settlement which 
in spite of all contestation reduced inter-noble competition over the peasantry. Such 
inter-noble arrangement for mutual agrarian profit was buttressed by wider common 
strategies of successful geopolitical accumulation in north-western Europe under the 
aegis of the king - ‘Lord Paramount’.
The Spanish Reconquista
252 Kaeuper 1988, 153 ff.
253 Davies 1989 and 1990; Bartlett 1993, 24-59 passim.
254 Le Patourel 1976; Frame 1990.
255 Hilton 1976.
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Against the sudden imposition of Franco-Norman rule on the British Isles, the 
processes of conquest and settlement in Spain and trans-Elbian Germany were more 
protracted and spasmodic in character. Here the bases of further expansion were those 
conquest lordships which Charlemagne had established at the height of his power 
around the year 800: Catalonia and Saxony.
Catalonia fragmented during its ‘Feudal Revolution’ (1020-60) into a 
multiplicity of banal lordships inducing the familiar processes of general enserfment 
and incasteUamento so as to establish a new mode of exploitation.256 Inter-lordly 
relations were radically feudalised in this process while the authority of the former 
count could no longer rely on imperial backing. However, due to the persisting 
opportunities for conquest and after a period of intense inter-Catalan feuding, Catalan 
lords accepted the overlordship of the comital dynasty of the Berenguers in its function 
as supreme warlord, whereas the count accepted in return ‘private’ lordly exploitation 
of a formerly free and tax-paying peasantry.
Catalonia, similar to 11th Century Normandy, emerged out of the ‘Feudal 
Revolution’ as the leading polity in the north-western Mediterranean. Whereas pre-11th 
century Muslim-Frankish relations were marked by political expediency and mutual 
accommodation (the religious cleavage was secondary in trans-border relations),257 the 
counts of Barcelona began immediately to pay off their license to rule by adopting 
from the mid- 11th century onwards an aggressive systematic policy of external 
conquest against what only now came to be branded as the infidels.258 Catalonia’s 
outward orientation was decisively reinforced by the influx of landless Frankish knights 
- Duby’s ‘youths’ - from the old Carolingian core-regions. In a shrewd diplomatic 
mobilisation of dynastic marital policies, Ramon Berenguer IV arranged his betrothal 
to the daughter of the King of Aragon, securing a union between formerly competing, 
yet christianised, neighbouring polities, combining forces against the Muslims to the 
south.259 The ruling dynasty renewed pressures on the taifa chieftains, attempted to 
capture Valencia, and engaged vigorously into the wider international affairs of the
256 Brilliantly: Bonnassie 1991c and 1991b and Brenner 1996, 264-9.
257 Fletcher 1987.
258 Bonnassie 1991c, 163-7.
259 Bisson 1986.
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Mediterranean, establishing ties with Norman Sicily and the incipient North Italian 
trading cities. With the help of Frankish knights, it captured Majorca and renewed its 
suzerainty over Septimania and Provence. The driving ideological but also material 
force behind such intensification of warfare were the reformed monasteries and a newly 
invigorated Gregorian papacy. In a letter of April 1073, Gregory VII exhorted the 
French
‘“princes wishing to set out for the land of Spain’” that ‘’’since the kingdom of Spain 
was from ancient times the property of St.Peter”, all lands conquered by the French 
invaders must be held as fiefs from the saint.’260
French Benedictine monks, themselves, of course, of noble origins by dint of 
aristocratic standard procedures of convent placement, came now to be appointed to 
re-captured Spanish bishoprics, busily administering Arab tribute-payments which were 
transferred back to Cluny. ‘By 1100 a large proportion of Spanish sees were ruled by 
French monks’.261
These mechanisms of geopolitical accumulation engendered a systematic 
manorialisation of the conquered regions through the familiar cycles of common count- 
led conquests, followed by the granting of fiefs to lesser lords and their consequent 
enfeoffment. These newly landed lords undertook it to either enserf their local 
peasantry or to offer initially attractive conditions of settlements in the form of 
franchises to rural colonists during times of labour scarcity, similar in character to the 
practices of enfranchisement in connection with the German Ostsiedlung. Local 
Christian magnates and Frankish knights, clerics and the pope had united in a long­
term alliance, conducting a ‘Holy War’ to expand their dominion.
The German Ostsiedlung
The German Ostsiedlung was similarly variegated in nature and even less 
centrally organised than the Norman or even Catalan undertakings, reflecting different 
starting conditions in the post-Carolingian Eastern Kingdom. Here, due to the Ottoman
260 Robinson 1990, 324.
261 Lomax 1978, 56.
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recovery of the 10th Century, the feudalisation of the state set in later and was never 
carried as far as in the French Western Kingdom. When the crisis came in the late 11th 
Century under the impact of external invasions, it took the peculiar form of a power 
struggle - the Investiture Controversy (1060-1130)- between the Emperor Henry IV, 
trying to maintain his grip on the bishoprics, and the reforming papacy allying with the 
German regional duchies 262 Ducal-papal victory meant the end of German imperial 
theocracy promoted by its rights of lay investiture. It also engendered the 
‘mediatization’ of subvassals, institutionalised in the rigorous pyramidal stratification 
of the German Heerschild In contrast to England, the German Hohenstauffen rulers 
failed to become territorial lords able to implement uniform trans-territorial policies 
beyond their royal desmesnes.
‘German feudal law, as always, placed the interests of the vassals above those of the
overlord.’263
The displacement of a wider notion of regalian public power by powerful territorial 
princes, which reserved the right to elect the Emperor, cut the crucial protective link 
between the free peasantry and royal justice, leading to the new property structure of 
lordly estates worked by enserfed peasants.264
After the feudalisation of inter-lordly relations, the often mythologised ‘drive 
towards the east’ revolved around two axes. On the one side, the logic of territorial 
political accumulation unfolded on the country-side, orchestrated by the great trans- 
Elbian territorial marcher lordships. What Normandy was for England and Catalonia 
for Spain, Saxony became for Eastern Europe. From the late 12th century onwards, the 
familiar cycles of campaigning, land-redistribution and enfeoffment, followed by 
further campaigning and sub-infeudalisation projected German political domination 
beyond the Oder deep into Slav territory. In this process, knights of often landless and 
humble origin from the old areas of German settlement in Saxony, Lotharingia or Frisia 
came to receive immense landed wealth which soon allowed them to serve their 
overlords with hundreds of retainers.265 The land-based political economy of feudal
262 Mitteis 1974, 177-92.
263 Mitteis 1974, 251.
264 Arnold 1985, 1-22 and 1991; Anderson 1974a, 161-5.
265 Bartlett 1993, 33-39.
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geopolitical relations seized upon the opportunities of noble upward social mobility 
offered by the Eastern Settlement and the ‘moving’ German frontier.
At the same time, German merchants set up a dense net of trading ports and 
towns along the southern shore of the Baltic tapping the vast cereal, timber and fur 
resources of Eastern Europe. This form of commercial capitalism, co-ordinated by the 
evolving Hanse league with its mother town Lubeck, established a series of trading 
monopolies which were defended by Military Orders of which the Teutonic Order 
came to dominate Prussia. Military Orders pooled landless Frankish lords securing not 
only naval trading routes but also advancing the feudalisation of the coastal Slav 
hinterlands. Originating in the context of the Crusades, Military Orders recruited 
systematically from the Frankish knights and were characterised by extraordinary 
international mobility and tight internal organisation. Entertaining a dense net of 
strategic and logistic bases throughout the Mediterranean and along the Atlantic shore, 
they presented an emergency force for feudal Christendom.266 In the Baltic, 
commercial and missionary interests combined with the martial capacities and land- 
hunger of monastic lords in the colonisation of the trans-Elbian regions.
The Papal Revolution and The Crusades
The novelty of Military Orders - which would have been regarded in the 8th 
Century as a contradiction in terms - indicates a revolution in the institutional set-up 
and ideological self-understanding of the papacy. The very 11th Century which changed 
inter-lordly relations so dramatically in the old Frankish heartlands, also changed the 
relation between the secular and the ecclesiastical in the wake of the Gregorian 
reforms, establishing the papacy as a feudal power striving for European supremacy.
During the Carolingian epoch, the pre-Gregorian Church was subordinate to 
Frankish secular lords. 267 Bishops were nominated and invested by the Emperor, 
enjoying special protection by the Emperor and tax exemptions (indemnities); the 
system of noble proprietary churches prevailed at the local level. As a rule, parish 
priests and abbots were nominated by that noble family which had originally endowed
266 Christiansen 1980.
128
the religious institution with land, leading to the regular practices of convent placement 
of noble daughters and cadets. Rome was merely a spiritual center of pilgrimage. No 
separate legal framework separated the Latin clergy from the rest of feudal society. 
The pope was essentially a weak figurehead of the nobility of the city of Rome, 
appointed by the German Emperor. Thus, pre-11th Century Roman bishops were mere 
primi inter pares.
The structural position of the Church in medieval society began to change 
precisely at that point in time when imperial theocratic power was burst asunder 
through the violent undertakings of banal lords in search for profit. Regional 
bishoprics, monasteries, and parish churches were the first to suffer from lordly 
pillaging and dispossessing during the period of feudal anarchy in the absence of 
public protection. It was precisely at this time that the unarmed clergy, most affected 
by the feuding terror of the castellans, tried to find new ways of dissociating the realm 
of the sacred from the profane - to wrest themselves from the control of local feudal 
lords.268
First, the monastic reform movement, headed by the Benedictines, re­
structured relations amongst its scattered and hitherto loosely connected monasteries 
and lands into an extra-papal hierarchical system under the jurisdiction of the Abbot of 
Cluny. At the same time, monks formulated the doctrine of the Three Orders and 
invented a specific ethos of Christian chivalry which provided the ideological 
background for the Crusades.
Second, the episcopal peace-movements tried to re-impose order by 
orchestrating first the ‘Truce of God’ and later the ‘Peace of God’ in the lands between 
Catalonia and Flanders.269 This bishop-led strategy of appeasement was too weak to 
outlaw feuding but succeeded in specifying exemptions to warring, first in terms of 
persons and objects, later in terms of time and space. However, precisely because the 
Church lacked powers of enforcement - the threat of excommunication only went so 
far -, 11th Century popes thoroughly re-defined their war ideology and tried to canalise 
lordly violence by deflecting it into outward aggression against the ‘infidels’. Promising 
not only land and booty, but eternal salvation, the papacy instrumentalised Frankish
267 ‘There was a fusion of the religious and political spheres.’ Berman 1983, 88.
268 Mitteis 1974, 177ff.
269 Flori 1992a.
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lords, rebaptised them as milites Sancti Petri, and invented, in striking contrast to 
earlier notions of inter-Christian non-violence, notions of Just and Holy War: the idea 
of the crusades was born.270
Third, Church lore on war changed as rapidly as the institutional structures of 
the papacy tightened into a state-like trans-territorially centralised administrative 
system, based on canon law. Taking the Cluniac system as a model, the reform 
movement under Pope Gregory VII struggled for papal supremacy over spiritual 
matters by usurping the Holy See from the German Emperor through by what would 
today be called a coup d ’Etat (1075/ This struggle over supremacy in the name of the 
libertas ecclesiae unleashed the famous Investiture Controversy which soon gave rise 
to a series of Wars of Investiture between Gregory VII, mustering Norman 
mercenaries from Sicily and Frankish knights, and the German Emperor, Henry V, 
occupying Rome in 1111 with his imperial army. After the Concordat of Worms 
(1122), the Ottoman theocratic system of government inherited from the Carolingians 
was a dead letter. The papal claim to legal supremacy over the whole of Christendom 
was established, though only the clergy was subjected to a systematised canon law, 
whose court of last instance became the papal curia.
It is in this context of revolutionary struggles that the Crusades (1096-99, 
1147, and 1189), ‘the foreign wars of the Papal Revolution’271 have to be set. They 
were the result of the Vatican’s policy to establish with the help of Frankish and 
Norman land-hungry lords and soldiers and the financial support of the Italian city- 
states, a series of vassalic states in the Levant and the eastern Mediterranean. Their 
constitutional set-up reflected perfectly the feudal structure of the invasion armies. 
Since each prince led his vassalic contingent of knights and mercenaries into battle, 
Syria was divided into a number of feudal principalities, owing nominal loyalty to the 
King of Jersualem and, ultimately, to the pope in his function as overlord. During these 
processes, the Church was centralised, monarchised, and militarised. What used to be a 
spiritual center of faith turned into a secularised Church state (Kirchenstaat) 
entertaining a power-conscious foreign policy. Henceforth, Christian universalism 
knew several heads. One the one hand, we find monarchies defending their direct
270 Flori 1986, 191-203 and 215-19 and 1992b, 133-46.
271 Berman 1983, 101.
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mandate from God and entertaining sacred notions of kingship; on the other hand, we 
find a reinvigorated papacy insisting on its right to invest or depose temporal rulers.
French State-Formation between the 11th and 14th Centuries: From Banal 
Fragmentation to Royal Consolidation
While ex-Frankish lords successfully conquered the non-Frankish European 
periphery, the old Frankish core underwent in the period between the 11th and the 14th 
Centuries a transition in the political structure of high medieval France from a plurality 
of banal lords to a hierarchised feudal monarchy. By the early 14th Century, the French 
kings had clearly established their feudal overlordship - feudal suzerainty - over France. 
While these developments saw also the beginning of a shift in inter-lordly relations 
from pure inter-vassalic bonds to nascent conceptions of public order, it is entirely 
erroneous to equate these transformations with the origins of the modem state, as 
Hendryk Spruyt maintains with reference to Joseph Strayer.272 This section retraces 
the conflicting social processes which led to the territorial aggrandisement, but 
imperfect administrative consolidation of the Capetian monarchy up to the 14th Century 
Crisis.
The Capetian ‘Domain State ’
At the height of the ‘Feudal Revolution’, the power of the monarchy was 
reduced to the royal domain, its control of a substantial number of bishoprics and 
monasteries in northern France, and the largely nominal regal rights it enjoyed due to 
its sacral status. Powerful territorial princes dominated the greater duchies and 
counties in the North and in the marches - Normandy, Flanders, Picardy, Brittany, and 
Catalonia -, whereas political fragmentation due to the terror of the castellans was far 
more advanced in Burgundy, Blois-Champagne, Anjou, Aquitaine, Gascony, Toulouse,
272 Spruyt 1994a, 79; Strayer 1970. Even Mitteis concludes his masterful survey by arguing 
that by the 13th century ‘the impersonal and institutionalized machinery of the modem state’ 
was already in place. Mitteis 1975, 393.
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and in the lie de France itself. These castellans whom we defined as lords who, 
through the appropriation of former Carolingian ‘public’ powers, had amalgamated the 
functions of ‘domestic lordship’ with those of ‘banal lordship’, were the dominant 
political actors. Although slavery was dead by the 11th Century, the status of the 
peasantry was reduced to serfdom within the castellanies. The structure of society was 
anarchical in so far as, in spite of the fact that the idea of feudal bonds between King 
and princes was never entirely forgotten, homage, if paid at all, was more regarded as a 
treaty between two independent rulers, then as a manifestation of subordination 
according to feudal law.273 In most cases, the princes, even in the northern duchies, had 
to rule against the castellans rather than with them in order to impose hierarchy and to 
retain or regain the territorial identity of their principalities. The ‘feudal anarchy’ of the 
11th Century rested on the territorial monopolisation of the powers of exploitation by 
individualised small banal lords. This acephalous structure of French inter-noble 
relations was to change significantly in the course of the next four centuries into a 
‘hierarchical’ structure of political power.
Let us first specify the nature of that political actor which played the major part 
in this history of large-scale structural change. The Capetian ‘state’ which set out to 
conquer France carried all the characteristics of an extended patrimonial household 
transforming itself in the course of its territorial aggrandisement into a half feudal, half 
patrimonial state - both elements standing in constant tension throughout the period.274 
‘Government’ emanated from the king surrounded by the curia regis which was 
composed of dependent patrimonial officers. In the 11th and 12th Centuries, the French 
kings drew their revenues largely from the classical sources of patrimonial and 
increasingly feudal lordship. These have to be divided into the different functions of 
kingship: seigneur of the royal domain, territorial lord, and feudal overlord over all
273 Hallam 1980, 95.
274 Whereas a feudal political relation between two lords is based on a reciprocal contract 
between two independent lords, a patrimonial relation conferred a unilaterally revocable right 
to an officer who remains subordinate to his lord. ‘Patrimonial domination is thus a special 
case of patriarchal domination - domestic authority decentralized through assignment of land 
and sometimes of equipment to sons of the house or other dependents.’ Weber [1922] 1968a, 
1011. Weber expands that ‘we shall speak of a patrimonial state when the prince organizes his 
political power over extrapatrimonial areas and political subjects - which is not discretionary 
and not enforced by physical coercion - just like the exercise of his patriarchal power.’ Weber 
[1922] 1968a, 1013. Since this extension in France was more often enforced than not, we shall
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fiefs {la mouvance). Next to the income - mostly in kind - derived from the royal 
domain supervised by prevots and baillis (itinerant officials), revenues were largely 
generated through indirect taxation (tolls and fines), special rights (judicial profits, 
minting, hunting, foresting), and the extraordinary aids from royal vassals in times of 
crisis. To this have to be added the profits of justice and war (treasure, tribute, ransom 
money) and an increasing reliance on ‘public credit’ financed by merchant bankers. The 
army was still gathered by means of the feudal levy based on reciprocal inter-personal 
bonds, before noble military service was commuted into monetary payments, which 
allowed, in turn, the maintenance of mercenary troops. No general and regular 
imposition existed besides the inter-personally and irregularly negotiated dues and 
services provided by the nobility. As a rule, the feudal property regime did not allow 
for direct taxation in the absence of a generalised notion of a subject, i.e. as long as the 
majority of the peasantry was personally bound to a local lord. In short, the ‘fiscal’ 
machinery of the state took the form of an expanded royal household.275
Capetian Political Accumulation
As the revenue system betrayed the extractive logic of a feudo-patrimonial 
‘domain state’, so did the techniques of territorial expansion betray the thoroughly 
feudal geopolitical dynamics of the French monarchy. From the late 11th Century 
onwards and throughout the 12th and 13 th, the princes and the king tried to re- 
consolidate their territories - internally over and against the castellans, and externally 
amongst each other. The logic of French state-building unfolded thus under the 
constant pressures of geopolitical competition, which drove smaller lords into the 
hands of greater lords, and of inter-lordly political concentration to retain the political 
hold on the peasantry. In this process, the French monarchy had to deploy the whole 
arsenal of feudal expansionary techniques to establish its suzerainty over Francia 
during the course of four centuries. These ranged from outright war and annexation,
rather speak of a feudo-patrimonial state. By the same token, since the Capetian state drew 
from very early on on extra-patrimonial resources, it was never a pure ‘domain state’.
275 Ormrod and Barta 1995, 62-8; Guenee 1985, 91-110.
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through dynastic marriage-policies, alliance-building276 and bribery to simple 
confiscation and enfeoffment, so that the local aristocracy was either suppressed, co­
opted, intermarried, bought, or tied to the king by unstable bonds of vassalage 277
The first unmistakable signs of Capetian revival278 came under the rule of Louis 
VI (1108-1137) who succeeded in suppressing a number of unruly castellan dynasties 
in the royal principality, seized their lands and granted them out to loyal vassals so as 
to mark the beginning of the hierarchical feudal pyramid. His efforts remained, 
however, limited to the lie de France, and he and his son Louis VII (1137-80) had to 
concede the acquisition of much of western France by the latter’s fateful divorce from 
Eleanor of Aquitaine and her subsequent marriage to Henry II, King of England. The 
ascendancy of the English-dominated ‘Angevin Empire’ eclipsed the power of any 
French prince, including the King, for about a century. The decisive turn came with 
Philip II ‘Augustus’ (1180-1223) who, by profiting from problems in the English 
succession and Richard the Lionheart’s absence while crusading, received the Artois 
and Vermandois as a dowry, conquered the Berry and much of the Angevin lands 
(Normandy, Maine, Touraine, Anjou, and Brittany), and confiscated with the support 
of the papacy large parts of the Languedoc (the county of Toulouse) from their heretic 
lords during the Albigensian crusades.279 These acquisitions were entrenched by his 
son, Louis VIII (1223-26) who added Poitou to the kingdom, and his successor, Louis 
XI (1226-70) who bought Macon in 1239. Philip the Fair, finally, bought the counties 
of Chartres, La Marche and Angouleme, as well as the important county of Burgundy 
(Franche-Comte), while adding a range of important towns and ports. These purchases 
were usually made from heavily indebted regional lords who received in turn a lump 
sum and an annual pension for lifetime.
276 Philip I, for example, allied with the dukes of Flanders and Anjou to balance the power of 
the Norman Duke. Mitteis 1975, 194.
277 Mitteis 1975, 267-79 and 345-52; Given 1990; Anderson 1974a, 156-8; Spruyt 1994a, 
chap. 5. Spruyt explains the rise of the modem sovereign territorial state in France in terms of 
a coalition of interests between towns and kings, the former providing sources of income in 
return for protection and standardised taxation, administration, and jurisdiction allowing for the 
reduction of transaction costs and greater efficiency (p. 79). The prior question remains why the 
French nobility lost its politically-constituted extractive powers so as to turn to the monarchy to 
provide income.
278 Hallam 1980, 114-36.
279 In detail Given 1990, 104-11.
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'The total effect of the additions now made to the royal domain was so overwhelming 
that by 1328 the domain covered a total area about three times that of the great 
appanages and fiefs.'280
Precisely because this process of territorial expansion was carried out by 
different rulers at different stages of administrative organisation confronting regions 
with different internal class-constellations and legal customs, their integration into the 
French sphere of influence evinced important regional peculiarities - peculiarities which 
spawned ‘historical legacies’ which were consequential for French administrative 
diversity even under the centralising pressures of later absolutist rulers. In striking 
contrast to post-Conquest England, territorial administrative uniformity was thus 
blocked from the first.
Changing Class Relations: The End of Serfdom, the End o f the Castellan Class, and 
the Ascent o f Feudal Kingship
In this process of geopolitical accumulation, the structure of the French nobility 
changed significantly and with it, the relations between king-cum-officials and nobility 
in the administrative organisation of the annexed lands.281 The regional French 
aristocracy was, of course, not simply a passive victim but an active interested party 
whose room for political action was circumscribed by the scissors opening up between 
its growing consumption needs due to rising costs in military equipment, and stagnant 
or falling returns from their agricultural exploitations. In other words, its reproductive 
fortunes were suspended between a resisting peasantry and competing co-rulers. We 
have seen how the ascent of banal lordships went hand in hand with the rise of 
serfdom. The military apparatus (knights and castles) necessary to keep serfs subdued 
pressed banal lords to seek new sources of revenue. Under these circumstances, they 
either sought the assistance of greater lords - be it the King or the princes - in 
maintaining ‘order’ through their enhanced military capacities or had to offer 
concessions (franchises and peasant charters) to the peasantry, especially in connection 
with the colonisation of new lands.
280 Waley 1985, 51.
281 Gerstenberger 1990, 268-80.
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Let us first turn to the constitutional consequences of these competing inter- 
lordly relations, before we set out their implications for the peasantry. The support of 
greater lords came, of course, only at the price of political subordination. The classical 
mechanism by which this subordination was effected throughout the 12th Century was 
the f ie f  de reprise, through which an independent lord offered his allod for a 
substantial price as a fief to an overlord, allowing him unconditional access to the 
castle.282 However, due to the uneven and piecemeal process of territorial 
feudalisation, subvassals - in stark contrast to England - did not owe primary allegiance 
to the king, but to their immediate lords (Vasallus vasalli mei non est meus 
vasallus).283 The struggle over direct allegiance or mediatisation - partially resolved 
through the introduction of liege-homage - marked the 13th Century. The process of 
territorial expansion through feudal hierarchisation was accelerated through the 
growing monetarisation of social relations. Vassals came to substitute their military 
services to the King through payments (‘bastard feudalism’). This mechanism tended 
to increase the relative autonomy of the King from his vassalic retinue by de­
militarising inter-vassalic relations and the concomitant build-up of mercenary troops 
under exclusive royal command. In turn, the growing costs of warfare reduced the 
chances of castellans and even greater princes to maintain themselves in their capacity 
as independent lords.
At the same time, the Capetians asserted their hold in the regions over and 
against the nobility through the extension of their court system284 beyond the royal 
domain. The itinerant justices became sedentary and institutionalised assizes in legal 
territorial units called bailliages in the north and senechausees in the south, presided 
over by royal agents. Cases could be brought not only by vassals against their 
immediate overlords, but also by towns and rural communes. The doctrine came to 
prevail that all cases touching the king’s sovereignty - by which was meant the king’s 
peace - could be brought before the king’s courts. By the 14th Century, a system of 
royal jurisdiction, operated by royal officials, with an appellate system culminating in 
the Parlement de Paris was established. It was the court of last instance in feudal law 
as well as in nascent royal law (public law).
282 Duby 1991, 165 ff.; Poly and Boumazel 1991, 65; Reynolds 1994, 260-66.
283 Mitteis 1975,351.
284 Kaeuper 1988, 150-1 and 160; Mitteis 1975, 346-7.
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However, the royal policy of monopolising jurisdiction in the hand of the state 
was more apparent than real. Strong countervailing forces inherent in agrarian 
economies based on feudal property relations squashed legal sovereignty. First, royal 
judges came to be recruited - with the exception of the Parlement which was staffed 
with urban legal professionals - largely from the regional nobility. Since their office 
was patrimonial285 in character, i.e it was granted to the highest bidder who carried out 
the farming of taxes from which he deduced his own income, it came to be seen as 
another source of patronage and personal profit, creating difficulties of central control. 
Similar to the Carolingian Empire, the creation of offices contained the tendency 
towards their ‘privatisation’, involving sub-letting and, in extreme cases, hereditability 
and alienability. However, although the office was farmed-out as a fee benefice, the 
13th Century practice of office-holding did not yet go as far as the 16th Century practice 
of office venality in which hereditability and non-revocability were legally recognised in 
a contract of purchase. The incumbent leased the office but did not own it and was 
therefore revocable after the duration of the lease had lapsed.286 Secondly, the 
comprehensive penetration of the French country-side with a supra-territorial system 
of jurisdiction remained impossible to achieve in the face of persisting autonomous 
lordly powers.
‘In about 1308 there were roughly thirty bailliages and senechaussees, with more than 
300 subordinate courts of prevots (in the north), viguiers or bayles (in the south) 
coexisting with the thousands of feudal justices. ’287
The royal claim to final jurisdiction ran time and again against the original 
rights and powers of the feudal nobility. Successive attempts by late Capetian and early 
Vallois kings to outlaw feuding (‘private war’), to license castle-building, and to 
arrogate the final say over noble arms-bearing - the marks of political lordship - were 
frustrated.288 The practical problems in inducing compliance with royal ordinances and
285 According to Weber, the high and late medieval French royal judges held ‘fee benefices’, in 
which the maintenance of the incumbent was based on fees of extrapatrimonial origin; that is, 
they were not paid by the King but reproduced themselves through the proceeds of their office. 
Weber [1922] 1968a, 1032.
286 Schwarz 1983, 181; Guenee 1985, 118-9.
287 Kaeuper 1988, 169.
288 Kaeuper 1988, 184-268.
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judgements testified to the persisting lordly powers of the nobility. Jurisdiction 
remained fragmented.
It was precisely these competing claims to final jurisdiction, symptomatic of the 
weakness of high medieval French ruling class organisation, which were decisive for 
the improving status of the French peasantry. In spite of unfavourable demographic 
pressures,289 the peasantry succeeded in the course of the 12th and 13th Centuries to 
shake off serfdom (commutation of labour rents into money rents) and to establish by 
the early 14th Century de facto - though not de iure - property rights over customary 
tenures, including the right to inherit. Lords in need of cash engaged in selling charters 
of liberty to peasant communes which regulated lordly exactions and curbed their 
arbitrary character.290 Rents (cens), but also other dues (fines, death dues, transfer 
dues) which still weighed on the plots became fixed and remained thus unadjusted to 
inflation. Over time, lords were obliged to lease out desmesne land or to sell land 
directly.291 Declining rents and alienation of property brought them into an increasingly 
precarious financial situation. Many castellans and knights were driven into debts and 
were drawn into the service of greater noble households. Alternatively, they sold 
themselves as mercenaries or went directly ‘abroad’ to carve out lordships in the non- 
Frankish periphery. Crucially, the peasantry exploited the weakened status of their 
direct lords to appeal immediately to royal courts to uphold its granted concessions 
which it had wrought from their erstwhile banal lord. In this process, the king tended 
to side with the peasants, for their loss of serfdom was his gain in terms of a new 
income-base (no longer a rent-base, but a tax-base) and the simultaneous subjection of 
a noble rival. Charters of liberty for rural communes and individual franchises 
dislodged much of direct noble hold on the rural population. Wherever the local 
nobility tried to re-impose arbitrary taxation or customary levies to counteract their 
income crises, the French King was instrumental in backing up petty peasant 
proprietorship in public courts, thus ultimately safeguarding an important source of 
state revenue.
289 According to Neo-Malthusian reasoning, a rising population would have meant an over­
supply of labour, resulting in lower peasant incomes or in a demotion of their legal status. 
None of which occurred in France.
290 Duby 1968, 242; Hallam 1980, 161 ff. and 225; Brenner 1996, 256-7.
291 Duby 1968, 237-9; Neveux 1975. 36; Brenner 1985b, 243.
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The struggle between ‘state’ and nobility in the countryside was to a large 
degree a struggle over the rights and profits of jurisdiction, i.e. about political 
domination. The build-up of a system of royal jurisdiction competed with and tended 
to undermine the political and extractive power of the local nobility.292 The French 
lower nobility found itself squeezed between strong peasant-communities and the 
greater princes, of which the King was primus inter pares. By the early 13th Century, 
‘the castellan class was disintegrating’,293 and the greater magnates struggled against 
the royal claim to feudo-patrimonial sovereignty.
An Imperfect Feudal Kingdom
The establishment of Capetian rule in the various French principalities was not 
so much a process of abrupt imposition as a process of blending - in a regionally and 
chronologically highly uneven process - kingly patronage networks with those of pre­
existing noble families through patrimonial and feudal techniques of domination. Here 
was not a state which grafted its bureaucratic administration upon a territory, but a 
feudal ruler who had to ensure through a mixture of coercion and conciliation the 
personal loyalty of political lords - who continued to reproduce themselves from their 
own lands - and patrimonial officers who veered constantly towards the appropriation 
of their farmed offices. French rule meant, on the one hand, the integration of 
independent lords as vassals into the feudal hierarchy; on the other, it meant the 
insertion of a network of royal jurisdiction, operated by royal agents, into the regional 
political landscape. This attempt to monopolise the right to arbitrate the chronic 
disputes between greater lords (lay or ecclesiastical), towns, petty seigneurs, and rural 
communities enmeshed the royal agents heavily into local politics. And it was the 
changing alliances between the king, the regional nobility, towns, and peasants, and 
especially the royal interest to wrest control over towns and peasant communities from 
the nobility, which gave French state-formation its peculiar uneven and piecemeal 
character.
292 For Languedoc see Given 1990, 83-88
293 Duby 1991, 166.
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By the beginning of the 14th Century, the French ‘state’ came to rest on a new 
constellation of social classes. The King, in theory and in practice, had become a feudal 
suzerain; the territorial princes had become integrated into the feudal hierarchy; the 
independent class of banal lords and knights had vanished or had turned into a petty 
nobility of service for the King; many towns had emancipated themselves from 
seigneurial control and enjoyed royal liberties; and the peasantry had gained personal 
freedom and de facto property rights. Yet, for all the tendencies toward administrative 
centralisation and territorial concentration, the realm remained thoroughly feudal, that 
is: personalised, in character.294
The Capetian rise to supremacy and the extension of the royal domain to cover 
four fifths of contemporary France was neither inevitable, nor was it the natural, 
unilinear, and uninterrupted growth-story of state-formation as textbooks and national 
histories want us to believe. Indeed, the comparatively small royal domain in the Ile- 
de-France, though it carried the important legitimation of ecclesiastical consecration 
and divine monarchy, was an unlikely pretender to achieve and exert suzerainty over 
more powerful rivals, of which the English King, Henry II and his successors, were the 
most formidable. The very nature of feudo-patrimonial states, carrying all the 
vicissitudes of a non-unified territory due to the biological play of chance of dynastic 
family reproduction and rules of succession - appanages granted to royal cadets 
alienated time and again parts of the territory - set absolute limits to and refracted the 
linearity of French state-formation. The size of the territory contracted and fragmented 
at times and the indeterminacy of the whole undertaking came clearly to the fore in the 
feudal crisis of the 14th Century and the Hundred Years’ War in its wake. However, 
this is no argument for the role of chance and contingency in history, but an argument 
that under persisting inter-personal political property-relations, the logic of state- 
building contained both a centralising as well as a de-centralising drive, depending 
upon the degree of self-organisation of the ruling and producing classes, governing the 
rate of surplus extraction under the impact of the demo-economic cycles of agrarian 
economies.
294 ‘Powers of legitimate coercion and control were not concentrated in royal hands but were 
widely diffused throughout society. (...) One can hardly say that even the most determined royal 
government had successfully penetrated its society in the sense that it had set up a unified, 
rational field administration for resource mobilization, the creation of public order, and the 
coordination of collective efforts." Given 1990, 248.
140
As in the 9th and 10th Centuries, when the Carolingian Empire disintegrated into 
its constitutive lordships under the combined impact of over-taxation and external 
threats, so did the French monarchy struggle to keep its leading barons - alienated 
through over-taxation and under-exploitation - at bay in the crisis of the 14th Century. 
In other words, property-relations provided clear structural limits to how far the 
experience of state-formation could proceed in high and late medieval France.
Conclusion: The Medieval Making of a Multi-Actor Europe
‘Europe’ expanded before the onset of capitalism. It expanded before the 
Italian, Flemish and German trading ports established their far-flung commercial 
activities in the Mediterranean, the Baltic and along the Atlantic rim, and it expanded 
before the great absolutism-sponsored discoveries overseas. The agents of medieval 
expansion were a dissatisfied and economically threatened transnational late Frankish 
nobility in search of new sources of income. The causes of feudal expansion were 
‘domestic’. The centrifugal dynamic of such mass migration was prompted by a prior 
internal re-structuring of social and political relations in the late Carolingian European 
heartlands. Interpreting the 10th Century ‘Feudal Revolution’ as a dramatic seigneurial 
reaction to a crisis in income reveals the immediate link between internal social 
relations and external conquest, ‘domestic’ transformations and international 
repercussions.
Wherever the European knights succeeded in holding tight to their newly 
acquired lordships, feudal state-formation occurred. New kingdoms rose. The social 
transformation and geographic integration of the extra-Frankish European periphery 
unified the Continent in social, military, commercial, cultural, and religious terms under 
the spiritual umbrella of the political papacy. The Baltic Sea, the Northern Atlantic and 
the Mediterranean were turned into Catholic lakes, increasingly dominated by 
commercial city-leagues and city-states, connecting Liibeck with Reval, Hamburg with 
Bruges and London, Genoa with Barcelona, and Venice with Constantinople and 
Alexandria. Yet, while commercial and cultural unity spread, politico-territorial 
disunity became entrenched. Given the feudal character of colonisation, post-millennial
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expansion did not engender dependent colonies, but independent dynastic polities. This 
tendency was built into the inter-personal structure of the feudal mode of exploitation 
which left more room for power-political fissures, eagerly seized upon by parvenu 
dynasties, then for pan-European imperial domination. By the early 14th Century, the 
political map of Europe exhibits a geography of feudal statehood which had shaken off 
the hierarchical ghosts of its imperial Roman and Carolingian pasts. While new empires 
(Spain and Germany), powerful monarchies (France and England) and a supremacy- 
claiming papal state emerged, the struggle for universalism amongst the unequal 
polities within Europe remained henceforth undecided. The renewed rise of kingly 
power within these feudal polities aborted a repetition of the extreme fragmentation of 
political power around the year 1000. While the ascent of a multi-actor Europe was 
logically not an irreversible process, the emergence of multiple polities within the 
cultural unity of Christian Europe time and again frustrated the imperial and universal 
ambitions, fuelled by the persisting logic of political accumulation, and claims of 
precedence of its most powerful members.
However, if a political pluriverse came now to be a constitutive feature of 
European geopolitics, it did not imply a fixed territorial identity of its units, nor did it 
inaugurate the era of the rise of the modem state. Lordly colonialism did not represent 
a structural advance in the modes of social and political organisation of the labour 
process, nor a leap in technological innovations harnessed to such purposes. The 
persistence of the agrarian-based coercive mode of extraction during the Middle Ages 
meant that the forms of lordly appropriation remained primarily extensive, rather than 
intensive, oriented towards territory, not towards increases in productivity. Thus, while 
territory-based extra-European expansion continued, inner-European competition over 
territory intensified on a par. Trade was epiphenomenal to the kind of medieval 
colonialism in question, but the break-down of the Carolingian Empire created those 
power-political ‘interstices’ in which towns could wrest themselves from the political 
control of territorial princes. Yet, while urban political autonomy was gained in those 
regions were kings were too weak to quickly re-impose territorial power after the 
‘Feudal Revolution’ (Germany, Italy, Flanders), these cities remained economically 
entirely dependent upon the demands and buying-power of feudal lords and the wider 
secular and ecclesiastical political establishment. The rise and fall of medieval cities 
was directly pegged to the extractive powers of the land-holding class and, in
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particular, to the solvency of borrowing kings, as well as to the militarily-protected 
lines of long-distance commerce. Unless they succeeded in transforming themselves 
into land-based city-states, drawing on independent sources of non-commercial income 
(Venice), their fortunes would follow lordly demand as informed by the level of rents 
extracted from the peasantry within the wider context of the eco-demographic 
fluctuations of the agrarian economy. The resumption of long-distance commerce in 
the 12th Century was itself an upshot of heightened aristocratic demand based on 
intensified exploitation of a systematically enserfed peasantry intensifying, by the same 
token, inter-lordly military competition, which, in turn, powered the wheels of 
commerce. When the crisis of the 14th Century set in, cities were to suffer first.
To conclude, intra-ruling class struggle among late Frankish lords under 
outside pressure precipitated the implosion of the Carolingian Empire during the 
‘Feudal Revolution’ of the Year 1000. Imperial hierarchy gave way to feudal anarchy 
during the regime of banal lords. The re-structuration of the mode of exploitation to a 
serf-based agrarian economy engendered the militarisation of the Frankish country­
side, while the territorialisation and patrimonialisation of lordships prompted the 
introduction of primogeniture and impartible inheritance amongst noble families, 
driving excess knightly sons beyond the borders of ancient Francia. Thereafter, 
migrating Frankish lords, legitimated by the political Church, attempted to replicate 
their traditional forms of political reproduction in the extra-Frankish periphery. New 
feudal kingdoms sprang up headed by ex-Frankish knights turned dynasts. The new 
pattern of international organisation came to be characterised by a plurality of royal 
dynasties, generating inter-regal anarchy, loosely mitigated by feudal bonds and a 
common Roman Catholic cultural discourse.
However, the essential unit of production and authority, be it in the Holy Land, 
Andalusia, Leinster or Silesia, was and remained the lordship. The diverse experiences 
of extra-Frankish as well as inner-Frankish high medieval state-building found their 
institutional and ‘modernising’ limits in the survival and export of structures of 
lordship. While the territorial extent of feudal Europe increased dramatically after the 
passage from the early to the high Middle Ages, and while its various rulers were no 
longer united under imperial authority, its form of socio-political organisation did not 
alter fundamentally. In one sense, feudalism created a world according to its own
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image. In a very different sense, however, feudalism created the lasting legacy of a 
European political geography divided along dynastic lines.
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Chapter Four
Transitions and Non-Transitions to Modernity: 
A Critique of Rival Paradigms
Introduction
This chapter seeks to peruse dominant models of transition to * modernity’ in 
their implications for the problem of systemic change in the discipline of IR. 
Conventional IR paradigms, most notably those of realist or neorealist lineage, would 
of course challenge the very idea that the deep logic of international relations alters 
with the arrival of modernity. Where there is no change, there is no need of 
explanation. This no-deep-change model which has dominated the discipline of IR over 
the last two decades is however a disciplinary anomaly of a branch of knowledge 
which mistook the expulsion of history for scientific rigour. Still, the necessity for and 
force of our argument rests on a convincing case for the historical specificity of 
international orders. This argument is itself predicated on the assumption that we can 
discern both, a deep ‘generative structure’ of international systems which explains their 
institutional and dynamic differences and a ‘transformative logic’ which explains the 
transitions from one system to another.
The preceding two chapters on the geopolitical relations of the European 
Middle Ages have shown the uniqueness of feudal ‘international’ order. Theoretically, 
we have argued that social property relations (‘generative structure’) and their 
conflicting class-related contestations (‘transformative logic’) provide the social 
rationale behind the historically distinct nature of medieval geopolitics. In a very real 
sense, however, the coherence and trans-historical explanatory power of our social 
property approach depends upon its capacity to theorise the transition to ‘modernity’
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and to draw out significant implications for early modem and modem processes of 
state-building, and, by extension, the genesis of the modem European states system. It 
is then our task to show how, at the end of the Middle Ages, social conflict over social 
property relations translates into specific experiences of state-building and geopolitical 
behaviour.
Before we show in the next chapter the origins and nature of French absolutism 
as the major paradigm of early modem state-formation, we first have to refute the 
theoretical pretensions inherent in two prominent alternative models of the transition to 
‘modernity’, the ‘geopolitical competition model’ and the ‘commercialisation model’. 
Everything hinges, of course, on a tight definition of what it is that we want to explain. 
Macro-explanations of the transition to modernity either seek to account for the war- 
driven formation of the modem state and the modem states system, the ‘rise of the 
West’ and its ‘superiority’ over non-European cultures, or the rise of capitalism, self- 
sustaining long-term economic development, and territorial economic expansion. A 
military logic is here confronted by an economic logic. These logics are, of course, in 
various theories interrelated or causally co-constitutive, but a distinct focus of inquiry 
is nevertheless identifiable in various transition literatures.
This chapter seeks thus to refute the accounts of the transition to modernity 
inherent in the ‘geopolitical competition model’ and in the ‘commercialisation model’. 
The first model emphasises the competitive international relations of late medieval 
times which entailed dynamic pressures for the build-up of ever more consolidated and 
territorialised states eager to increase their war-making capacities. The second model 
specifically seeks to understand the role of trade, the growth of towns, the increasing 
international division of labour, and the rise of a bourgeoisie as long-term causes 
behind Europe’s ascendancy. Both theories have long-standing theoretical ancestries 
and enjoy periodic revivals in various guises. In our exposition, we will see how 
various scholars, although they come from different theoretical traditions, can be 
subsumed under these two models.
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Defining Political Modernity, Defining Capitalism
The specific thesis which we want to defend and on which our critique of the 
two macro-models is predicated proposes that ‘modernity’ arises only with capitalism. 
Capitalism is, however, not simply understood as an economic category, but as a 
social-property regime to which a specific state-form is internally related. Again, 
everything does not only depend upon on how we define modernity, but also how we 
define capitalism.
Two dominant concepts of capitalism can be distinguished in the literature. The 
first concept defines capitalism as an economic system of production for the market 
predicated on an advanced division of labour within and between centers of 
commercial production (towns), which allow for the accumulation of profits through 
inter-urban long-distance trade. Capitalism resides here in the ‘logic of circulation’.295 
The second concept defines capitalism as a social system predicated on a set of social 
property relations in which the direct producer is separated from his means of 
subsistence, so that he is compelled to sell his or her labour power to a capitalist owner 
of the means of production to make a living. Profits are here generated through the 
exploitation of labour-power by the siphoning off of surplus value in the process of 
production itself. Capitalism resides here in the ‘logic of production’.296
The defenders of both concepts claim to be consistent with Karl Marx’s usage 
of capitalism. Yet, while the production-paradigm is held to be Marx’s original 
contribution to the critique of political economy, the circulation-paradigm has a longer 
pedigree which can be traced back to Adam Smith and is also compatible with 
Weberian understandings of capitalism. To put it in ideal-typical terms, while the 
production paradigm presupposes an objective set of social property relations as the 
necessary social and historical condition for capital accumulation and sustained 
economic growth, the circulation-paradigm presupposes a (naturalised) subjective 
profit motive which engenders rational economic action, specialisation, and a tendency
295 Braudel 1977 and 1984; Wallerstein 1974, 1980, 1995; Sweezey 1976; Abu-Lughod 1989; 
Arrighi 1994.
296 Dobb 1976; Merrington 1976; Brenner 1977, 1985b, 1986; Wood 1991 and 1995;
Comninel 1987; McNally 1988, Gerstenberger 1990; Mooers 1991; Katz 1989 and 1993; 
Rosenberg 1994
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towards a further division of labour, once the artificial impediments for a full flowering 
of the profit-motive - be they of a cultural or military-political kind - have been 
removed. The implications of these two meanings of capitalism are, however, not 
confined to marxological disputes over the correct reading of Marx himself, but have 
profound effects on the question of the origins of capitalism, modem state-formation, 
the dynamics of capitalism, the significance of class conflict and revolutions in history, 
the crisis-character of capitalism, and the possibility of formulating strategies for its 
transcendence. In short, they have profound implications for a theoretically controlled 
interpretation of long-term historical development.
The Commercialisation Model: The Example of Fernand Braudel
Le Monde Braude lien: Capitalisme Depuis Toujours
The work of Fernand Braudel and that of the Annales School has exerted 
considerable influence on post-war European historiography and, especially since the 
1970s, on the social sciences at large. Its appeal lay in a theoretical shift away from a 
discredited history of events and the short-term to a history of conjunctures and 
preferably a history of structures, which pre-dated and out-lived any individual life- 
experience. The theoretical implication was a deep-rooted immobility at the heart of 
history, fundamentally determined by geography, ecology, human infrastructures and, 
later, mentalities, forming almost unalterable structures. The cyclical life-times of 
economies, societies, states, and civilisations were rubricised as conjunctures, while 
high politics and war made part of the history of events.
Through Immanuel Wallerstein’s reception of and collaboration with Braudel, 
the structural understanding of single-society-transcending socio-economic systems, 
first formulated by Braudel in his study The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean 
World in the Age o f Philip //, gave rise to a distinct world-system paradigm.297 Since
297 Wallerstein 1974, 1980.
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the late 1970s, it has made deep inroads into the contemporary discipline of IR and 
references to la longue duree and the conceptual triad structure-conjuncture- 
evenement recurrently appeared in the IR literature.298
This section outlines the Braudelian conceptual background to the 
commercialisation model and Wallerstein’s imposing, though, as we will argue, 
defective theoretical edifice. The failure of the ‘world-system’ approach rests to a 
considerable extent on methodological assumptions of the Annales School, which were 
themselves deeply problematic.299 Here, we will only. show how Braudel’s 
historiographical propositions - exemplified in relation to such central concepts like 
world-economy, capitalism, and development - are informed by this methodological 
framework.
The descending appreciation which Braudel expresses for his three levels of 
historical time is captured in the preface to his seminal study on the Mediterranean. 
The history of structures
‘is devoted to a history whose passage is almost imperceptible, that of man in his 
relationship to the environment, a history in which all change is slow, a history of 
constant repetition, ever-recurring cycles’.
The history of conjunctures refers to a history ‘with slow but perceptible rhythms’ (...), 
a social history, the history of groups and groupings’ (author’s italics, B.T.). The 
history of events captures
‘surface disturbances, crests of foam that the tides of history carry on their strong backs.
A history of brief, rapid, nervous fluctuations, by definition ultra-sensitive; the least 
tremor sets all its antennae quivering. But as such it is the most exciting of all, the 
richest in human interest, and also the most dangerous. We must learn to distrust this 
history with its still burning passions, as it was felt, described, and lived by 
contemporaries whose lives were as short and as short-sighted as ours.’
To these diverging histories correspond different temporalities: ‘geographical time, 
social time, and individual time.’300 Space and time are correlated. The smaller the unit 
of analysis, the greater the acceleration of its time. The chapter-structure of his study
298 Ruggie 1989 and 1993.
299 Good critiques are Hexter 1972; Vilar 1973; Gerstenberger 1987.
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follows these three levels of reality. Yet, what was conceived as a heuristic device for 
purposes of exposition turns in the course of the book into three independent realities. 
Braudel works thus not with a conception of totality in which all phenomena are 
internally related, but with separated levels of historical life having their own 
temporalities and unfolding according to their own logics.301
Against this methodological background, we need to ascertain Braudel’s 
conception of capitalism and its possible correlation with the ‘modem’ state and the 
states system. From there, we can arrive at his understanding of the dynamics which 
underlie and sustain this system. There is one master-concept in Braudel’s world to 
which all other concepts stand in dependent relation: World-Economy. It is defined as 
‘an economically autonomous section of the planet able to provide for most of its own 
needs, a section to which its internal links and exchanges give a certain organic
• 302unity’. In contrast to world-empires, it consists of a multiplicity of independent 
polities which are externally linked through trade, yet are at the same time tightly 
locked into a geopolitical system. A world-economy is marked by a prosperous core 
with a dominant city, surrounded by a subservient semi-periphery, and a dependent and 
backward periphery. A strict hierarchy relates these components deriving either from 
economic asymmetries consequent upon being integrated into a fairly stable 
international division of labour, economically reproduced through unequal exchange, 
or from political pressures in the form of politically-maintained trading monopolies in 
the hands of privileged core-countries - a theoretical inconsistency never resolved by 
Braudel.
Built into this hierarchical world-economy based upon an international division 
of labour, we find a theory of the state. A state’s form and strength stands in direct 
relationship to its position in the world-economy.
300 Braudel 1972a, 20-1.
301 While Pierre Vilar appreciated Braudel’s emphasis on the ‘deep structure of geography and 
nature1, he made the crucial objection. ‘To think history geographically is not therefore 
contrary to marxism. It would, however, be more Marxist to think geography historically.’ 
Vilar 1973, 29.
302 Braudel 1984, 22; cf. also Braudel 1977, 81-2. The term was first introduced in Braudel 
1972, 387. ‘ Weltwirtschaft, a world-economy, a self-contained universe. No strict and 
authoritarian order was established, but the outlines of a coherent pattern can be discerned. All 
world-economies for instance recognize a centre, some focal point that acts as a stimulus to 
other regions and is essential to the existence of the economic unit as a whole.1
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‘At the center of the world-economy, one always finds an exceptional state, strong, 
aggressive and privileged, dynamic, simultaneously feared and admired. In the fifteenth 
century it was Venice; in the seventeenth, Holland; in the eighteenth and still in the 
nineteenth, it was Britain; today it is the United States.’303
In the semi-periphery, as in absolutist France, for example, the strength of states was 
hampered due to internal competition over state-control between monarchy and 
nobility. Colonial peripheries were governed from the metropolitan centers. However, 
not only the form of the state follows from the exigencies of trade, the very relations of 
production and the status of the producer are a function of the structural location of 
each country in the exchange-system.
‘Every task, once allocated in the international division of labour, created its own form 
of control and that control articulated and governed the form taken by society. (...) In 
every case, society was responding to a different economic obligation and found itself 
caught by its very adaptation, incapable of escaping quickly from these structures once 
they had been created.,304
Wage-labour, share-cropping, serfdom and slavery correspond to core, center and 
periphery.
Paradoxically, in spite of these rigid allocations of roles in the labour process 
and of form and functions of statehood, an enormous dynamic pervades the history of 
European-dominated world-economies. As the penultimate quotation implies, world- 
historical progress is conceived by Braudel in terms of a clear-cut succession of world- 
economies with ever-more powerful world-cities at the center commanding over ever 
greater spheres of influence and re-arranging the respective constellations between 
core, semi-periphery and periphery. The author locates the beginnings of this sequence 
- in contrast to Wallerstein who opts for the ‘long 16th Century’ - in the European 13th, 
if not 11th Century,305 witnessing the growth of a bi-polar town-centered trading- 
network linking the Italian city-states and the North-European towns and city-leagues.
The explanation which Braudel adduces to theorise the origins of and 
subsequent transition from one town-centred world-economy to another is formulated
303 Braudel 1984,51.
304 Braudel 1984, 62.
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in the following terms: ‘This break with the past appears as the result of an 
accumulation of accidents, breakdowns and distortions.’306 Hesitatingly, Braudel tries 
to understand the rise and fall of world-economies in the context of wider secular 
trends, of which he discusses the dominant Neo-Malthusian one,307 governing price- 
movements and income-distribution. However, the discussion on the origins of world- 
economies and the mechanisms behind their shifts remains inconclusive. No general 
theoretical correlations are established and we are forced to turn to contingent 
processes of causation provided by Braudel in the narrative sections of his opus 
magnum devoted to each world-economy. However, even if we would follow the 
crisis-model inherent in demographic fluctuations, Braudel would be at a loss to 
specify why a determinate country assumed at a determinate point in time the leading 
position in a re-structured world-economy. Transitions are thus conceived in 
quantitative and evolutionary terms in which the same principles of an international 
division of labor cum corresponding state-forms re-appear on an ever-increased scale 
in an altered geopolitical framework. What changes - for largely accidental reasons - is 
the dominant actor at the center of the world-economy which re-distributes political 
and economic attributes to all other actors in the system. What we see therefore is not 
only a quantitative and evolutionary model of large-scale social change, but also a 
systemic and heavily deterministic, economistic and functionalist theory of economic 
and political development.
Why then is Braudel led to advance such a sweeping conception? We contend 
that Braudel’s theorisation is predicated upon an erroneous and fundamentally a- 
historical conception of capitalism. His inconcise mode of narration does not produce a 
consistent working-definition of capitalism. Instead, we are faced with a series of 
impressionistic insights resulting eventually in a conceptual distinction between 
capitalism and market economy. Whereas the latter refers to the competitive sector of 
small-scale production below the level of capitalism proper, capitalism itself is equated 
with ‘big business’ and monopolies.308 Market-economies stand for local, transparent 
and equal exchanges in a market place based upon competitive bargaining. The term
305 Braudel 1984, 92.
306 Braudel 1984, 85. ‘In the economic poker game, some people have always held better cards 
than others, not to say aces up their sleeves.’ Braudel 1984, 48; cf. also Braudel 1977, 86.
307 Braudel 1984, 78-81.
308 Braudel 1984, 629; cf. especially Braudel 1977, chap.2 and 113-5.
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capitalism is reserved for a privileged, hierarchical, secluded and pre-eminently long­
distance sphere of merchant capitalism proper. And it turns out that this form of 
commercial ‘monopoly-capitalism’ underlies as the unifying and driving principle 
Braudel’s entire narrative on the succession of world-economies. Here, the author 
conflates the distinction between contemporary private market monopolies, which are 
economic and not political monopolies, and pre-capitalist politically-constituted 
trading-monopolies. As long as the latter are discernible, capitalism, in Braudel’s sense, 
exists. It is this political definition of capitalism which allows Braudel to bring the state 
back into the picture.
His world-economies, whether we look at the medieval Flemish cities, the 
Hanseatic League, Venice, Holland, Great Britain or the United States, are then all 
invariably capitalist in so far as they exploit state-constituted monopolistic trade- 
advantages by dint of unequal exchange with their concentric semi-peripheries and 
peripheries. The only noticeable conceptual distinction within and between these 
leading centers is made along the lines of city-based versus national-market-based 
world-economies, a classificatory distinction which remains under-explored in its 
implications.309 It is then not surprising to read that
‘I have argued that capitalism has been potentially visible since the dawn of history, and 
that it has developed and perpetuated itself down the ages. (...) Far in advance, there 
were signs announcing the coming of capitalism: the rise of the towns and of trade, the 
emergence of a labour market, the increasing density of society, the spread of the use of 
money, the rise in output, the expansion of long-distance trade or to put it another way 
the international market.’310
This statement then squares with his conviction that there have always been 
world-economies which, in turn, ties in with Braudel’s conceptual framework of 7a 
longue duree ’ of which capitalism appears now as one emanation. But because nothing 
ever really changes qualitatively in the rises and falls of world-economies, Braudel 
remains logically prisoner of his own system. ‘Slavery, serfdom and wage-labour are
309 Braudel 1977, 95 ff.
3,0 Braudel 1984, 620.
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historically and socially different solutions to a universal problem, which remains 
fundamentally the same.’311
Implications for IR
If we adopt the ‘commercialisation model’, then specific corollaries follow for 
the conceptualisation of the modem state and the modem system of states. First, the 
timing of the onset of capitalism and the modem state is inherently indeterminate. It 
can then be conventionally traced back to the ‘long 16th Century’ that opened up inter­
continental trading circuits between Europe and the rest of the world.312 Yet, little 
prevents us in this perspective from identifying its origins equally in the emergence of 
trading cities, usually with reference to the Italian Renaissance city-states,313 to the 
commercial revival of medieval cities in the 12th and 13th Centuries,314 in the 
establishment of an inter-continental system of exchange between India and Arabs on 
the one hand, and Europe on the other, during the same time period,315 or, indeed, in 
trading-relations between Ancient Greece, Persia, and China.316 In principle, capitalism 
in this sense tends to turn into a timeless occurrence.317 If capitalism is thus understood 
as production for and exchange on the market with a view to accumulate profits in the 
process of exchange, then it is timeless, however, not only with respect to the past, but 
potentially also with respect to the future. Neorealism’s transhistorical assumption of 
anarchy is here shadowed by a transhistorical assumption of capitalism. In this 
perspective, the crucial historical question is then not how to theorise the transition 
from feudalism to capitalism, but how to theorise the transition ‘from scattered to 
concentrated capitalist power’.318 In other words, capitalism does here not involve a
311 Braudel 1984, 63. For the argument that capitalism, beyond quantitative expansion, 
remained essentially unaltered, see Braudel 1977, 111-2.
312 Wallerstein 1974, 1980.
313 Arrighi 1994.
3,4 Mann 1986 and 1988b.
315 Abu-Lughod 1989.
316 Wallerstein 1974, 16.
317 Cf., for example, Braudel 1984, 620; Frank and Gills 1993.
3,8 Arrighi 1994, 11.
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qualitative transformation of social relations, but simply assumes a quantitative 
expansion of the market, which, in turn, intensifies the division of labour, and a 
corresponding concentration of capitalist power within firms and states.
Second, if we accept the idea of ‘commercial capitalism’, then how do we 
relate it to the rise of the modem state? A priori, if capitalism is timeless in this sense, 
then we are under pressure to spell out how it relates to or constitutes the historically 
and chronologically specific onset of modem state-formation, irrespective of whether 
we want to associate it with the rise of absolutism, or the rise of the modem state 
proper in Weber’s sense. Since this disjuncture between eternal capitalism and 
relatively late and time-bound modem state-formation creates thus theoretical 
problems, we could, of course, simply deny a causal nexus between these two 
phenomena - an option taken frequently by scholars of various persuasion -, or argue 
that capitalism receives its dynamic and expansive character only once it is embedded 
in and managed by modem states - an option associated with Weber’s idea of ‘political 
capitalism’, Braudel’s idea of leading capitalist cities/states, and Arrighi’s idea of a 
capitalist hegemon.319 A third option, regularly adopted by world-systems theorists, 
consists in antedating the rise of the modem state to the ‘proto-modem’ Italian city- 
states. All three options are however, as will be shown in the course of this chapter, 
problematic.
In fact, the Wallersteinian School has no theory of the modem state at all, it 
only has a theory of differential power capacities of states within the world system, in 
generic contrast to preceding world empires in which bureaucracies absorbed surpluses 
so as to stifle world trade.320 In the Wallersteinian scheme, the form of the state is 
essentially a function of the timing of its incorporation into the international trade- 
based division of labour, which determines which regions specialise in which produce. 
This trade-dependent specialisation determines, in turn, the ‘regime of labour control’ 
in the process of production, i.e. slavery, serfdom, or free wage-labour. A ‘strong4 
state is then associated with the capitalist core regions of the world system, protecting 
trade relations, a ‘weaker’ state in the semi-periphery, and a ‘weak’ state in the 
periphery. Thus a world-economy is politically structured by an international order 
divided into three zones of unequally powerful states. Without repeating the empirical
3,9 Braudel 1984; Arrighi 1994.
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objections which have been rightly raised against this trade-dependent distribution of 
state power, we notice that Wallerstein at no point conceptualises the emergence of a 
distinctly modem state.321
Third, ‘commercial capitalism’ also compromises the constitutive role of class 
conflict and revolutions for historical development. While this may be beneficial from a 
non-Marxist point of view, it poses the problem for Marxists of the Wallersteinian 
School of how to deal with and incorporate the significance of class conflict and major 
socio-political crises into the historical and theoretical equation. The standard response 
amongst world-systems theorists is either to omit the problem of class entirely from the 
investigation,322 or to attribute a subsidiary and dependent role to it. In this case, the 
structure of class relations in the process of production turns into a function of a 
specific region’s role in the international division of labour, determined by the timing of 
its integration into the world economy, which governs its relation to the capitalist core 
region, mediated by the circuits of trade.323
Fourth, adherence to the circulation-paradigm also confronts us with the 
challenge of explaining why it is that powerful indicators of the ‘growth of the West’ 
appeared in a territorially uneven process first in north-western Europe and, 
specifically, in early modem England. For example, while the great secular Malthusian 
fluctuations in the agrarian economy persisted in Western Continental Europe well 
after the crisis of the 17th Century, sustained economic and productivity growth, 
demographic trends of unbroken population growth, and permanent technological 
innovations can be detected first of all in 17th Century England.324 In other words, if 
the dynamic of capitalism seems to have set in at a specific point in time and space, the 
advocates of the circulation-paradigm are confronted with squaring the general history 
of capitalism with the particular history of the emergence of economic, technological, 
and demographic growth.
320 Wallerstein 1974, 1980.
321 Critiques of Wallerstein’s state theory can be found in Brenner 1977, 63-7, Gourevitch 
1978b, and Skocpol 1994.
322 Arrighi 1994.
323 Wallerstein 1974, 1980, andl995.
324 Crouzet 1990.
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Capitalism and the Modern State: An Alternative Conception
Capitalism as a Relation of Production
For these reasons, it is useful to see how capitalism in the sense of the ‘logic of 
production’ deals with these problems. This version of capitalism was most powerfully 
and most originally elaborated by Robert Brenner in a series of articles and a major 
historiographical monograph.325 It can be summarised as follows. Capitalism connotes 
a social system predicated on the existence of determinate social property relations 
between direct producers, who have lost possession of and unmediated access to their 
means of subsistence, and a class of non-producers who have come to own the means 
of production. This process of dispossession involves an account of the qualitative 
transformation of essentially pre-capitalist social property relations into capitalist 
property relations. Once a capitalist property regime is established, specific and 
objective (meaning not subjectively motivated or intended) rules of reproduction and 
economic action follow on both sides of the labour process.
On the side of producers, the separation from their means of subsistence turns 
them into ‘free’ labourers, compelled to reproduce themselves in and for the market. 
The commodification of labour power, the establishment of a ‘free’ labour market, 
political freedom and direct economic dependence on the market are four aspects of 
one and the same process.
On the side of capitalists, since direct producers are no longer coerced by 
extra-economic means to either hand over a part of their surplus to or work for a lord - 
since labourers are politically free - their fortunes of reproduction also come to depend 
on maintenance in the market. The deployment of capital for production for the market 
leads to inter-capitalist competition, regulated by the ‘invisible hand’ of the price- 
mechanism, which tends to impose downward pressure on commodity prices. 
Capitalist survival, capital accumulation, and expanded reproduction (the raising of 
additional income) in the market necessitate both, the expansion of the range of 
produce (specialisation) and the out-pricing of competitors which, in turn, involves the
325 Brenner 1977, 1985b, 1986, 1989, 1993.
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reduction of production costs. In this perspective, profit-maximisation is not a 
subjective naturalised attribute of Adam Smith’s homo oeconomicus, but an objective 
function of a social relation mediated by property. Cost-cutting takes either the form of 
the lowering of wages - a tendency assisted by competition among workers to sell 
themselves competitively on the market - or the replacement of wage-labour by means 
of technological rationalisation. Technological rationalisation requires, in turn, constant 
competitive re-investment into the productive forces, driving a tendency towards 
technological innovation. A theory of technological progress is thus built into capitalist 
relations of production. This tendency towards productive re-investment is also 
assisted by the fact that non-producers are no longer required to divert surpluses into 
the means of violence and conspicuous consumption as under feudalism and 
absolutism, since the transfer of surplus, given commodified labour, involves no longer 
physical coercion and the concomitant build-up of a privately owned apparatus of 
violence. Simultaneously, productive re-investment entails a systematic tendency to 
increase labour productivity by replacing ‘absolute surplus labour’ with ‘relative 
surplus labour’, and a decrease in commodity prices. These processes drive economic 
development and growth. At the same time, inter-capitalist competition generates also 
a territorially expansive tendency towards the opening up of new markets via trade. If 
this geographically expansive tendency is not resisted by political power or cultural 
resistance, the mere economic logic of out-pricing competitors based on 
technologically assisted productivity-gains, ensures the widening of markets, but not 
necessarily the transformation of social property relations within the trading polity into 
a capitalist direction
These logically interlinked processes tend thus to generate, as a rule, economic 
growth, technological development, specialisation, product-diversification, and 
pressures towards the territorial expansion of market relations (but not eo ipso 
capitalist property relations). Crucially, this concept of capitalism requires a prior 
historical account of the origins of capitalist relations of production. The development 
of capitalism is thus not to be sought in the geographic and quantitative expansion of 
more or less ubiquitous market relations based upon fluctuations in the division of 
labour, but demands an account of the qualitative transformation of social property 
relations in the process of the transition from feudalism to capitalism. Thus, the whole
158
complex of class conflict, socio-political crises, and revolutions remains decisively 
within its theoretical ambit.
Capitalism, the Modem State, and the Modem States System
However, this conception of capitalism also entails a theory of the modem 
state.326 For if the transition from feudalism to capitalism engenders a shift from a 
regime of political extraction (extra-economic coercion), based on feudal social 
property relations, to a regime of physically un-coercive exploitation, based on 
capitalist social property relations, then we have identified the operative principle 
which underlies the differentiation between the political and the economic. If ruling 
class power resides in capitalist societies in property of and control over the means of 
production, then ‘the state’ is no longer required to interfere directly into processes of 
production and extraction, but can confine its functions to the maintenance of the 
existing property regime and the legal enforcement of what now turns into civil 
contracts among politically, though not economically, equal citizens, subject to civil 
law. While this basic function does, of course, not exhaust the historical role of the 
state over and against civil society, the theoretical link between property relations and 
the separation between an un-coercive ‘economic economy’ and a ‘political state’, 
maintaining the monopoly in the means of violence, is established.
This theoretical nexus is also capable to explain the necessary, but lacking, 
social preconditions for Max Weber’s typological standard definition of the modem 
state. Weber, of course, did not only maintain that the modem state is ‘a human 
community that (successfully) claims the monopoly o f the legitimate use o f physical 
force within a given territory’,327 but asserted also that the separation of officials from 
their previously privately owned means of administration constitutes a social 
prerequisite for the establishment of a modem ‘impartial’ bureaucracy.328 While Weber 
maintained that the conflicts over this separation which enabled the transition from
326 While a state theory is implicit in Brenner’s work, it has been more explicitly elaborated by 
Wood 1991 and 1995 and Rosenberg 1994, 123-58. Cf also Sayer 1985.
327 Weber 1946, 78.
328 Weber 1968a.
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patrimonialism to modem bureaucracy were fought out under geopolitical pressure 
between centralising kings and particularising patrimonial officers (rulers and their 
staff),329 the deeper logical and social preconditions for this withdrawal of the state 
from direct economic exploitation (tax-farming etc.) cannot be understood within the 
framework of a sociology of domination and administration. Rather, the de­
politicisation and de-personalisation of direct economic extraction is directly bound up 
with this transformation of social property relations. The dispossession of the ‘staff 
from their means of administration and exploitation is the obverse side of the 
commodification of labour. Politically enforced exploitation of the direct producer, 
which required either the fragmentation of politico-military powers of coercion under 
feudal social property relations (serf-lord relation mediated by rents), or the re­
privatisation of political rights of coercion under absolutist social property relations 
(free peasant-venal patrimonial officer relation mediated by taxes), can now be 
abandoned in favour of a trans-personal tax-collecting bureaucracy, which constitutes 
the backbone of the modem state. At the same time, the public monopolisation of the 
means of violence serves no longer directly extractive purposes, but guarantees the 
internal and external defence of law and order.
This nexus enables us to see furthermore why the ruling class does not directly 
rule in capitalist societies. While in pre-capitalist societies, there is an immediate 
identity between the personnel of the ‘state’ and the ruling classes - lords in feudal 
polities, monarchy and a patrimonial nobility of service in absolutist states, and a 
commercial oligarchy in merchant republics - this identity is no longer directly visible in 
capitalist states. While the propertied classes did, of course, set up the first modem 
parliament in England during the course of the English Revolutions - in other words, 
while legislation and the budget remained under direct control - the enforcement of law 
and order could be left to an ‘impartial’ and ‘objective’ bureaucracy, separated from its 
means of administration and thus dependent for its reproduction upon state salaries. 
Thus, a specific state form is internally related to capitalism as a social property 
relation
It is with the historical constitution of this specific state/society complex and its 
subsequent crisis-ridden internationalisation that we can trace the arrival of modernity
329 Cf., for example, Weber 1968, 1086 and 1103.
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in IR. Thus, the assumption is that the rise of capitalism was neither a phenomenon 
associated with the Italian Renaissance city-states, nor a simultaneous trans-European 
phenomenon during the ‘long 16th Century’, nor can the process of ‘primitive 
accumulation’ be broken down in a sequence of nationally-confined leading economies, 
but was unique to early modem England.330 At the same time, the non-establishment of 
a capitalist social property regime in early modem Continental Europe implies eo ipso 
the non-establishment of the modem state. If this thesis holds, then this chapter will 
have to show how the dynamics behind European commercialisation and war-driven 
state-centralisation failed to result in the establishment of the modem state and, by 
extension, the modem state system. To this extent, both models present ex hypothesis 
theories of non-transition to modernity.
However, while these macro-explanations are unable to theorise fundamental 
economic transformations, they do involve arguments about fundamental political 
transformations. In other words, while they are unable to account for the rise of 
modem capitalism, they do contribute, though insufficiently, to an understanding of the 
formation of the Westphalian early modem system of states. It follows that the 
formation of a system of states preceded the onset of capitalism in our sense. This 
system of states was however distinctly pre-modem in its geopolitical properties, since 
its constitutive units were predominantly dynastic states and, to a lesser degree, 
oligarchic merchant republics. Throughout the following chapters, this pre-modem 
international order will be referred to as the Westphalian Order.
However, maintaining that a system of states preceded the rise of capitalism 
does not imply that the formation of the European pre-capitalist states-system is not 
amenable to a Marxist interpretation. It rather means that the pressures towards the 
replacement of fragmented feudal polities by more consolidated dynastic states are 
bound up with persisting non-capitalist social property relations, which necessitated the 
pursuit of strategies of political and geopolitical accumulation as rational forms of pan- 
European intra-ruling class conflicts as well as peasant repression and exploitation. 
While the logic of political accumulation hardened European political relations into a 
pre-modem system of states, the rise of capitalism in 17th Century England and its 
international repercussions occurred in an already established non-modem, i.e.
330 Brenner 1993; Wood 1991 and 1996.
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dynastic-absolutist, system of states, whose ‘generative grammar’ and form of 
operation came to be drastically re-defined under the impact of the geopolitically 
mediated spread of capitalist relations of production. Ex hypothesis, the arrival of 
modem international relations has thus to be theorised in terms of socially combined, 
yet geographically uneven development, transforming the nature of European and 
world politics in the course of the 19th Century.
The Geopolitical Competition Model
The literature which we discuss in the subsequent sections comes largely from 
outside the discipline of IR. Although the last decade witnessed a growing awareness 
in IR of the problem of systemic transformation, the transition from pre-modem to 
modem international relations remains radically under-defined. An excursion into the 
wider social sciences and historiography is therefore imperative if we want to provide a 
serious contribution to the debate which presents not only an innovative and original 
advance in the field of IR, but which can stand its ground in historical sociology and 
historiography as well.
The method employed in this chapter follows the precepts of immanent 
critique. This means that we want to expose how various transition-theories are unable 
to provide coherent and convincing explanations of their objects of inquiry on the basis 
of and in line with their initial assumptions and premises.
The Military Logic o f State Formation
The second rival macro-paradigm against which this inquiry reacts can be 
broadly termed the geopolitical competition model. Its sociological roots are 
associated with the Weber-Hintze tradition in the state-building literature, while its 
historiographical antecedents can be traced back to the Prussian Historical School and 
particularly to Leopold von Ranke’s theorem of the ‘primacy of foreign policy’. Its 
core idea was classically expressed by Otto Hintze.
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‘If we want to find out about the relation between military organization and the 
organization of the state, we must direct our attention particularly to two phenomena, 
which conditioned the real organization of the state. These are, first, the structure of 
social classes, and second, the external ordering of the states - their position relative to 
each other, and their over-all position in the world. It is one-sided, exaggerated, and 
therefore false to consider class conflict the only driving force in history. Conflict 
between nations has been far more important; and throughout the ages, pressure from 
without has been a determining influence on internal structure. It has even often 
suppressed internal strife or forced it into compromise. Both these forces have manifestly 
worked together in the design of the military order and the state organization.’331
The essential causal sequence of the geopolitical competition model may be 
schematically sketched as follows: international competition => war => cost increases 
=> increased resource extraction => new modes of taxation and fiscality => military- 
technological innovations => state monopolisation of the means of violence => state 
centralisation and rationalisation.332 Since the literature, revolving around this core 
hypothesis, constitutes the dominant theoretical tradition on the topic of state- 
formation in contemporary Western scholarship, and is thus conventionally drawn 
upon by IR scholars, we will subject it to a critique which spells out its core ideas and 
its associated core problems.
This literature may be subdivided into four closely related strands. A first 
strand emphasises primarily the role of military competition in its implications for the 
centralisation and rationalisation of military power in the hands of the state. A second 
strand focuses primarily on alterations in the fiscal and financial techniques of revenue 
procurement in their consequences for state-building. A third strand concentrates pre­
dominantly on administrative and institutional innovations, especially on the evolution 
of representative assemblies and ‘bureaucracies’, in their consequences for state- 
consolidation. A fourth axis of inquiry revolves around the formation of a uniform 
legal system, the evolution of a secular and codified body of civil and public law, and 
the establishment of a centralised court hierarchy, operated by professional jurists. 
However, all four strands converge in regarding these partial developments as parallel 
and interrelated steps towards one core institution: modem sovereignty.
331 Hintze 1975b, 183. It may be noted that both Hintze, as well as the Hintzean tradition, has 
subsequently neglected the class structure of society in its implication for state-formation.
332 Central representatives are Tilly 1975, 1986, 1992; Finer 1975; Braun 1975; Skocpol 1979; 
Mann 1986, 1988a and 1988b; Downing 1992; Reinhard 1996a and 1996b; Ertman 1997.
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This literature is furthermore in broad agreement on three fundamental 
propositions. First, the emergence of states on more centralised military, fiscal, 
administrative, and legal principles is essentially achieved in the main Western 
countries by about the 17th, at the latest by the 18th Century. Second, these political 
phenomena can be equated with a broader notion of modernity. The sovereign state of 
the 17th Century is a modem state.333 Third, the fundamental cause, the primum 
mobile, behind these processes of modem state-formation is systemically induced 
pressure towards war, enforcing state rationalisation in the service of war-making 
capabilities. Again, these assumptions were already pithily captured by Hintze:
‘The constant rivalry between the Great Powers, which was still mixed up with 
confessional differences; the permanent political tension that invariably provoked further 
military exertions, in order that single states could preserve their independence and thus 
the basis of all prosperity and culture; in short, power politics and balance-of-power 
politics created the foundations of modem Europe: the international system as well as the 
absolutist system of government and the standing army of the Continent.’334
What are the criteria in the Weber-Hintze tradition of thought which are held to 
justify the determination of the arrival of modernity in the sphere of state-formation? A 
first criterion is sought in the sphere of military organisation, based on the Weberian 
distinction between an essentially feudal oligopoly and an essentially modem state 
monopoly in the means of violence. The nexus between international rivalry, military 
rationalisation, and state-building has been formulated in a simple and suggestive law­
like generalisation by Samuel E.Finer in form of an ‘extraction-coercion-cycle’ and by 
Charles Tilly in form of a ‘war-making and state-making’ model.335 The transition from 
the feudal host, based on inter-personal obligations and activated by the royal arriere- 
ban, to a modem standing army, financed and controlled by the monarchy, led to the 
monopolisation of the means of violence by the state. Driven by major military 
technological innovations (“Military Revolution’, 1550-1660), the ‘irrationality’ and 
inefficiency of the feudal knights, whose relation to the king was based on an often 
fragile vassalic loyalty and not on direct dependence, was replaced by a disciplined, 
trained, and publicly paid professional army {miles perpetuus), whose structure was no
333 Tilly 1975, 27
334 Hintze 1975b, 199.
335 Finer 1975, 96 ff.; Tilly 1975, 23-4, 1985,1992.
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longer organised along inter-personal lines predicated on the fief system, but along the 
lines of functional branches (artillery, cavalry, infantry, navy). The internal 
monopolisation of the means of violence - the outlawing of feuds and the crushing of 
the noble right of resistance - went hand in hand with the external monopolisation, 
evinced in the closure of the state over and against imperial and papal authority claims. 
Noble de-militarisation and the concentration of war-making powers by the state are 
two sides of the same coin. While these processes allowed for rationalisation and 
military efficiency gains, it also called for extraordinary, that is, extra-feudal financial 
resources.
This demand for additional resources leads directly to the second criterion, 
identified in the realm of taxation based on the Schumpeterian distinction between an 
essentially feudal ‘domain state’ and an essentially modem ‘tax state’.336 The modem 
tax state is thought to be in place when ‘the “private” resources of the ruling power 
were exceeded in value by the “public” revenues derived from a system of general 
taxation.’337 This passage from fiscal personalism, in which the distinction between 
royal private income and public revenue was immaterial (Le roi faut vivre du sien), to 
fiscal institutionalism is held to have been consummated by a centralising monarchy 
extending its fiscal supremacy beyond the royal domain over the entire realm. In this 
process, new modes of fiscality operated by new public institutions were invented and 
enforced over and against the old autonomous powers of the feudal nobility and the 
privileges and immunities enjoyed by the clergy, which all led in the direction of fiscal
336 The classical text is Schumpeter 1954. The couplet ‘domain state - tax state' serves as the 
organising concept for the recent volume on Theme B: Economic Systems and State Finance in 
the seven volume edition on ‘The Origins of the Modem State in Europe: 13th to 18th 
Centuries’, edited by Wim Blockmans and Jean-Philippe Genet. ‘The transition from the 
“domain state” to the “tax state” (...) is fiscal history’s equivalent to the transition from 
feudalism to capitalism for economic history in general, and at times it has threatened to 
become the overarching theme of the book.’ Bonney 1995a, 13. Compare Bonney’s under­
informed and dismissive remarks on Marxist conceptualisations of state-economy relations 
(Bonney 1995a, 3-5), which apparently suffice to never mention again the transition from 
feudalism to capitalism in its implications for public finances and state-formation in the entire 
volume. We will show later that the emergence of the tax state in 17th Century Europe has 
nothing to do with the emergence of capitalism nor of the modem state; indeed, it could be 
argued that the existence of a ‘tax state’ points precisely to the non-existence of capitalism and 
therefore to the non-existence of modernity..
337 Ormrod 1995, 123. Cf. also Braun 1975.
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uniformity and institutional centralisation.338 The most important innovation is the shift 
from feudal military and financial assistance and inelastic royal indirect taxation to 
generalised elastic direct taxation. Extraordinary aides gave way to regular and general 
taxation. Revenue extraction and expenditure became a public matter. The maxim 
pecunia nervns renim (Bodin) became a state doctrine. This transition is generally held 
to have taken place in the leading West European monarchies between the 14th and 17th 
Centuries in close connection with the pressures towards financing ‘state-constitutive 
wars’ which necessitated a state monopoly in taxation, subsequent to the 
monopolisation of the means of violence by the ‘new monarchies’ in the competitive 
context of the emergent early modem state system of Europe.
This trend leads, in turn, to the third criterion, residing in the transition from 
fragmented feudal to modem bureaucratic administration. Both the standing army and 
a centralised tax regime require professional officials to administer and supervise the 
maintenance of the army, tax enforcement, and public expenditure. Next to the 
standing army, a ‘sitting army’ of patrimonial officers, employed, controlled, and paid 
by the state, based on formal precepts of professional promotion, came to challenge 
and finally supplant the independent local and regional forms of feudal administration. 
A nobility of service (<noblesse de robe) grew at the expense of the old sword-carrying 
nobility {noblesse d'epee).
The fourth criterion is identified in the establishment of a legal system. The 
welter of independent feudal courts gave way to a nationally unified legal system, 
regulated by one uniform tax code, operated by legal experts, on the basis of a 
territorially integrated court hierarchy, culminating in royal courts. Earlier feudal inter- 
lordly disputes were no longer resolved by archaic feuds, based on the armigerous 
status of the lordly class, but by royal civil law. The invention of new modalities of 
fiscality required increasing powers of surveillance, enforcement, and disciplinisation to 
avoid tax evasion. Disputes between peasants and landowners were no longer decided 
by the political justice on manorial courts, but were brought to royal courts. In short, 
military rivalry prompted powerful tendencies towards the internal juridification of 
social relations.
338 Ormrod 1995, 124-7. In German parlance, this process is conceived as a transition from the 
feudal Personenverbandsstaat (state of associated persons) to the modem institutioneller 
Flachenstaat. (territorially institutionalised state).
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Universal War -  Variations in State Responses: A Critique
There are, however, a range of important questions to be posed which (1) 
query the assumed, but not explained, ‘givenness’ of the existence of a system of 
multiple states, and thus the lack of an account of the origins of the European political 
pluriverse, (2) point to the lack of a social theory of war, (3) qualify the universal 
effects of geopolitical competition in the institutionally very different forms of political 
community in the European late Middle Ages, (4) contest the explanation for the 
success or failure behind these important transformations in various European regions; 
and (5) challenge the definitional status of political modernity in these accounts.
First, we have observed that the causal starting-point for the geopolitical 
competition model resides in the geo-historical plurality of polities in late medieval and 
early modern Europe.339 With the exception of Thomas Ertman, this geopolitical 
pluriverse serves as the unexplained and unquestioned 'given' which lies outside the 
explanatory reach of the model. While this pluriverse can, of course, not simply be 
‘read off from existing social property relations at any given point in time and space in 
a static and structuralist way, the preceding two chapters have shown how European 
geopolitical fragmentation can be theorised as the historical outcome of class conflicts 
which tore the last pan-European Empire - the Carolingian Empire - asunder. 
Geopolitical plurality is thus not a natural, geographical, ethnic, or cultural 
phenomenon, but a class-induced social outcome.
Second, the geopolitical competition literature lacks, for all its insistence on the 
primacy of military rivalry, a social theory of war. The dominant explanation behind the 
processes of military, fiscal, and institutional centralisation are held to derive from 
permanent geopolitical pressures in an anarchical system of self-seeking conflict-units. 
The focus of research then shifts towards an investigation of how well power elites 
responded to these pressures by re-structuring domestic techniques of revenue 
extraction, military mobilisation, and institutional rationalisation.
339 Cf., for example, Gerhard 1992, 75 and 1996b, 18.
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This approach poses one logical and one theoretical problem: First, if every 
ruler had to respond to external pressures, who then did act on which grounds in the 
first place? In other words, there is not one good argument in the entire geopolitical 
competition literature which explains why the mere territorial contiguity of several 
states necessarily and logically entails competition. This is not to dispute the very real 
existence of early modem geopolitical pressures, but a question of causality. Radically 
put, the geopolitical competition model lacks a convincing explanation of why early 
modem polities were necessarily expansive. This rather spectacular lack of a social 
theory of war results in two typical methodological dilemmas. In society-centered 
perspectives, the initial stimulus is usually externalised to international forces and can 
thus no longer be comprehended within these perspectives; alternatively, in system- 
centered approaches, the initial stimulus is attributed to what then becomes a 
naturalised competitive inter-state system whose pressures are then explained out of 
anarchy. In other words, the mere geographical contiguity of polities does not 
exhaustively explain why inter-state relations were necessarily bellicose, unless we 
impute an anthropologically questionable idea of man as a natural power-maximiser or 
a psychologising rational-choice model, which assumes that risk-minimisation and 
‘safety first’ considerations create a security dilemma escalating in arms races.340 These 
dilemmata replicate the social emptiness inherent in man-centered realist thinking, as 
well as in system-centered neorealist thinking. The hypostatisation of systemic 
pressures calls thus for an approach whose framework of analysis is wide enough to 
understand ‘external’ factors as internal to the system, and which understands the 
system not as an abstracted ‘third image’ operating above and beyond its constitutive 
actors according to its own iron logic, but as internally related to a ‘generative 
structure’ which explains the latency of war. What this implies is that we have to 
unbundle the social content of war as a system-wide phenomenon in relation to very 
definite social property relations which made war a necessary and dominant strategy of 
reproduction of pre-capitalist ruling classes.341
340 Counterfactually, one would have to think about a historical geopolitical pluriverse without 
aggression to disprove the idea that war is latent in any anarchical system.
341 The social meaning of war is here and there acknowledged in fleeting comments in the 
Weber-Hintze literature, but it is not systematically theorised as arising out of distinct social 
property relations which made the pursuit of war an economic necessity, rather than the sport 
of the princes. Cp. for example: ‘As for the question of the acquisition of territorial rights, it
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Third, at the most general level of the model’s causal inferences, it has to be 
observed that while war was universal, the responses within different polities were 
highly specific. In other words, variations in state-reactions in the face of military 
pressure cannot be directly deduced from a geopolitical functionalism, but have to be 
explained with reference to specific domestic social constellations and the timing of 
military exposure. As a rule, the pure logic of international rivalry does not only fail to 
cover the differential development of European non-monarchical variants of early 
modem state forms,342 it is equally unable to account for developmental variations in 
the historical trajectory of the dominant Western monarchies of France, Spain, and 
England. Not only is it difficult in this perspective to explain why some feudal 
monarchies succeeded to turn themselves into territorial monarchies while others 
failed, it is even more difficult to explain why some European political communities - 
city-states, city-leagues, Empire, Church state, merchant republics, aristocratic 
republics and peasant republics - maintained themselves in the emergent competitive 
inter-state system of early modem times, although they evinced a completely different 
institutional make-up and political regime and although some of them could draw on a 
much smaller territory with a much smaller populations and therefore a much smaller 
tax base.
‘This in turn prompts the comment that such alternative forms of state possessed a real 
dynamism and a capacity to modernize which also enabled structures that may appear 
archaic to survive.’343
In other words, we have not only to account for the success of territorial monarchies, 
we also have to account for alternative forms of successful non-absolutist state 
formations as well as state failures. In particular, we have to set success, variations, 
and state ‘exit’ in relation to political and social organisational diversity. In other 
words, the universal logic of geopolitical competition has to be filtered through the 
social forces internal to domestic polities. Without such a widening of our optic,
was settled by combining the hereditary principle with an appropriate matrimonial policy.
When succession disputes arose, armed force was usually the final means of action. Spending 
on external security by monarchical states should, therefore, be at least partly regarded as an 
investment for the acquisition of rights of domination, at least when war was followed by 
territorial aggrandizement.’ Komer 1995a, 404.
342 This point is made by Spruyt 1994 and Komer 1995a, 394-5.
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sociologists and IR scholars tend to turn a historical outcome - the eventual victory of 
the territorial state as the dominant form of political organisation - into a functionalist 
theoretical outcome.
Thus, the very variegated political landscape of late medieval Europe did not 
constitute a ‘natural field of selection’ - theoretically conceived in neo-evolutionary 
terms - in which bigger conflict-units either subsumed smaller ones or forced them to 
adopt a similar political and social regime, but a dynamic and mixed social system in 
which the main causes for survival or decline have to be sought in the nexus between 
internal social conditions of revenue extraction and the productivity of the tax base. 
War was universal, yet individual state responses were specific. This proviso does not 
only apply to the very obvious difference between territorial monarchies and non­
territorial alternatives, but also to the very real differences between territorial 
monarchies themselves. For how shall we explain that England, although it could 
nominally draw during the Hundred Years War on a much smaller tax-base, dominated 
and besieged for centuries much ‘bigger’ France, whose territory had twice the seize 
and three times the population of its northern neighbour? And how should we explain 
that the Dutch Provinces freed themselves from the ‘Spanish Yoke’ and resisted 
repeated French bids for incorporation, although natural resources and population 
numbers were inferior to France’s and Spain’s?
Fourth, to the degree that the geopolitical competition literature does try to 
theorise how efficiently regional power elites responded to the ubiquitous threat of 
military competition, the subsequent exposition remains overwhelmingly confined to 
either an abstract enumeration of newly invented fiscal instruments, military 
innovations, and institutional modernisations, or to the subsequent ‘dialogue’ within 
the power elite - usually between king and some representative assembly composed of 
the clergy, the nobility, and burghers - which resulted in the establishment of new 
modalities of intra-power elite consultation and co-operation.344 Such a theoretical 
confinement to the processes of interaction amongst elite groups, although it 
represents an important step beyond the mere listing of innovations, fails however to
343 Komer 1995, 394.
344 Cf. for example Hintze 1975c; Tilly 1975 and 1985; whereas Tilly devoted in 1975 two and 
a half pages to the ‘peasant base’, the peasantry drops later out of the picture; Mann 1986 and 
1988a; Ormrod 1995, 157-8; Gerhard 1996a; Bulst 1996; Ertman 1997.
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extend this ‘dialogue’ to those who are essentially affected by new modes of revenue 
extraction: the direct producers. In other words, we need a theoretical framework 
which conceptualises elite conflicts in a horizontal sense as intra-ruling class conflicts 
over access to and property of the means of exploitation, as well as social conflicts 
over the rate of taxation as class conflict in a vertical sense. If the analysis is extended 
to the peasantry, it usually appears however not as a social agent, who displayed 
considerable influence over the level and forms of extraction, but rather as a neutral tax 
base or simple ‘the economy’ whose importance appears only in socially disembodied 
figures of population fluctuations, agrarian productivity, or in such formal terms like 
taxpayers, tax compliance, fiscal limit, and fiscal capacity.345 The unwillingness to 
systematically recognise the peasantry as the fourth party to the ‘dialogue’ between 
king, staff, and estates presents thus not merely an omission, but constitutes a decisive 
theoretical and substantive failure in the assessment of socially constructed and 
therewith regionally specific solutions to the general problem of war-induced 
taxation.346 Without a theorisation of the peasantry as a conscious class, defending its 
own interests, a fiscal sociology of ‘the evolution of pre-modem fiscal systems, in a 
comparative European framework’347 is doomed to failure. In other words, it is the 
class conflicts between and within the major classes of late medieval times, as they 
grew out of varying degrees of self-organisation resulting in determinate balances of 
class forces, which in the form of the struggle over the distribution of taxation was 
decisive for the regionally diverse outcomes of state attempts to procure war finances
345 Bonney’s assertion that ‘(...) it was the interaction of the state’s demands with harvest 
fluctuations which determined the real fiscal burden carried by the majority of taxpayers’ is 
symptomatic of the non-recognition of the peasantry as a social actor in the institutionalist 
literature. Bonney 1995a, 17-18. Whereas harvests remain, of course, the natural condition for 
any dues, the social determination of the level of taxation was a result of the conflicts between 
those who imposed taxes and those who had to pay them. Although Bonney later tries to re- 
politicise taxation (‘If regional fiscal divisions were in large measure a question of privilege 
then we should not expect any clear relationship between economic wealth and fiscal burden.’ 
Bonney 1995b, 501), the conflict over the tax rate is carried out between ruler and taxpayers
346 A notable exception is Winfried Schulze. Although he also introduces the Schumpeterian 
couplet in passing, he then cites approvingly Marc Bloch on the social rationale behind royal 
Bauernschntzpolitik (policy of peasant protection). ‘We may interpret this trend towards 
protection of the peasantry by the state as a “struggle between taxes and rents”. This 
perspective has the advantage of linking the tensions between princes and their estates, between 
peasants and their landlords and between peasants and princes, various aspects of which may 
be seen at work in the frequent rebellions against taxation.’ Schulze 1995, 264.
347 Bonney 1995a, 2.
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on more centralised principles. Regionally varying balances of class forces explain 
variations in the domestic responses to war understood as intra-ruling class 
competition over land and labour.
Fifth, this does not yet tell us anything about the modernity of these state- 
building attempts. Crucially, we dismiss the adequacy of the term modernity in 
connection with early modem attempts of state centralisation. No early modem 
European state, with the exception of post-revolutionary England - achieved 
sovereignty in the modem sense of the term. Since the overwhelming majority of 
European states remained dynastic-absolutist states, the rights of sovereignty came to 
be privately owned by the mling dynasty, regarding state territory as its private 
patrimonial property. Nowhere was the cmcial transition from patrimonial officialdom 
to modem bureaucracy, implying the separation of the staff from their previously 
privately owned means of administration and coercion, in Max Weber’s sense 
achieved. The state edifice remained at all levels highly personalised, that is, no clear 
distinction between the public and the private was effectuated, in distinction to the 
trans-personality of the modem state. In dynastic-patrimonial states, venal officials re­
privatised the rights of governance and taxation, so that state power became 
progressively alienated by a monarchy under financial duress. The administration 
remained an ‘irrational’ net of personal dependencies, characterised by venality, 
patronage, clientelism, nepotism, and favouritism. As the means of administration 
remained de-centralised and personalised, so were the means of violence not 
monopolised by the state, but remained under personal-patrimonial control. The king’s 
standing army was precisely the king’s standing army, supplemented by the customary 
hiring of mercenary forces. Military enterprisers remained, of course, outside the direct 
control of the state. Within the king’s army, the practice of office venality implied that 
nobles bought colonelcies and entire regiments out of their private purses, recruiting, 
maintaining, and de-commissioning their soldiers at their will. The legal system, in turn, 
suffered equally the effects of venality, while the persistence of feudal courts and 
regionally different law codes frustrated the principle of legal uniformity and court 
hierarchy. Territory, finally, turned into a function of dynastic practices of military and 
matrimonial political accumulation, so that dynastic states were in essence ‘composite
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monarchies’,348 blocking the fixity and exclusivity of modem notions of state territory. 
In short, the early modern state evinced none of the typical traits of what is 
conventionally associated with the modem state. In other words, while the transition 
from feudal monarchies to absolutist monarchies represented an important 
development, it did not lead to the formation of the modem state and, by extension, 
the modem system of states. We will show in the next chapter how the non­
establishment of a modem state in early modem Europe can be theorised in relation to 
prevailing pre-capitalist social property relations.
To conclude, the Weber-Hintze tradition of war-driven state-formation would 
do well to return to Hintze’s admonition that the military logic should not replace class 
conflict, but be theorised in relation to it.
348 Elliott 1992.
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Chapter Five
r _
UEtaU c ’est m o i!; The Personal and Compromised Nature 
of Absolutist Sovereignty
Introduction
Modernity, Sovereignty, and IR
Modernity is an elusive and therefore essentially contested concept. Substantive 
criteria adduced in different social-scientific disciplines to establish its identity flow 
from different knowledge-guiding interests and lead to diverging periodisations of the 
modem age. In the discipline of IR, the onset of modem international relations is 
conventionally determined with reference to the emergence of the concept and practice 
of exclusive territoriality and external sovereignty, revolving around the state as an 
agent of peace and war (ius ad bellum ac pacem).349 Its historical appearance and 
international recognition is commonly associated with the contracting parties to the 
Westphalian Peace Treaties of 1648. Max Weber’s classical definition of the modem 
state, conceived as enjoying the legitimate monopoly in the means of violence in a 
clearly demarcated state territory over a population defined in terms of citizenship, 
serves as a standard point of reference.350
The argument, developed in this chapter, is that before we provide an 
alternative interpretation of the Westphalian Order, we have to re-consider the nature 
of the dominant early modem state form: absolutism. This prior inquiry seeks to rectify 
the fundamental error in the dominant IR literature, which tends to equate absolutist 
sovereignty with modem sovereignty. The conventional misinterpretation of 
Westphalia’s modernity is predicated on this erroneous equation. Theoretically, IR’s 
misconception and misperiodisation of the Westphalian order rests on an idealisation of 
early modem kingly sovereignty and the nature of absolutist bureaucracy.
349 Gross 1948; Morgenthau 1985, 293-4 and328-9; Gilpin 1981, 111; Kratochwil 1986, 51;
Holsti 1991, 25; Spruyt 1994, 3 and 153-5.
350 Cfi, for example, Gilpin 1981, 17; Spruyt 1994, 35.
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Methodologically, this misinterpretation is predicated upon four related tendencies. 
First, as a rule, in its preoccupation with the external marks of sovereignty, 
international relations are persistently theorised in the IR community in abstraction 
from the internal constitution of the constitutive units of geopolitical systems. In other 
words, the historically diverse nature of political communities is generally under­
theorised and under-differentiated. Second, if the concept of ‘the state’ is 
problematised in IR, its identity is generally theorised in institutional, and therefore 
largely static and comparative, terms. Third, to the degree that Max Weber’s definition 
of the modem state is employed for establishing the identity of historically variable 
political communities, it is generally falsely projected into differently structured pasts. 
Fourth, IR theories of early modem international relations have generally drawn on the 
traditional interpretation of absolutism developed in the historiographical literature. 
This interpretation was already problematically influenced by ill-understood Weberian 
notions of state rationalisation and bureaucratic centralisation. This literature is today 
largely contested, if not outdated.
Chapter Structure
Since it is one of the fundamental premises of this study that the nature and 
dynamics of geopolitical relations cannot be adequately understood without a 
systematic inquiry into the domestic sources of political power, this chapter re­
examines the domestic structure of French absolutist power and the meaning of 
absolutist sovereignty in order to develop a firm basis from which to re-theorise the 
overall character of the early modem system of states.
The chapter is divided into four major sections. Section one provides a brief 
survey of the traditional state-centred interpretation of absolutism in the 
historiographical and historical-sociological literature, which underwrites IR’s standard 
account of the modernity of post-Westphalian international relations. This survey is 
followed by a short critique of the society-centred revisionist literature and a critical 
exposition of the Marxist debate on absolutism.
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Section two articulates the core thesis on the nature of the absolutist state and 
its long-term trajectory and sets out four methodological premises which inform the 
subsequent interpretation of absolutist core phenomena.
On this basis, section three seeks to clarify the meaning of proprietary kingship 
for the personalised nature of absolutist sovereignty.
Section four turns to the main domestic institutions of absolutist rule. It spells 
out the causes of office venality and its consequences for the structure of early modem 
public power, the persistence of independent political centers of power, the logic of 
legislation, taxation and fiscal crises, and the structure of the absolutist military 
constitution and early modem warfare. Each of these absolutist macro-phenomena is 
analysed with reference to prevailing non-capitalist social property relations, governing 
determinate intra-ruling class conflicts as well as class-conflicts between producers and 
non-producers which define, in turn, domestic as well as geopolitical public policy 
options. In particular, it draws out the implications of the wide-spread practice of 
office venality, both in civil administration as well as in the military apparatus, for the 
non-modernity of the French state of the Old Regime. At the same time, it will be 
shown how all of these practices expressed the non-capitalist character of French 
absolutist society as they were inimical to the establishment of capitalist relations of 
production.
The conclusion summarises and substantiates the thesis that, given the nexus 
between a non-capitalist agrarian economy and a parasitic patrimonial state apparatus, 
the long-term trajectory of Old Regime France exhibits, in the context of a competitive 
system of states, an economically ‘involutionary’ and thus politically crisis-ridden 
dynamic, which only started to be radically altered well after the French Revolution. 
The argument is that while the absolutist state is not only distinctively non-modem, it 
is not even transitional. In other words, the internal dynamic of absolutist class 
relations led developmentally to a dead end. Under these conditions, the origins of 
international modernity have to be sought in the rise of the first modem state - 17th 
Century England -, which, driven by an expanding capitalist economy, began to 
undermine the politically accumulative logic of the Continental absolutist system of 
states in the 18th Century, and imposed its new capitalist logic on it in the course of the 
19th and early 20th Century in a crisis-ridden process of socially combined and 
geographically uneven development. Ex hypothesis, it is these processes which
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transformed the logic of the absolutist system of states into the modem international 
order.
Debating Absolutism: Transition or Non-Transition?
The historiographical literature on the nature of absolutism has seen over the 
past three decades an important debate on the ‘absoluteness’ o f  kingly government in 
its relation to political society. It opposed the defenders of an older state-centred 
orthodox interpretation over and against the followers - Marxists and non-Marxists 
alike - of a revisionist strand which tried to expose the limits of absolutism.351 This 
debate is central to the discipline of IR since it problematises the nature of the early 
modem state and absolutist sovereignty and has therefore direct implications for the 
question of the emergence of the modem system of states.
Although the debate covers all European political regimes, it came to focus 
very much on France, the classical model of absolutist state-formation. If the 
phenomenon of absolutism is analysed in this chapter with special reference to France, 
this does not imply that the Bourbon state merely exemplified in ideal-typical form a 
general European phenomenon. In some European polities, say, the Dutch General 
Estates, England, Switzerland, or Poland - for reasons having to do with specific 
resolutions of preceding class conflicts on the basis of different social property- 
relations - absolutism never took hold. Even in those policies where versions of 
absolutist rule are conventionally taken to be discernible - as in Spain, Austria, Russia, 
Prussia, Sweden or Denmark - absolutism had different chronologies, dynamics, and 
characteristics. However, the differences between, for example, French mercantilism 
and Prussian cameralism, are smaller than their commonalities, provided that we want 
to distinguish these modes of government from preceding as well as subsequent forms 
of rule. Since our analysis of absolutism stands in the service of defining the overall 
character of early modem international relations, and since it was essentially absolutist
351 The revisionist literature is now vast. Non-Marxist accounts include Elias 1983 and 1994; 
Root 1987; Mettam 1988; Hinrichs 1989 and 1996; Kaiser 1990, 7-202; Henshall 1992 and 
1996; Hoffman 1994; Asch and Duchhardt 1996; Oresko, Gibbs, and Scott 1997. Marxist 
accounts include Anderson 1974b; Beik 1985; Parker 1989 and 1996; Gerstenberger 1991.
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regimes (and first and foremost France) which laid down the rules of the Westphalian 
Peace Treaties, we contend that our focus on France is justified.
The Traditional State-Centred Interpretation: The State as Rational Actor
The traditional interpretation started from the assumption that from the 16th 
Century onwards and especially during the 17th Century, the pressures of intensified 
geopolitical conflict and the domestic turmoil associated with confessional disputes 
spawned a process of concentration of political, legislative, judicial, financial, 
economic, and military decision-making powers to the benefit of the monarch.352 The 
state arrondised, consolidated, and centralised its territory on the basis of a systematic 
build-up of a net of public institutions operated by loyal bureaucrats. Under the whip 
of external defence and demand for internal supra-confessional pacification, the king 
came into a position to side-step the consultation and consent of political intermediary 
powers so as to arrogate ‘legislative sovereignty’, expressed in the formula princeps 
legibus (ab)solutus. The king’s position beyond the law went hand in hand with a 
growing juridification and rationalisation of what came now to be distinguished as 
public and private spheres of life. The substitution of multiple and overlapping feudal 
rights and privileges by a centralised legal system emanating from the King’s Council 
was mirrored by the monarchical monopolisation of taxation, requiring the build-up of 
an officer class in the service of and dependent upon the king. Powerful, but revocable, 
agents of the king - the intendants - carried the will of the king into the provinces. The 
new service nobility, the noblesse de robe, staffed with literate burghers and clerics 
deriving their title from office was played out against the old sword-carrying nobility, 
the noblesse d  'epee, deriving its titles from inheritance and landed property.
Conscious state-sponsored policies of economic development took shape in the 
form of mercantilism. State agencies improved national infrastructures for transport,
352 Two widely received studies which are often adduced in the IR community as evidence of 
the modernity of the Westphalian state are Poggi 1978 and Strayer 1970. For Poggi, ‘the new, 
absolutist system of rule, (...) is widely considered the first mature embodiment of the modem 
state’. Poggi 1978, 62. Strayer is invoked by Gilpin 1981, 116-23 and Spruyt 1994, 78-108.
Cf. also the influential study edited by Tilly 1975 and Giddens 1985, 83-121. Tilly’s ‘war
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pressed for a common standard of weights and measures, supported manufacture and 
foreign trade, demolished the mass of internal tariff barriers while replacing the 
fragmented medieval toll system with a single customs unit, and operated a common 
coinage to raise the wealth of the state. Economic planning created a unified internal 
market, while the pursuit of a positive national balance-of-trade geared external trade 
to the hoarding of bullion and treasure.
Informal mechanisms of domestic domination and conflict-resolution (feuds) 
were replaced by institutionalised contracts and non-violent rules for conflict- 
resolution, based on positive legal principles. Older customary and contractual forms 
of state power amongst lords (the state of associated persons) gave way to an 
impersonal conception of the state over and above its subjects informed and legitimised 
by Roman law. A distinct sphere of politics came to be distinguished from civil society: 
A new discourse of secular sovereignty, archetypically exemplified in Jean B odin’s Six 
Livres sur la Republique supplanted medieval lore of divine kingship, vassalage, the 
code of chivalry and societal trifimctionality based on orders. The medieval conflation 
of public law and penal law gave way to a distinction between public international law 
and private criminal law: a police force started to carry out the disciplinisation of the 
non-noble population, while noble resistance was no longer lawful in cases of kingly 
non-compliance of the feudal contract, and did no longer follow the prescriptions of 
diffidatio. Henceforth, feuds were ostracised as disobedience and rebellion, falling 
under the ultimate crime of treason, that is: lese majeste. Defiant nobles turned into 
enemies of the state. At the same time, feudal forms of military organisation based on 
the summons of the feudal host and the arriere-ban were supplanted during the 
‘military revolution’ by the de-militarisation of the noble class and the creation of 
standing armies (the miles perpetuus) under royal control, while state-investments in 
military technology (artillery, navy, and fortifications) rendered feudal military tactics 
and strategy obsolete. Foreign policy came to be an exclusive part of monarchical 
prerogatives - the arcana imperii - in the name of raison d ’Etat, while ad hoc 
diplomatic missions were replaced by permanent embassies, enjoying immunity due to 
the new principle of extra-territoriality. The kingly monopolisation of the means of 
violence underwrote the transition from the late medieval ius gentium to the ius inter
makes states and states make war’ approach (coercion-extraction cycle) is summarised in Tilly
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gentes and subsequently to the French-dominated droit public de I 'Europe, 
transforming medieval hierarchy or heterogeneity into an ‘anarchical’ geopolitical 
order of legally equal states.
In theory, absolutist rule
‘resided in the undivided and unlimited authority of an individual, who, as legislator, was 
not bound by the laws, who was independent of all control, and who exercised 
sovereignty without consulting any groups or institutions except those created by 
himself.353
The Sun King, Louis XIV, came to embody the radiant omnipotence of absolute 
monarchy epitomised in his claim (ascribed or authentic) that ‘L ’Etat, c'est moiV, 
while drawing an increasingly ornamental aristocracy into the artificial, baroque, and 
purely representative life style of Versailles court society. In practice, it was maintained 
that the outcomes of the struggles of the 17th Century ‘represented the conclusive 
establishment of the structure that is recognisable as the modem state, organized 
around an impersonal, centralized, and unifying system of government, resting on law, 
bureaucracy, and force.’354 In sum, the ‘state’ was essentially seen as the ‘modernising’ 
rational organiser of a society internally tom by conflicts among status groups and 
externally under threat of invasion
It is this orthodox view of early modem politics, idealising the rationality of 
absolutist public institutions while minimising its differences with the modem state, 
which has informed the prevailing consensus within the discipline of IR that the mid- 
IT* Century Peace Treaties of Westphalia perfected the architecture of European 
politics by laying down the rules of modem international relations for what were 
essentially modem states.355
1985.
353 Vierhaus 1988, 113. It should be noted that Vierhaus himself advanced already in 1966 a 
much more nuanced picture of absolutist rule than implied by the classical definition and 
asserted that ‘since WWI, at the latest since WWII, such a view of absolutism can be regarded 
as outdated in academic circles (even if it survives in popular historical perceptions) [my 
translation, B.T.]. Vierhaus 1985, 36.
354 Rabb 1975, 72.
355 Cfi, for example, Spruyt 1994a, 77-108 and 1994b, 540-2.
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The Revisionist ‘Society-Centred' Critique
Objections against the gradualist institutional account soon crystallised into a 
distinct revisionist literature, inspired by Roland Mousnier’s concept of a society of 
orders.356 Empirically, it was pointed out that office venality, clientage, legal non­
uniformity, tax-farming, mercenarism and a host of cognate phenomena negated the 
thesis of any smooth progression towards the precepts of bureaucratic rationality 
associated with the modem state. Theoretically, it was argued that this failure was 
bound up with the lack of an inquiry into Old Regime France as a society of orders, 
comprising traditional interest groups competing over status and position. Institutional 
setbacks in the completion of the modem state were thus not temporary disturbances, 
but expressed the structural factional interests of political society recurrently opposing 
the modernising ambitions of the monarchy.
Yet, while the non-Marxist revisionist literature - Annalistes and new 
institutionalists alike - persuasively unmasked the confirmationist bias towards state- 
perfection in the old institutionalist literature, in many ways, it only reversed its 
premises. While in the old institutionalist scenario, the state was held to be the active 
and rational actor and society a recalcitrant and irrational mass of particular interests, 
now it was maintained that the center of Old Regime power was to be sought in 
‘society’ which held the ‘state’ hostage to its particularistic interests. This position was 
summed up by William Beik:
‘Thus historians have moved from viewing the state as a triumphant organizer of society 
to viewing it as a fragile organism struggling against a vast, turbulent society, and 
finally to the realization that forces in society were influencing, if not defining the very 
function of the state. The existence of these forces does not necessarily negate the state’s 
progressive role, but it does call for a reassessment of the way distinctive early modem 
institutions interacted with a distinctive early modem society.’357
Although the burden of causality came now to lie on ‘society’, the basic 
premise, namely that early modem state and society can be meaningfully theorised as 
two distinct and autonomous entities, pursuing antagonistic interests, was not
356 The locus classicus is Mousnier 1979 and 1984. The best summaries of the more recent 
debates are Beik 1985, 3-33 and Parker 1996, 6-27.
357 Beik 1985, 17.
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abandoned. Whereas formerly, a modernising state struggled victoriously against a 
retarding society, henceforth, a backward-looking society frustrated the modernising 
ambitions of the state. In this perspective, the idea that a common set of interests 
between privileged orders and the Crown may have created a field of compatibility 
amongst the ruling classes, uniting them over and against the peasantry and 
reproducing thus a pre-modem state form, was excluded from the first. If they were 
united vis-a-vis the peasantry, they were divided over the issue of distributing peasant- 
produced tax proceeds. Thus, if, as we will show later in detail, it can be said that 
political power remained throughout the period personalised and given that this 
personalised character of public power was shared between the monarchy and its 
privileged classes, then the state-society dyad cannot be meaningfully employed as an 
operative category in Old Regime France.
The view that the absolutist state could be conceptualised as something outside 
of and causally distinct from society, pursuing its own goals, while disciplining society 
over the centuries, and its revisionist society-centred inversion, were most successfully 
attacked by Marxist authors.
The Orthodox Marxist Interpretation: The 'Equilibrist-Transitional Paradigm'
Paradoxically, however, Marxist interpretations of absolutism were for a long 
time marred by the orthodox and formulaic stagist philosophy of history driven by a 
succession of ascending classes, which taught that the new progressive class, the 
bourgeoisie, would have to develop gradually in the womb of the old order, 
overthrowing it in an abrupt revolutionary climax. The Communist Manifesto codified 
this conception in classical form.358 Under the shadow of its authority, the age of 
absolutism, instead of its recognition as a social formation in its own right, was 
degraded as an object of research to its preparatory role for the French Revolution. 
The research-organising theme became the ‘transition to capitalism* and the genesis of 
its historical agent - the bourgeoisie - its fulcrum. While the state-society dyad was 
replaced by class analysis, the theme of the rise of capitalism within the framework of
358 Marx and Engels 1848.
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the Old Regime became all-pervasive. While neither Marx nor Engels ever put forward 
a systematic study of absolutism, the classical Marxist interpretation was canonised by 
Engels’ famous statement that the absolutist monarchy ‘held the balance between the 
nobility and the burghers,’359 thus gaining considerable autonomy from both classes 
until the bourgeoisie pushed through the integument of the Old Regime. In this 
‘equilibrist-transitional’ perspective, the rise of capitalism was the outcome of the 
growth of a bourgeoisie whose interests were promoted and instrumentalised by the 
monarchy in order to out-balance the reactionary particularistic interests of the landed 
nobility, until the absolutist monarchy was finally overthrown in a cataclysmic violent 
denouement by that class whose aspirations it helped to unleash.
This interpretation of absolutism, conceptualising the early modem period 
essentially in terms of a long transition, was also assisted by the fact that serfdom was 
dead in France after the crisis of the 14th Century. If feudalism was defined in terms of 
the class-relation between lords and serfs on the medieval manor, then post-14th 
Century - not to speak of post-17th Century - French society could not qualify as 
feudal. Yet, if feudalism is essentially defined in terms of serfdom, which was non­
existent in early modem France, and if capitalism is essentially defined as a system of 
production in which the direct producer is separated from his means of subsistence so 
that he finds himself compelled to sell his labour-power to those in control of capital - 
equally non-existent in early modem France -, then the four centuries between the late 
14th century and 1789 could only qualify as a period of transition. The growth of urban 
mercantile activity, the monetarisation of rural rents, and the general spread of 
commercialisation and commodification of economic life could only support such an 
interpretation.
These themes informed the refinements of the equilibrist-transitional paradigm 
advanced by Boris Porchnev and A.D. Lublinskaya. Porchnev argued that the 
monarchy, under pressure from peasant rebellion, co-opted a capitalist bourgeoisie 
through office-venality into the state, so as to simultaneously out-balance a factional 
reactionary aristocracy, while preventing a latent alliance of interest between peasantry 
and bourgeoisie.360 Lublinskaya, in turn, argued for an equilibrium between an
359 Engels 1884, 271. Further variations of this position can be found in Marx 1847, 326 and 
333; Marx and Engels 1848, 486; Marx 1871, 328.
360 Porchnev 1963.
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independent commercial and industrial capitalist bourgeoisie, supported by the 
monarchy, and a reactionary but unified sword and robe nobility.361 Irrespective of the 
more detailed merits and problems of these two approaches, both authors did not 
transcend the classical Marxist ‘equilibrist-transitional paradigm’.
Perry Anderson's Subterranean Transition to Capitalism
Rejecting the equilibrist interpretation, Perry Anderson developed the 
transitional theme and its associated class-relations in a brilliant, but not unproblematic, 
theoretical and synoptic account. Anderson squarely identified the absolutist state as a 
feudal state, defending the interests of the old medieval aristocracy.362 Starting from 
the observation that absolutist monarchies were ‘exotic, hybrid compositions whose 
surface “modernity” again and again betrays a subterranean archaism’,363 Anderson 
convincingly de-codified the non-modern nature of absolutist institutional innovations - 
army, bureaucracy, taxation, trade, diplomacy - by suggesting that the end of feudalism 
in its narrow sense, i.e. serfdom, was not tantamount to the disappearance of feudal 
relations of production in the early modem French agrarian economy.364 However, the 
dissolution of serfdom did mean that the unity of politics and economics - economic 
exploitation through politico-legal coercion - at the molecular level of the village, 
which defined the parcellised character of feudal sovereignty as distributed in a 
hierarchical chain of inter-lordly relations, was destroyed. In its stead, on the 
instigation of the old noble class threatened to be shorn of its class power, this cellular 
unity of extra-economic coercion was re-established on a national scale in form of the 
absolutist state. ‘The result was a displacement of politico-legal coercion upwards 
towards a centralized, militarized summit - the Absolutist State.’365 Localised and 
individualised feudal rents were replaced by centralised feudal rents in the guise of 
royal taxation.
361 Lublinskaya 1968 and 1980.
362 Anderson 1974b, 428 and 41-2
363 Anderson 1974b. 29.
364 Anderson 1974b, 17.
365 Anderson 1974b, 19.
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‘Absolutism was essentially just this: a redeployed and recharged apparatus o f feudal 
domination, designed to clamp the peasant masses back into their traditional social 
position - despite and against the gains they had won by the widespread commutation of 
dues. In other words, the Absolutist State was never an arbiter between the aristocracy 
and the bourgeoisie, still less an instrument of the nascent bourgeoisie against the 
aristocracy: it was the new political carapace of a threatened nobility.’366
While the mode of political organisation had changed, the ruling class, 
according to Anderson, was and remained the same: the feudal nobility supported by 
the coercive and centralised power of the new state apparatus.
Yet, in spite of acknowledging the persistence of a pre-capitalist mode of 
exploitation in the form of extra-economic centralised rents, Anderson nevertheless 
argued for a long transition towards capitalism in this period. His argument revolves 
around two axes. First, in the country-side, the concentration of political power at the 
apex of the social system, mediated by the commutation of labour-rents into money- 
rents was complemented by the economic consolidation of feudal property. Feudal 
conditional property gave way, aided by the reception of Roman law, to absolute and 
exclusive private titles of property. ‘Landownership tended to become progressively 
less “conditional” as sovereignty became correspondingly more “absolute”.’367 The 
creation of a land market fulfilled an essential background condition for the 
establishment of capitalist agriculture.368 Second, in the towns, the same Roman civil 
law notion of Quiritary ownership, which was re-discovered by royal legists in order to 
defend the regroupment of feudal class power on more centralised principles, was 
seized upon by the urban bourgeoisie as the legal expression of free capital. The very 
reception of Roman law and especially its differentiation between civil and public law, 
had the unintended effect of providing a legal idiom for the interests of the mercantile 
bourgeoisie by providing a code of law and legal procedures which guaranteed the 
security of private property and capitalist transactions (certainty, clarity, uniformity) 
based on written contracts.369
‘For the apparent paradox of Absolutism in Western Europe was that it fundamentally 
represented an apparatus for the protection of aristocratic property and privileges, yet at
366 Anderson 1974b, 18.
367 Anderson 1974b, 20.
368 Anderson 1974b, 424-6.
369 Anderson 1974b, 26.
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the same time the means whereby this protection was promoted could simultaneously 
ensure the basic interests of the nascent mercantile and manufacturing classes.’370
Yet, Anderson’s analysis of absolutist France does not bear the character of a 
self-enclosed case study, but is embedded in a wider world-historical comparative 
history of uneven development. Again, the ultimate research-organising question 
revolves around the uniqueness of the ‘West’ and, in particular, the specificity of those 
long-term conditions which were conducive to the rise of capitalism in Europe. Here, 
the classical Marxist notion of world history as a succession of modes of production as 
a simple temporal sequence following the logic of replacement is rejected in favour of, 
as Hegelians would put it, the dialectical logic of ‘sublation’ {Aufhebung in its triple 
meaning), in which the traces of the past are only abolished in order to be preserved in 
a qualitatively transformed higher synthesis.
‘The course towards capitalism reveals a remanence of the legacy of one mode of 
production within an epoch dominated by another, and a reactivation of its spell in the 
passage to a third.’371
More concretely, ‘the concatenation of the ancient and feudal modes of production 
was necessary to yield the capitalist mode of production - a relationship that was not 
merely one of diachronic sequence, but also at a certain stage of synchronic 
articulation.’372 In other words, while the survival of a dense network of urban 
enclaves, the lingering memory of Roman law, and the rational cultural forms of 
Roman modes of thought comprise the capitalism-assisting legacy of antiquity, the 
feudal fief - unknown outside Europe except in Japan - pre-figured as a unit of 
economic exploitation the material matrix of landed private property under capitalism. 
Absolutism was its period of incubation. Thus,
‘in nature and structure, the Absolute monarchies of Europe were still feudal states: the 
machinery of rule of the same aristocratic class that had dominated the Middle Ages . But 
in Western Europe where they were bom, the social formations which they governed 
were a complex combination of feudal and capitalist modes of production, with a 
gradually rising urban bourgeoisie and a growing primitive accumulation of capital, on 
an international scale. It was the intertwining of these two antagonistic modes of
370 Anderson 1974b, 40.
371 Anderson 1974b, 421.
372 Anderson 1974b, 422.
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production within single societies that gave rise to the transitional forms of 
Absolutism.’373
To sum up, for Anderson, absolutism was the result of a regroupment of noble 
class power after the end of serfdom in the form of a centralised state performing the 
former localised functions of extra-economic coercion on a national scale to the benefit 
of the nobility. The institutional innovations - unearthing the achievements of antiquity 
-, which accompanied the new centralised mode of extraction, created inadvertently, in 
conjunction with the spread of commodification and exchange, the conditions for the 
spread of absolute private property and the rise of a capitalist bourgeoisie. While the 
final clash between a rising bourgeoisie and a falling aristocracy is postponed to the 
bourgeois revolution proper, capitalism developed, so to speak, silently, even 
subterraneously.
There are various interconnected empirical and theoretical problems in 
Anderson’s account of the rise, nature and dynamics of French absolutism. First, it is 
doubtful whether the growth of absolutism was ever actively pursued, in the interest 
of, or was ultimately beneficial to the class power of the old feudal ruling class. Even if 
the old nobility survived within the absolutist state, its existence and functions cannot 
be derived from an original set of noble preferences. Inversely, pre-M* Century Crisis 
noble preferences would not have led by themselves to the absolutist form of the state. 
The absolutist state and its ‘centralised rent’ was not the functional equivalent of noble 
local powers of exploitation. In fact, the feudal crisis of the 14th and 15th Centuries 
created a pattern of class alliances which saw the monarchy siding repeatedly with the 
peasantry to the detriment of the old medieval nobility.374 Nobility and monarchy had 
clearly competing interests in the exploitation of the peasantry. While serfdom implied 
noble peasant-exploitation, peasant freedom meant monarchical-fiscal peasant- 
exploitation. The end of serfdom was partly brought about through the insertion of 
royal public courts into the lord-peasant relationship, defending peasant liberties 
against the local lords. The struggle between a feudal rent-regime and an absolutist 
tax-regime was ultimately decided against the interests and to the detriment of the old
373 Anderson 1974b, 428-9.
374 Brenner 1985b, 288-9.
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medieval nobility. Anderson’s thesis that ‘throughout the early modem epoch, the 
dominant class - economically and politically - was thus the same as in the medieval 
epoch itself: the feudal aristocracy’375 underestimates the changed class basis of the 
early modem nobility as it underrates the active role of the monarchy. Not only was 
there very little aristocratic intergenerational continuity and identity within the majority 
of noble families between the 14th and 17th Centuries, the very class basis of the 
medieval nobility was eroded and re-defined in this process. The class which collected 
public taxes was no longer identical with the class which had reaped feudal rents.
Most importantly, while the aristocracy retained its landed possessions, it lost 
its political powers of representation. In other words, it was no longer the ruling class 
in the strict sense of the term. Nothing exemplifies more drastically the relative decline 
of the old nobility than the non-convocation of the Estates General between the late 
16th and the late 18th centuries.376 This political loss of class power translated also into 
the sphere of international relations, where the arrogation of foreign policy 
prerogatives by the king undermined the independent war-making capacities of the old 
nobility. While the majority of the members of the noblesse d ’epee had lost their arms- 
bearing status due to the end of serfdom, vassalage, and conditional property, the real 
beneficiary of the rise of absolutism became a new state-sponsored patrimonial officer 
class: the noblesse de robe. Its outlooks and interests were directly bound up with the 
crown, reproducing itself through the extractive powers of the state apparatus, and 
imposing a qualitatively different long-term dynamic of inter-ruling class relations on 
French society as a whole. While the aristocracy survived in altered form, its interests 
were not directly represented by or identical with those of the monarchy.
Second, Anderson’s insistence on the persistence of the old feudal ruling class 
led him to underrate the intervening transformations of inter-ruling class relations, i.e. 
the tensions between the monarchy, the sword-carrying nobility and the office-holding 
nobility. In particular, it led him to under-theorise the contradictions of absolutist 
sovereignty. On the one hand, centralised rents as the operative mechanism of surplus
375 Anderson 1974b, 18. Cf. also 430.
376 Although Anderson discusses aristocratic discontent, he nevertheless insists that absolutism 
was ultimately - and even in spite of its own original intentions - beneficial to the old 
aristocracy, surviving not only economically, but also politically. ‘No class in history 
immediately comprehends the logic of its own historical situation, in epochs of transition: a
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extraction clearly subordinated the nobility to the distributive favours of the monarchy. 
At the same time, public taxes and the concomitant kingly monopolisation of the means 
of violence elevated the dynastic principle to the core of absolutist sovereignty and the 
cornerstone of early modem international relations, while the royal court became the 
centre of patronage, intrigue, and faction. Dynastic diplomacy was not the ‘index of 
feudal dominance’,377 but a sign of its relative decline. On the other hand, while 
Anderson’s discussion of office-venality clearly shows the limits of state rationalisation 
and centralisation, he failed to draw the more radical conclusion that the privatisation 
of offices implied a renewed tendency towards the de-centralisation of sovereignty. 
While Anderson is right to say that ‘landownership tended to become progressively 
less “conditional” as sovereignty became correspondingly more “absolute”,378 the 
absolutisation of sovereignty was precisely reversed through the alienation of state 
offices. While this was less palpable in foreign affairs, its domestic effects entailed a de- 
uniformisation in the implementation of legislation, taxation, and jurisdiction. Venality, 
patronage, and corruption frustrated legal clarity, certainty and uniformity.
Third, office venality not only prevented internal state sovereignty, it tended to 
divert urban and mercantile capital into state-constituted sources of income - by the 
purchase of sinecures, company charters, or loans to the crown. The monarchy became 
thus indebted to an ever-growing parasitic patrimonial class of officers, financiers, tax- 
farmers and mercantile adventurers, which tried to recoup their public investments 
through the full exploitation of their privately-owned state-granted titles to income. 
The net effect was a symbiotic and parasitic inter-ruling class relation between 
monarchy, noblesse de robe, financiers, and town-oligarchs which stalled any transition 
to capitalism. In this respect, the ‘lucrative if risky investments in public finance for 
usury capital’ connected with rentier sinecures in the royal bureaucracy, monopoly 
trading charters, and colonial enterprises did thereby not ‘accomplish certain partial 
functions in the primitive accumulation necessary for the eventual triumph of the 
capitalist mode of production itself.379 Rather, as I will show later in some detail, they 
represented speculative forays into state-backed forms of political accumulation, which
long period of disorientation and confusion may be necessary for it to learn the necessary rules 
of its own sovereignty.’ Anderson 1974b, 55.
377 Anderson 1974b, 39.
378 Anderson 1974b, 20.
379 Anderson 1974b, 40.
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tied capital-owning burghers to a crown which dispensed and sold official and 
commercial titles. While it is correct to say that ‘economic centralization, 
protectionism and overseas expansion aggrandized the late feudal state while they 
profited the early bourgeoisie’,380 this bourgeoisie did thereby not turn into a capitalist 
bourgeoisie.381
Fourth, Anderson repeatedly insinuates that the consolidation of private 
property as well as the commodification and commercialisation of town and country 
life acted as a background condition for the origins of capitalism.
‘The maxim of superficies solo cedit - single and unconditional ownership of land - now 
for the second time became an operative principle in agrarian property (if by no means 
yet the dominant one), precisely because of the spread of commodity relations in the 
country-side that was to define the long transition from feudalism to capitalism in the 
West.’382
Yet, although it is true that the commutation of labour rents into money rents turned 
the lordly domain into an economic estate which could be bought and sold; in short: 
although it created a market in land, direct producers continued to be in possession of 
their customary plots which became their de facto property. The implication was that 
peasants were, as Anderson professes at one point,383 not formally subsumed under 
capital, i.e. economically compelled to rent out from or work for a landlord so as to 
create surplus-value instead of just producing surpluses. Thus, while lordly estates 
became ‘allodialised’, i.e. they turned into absolute private property, neither landlords 
nor peasants had much incentive to consolidate their plots and estates, to introduce 
novel farming techniques and to specialise produce. Capital investments did not yet 
follow the logic of cost-cutting competition, precisely because rural labour was not yet 
generally commodified, that is, proletarianised. Anderson thus underrates the 
economically arresting implications of wide-spread petty peasant property. The 
introduction of Roman private law notions of Quiritary ownership, which allows for
380 Anderson 1974b, 41.
381 It is curious to see how Anderson’s general theoretical claim on the capitalist transition in 
his introductory chapter is infirmed by his subsequent historical chapters. Cf. Anderson 1974b. 
97.
382 Anderson 1974b, 26. Cf. also: ‘The new form of noble power was in its turn determined by 
the spread of commodity production and exchange, in the transitional social formation of the 
early modem epoch.’ Anderson 1974b, 18.
383 Anderson 1974b, 17.
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civil contractual relations in the transfer of property, was therefore not consequential 
for the consolidation of an agrarian capitalist regime of production. Antiquity was 
neither a sufficient, nor even a necessary condition for the rise of capitalism. In other 
words, Anderson does not show convincingly how his two conflicting claims, viz. that 
rural labour remained throughout the period independent and that economic life - 
urban and rural - was generally commodified into the direction of capitalist relations of 
production, can be logically reconciled. In spite and because of the latent Althusserian 
idiom of ‘articulation’ and ‘over-determination’, Anderson fails to show how the 
‘feudal mode of production’ and the ‘capitalist mode of production’ are actually, as he 
had it, ‘intertwined’.
Fifth, Anderson’s treatment of the role of medieval towns is ambiguous. He 
starts off by noting that towns were internal to feudalism, since the parcellisation of 
sovereignty allowed a decisive degree of political independence for urban 
communes.384 This is taken to be an argument against those (Sweezey et al.) who 
argued in the Transition Debate on the external dissolution of feudalism through the 
growth of towns and long-distance trade. At the same time, according to Anderson, 
municipal political autonomy was the condition of possibility for towns to develop into 
centres of production - rather than remain parasitic centres of administration and 
consumption as in the Roman Empire and in non-Westem agrarian empires -, which set 
up ‘a dynamic opposition between town and country’,385 which contributed in the long 
run decisively to the subordination of the country to the town, i.e. production for urban 
markets. In this perspective, the original de-centralised political structure of feudal 
domination was decisive for the town’s eventual economic subordination of the feudal 
agrarian economy under their mode of production. Yet, this account must not only 
assume that medieval burghers were either from the beginning proto-capitalists, or 
gradually evolved into a capitalist urban bourgeoisie, it rests on a misreading of John 
Merrington’s contribution which is affirmatively cited to back up Anderson’s 
argument.386 Although Merrington did stress the political independence of medieval 
towns based on the fragmented political character of the mode of feudal domination in
384 Anderson 1974b, 21.
385 Anderson 1974b, 422.
386 Anderson 1974b, 21. Merrington’s study was first published in 1975, but Anderson refers to 
an unpublished draft.
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general - so as to argue that towns were both internal as well as external to feudalism - 
, he simultaneously argued for their economic dependence (as centres of production, 
distribution and consumption) upon the demand and supply generated by the feudal 
country-side.387 Hence, although medieval towns evinced a political ‘internal 
externality’, they were also economically internal to feudalism, and no quantitative 
growth of exchange and markets would, according to Merrington, change this basic 
premise.388 There was no dynamic opposition between pre-capitalist towns and pre­
capitalist agriculture. Even if Anderson does not share Merrington’s (logically 
stringent) conclusion, he would have to demonstrate - theoretically and empirically - 
how the dependency of towns upon the agrarian economy was reversed.
Sixth, Anderson ends his introductory chapter with a short preview on the 
complex of ‘bourgeois revolutions’ and the establishment of capitalist economies and 
states. Although the actual exposition of these themes belongs to the projected third 
volume of his trilogy, the following premonitions extend the logic of his previous 
research to the revolutionary period.
‘The rule of the absolutist state was that of the feudal nobility in the epoch of transition 
to capitalism. Its end would signal the crisis of the power of its class: the advent of the 
bourgeois revolutions, and the emergence of the capitalist state.’389
Without wanting to hold Anderson too closely to these preliminary hypotheses, it 
should be remarked that powerful interpretations have meanwhile appeared which tend 
to pre-empt the validity of even an updated re-formulation of the classical Marxist 
social interpretation of the French Revolution. Especially Comninel, supported by the 
non-Marxist revisionist literature of 1789, concluded that (1) the Great Revolution was 
not so much a class struggle between a rising capitalist bourgeoisie and a falling 
aristocracy, but rather the outcome of the ambitions of a dissatisfied patrimonial state- 
dependent class, comprising both nobles and bourgeois, which fought for a greater
387 Merrington 1976, 177-80
388 Merrington 1976, 178. Merrington therefore argued against the dissolving effect of towns on 
feudalism. ‘This absence of revolutionary vocation on the part of towns, the constant 
‘betrayals’ of the bourgeosie to the old order (as the creditor of the old order), (...), must be 
seen in terms of their objectively convergent interests vis-a-vis the exploitation of the 
countryside so long as rent remained, in its various forms, the principal mode of appropriation 
of the surplus and capital remained external to the productive process.’ Merrington 1976, 180.
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share in the political control of the state’s extractive capacities which went, under the 
impact of radical mass demands, to the detriment of the aristocracy and the monarchy, 
and (2) that the Revolution itself did not create a capitalist society, but rather further 
entrenched petty peasant property while re-distributing state offices in favour of a non­
capitalist bourgeoisie.390
Thus, while Anderson shows clearly the non-capitalist character of the early 
modem French society in its economic and political aspects and while he rejects the 
equilibrist interpretation, he still clings to the received Marxist orthodoxy that the rise 
of capitalism was the historical task of the bourgeoisie, which, assisted by the spread of 
market opportunities and the state-sponsored revival of Roman law, developed in the 
interstices of the old feudal order. In this, Anderson and the old equilibrist-transitional 
interpretation parallel the modernising bias attributed in the institutionalist literature to 
the absolutist state, since it acted as the unwitting midwife of a victorious capitalist 
bourgeoisie.
To sum up, major empirical and theoretical objections can be cited against 
versions of the ‘equilibrist-transitional’ interpretation of absolutism.391 First, the 
peasantry remained throughout the early modem period in direct possession of its 
means of subsistence. Second, mercantile activities did not create eo ipso a capitalist 
bourgeoisie as the growth of trade did not act as a solvent of feudalism. Third, class 
relations between bourgeoisie and aristocracy were not necessarily antagonistic since 
both shared the same proprietary relation to the extra-economic means of exploitation. 
Fourth, the absolutist state retained throughout a patrimonial character into which a 
non-capitalist bourgeoisie and a de-feudalised aristocracy became assimilated through 
the sale of offices and other privileges. Fifth, the main axis of intra-ruling class conflict 
- of which 1789 was a constitutive part - was not so much defined by a struggle 
between a rising capitalist bourgeoisie and a falling aristocracy, but rather by the 
ambitions of a dissatisfied patrimonial state-dependent class which fought for a greater 
share in the political control of the state’s extractive capacities. Sixth, the Revolution 
itself did neither create a capitalist economy nor a capitalist state, but rather further
389 Anderson 1974b, 42. ‘In the West, the Spanish, English, and French monarchies were 
defeated or overthrown by bourgeois revolutions from below.’ Anderson 1974b, 431.
390 Comninel 1987, 179-207.
391 Cf. Merrington 1976; Beik 1985; Comninel 1987; Parker 1996
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entrenched petty peasant property while re-distributing state offices in favour of a non­
capitalist bourgeoisie.
If absolutism was neither a success story in modem state-building as the old 
historiography maintained, nor a society of orders which obstructed its modernising 
ambitions as the revisionist institutionalists claimed, nor an arbiter between the 
aristocracy and the bourgeoisie as originally suggested by Marx and Engels and later, 
with more nuanced emphases, by Porchnev and Lublinskaya, nor an instrument of the 
old aristocracy against the peasantry, ‘overdetermined’ by the rise of a capitalist 
bourgeoisie, as Anderson submitted, what was it then?
Political Marxists and the Critique o f the ‘Bourgeois Paradigm ’
An answer to this question requires a fundamental prior theoretical 
clarification. The orthodox Marxist theorem of a necessary co-development of a 
bourgeois class and capitalism has recently come under heavy attack from within the 
Marxist tradition, both on empirical as well as on theoretical grounds. The failure to 
adequately theorise absolutism and the French Revolution was, as Comninel and 
Brenner convincingly argue, due to Marx and Engels’ uncritical acceptance of the 
liberal theory of bourgeois revolution in their early works.392 Comninel and Brenner 
argued that much of the orthodox Marxist interpretation of the rise of capitalism 
remained under the spell of the young Marx’s adoption of a materialist, but distinctly 
liberal, conception of general historical progress. They demonstrated how this 
misunderstanding generated two opposing interpretations of the transition to capitalism 
to be found in Marx’s writings themselves.
The first interpretation, expounded in his writings of the 40’s and the early 
50’s, was significantly influenced by Scottish classical political economy and 19th 
Century French liberal historiography. On this textual basis, Marx’s early writings
392 Comninel 1987, 53-76 and 104-78; Brenner 1989. Parker 1996, 14, and Beik 1985, 21. Yet, 
in spite of the evidence amassed in his study, Beik still subscribes to the transition-paradigm: 
‘Absolutism must be seen accordingly, not as a modem state grafted onto a pre-modem society, 
but as the political aspect of the final, highest phase of a venerable, though modified, feudal 
society - a society in transition, if you like, from feudalism to capitalism.’ Beik 1985, 339.
194
explained the rise of a capitalist bourgeoisie as a result of the expansion of market- 
relations through commerce subsequent to an increasing division of labour on the basis 
of the development of the forces of production in towns. The driving class-antagonism 
was identified in the conflicting relations between an urban class of burghers (which 
transformed itself into a capitalist bourgeoisie), and a reactionary land-based feudal 
aristocracy. While classical political economy revolved around the core-idea of a 
‘natural’ expansion of free market relations, i.e. economic liberalism, the French liberal 
Restoration historiography embraced already the idea of history as class struggle 
whose terminus ad quem became political liberalism. Both traditions converged au 
fond  in a liberal materialist conception of historical progress, comprising a stagist 
theory of history.
The second interpretation, expounded in Marx’s mature critique of political 
economy, revolved around the conflicting reproduction of pre-capitalist class relations 
between direct producers and lords which gave rise to the crucial process of ‘primitive 
accumulation’, separating the direct producer from his means of subsistence while 
subjecting him to the power of capital. In this version, the movens of historical 
development was not so much sought in the resolution of class conflicts between 
aristocracy and bourgeoisie, but between exploiters and exploited, lords and peasants. 
It was the historically unique resolution of these class conflicts which first established 
capitalist relations of production in the English agrarian economy in the course of the 
16th and 17th Centuries.
With the canonisation of the first interpretation in the Communist Manifesto, 
much of the subsequent Marxist interpretation of absolutism, the origins of capitalism, 
and the French and English early modem revolutions remained prisoner of the 
‘bourgeois paradigm’ which posited that capitalism and bourgeoisie are indissoluble 
twin-concepts.393 The implication was that the rise of capitalism could be potentially 
studied in every early modem European country, which featured cities and commerce, 
as a development internal to these societies. The origins of this dilemma reach directly 
back to Marx and Engels’ subsumption of France and England under one type of 
development.
393 Wood 1991,2-11.
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‘Generally speaking, for the economic development of the bourgeoisie, England is here 
taken as the typical country; for its political development, France.’394
The abstraction of a universal schema, culled from the conflation of two rather unique 
national experiences - England and France and its subsequent re-imposition on quite 
distinct national developmental courses, led to distorted and a-historical 
interpretations.
However, Brenner and Comninel argued that the crucial conceptual 
dissociation of bourgeoisie and capitalism does not foreclose the possibility of a 
Marxist re-interpretation of the crisis of the Old Regime and the transition to 
capitalism, both in England and in France. With respect to early modem France, both 
based their analyses on the rise of royal centralised extra-economic coercion on the 
basis of a petty peasant property regime. More concretely, Comninel maintained that 
the dynamic of class-conflict underwriting the French Revolution did not derive from a 
growing antagonism between a progressive capitalist bourgeoisie and a reactionary 
feudal aristocracy, but from inter-ruling class struggle over access to politically- 
constituted sources of income provided by the absolutist state.395 With respect to 
England, Brenner demonstrated how the rise of capitalism resulted from class struggles 
in the country-side between direct producers and lords prior to the English Civil War, 
which was consequently itself re-interpreted as a struggle between a capitalist landed 
aristocracy and a reactionary class-alliance between Crown and privileged chartered 
merchants over the form of the English state.396 While both advanced powerful 
interpretations of the English and French Revolutions, both equally argued that both 
were the result of regionally radically divergent long-term trajectories of political and 
economic development. On this basis, the prevailing tendency to assimilate France and 
England - the former achieving political centralisation a bit earlier while lagging behind 
in economic development and the latter being economically precocious while having to 
catch up politically - as two variations of one path towards modernity was radically
394 Marx and Engels 1998, 37.
395 Comninel 1987, 179-207
396 Brenner 1993. Cf. also Wood’s clarification of the theoretical link between Brenner’s earlier 
work on the origins of English agrarian capitalism and his later work on the role of merchants 
in the English Civil War. Wood 1996.
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rejected.397 However, if early modem England and France constitute structurally non­
equivalent state/society complexes, and given that it was France which came to lay 
down the rules of the Westphalian Peace Treaties, what are the implications for the 
discipline of IR regarding the explanation and periodisation of the origins of the 
modem system of states?
The Argument: The Involutionary Class Logic of French Absolutism
While Political Marxists focused their research on the origins of capitalism in 
England and on the French Revolution, their analyses of the French early modem state 
remained limited to exploratory statements.398 Yet, if their general argument holds, 
then this chapter will have to show how the French absolutist state was as structurally 
impaired to transform itself into a modem state as it was impaired to unleash 
capitalism. Yet, we will argue that the absolutist state-economy nexus not only failed 
to ‘progress’ towards political and economic modernity, on the contrary, it imposed an 
economically involutionary and politically highly conflictual logic on French early 
modem society as a whole. The logic of French class relations resulted in the 
hypertrophical growth of an ever-more parasitic and bizarre state apparatus, weighing 
down on a non-capitalist agrarian economy, which led eventually, under the impact of 
growing international competition exerted most forcefully by capitalist Britain, to the 
complete break-down of absolutism. Against the background of such an economically 
subversive and politically and geopolitically conflict-ridden dynamic, we will be in a 
position to show in the next chapter (1) how long European international relations 
remained determined by distinctly non-modem, i.e. dynastic, forms of geopolitical 
inter-action, and (2) that the beginnings of modem international relations should not be 
traced back to France, but are connected with a new set of pressures exerted by a 
qualitatively new state/society complex first achieved in England on the basis of a 
capitalist agrarian economy.
397 For Brenner’s broader argument cf. Brenner 1985b. The incommensurability between 
France and England is also stressed by Parker 1996, Gerstenberger 1990, and Beik 1985, 4.
398 Outlines can be found in Brenner 1985b, 288-91 and Comninel 1987, 180-2 and 193-6. 
Systematic treatments can be found in Gerstenberger 1990, 261-463 and Mooers 1991, 45- 
102.
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This chapter employs four interrelated methodological premises which generate 
four substantive theses on the nature of the absolutist state and its long-term political 
and economic dynamic.
First, in order to resist the abstractions of state-centred institutional and those 
of society-centred revisionist approaches, it is necessary to uncover the content of the 
early modem state as a class relation: With the transformation from a rent-regime 
based on the politically-constituted relation between serfs and lords, to a tax-regime 
based on the politically-constituted relation between king and free peasants, the crown 
strove to monopolise the rights of taxation, administration, violence, and jurisdiction to 
the detriment of the old sword-carrying nobility. This process started during the crisis 
of the 14th Century and ended after the crisis of the 17th Century. It was not the ‘state’ 
which set out to centralise and monopolise the administrative apparatus so as to levy a 
‘centralised rent’, but the king in his personal capacity. The rights of extra-economic 
compulsion - and thus sovereignty - became personalised in the ruling dynasty.
Second, in order to understand the internal political constitution and economic 
dynamic of the early modem polity, it is necessary to understand the main driving force 
behind social conflict as (1) class conflict between direct producers and non-producers 
over the rate of extraction, and (2) as intra-ruling class conflict over access to the 
politically-constituted means of appropriation: No sooner had the king outmanoeuvred 
the old noblesse d ’epee (sword-carrying nobility), than he found himself forced, driven 
by personal debts, to alienate and re-privatise the state apparatus by dint of office 
venality to a new rentier class - the noblesse de robe (office nobility). This precarious 
intra-ruling class compromise - arising on the basis of prevailing non-capitalist agrarian 
social property relations - re-fragmented the rights of ‘extra-economic coercion’ by 
adding to the feudal arms-bearing nobility, receding in numbers and declining in 
political pre-eminence, the new ‘sitting army’ of patrimonial officers. The newly 
consolidated early modem ‘tax/office state’399 produced a new mode of de-centralising 
political and military power to private agents, the class of venal officers and military 
entrepreneurs. Public power lay therewith neither with ‘social forces’, nor with the 
‘state’, but with private agents who had appropriated a part of the extractive powers of
399 Brenner 1985, 263.
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the king. State-action was therefore neither a purely political affair, nor a purely 
societal affair, but an expression of re-privatised personal domination. Sovereignty was 
not only personalised, it was domestically compromised.
Third, the conceptual dissociation of bourgeoisie and capitalism and, especially, 
the focus on inter-ruling class conflict over politically-constituted sources of income on 
the basis of a petty peasant property regime demands a renewed assessment of the rise 
or non-rise of capitalism. Conflicts within the ruling classes over the politically- 
constituted rights of appropriation induced internally as well as externally coercive 
public policies of surplus extraction: Internally, the early modem tax/office state 
imposed punitive levels of taxation on a non-capitalist peasant economy, whose 
potential for economic growth was still governed by feudal eco-demographic long­
term fluctuations, experiencing definite limits to productivity-growth.400 On the side of 
the peasantry, over-taxation quenched any systematic tendencies of productive re­
investment. On the side of the ruling classes, tax returns, as a rule, were not re­
invested into the means of production, but were still directed to investment into the 
apparatus of violence which supported the privileged class-position of the ruling 
classes so as to maintain the existing property settlement on which these classes 
thrived. This social property settlement stalled productivity growth and explains the 
failure of French agriculture vis-a-vis the spectacular growth rates achieved in England 
during its ‘Agricultural Revolution’.401 This backward-looking and precarious class 
dynamic, throwing the ancien regime time and again into fiscal crises and 
bankruptcies, defined the limits to the potentials of absolutist political modernisation as 
it was inimical to the development of capitalism. The structure of class power and class 
interests promoted no slow or gradual expansion of capitalist relations of production, 
but reproduced the status quo of an ultimately self-exhausting non-capitalist economy. 
The argument entails thus a negative developmental assessment of the modernising 
potentials, both economically as well as politically, of French absolutist society. It is 
one of the fundamental conclusions of this chapter that absolutism should not be 
treated as a transitional form of society, merely preparing the ground for the coming of
400 Brenner 1985b, 299-319 and 1986, 27-32.
401 Opinion is now nearly unanimous that French early modem agriculture failed to achieve 
English levels of productivity. Cf. Wrigley 1985 and Crouzet 1990.
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the modem state or capitalism,402 but rather as a sui generis social formation, 
displaying determinate pre-modem and pre-capitalist domestic and international ‘laws 
of motion’. In evolutionary terms, absolutism was a dead end.
Fourth, in order to account for the long-term dynamic of French absolutism, it 
is not only necessary to theorise the early modem state as a contested and thus 
dynamic social relation, but also to embed its trajectory within the wider pressures of 
inter-state competition, whose social rationale was not determined by systemic power 
politics, but by the imperatives of geopolitical accumulation. Externally, the absolutist 
socio-economic logic of class relations induced an aggressive and predatory foreign 
policy in which territory as a natural monopoly and exclusive control over international 
trade-routes were the highest prizes. Over-militarisation and near permanent warfare 
was, in turn, a prime cause of the series of fiscal crises and state bankruptcies. If 
absolutist foreign policies were still governed by the logic of political accumulation, 
then the violent terminus which absolutism suffered by the end of the 18th Century 
must be explained by relating its inner dynamic - especially its comparative mismatch 
between agrarian economic productivity and war-making ambitions - to the wider 
geopolitical relations within the competitive European inter-state system, putting it at 
an comparative coercive disadvantage in the 18th Century over and against capitalist 
Britain. The exploration of the ‘archaic’ geopolitical face of the internal set-up of the 
French state of the Old Regime, which defined the character of European international 
relations up to the 19th Century, will be the subject of the subsequent chapter.
‘L'Etat, c fest moil’: Absolutist Sovereignty as Proprietary Kingship
The modern notion of sovereignty is predicated upon the idea of an abstract, 
impersonal state, having an objective existence independent from the subjective will of 
its executive. The modem state endures and persists independently of the life-spans of 
respective representatives, based on the very separation of public office from private 
property. It is through this separation that modem state territory retains its clearly
402 As argued from a Neo-Weberian perspective by Giddens 1985, 98 passim.
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demarcated bounded character irrespective of the private accumulation of landed 
property of bureaucrats or the political class as happened to be the case in pre-modem 
times.
However, the non-separation between public authority and private property did 
not only characterise European feudalism, but it persisted in most European states well 
into the 18th and 19th Centuries, if in altered form. In absolutist states, this fusion of the 
public and the private can best be studied in relation to the practice of monarchic 
dynasticism and the notion of proprietary kingship.403 Proprietary kingship meant 
personal property of the state by the king.
In which sense did the king own the state? Ownership could not refer to 
territory given that noble and non-noble absolute landed property was widespread and 
that the king’s private lands - the royal domain - were distinguished from non-royal 
lands. Furthermore, the notion of kingly ownership of territory as freely disposable 
private property was negated by Salic Law which prohibited the permanent alienation 
of state territory.404 Territory was to be used by the king as an usufructuary and had to 
be passed on as dynastic patrimony undiminished and unimpaired. Ownership of the 
state, therefore, meant the legitimate and sole right of command within the realm and, 
in particular, personal ownership of the rights of taxation, trade and legislation over 
subjects. ‘L'Etat, c ’est moiV implied therefore kingly ownership of public power and 
the notion of absolutist sovereignty rested on this practice.405
How does the notion of proprietary kingship relate to developments in social 
property relations within society? The feudal notion of kingship as overlordship rested 
on the de-centralisation of authentic rights of appropriation held by lords in their 
lordships, predicated on possession of the means of subsistence by direct producers. 
Land was held by lords on condition of fulfilling specified military and political 
obligations, establishing a relation of mutuality between king and vassal (auxilium et 
consilium). Conditional property implied politically-constituted rights of appropriation 
which tied the direct producer to various degrees of personal unfreedom - ranging 
from slavery, via serfdom to other forms of bonded labour. After the crisis of the 14th
403 Rowen 1961, 1969, and 1980.
404 Mousnier 1979, 649-53. Yet, Mousnier’s conclusion that the king was the ‘first servant of 
the state’ goes against all evidence. Mousnier 1979, 653.
405 In a very real sense, the state was the private property of the king - not only ‘Z, ’Etat, c ’est 
moi ’, but as Herbert Rowen put it: 'L Etat, c ’est d rnoiW Rowen 1961.
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Century, the peasantry succeeded in France to shake off serfdom while gaining de 
facto  property rights of their plots.406 The lords, in turn, while losing many political 
powers of seigneurial exploitation, retained property rights in their desmesnes and 
turned them into landed estates, leased out to or worked by peasants paying economic 
rents, engaging in share-cropping or receiving wages.407 Yet, while many peasants took 
advantage of these opportunities, they were not compelled to do so, since they were 
not driven off their customary lands. The conversion of lordships from political units of 
reproduction into economic estates undermined the conditionality of feudal property as 
laid down in the vassalic contract. Noble ‘dominium utile’ turned into absolute private 
property.408 Political property as rights of command over subjects turned into 
economic property over objects (land). The king’s overlordship (dominium directum), 
in which the rights of command were de-centralised amongst lords, turned into a 
proprietary conception of kingship, which allowed the concentration of the powers of 
command and taxation by the king, while exempting the nobility from taxation. The 
transformation from a rent-regime to a tax-regime brought the king into a position of 
monopolising public power in his personal capacity over a structure of land-use defined 
by petty peasant proprietorship.
‘Feudalism involved specifically the merger of economic and political powers; the rise of 
the sovereign territorial state did not destroy this merger in the case of the dynastic 
monarchies but confined it increasingly to the monarch.’409
Absolutist sovereignty expressed the fusion of the economic and the political in 
the person of the king. Yet, while the king came to monopolise the rights of 
sovereignty, he never actually monopolised the means for its exercise.
The Modernising Limits of Absolutism
406 Brenner 1985b.
407 Cf. Goubert 1986, 23-34.
408 Rowen 1981, 29. Whether noble land was henceforth allodial in status, or whether it was
Roman ‘quiritarian’ in nature, is a matter of debate.
409 Rowen 1961,88
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This disjunction between rights and means pervaded the structure of political 
power in absolutist France. The personalised character of absolutist sovereignty left its 
imprint on all absolutist institutions. The following section shows how their hybrid 
character, pointing towards modernity while betraying time and again backwardness, 
was determined by the organising principle of French early modem society: the nexus, 
mediated by extra-economic coercion, between petty peasant property, politically- 
constituted rights of exploitation and proprietary kingship. The following investigation 
of core-phenomena of the age of absolutism - ‘bureaucracy’, political institutions, 
legislation, taxation, army - revolves around three major questions: How ‘absolute’ 
was absolutist rule? How modem was absolutist rule? To what degree did absolutist 
practices of rule and economic organisation stimulate a transition to modem forms of 
political and geopolitical organisation?
Office Venality as Alienation o f State Property
Proprietary kingship expressed the persisting non-separation between public 
power and private property and therewith the persisting logic of extra-economic 
appropriation in the operation of the French state of the Old Regime. This argument is 
decisively strengthened if we flesh out the implications of the patrimonial and, 
therewith, non-bureaucratic character of office-holding in absolutist states. Office 
venality
‘marked an acceptance of property in public offices below the level of kingship at the 
very time that jurists were striving to persuade their readers that the kingship itself was 
not only the highest office in the state, but also that it was not patrimonial property’.410
The implication was that offices could only be sold on the assumption that public 
power was indeed in full property of the dynasty and therefore not held by divine 
grace, but by right of inheritance. As a rule, state officers accumulated privately-owned 
wealth in pre-revolutionary France by dint of access to privately-owned public offices. 
According to Max Weber, the monopolisation of the means of violence constitutes one
410 Rowen 1981,55.
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important criterion for the existence of a modem state. This implies, however, not only 
the de-militarisation of semi-autonomous feudal actors, but also a separation of officers 
from their means of administration and coercion. Steps were indeed taken with regard 
to the first presupposition of sovereignty in absolutist France; yet, the second step was 
never taken. Not only did provinces, cities and other corporate institutions - as we will 
show in the next section - retain powerful rights, even those royal agents operating 
within royal institutions usually owned their offices as private property. The 
patrimonial nature of office-holding should however not be dissociated from the 
financial and fiscal limits of absolutism, for it was precisely the war-induced chronic 
deficits of the French state which forced the king to engage in the wide-spread practice 
of office sales - the alienation of state-property.
Against the evidence of Max Weber’s writings,411 large parts of the traditional 
literature on absolutism over-emphasised the continuity between the absolutist state 
and the post-absolutist rationalised state by projecting Weberian notions of a modem 
salaried bureaucracy, which was separated from its means of administration, back into 
the radically differently structured state of the Old Regime.412 Consequently, by falsely 
applying Weber’s ideal type of a rational bureaucracy as the defining criterion of a 
modem state, pre-revolutionary France, and in Spruyt’s case: 14th Century France, is 
transformed into a modem state.
This interpretation cannot easily be reconciled with the evidence. Even though 
it was tme that the French estates played only a minor role in comparison to other 
European countries, and that the process towards administrative growth was very real, 
the qualitative step towards a modem bureaucracy was never consummated, precisely 
because the sale of offices implied a re-patrimonialisation - in some cases even a re- 
feudalisation - of state power. Private shares in public power pervaded all spheres of 
political society. Even the highest posts in government were exploited for the 
accumulation of private riches. Both, Richelieu and Mazarin, the acclaimed
411 ‘Appropriation by virtue of leasing or sale of offices or the pledge of income from office are 
phenomena foreign to the pure type of bureaucracy.’ Weber 1968, 222. Cf. also Weber 1968, 
1038-9.
412 Spruyt asserts that by the late Middle Ages, ‘the king benefited by having a professional and 
remunerated bureaucracy’. Spruyt 1994, 102. For contrary views cf. Hinrichs 1989, 82 and 
Parker 1996, 176.
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masterminds behind absolutist state-making did not pursue a fictitious policy of raison 
d'Etat, but systematically built up their private empires within the state.
‘Although the idea of reason of state had begun to circulate in political pamphlets, 
leading political figures still acted primarily on the basis of a careful calculation of their 
personal interests. Both Richelieu and Mazarin exploited their own positions 
shamelessly. In the nine years after the Fronde Mazarin amassed one of the greatest 
fortunes in the history of the old regime, comprising abbeys, properties, duchies, lands in 
Alsace granted by the king, diamonds, claims on the throne, and cash - including large 
deposits near the borders of France in case he should ever have to flee again. He had 
also safeguarded his position among the magnates by marrying his nieces into important 
families.’413
The move towards selling offices was one strategy of income provision pursued 
by a monarchy under financial duress.
‘Between 1600 and 1654 some 648 million livres were received by the bureau des 
parties casuelles, the special treasury set up to administer revenues from office-holding. 
This constituted over 28 per cent of ordinary revenue of the crown for the same period.
At the peak of the fiscal exploitation of office-holders (which seems to have occurred in 
the 1620s and 1630s), revenues from this source represented over half the ordinary 
revenue of the crown.’414
The history of French offices itself reflected the nexus between ever-increasing 
kingly demand for income and increasing liberty and security granted to incumbents. 
Roughly speaking, we find the acceptance of perpetuity under Louis XI, of venality in 
the period between Louis XII and Francis I, and heredity under Henry IV.415 Waves of 
office-proliferation and increasing security of office tenure went hand in hand with 
foreign wars, especially during the period of the Italian Wars and the Thirty Years’ 
War. According to Le Roy Ladurie, the overall number of office-holders in the 
kingdom rose between 1515 and 1665 from 4,041 to 46,047.416 There was a direct 
correlation between office-proliferation and the intensification o f  warfare, and an 
inverse relation between the ruler’s pursuit of international geopolitical accumulation
413 Kaiser 1990, 82. Cf. also Bergin’s study on the connection between Richelieu’s tenure of 
political office and his accumulation of private and family wealth. Bergin 1985.
414 Bonney 1991,342.
415 ‘Henry IV not only accepted - and emphasized - his own proprietorship in the state; he also 
gave venal office, which institutionalized government offices as private property, full legality in 
the French state.’ Rowen 1980, 54-5.
416 Le Roy Ladurie 1994, 17.
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and the domestic hollowing out of state power.417 Decisively, these sales did not 
merely alienate parts of state property, they engendered a whole series of practices 
beyond kingly control - practices which are incompatible with any notion of a modem 
bureaucracy, of modem public finance, and modem sovereignty.
The price for an office was estimated on the basis of its value which was 
determined by the personal profits accming to the incumbent from its exercise. If an 
office was deemed to be particularly lucrative and prestigious, we find competing 
bidders driving up its value. In other words, the office turned into a commodity. 
Moreover, offices did not only confer title, prestige and political influence, they were 
treated as interest-bearing capital investments on the side of the buyer. To the king, 
they represented a form of credit with little or nil interests, since interests were covered 
by the income derived from the office.418 Although some office-holders did receive 
salaries, these gages were regarded as returns on investment and remained of minor 
importance in relation to the fees flowing from office.419 However, since this form of 
capital-investment was not ploughed back productively into the economy, but was 
invested in the means of violence so as to continue the logic of political accumulation 
qua office and geo-political accumulation qua war, these credit-structures have 
precious little to do with modem capitalism.420 ‘Frenchmen preferred to buy offices
417 ‘It was precisely in 1635, the year of France’s entry into the war against Spain, that the sale 
of offices reached its highest point with a massive flooding of the market with every sort of 
financial and judicial office from presidents of parlements to sergeants and clerks in the lesser 
jurisdictions.’ Parker 1996, 158.
4.8 Hoffinan 1994, 230-5.
4.9 Schwarz 1983, 178.
420 Reinhard’s account is therefore not convincing. He first argues that ‘it is today generally 
acknowledged that office venality was inimical to economic growth since it implied the 
withdrawal of capital from the economy’, but then asserts - by citing Marx - that venality and 
state debts were one of the most decisive levers behind “primitive accumulation” (in Marx’s 
sense), ‘since the existence of public debts strengthens a very uneven distribution of wealth, 
because only rich people can gain from these investments and profit opportunities [my 
translation, B.T.]. Reinhard 1975, 316. The existence of finance capitalism as well as 
commercial capitalism does not necessarily presuppose nor does it engender the existence of 
full-blown capitalism. Rather, they thrive on the persistence of political privilege. Parker writes 
that ‘there are those who argue that the French state, simply by virtue of the scale of the 
financial transactions which it stimulated, was ipso facto capitalist. This view is unconvincing 
not only because of the way state fiscalism drained the economy of resources and imposed a 
punitive level of taxation on the labouring population but also because the money raised was 
rarely transformed into productive capital.’ Parker 1996, 203. ‘The ‘insufficiency of theories 
which seek to explain the rise of Capitalism by the effects of monetary exchanges or the 
influence of government finance (debts, armament orders, etc.) consists in the fact that they
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rather than to invest in commercial or industrial activities.’421 These investments 
valorised rentier capital but did not turn it thereby into entrepreneurial capital. Rather, 
these rentier credit structures provided a new financial link which combined the 
persisting logic of the internal exploitation of the peasantry qua office-backed political 
power with the logic of external appropriation qua military-backed political power.
Given the commodified nature of offices, sales were usually a matter between 
seller and purchaser alone - a transaction which precluded a conscious kingly policy of 
recruitment, though it formally required the king’s dispensation. Offices were traded 
amongst ‘private’ bidders - the resignatio in favorem tertii 422 Thus, a veritable market 
in offices sprang into existence. If the king wanted to remove an incumbent, he had to 
be reimbursed. A range of dysfunctional practices followed: Since most offices had 
become hereditary by 1604 through the introduction of the paulette (an annual tax on 
venal offices) and since they were often auctioned to the highest bidder, then how was 
professional competence to be secured? Since the office was purchased as a means of 
personal enrichment, how should mal-administration, fraud, and corruption be 
controlled? Since the office was the holder’s private property, who should stop him 
from creating and selling new sub-offices on his own behest? Furthermore, given that 
the office was a commodity, it was handled like an economic asset. It could be 
pawned, sublet, divided upon inheritance, and finance ministers even required finance 
officers to make loans to the state to cover budgetary deficits - loans which were to be 
guaranteed on office-revenues. Over time, a credit structure developed which was 
guaranteed by largely fictitious future incomes and which turned the crown into a 
debtor of its own creation - the (private-patrimonial) officer class.
The only layer of officers which are often (but falsely) taken to correspond to 
Weberian criteria of non-patrimonial bureaucrats, the intendants, did not alter the 
fundamental logic of the pre-modem French bureaucracy. First of all, these revocable 
royal commissioners, equipped with extraordinary powers to supervise the collection 
of taxes and the administration of justice in the provinces, were created by Richelieu 
and Mazarin in response to the fiscal pressures exerted by the Thirty Years’ War and
emphasize only sources of enrichment and provide no explanation of how from a society of 
small owner-producers a vast proletarian army was bom.’ Dobb 1946, 186.
421 Bonney 1991, 344.
422 Reinhard 1975; Schwarz 1983, 177.
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its aftermath, and testify thus to the persisting financial logic of office-proliferation in 
17th Century France. Their imposition was immediately seen by the bulk of patrimonial 
officers as a direct attack on their prerogatives and thus provoked open resistance 
during the Fronde. Secondly, the intendants were themselves drawn from the higher 
magistracy and did not lose their venal offices while sent on commission. Therewith, 
through the cumulation of offices and the sharing of the same social background, their 
interests did not set them fundamentally apart from venal officers so as to form a 
separate officer class in the hands of the king.423 Thirdly, as royal commissioners they 
did in no way turn into independent state bureaucrats (with lifelong tenure), but 
formed simply a new officer class which, precisely because it did not own its offices, 
was freely dismissable by the king.424
In other words, office venality and office trading were not mere epiphenomena 
which can be dismissed as exceptional and unfortunate forms of corruption or as the 
anachronistic legacy of the feudal past. Rather, they were recognised, institutionalised, 
and legalised forms of early modem government under an agrarian property-regime of 
petty peasant-proprietors, which gave the French administrative system its peculiarly 
inert, ‘irrational’, and crisis-ridden character. A ‘useless’ and inefficient civil service 
did not stand in the way of a modernising state, but rather expressed the 
accommodation of a nobility which had lost its direct powers of political domination 
over the peasantry. No sooner had the king gained the claim to a monopoly in the 
means of administration and violence, due to the loss by erstwhile lords of their feudal 
political powers of extraction in the face of the end of serfdom, than he was forced to 
share this monopoly again with private ‘dilettante’ office-holders - not by dint of 
bureaucratic delegation, but by dint of a real alienation of state power to private 
persons.
423 ‘The monarchy may have undermined the security of the office-holders, but it never 
seriously envisaged the wholesale reformation of the system of venality. Indeed, (...) the 
monarchy had throughout the centuries continuously superimposed one administrative layer 
upon another without much consideration for the shape of the structure as a whole. The 
shading of the boundary lines between the commissaires and the actual owners of judicial and 
financial office makes it easier to understand the co-existence of the two after the Fronde, and 
the eventual assimilation of the intendancies with the general system.’ Salmon 1987, 202. Cf. 
also Beik 1985, 14-15; Mettam 1988, 23; Parker 1996, 176.
424 Hinrichs 1989,91.
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‘This was a development of the greatest importance, because it put brakes on the 
creation of royal absolutism (...). The powers that the crown had gained in thinning out 
the feudal system beneath it, retaining for itself the sole status of possessor of full 
power, was now given away again, not to vassals but to office-holders.’425
Thus,
‘a full realization of the implications of venality has had the effect of “demodemizing” 
seventeenth-century government. Venality tied absolutism to its feudal past by 
consecrating a new form of private ownership of public authority which enabled rich and 
influential subjects - noble or bourgeois - to share in the profits and prestige of the state.
It was a new expression of the king’s inability to control his society without conciliating 
his most powerful subjects.’426
The proprietary character of office-holding cannot be stressed enough in its 
implications for the non-modernity of the state of the Old Regime, for it constituted 
precisely the opposite of Max Weber’s ideal-typical formulation of a modem 
bureaucracy.427 There was a structural nexus - a relation of mutual dependence - 
between the absolutist ruler and the corps of officers which did not evolve in the 
direction of a truly modem state, but which reproduced and entrenched the existing 
arrangements until it led the state to systemic break-down.
Political Institutions in Early Modem France: Competing Centers o f Power
The de-mystification of absolutist ‘bureaucracy’ involves a broader clarification 
of the institutional set-up of the French polity. For only if all political institutions of the 
realm derived their legitimacy from royal fiat, and only if all institutions carried the 
royal will into the regions, does it make sense to speak of internal sovereignty. 
However, early modem French political institutions expressed a rather different spirit. 
They functioned not so much as faithful relays of kingly policies, than as bodies 
mediating between the interests of the crown and the politically-constituted interests of 
diverse, yet powerful, regional elites. If we unravel the structure of political power in 
early modem France, we will have to distinguish between a welter of independent
425 Rowen 1980, 56-7.
426 Beik 1985, 13.
427 Henshall 1992, 15.
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corporate bodies, co-existing side by side and often fusing with public monarchical 
institutions. By 1532, after the incorporation of Brittany as the last great principality 
into the realm, the status of the principality as a feudal fief, whose membership to the 
French polity was conditional upon adherence to the classical feudal contract between 
vassal and overlord, was dead. Thereafter all former principalities were part of the 
French kingdom not in their status as fiefs, but in their status as province headed by a 
kingly governor, who nevertheless usually happened to be the greatest provincial 
landowner. As such, the aristocratic governor represented the king in the province 
(without receiving compensation in return) and mediated between the interests of the 
king and those of regional elites, including himself.
Kingly and independent corporate political institutions competed for the rights 
o f political domination. On the one hand, truly royal institutions, owing their very 
existence to the crown, were the highest court - the Parlement de Paris - and the 
Royal Council. Yet, even the higher magistrates staffing these institutions - the higher 
noblesse de robe - came to own their offices. On the other hand, we find independent 
provincial corporate institutions which did not owe their existence to kingly fiat: 
Provincial estates (in the pays d'etat), town councils, noble and clerical assemblies, 
village assemblies and regional parlements. However, such a clear-cut distinction is 
only feasible if we take their original independence as the defining criterion. In terms of 
their operation, corporate institutions were the target of royal penetration by placing 
royal agents within these institutions. But since royal agents were often drawn from the 
local nobility, the clergy and the town patriciates, and since their offices were 
proprietary, the corporate bodies turned into hybrid institutions which, instead of 
imposing a hierarchical relation of bureaucratic subordination, only mediated the 
dialogue between crown and province. Furthermore, although it is true that the offices 
run by the nobility of service offered lucrative channels of non-noble social upward 
mobility for ‘new men’, they cannot be regarded purely as a manipulative device in the 
hands of the king over and against the aristocracy, since intermarriage between robe 
and sword was a common feature, and sword status still the higher social goal.
Most importantly, although these ‘new men’ were often drawn from 
prosperous families which had made their fortunes in commerce, industry, or finance - 
which had enabled them to purchase an office in the first place -, this was not a 
bourgeoisie which slowly but surely undermined the class-position of the sword
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nobility, but a privileged group of parvenues which remained financially dependent, be 
it in their offices or in their professions, on the favours of the king.428
In sum, the king could not rule without the privileged orders, for he needed 
their support in ruling the country, rooting the king in a net of patrimonial alliances. 
The privileged orders, in turn, realised that their survival and privileged class position, 
both in terms of buttressing their local hold over the peasantry as well as in terms of 
their collective defence over and against rival kingdoms, was dependent upon the 
profits bound up with royal office and upon proprietary security provided by royal 
military protection. The class dynamics of the absolutist state did not follow the logic 
of a crown pushing through its ‘historical task’ of modem state-making assisted by the 
legal expertise and financial resources of a conniving bourgeoisie to the detriment of a 
retrograde feudal nobility; rather, the town-patriciate and the old nobility fused in a 
nobility of service, which developed in tandem with the crown, both being inextricably 
linked to each other. Thus, in spite of an objective contradiction between crown and 
regional ruling classes over the rights of domination and exploitation, the relations 
between them did not amount to a zero-sum game,429 nor to an amicable sharing of 
political power based on consent and partnership.430 Rather, the scope and intensity of 
intra-ruling class conflict was circumscribed by the confines set by the double threats of 
internal peasant rebellions as well as geostrategic pressures. These forces kept French 
state-building, that is, inter-ruling class co-operation, on track.
Legibus solutus?
‘By the end of the Thirty Years’ War, sovereignty as supreme power over a certain 
territory was a political fact, signifying the victory of the territorial princes over the 
universal authority of emperor and pope, on the one hand, and over the particularistic 
aspirations of the feudal barons, on the other. The inhabitant of France found that 
nobody but the royal power could give him orders and enforce them. This experience of
428 ‘The venal office-holder, whether of the noblesse de robe or of humbler rank, would have 
felt that he had little in common with the merchant or the master craftsman, even though the 
money with which his family had purchased its first office, perhaps at a date long in the past, 
might well have come from the profits of trade or industry. Now, as an officier, he carefully 
cultivated all the habits of the old landed nobility, in whose circles he wished to be accepted.’ 
Mettam 1988, 22.
429 This is the older view: estate-building and state-building were mutually exclusive.
430 This is Henshall’s over-optimistic view. Henshall 1992 and 1996.
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the individual French citizen was duplicated by the experience of the king of England or 
the king of Spain; that is to say, the supreme authority of the French king within French 
territory precluded them from exerting any authority of their own within that territory 
save by leave of the French king himself or by defeating him in war. But if the king of 
England and the king of Spain had no power in France, they had exclusive power in their 
own territories. These political facts, present in the experience of contemporaries, could 
not be explained by the medieval theory of the state. The doctrine of sovereignty elevated 
these political facts into a legal theory and thus gave them both moral approbation and 
the appearance of legal necessity. The monarch was now supreme within his territory not 
only as a matter of political fact but also as a matter of law. He was the sole source of 
man-made law - that is, of all positive law - but he was not himself subject to it. He was 
above the law, legibus solutes.'431
How does Morgenthau’s conventional benchmark of absolutism - legislative 
sovereignty - fare when confronted with the wide-spread practice of venal officialdom 
and regionally autonomous political institutions? In spite of real developments towards 
‘legislative sovereignty’ through the expansion and refinement of royal law, the alleged 
transition in the legal role of the king from a personal dispenser of justice, based on 
feudo-theological conceptions of divine kingship, to a sovereign law-maker, was 
arrested by strong countervailing forces.432 The desire for legal uniformity, promoted 
with recourse to Roman law and the Justinian conception of undivided sovereignty 
flowing from one supreme source, did not so much supplant the existing operating 
principle that autonomous rights of justice emanated from possession of land and 
office, as to supplement customary practices of justice. 433 Not only did autonomous 
seigneurial courts persist (even though they tended to become integrated into an 
appellate system), and with them the principle that litigants ought to appear before 
their natural judges, the higher courts in the legal system did not draw their legitimacy 
from royal delegation of jurisdictional powers, but from a real devolution of authority 
to which the higher magistrates were entitled not by virtue of their function, but by 
virtue of their status 434
The patrimonial character of legal office-holding (and of office-holding in 
general), with its proprietary, hereditary and therewith irrevocable accoutrements,
431 Morgenthau 1985, 328-9. Note Morgenthau’s use of the term citizen - anachronistic before 
the French Revolution of 1789. Note also his collapsing of French and English early modem 
sovereignty into one concept.
432 For a contrary view cf. Spruyt 1994, 106-7.
433 Parker 1989.
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turned the legal system into an incongruous network of patronage and clientelism 
beyond royal control. It developed its own self-reproductive logic. The idea that legal 
uniformity imposed by the king implied the formal equality of what would then be 
equal citizens before the law, ran time and again against the traditional hierarchical 
structure of society, based on the possession of land, title, and privilege. Precisely 
because the kingdom was yoked together over several centuries by force as well as 
concessions, elites in the provinces enjoyed various liberties, tax exemptions, and 
powers of self-government. The king, in spite of all propaganda for legibus solutus, 
was thereby not iure soluti, provided we understand by ius the ensemble of customary 
understandings of primeval rights and privileges enjoyed by the members of the ruling 
class in a hierarchical society, which, by necessity, forced the king to make legislative 
concessions.435 For example, many local lords retained independent rights of justice 
over and against their peasants; law courts (the parlements) could obstruct royal 
‘legislative sovereignty’ by refusing to register royal edicts depriving them therewith of 
legality; the provincial estates in the pays d ’etats (the provinces which used to be 
powerful principalities) retained the right to vote on taxes; important cities held up 
their granted charters of liberty over and against royal legislative incursions.436
‘Rights and privileges embodied a discourse of ancient customs, contracts and charters:
their sanction was the past.’437
The royal pretension to absoluteness did not hereby absolve him from acting within the 
inherited boundaries of what was ‘right’.
Even the political discourse on absolutism, classically expressed in Jean Bodin’s 
Six Livres sur la Republique, was subjected to a de-absolutisation of the notion of 
indivisible sovereignty by retrieving the ‘framework of natural and divine law within 
which a just monarch is morally obliged to operate’.438 This is not simply a question of 
dismissing the discourse of raison d'Etat as a mere ideological weapon, forged and
434 ‘The struggle of the jurists to reconcile the idea that all justice derived from the king with a 
situation in which it still seemed firmly attached to the possession of office and land produced 
rather conflicting views and a considerable lack of clarity.’ Parker 1989, 50.
435 Brunner 1980, 163.
436 Hoffinan 1994, 226-9.
437 Henshall 1996, 30.
438 Parker 1981,253.
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wielded by a host of thankful pro-royal publicists and pamphleteers enlisted by the 
monarchical faction itself, for even the most ultra-royal political literature did not dare 
to challenge the fundamentals of absolutist society: property rights.
‘Invasion of property rights without consent was condemned even by allegedly 
“absolutist” thinkers like Bodin: force was unlawful.’439
There was a clear conceptual line in contemporary political consciousness between 
absolutism and despotism, between monarchie absolue and monarchie arbitraire.440 
Given the tradited structure of vested interests, royal positive law co-existed with 
customaiy, feudal and divine law. Legal sovereignty remained divided.
Growing Costs o f Warfare, the King's Debts, and Bankruptcies
The relation of co-dependence between the king and ‘his’ patrimonial and 
parasitic corps of officers did not only stall the passage towards the formation of a 
modem state, it threw state finances time and again into crises. The tendency towards 
financial state break-down had its roots in the dilemma opening up between the limited 
productive base of a pre-capitalist agrarian economy and the ever-growing 
unproductive costs of warfare imposed by the logic of geopolitical accumulation 
governing the incessant rivalries of the absolutist system of states.
The move towards ‘privatising’ the rights of appropriation and domination 
through tax-farming and the patrimonial dispensation of justice was one strategy of 
public income provision in order to fill the coffers for warfare. Warfare, in turn, was 
itself a common dynastic strategy of amassing territories and riches as well as the 
customary means of settling inter-dynastic property conflicts. Yet, these revenues did 
not nearly cover escalating war expenditures.
‘It was under Francis I and his successors that the expenditure of the French monarchy 
began to increase significantly. But the hegemonic policies of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries produced an expenditure explosion, the first peak beginning with the
439 Henshall 1996, 30. Cf. also Anderson 1974b, 50; Vierhaus 1985, 56-57; Wood 1991, 24-27 
and chapter 3.
440 Mettam 1988, 36.
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Thirty Years’ War and direct French intervention during the 1630s and 1640s. After a 
brief cessation of war with the advent of Colbert, expenditure rose again with the Dutch 
War and that of the League of Augsburg, reaching a second peak with the War of the 
Spanish Succession, and a third with the Seven Years’ War.’441
The arrival of the permanent war state intensified the super-exploitation of the 
peasantry. ‘In 1610, the fiscal agents of the State collected 17 million livres from the 
taille. By 1644, the exactions of this tax had trebled to 44 million livres. Total taxation 
actually quadrupled in the decade after 1630.’442 Next to the sale of offices and rising 
taxation, borrowing came to be the preferred royal instrument of revenue raising. 
However, since the king was an unreliable debtor, interest rates spiralled, causing ever 
more desperate and grotesque measures of royal income provision. Overall,
‘French revenues grew consistently, gross revenue amounting to 20.5 million in 1600 
and reaching nearly 32.8 million livres in 1608 and 42.8 million in 1621. Moreover, 
with the declaration of war against Spain in 1635, French revenues continued to expand, 
averaging some 115 million livres a year, although much of this came from borrowing at 
very high rates of interest.’443
What we see, therefore, is a self-perpetuating upward spiral of rising revenues to 
finance ever more costly wars - which were, of course, hoped to generate through 
plunder, the acquisition of territories, or the payment of indemnities or satisfactions 
enough resources to pay back creditors - and an ever-growing diversion of peasant- 
produced wealth into non-productive military consumption.
The net effect was that the resulting public credit-structure turned the king into 
the prisoner of ‘his’ state officers and financiers, which made the tax and the credit 
system virtually immune to domestic non-violent reform. This credit-structure did not 
develop towards a modem system of central banking, for credits were not administered 
and guaranteed by a national bank, but by a welter of private agents, the financiers.444 
Confidence in this credit system was defined by the crown’s capacity to serve its debts. 
That is, finance remained tied to the person of the king. In striking contrast to France, 
the English revolution in public finance had led by the end of the 17th Century to the 
setting up of the Bank of England. It was essential for raising loans, sustaining
441 Komer 1995a, 417-9.
442 Anderson 1974b, 98. Figures vary, but the trend is unequivocal. Cf. Kaiser 1990, 74.
443 Bonney 1991, 352-3.
^M ettam 1988, 106-17.
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governmental credits, and providing long-term credit-security beyond the individual 
life-spans of monarchs. Government loans were based on parliamentary guarantees,445 
and Parliament could raise money more effectively by taxing the propertied classes 
which sat themselves in Parliament. In France, in contrast, state debts were, so the title 
of Bonney’s study, the king’s debts.446 As such, they were not transferred from king to 
king, but risked forfeiture on the death of the original debtor in the absence of an 
abstract, impersonal state which could shoulder the debt burden.
The implication was that the entire credit structure stood and fell with the 
person of the king. The fiscal crises and the subsequent bankruptcies of 1598, 1648, 
and 1661 - roughly marking respectively the ends of the Wars of Religion, the Thirty 
Years’ War, and the war with Spain - were thus not those of the French state, but of 
the French monarch. What is more, the king’s debts were political debts in the sense 
that loans were often enforced or payments simply defaulted, so that borrowing to the 
king contained a high degree of credit risk.447 It was the king, who systematically 
turned his newly acquired prerogatives of sovereignty into an instrument of fund­
raising by selling not only offices, but also other privileges - like noble titles, 
professional qualifications, monopoly charters on trade and commerce etc. - through 
which the extra-economic powers of accumulation were distributed and therewith de­
centralised.448 One difference with the medieval world lay in the fact that it was 
henceforth one ruler who decentralised his powers, not a plurality of de-centralised 
autonomous lords, who while presiding over their respective networks of dependants, 
tried to centralise their fragmented powers through the system of vassalage.
The state-sponsored efforts towards financial and fiscal reform, aiming 
generally at establishing greater geographical uniformity and centralisation, at replacing 
proprietary office-holders with revocable royal commissioners, and at diversifying the 
instruments of taxation while increasing tax rates, ran time and again against the vested 
interests of patrimonial officers. Let us spell out the nexus between war, kingly debts, 
internal revolts and institutional reforms. After each war-ending, war debts triggered 
insolvencies and fiscal crises, translating into inter-ruling class conflicts with important
445 M.S.Anderson 1988, 154.
446 Bonney 1981.
447 Hoffman 1994, 232-3; Parker 1996, 197.
448 Finely shown by Bien in his case study of the proliferation of the secretaires du roi. Bien 
1978.
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institutional consequences.449 Royal counter-offensives to cut through the system of 
privilege and corruption faced each time stiff opposition. The end of the Wars of 
Religion brought the paulette, which granted office-holders heredity in return for an 
annual payment, so as to keep noble influence out of government business. The 
financial crisis of 1638, after France’s entry into the Thirty Years’ War, brought the 
intendants, created to supervise more effective tax-collection. The end of the Thirty 
Years’ War brought the Fronde (1648-53), pitching defrauded owners of government 
offices and holders of government rentes against the king, while the magnates and 
princes of the blood led foreign armies into the land and peasant tax rebellions struck 
the country.450 On return from exile, Mazarin restored the intendants system, re­
imposed heavy taxation and renewed the relations with the financiers. Overall, these 
institutional innovations had a piece-meal character but could not dislodge the 
fundamental contradictory logic of king-patrimonial officers relations.
‘There were (...) numerous financial office-holders established in the local bureaux des 
finances and elections. Their offices could not be abolished, and the owners reimbursed, 
because this would be too heavy a burden on the king’s already badly strained finances.
The offices could not be abolished without compensation, because this would be 
tantamount to an attack on private property. On the other hand, the existence of a large 
number of semi-autonomous accountants and financial office-holders ruled out an 
efficient system of direct administration {regie) since the crown had no direct control 
over their activities. If the king wanted a new and unpopular tax to be levied, it was by 
no means certain that his accountants or financial office-holders, men with property 
interests in the locality, would be co-operative.’451
The implication was that the counter-productive dynamic of the tax/office state 
fixed a structure of ruling class power that was inherently impaired to reform itself. 
Arguably, royal attempts to generate resources for war did not broaden the scope of 
central government (although institutions multiplied), but rather reduced royal 
autonomy by signing away more and more powers of government to private agents. 
Given this structural blockage, the crown could only recover or generate additional 
income by punitive taxation of the peasantry, or by ever-renewed geopolitical 
accumulation abroad, be it in the form of war, marriage, or mercantilist foreign trade. 
If the (il)logic of the absolutist war-state nexus was madness, it still had method.
449 Hoffinan 1994, 242-8; Mettam 1988, 102-5.
450 Kaiser 1990, 75-81.
451 Bonney 1981, 16-17.
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The Structure o f the Military Constitution o f the Old Regime
In the modern state, the monopolisation of military might is institutionalised in 
a public army (and navy). Soldiers are permanently garrisoned, disciplined, uniformed, 
trained, hierarchised and under public pay. The means of violence are not privately 
owned by the executioners of violence. Soldiers are not decommissioned and disarmed 
after conflicts, but return to their garrisons during peace-time. Soldiery is a full-time 
profession. In principle, the military apparatus functions according to the Weberian 
precepts of a modem bureaucracy.
What are the major traits of the military constitution in absolutist states? Spruyt 
assures us that ‘the standing army, since the late fifteenth century, thus became an 
instrument of the state rather than an instrument for the defence of the king’s private 
property.’452 Against Spruyt, this section argues that in spite of the transition from a 
feudal to an absolutist military regime, none of the traits of a modem mode of military 
organisation are visible in the states of the Old Regime.
The social relations of warfare in the European Middle Ages were based on the 
conditionality of property in land under direct peasant possession of the means of 
subsistence. Noble tenure of land imposed the obligation of military service to the land- 
granting overlord for a stipulated time of the year as laid down in the inter-vassalic 
contract. Peasant possession of the means of subsistence (on their tenures and in the 
commons) necessitated forms of extra-economic labour-control, in this case serfdom. 
Extra-economic labour control for the extraction of rents - be they in kind, labour, or 
money - translated into direct political coercion in the lordship. Lords bore arms. The 
ensuing de-centralisation of the means of violence amongst politically-appropriating 
lords determined the form of the medieval state (the state of associated persons) as 
well as its military constitution in form of the de-centralised knightly army. The 
commutation of peasant dues from rents in labour and in kind to rents in money from 
the 12th Century onwards, tended to alter the military obligations between lord and
452 Spruyt 1994, 165.
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king, based on military services in labour and in kind, to military payments to the king. 
Wealthy nobles could ‘buy off their military duties, allowing the latter in turn to pay 
mercenaries. However, the existence of mercenary knights supplementing the old 
feudal levy did not undermine the basic social logic of feudal military organisation.453 
They merely increased the dependence of the king on noble military contributions 
based on feudal law.
The emancipation of the king from inter-noble arrangements only came about 
with a fundamental change in agrarian social property relations. With the emancipation 
of the peasantry from serfdom - a conflictual process which occurred in France 
between the 13th and the 15th Centuries - the property nexus between serfs and lords 
was replaced by a new property nexus between land-owning peasants and the state. 
The importance of rents collected by lords receded in favour of taxes collected by the 
king through patrimonial officers. The lordly loss of direct political powers of coercion 
and extraction over the direct producer was a fundamental presupposition for changes 
in the military constitution of the French state. This loss of autonomous military 
powers of the former land-holding nobility destroyed their independent military raison 
d'etre. As extra-economic coercion in the form of the new tax-regime ‘travelled 
upwards’ to the apex of the feudal hierarchy, the king, so it was here that military 
power was re-organised on a more centralised basis. The re-structuration of the social 
relations of exploitation induced a re-structuration of the social relations of military 
organisation. As the old sword-carrying noblesse de epee blended with the newly 
created noblesse de robe, so many nobles took up office in the standing army of the 
king.454
Thus, in France, at the latest after the Ludovician military reforms of 1661, the 
king disposed of a permanent army, a special military budget, an institutionalised 
system of recruitment, a military hierarchy of regiments and ranks, a corps of officers 
whose competencies were defined and whose promotions were regulated, royal 
academies for the training of cadets, a civil administration for the provision of the 
army, and special commissioned civil inspectors {intendants d'armee, comissaires des
Wohlfeil 1988, 119.
454 This process was specific to France, presenting specific outcomes of social struggles 
between the various classes and factions of French society, and can thus not easily transposed 
to other contemporary European societies.
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guerres, and controlleurs des guerres) for its control. The king was both, the chief of 
the army and the chief commander.
However, the transition in France, accelerated by four crises (the Hundred 
Years’ War, the Religious Wars, the Thirty Years’ War and the Fronde), from a 
knightly feudal army to a royal standing army poses three questions with reference to 
the absolutist claim of monopolising the means of violence. First, who owned the army 
- the state or the king? Second, how far did this proprietary character of the army go in 
its internal structure? Third, what are the implications of the wide-spread use of 
mercenaries and military entrepreneurs during the early modem period?
First of all and most decisively, it was not the state which sought to monopolise 
the means of violence, but the king. Officers did not swear allegiance to an abstract 
state on entering the army, but to the person of the king. The proprietary conception of 
kingship did in fact not allow the crucial separation of the means of violence from the 
‘office’ of kingship; it merely continued the essential fusion of the means of violence 
and personal domination, if now in the more centralised form of the royal army.
‘The army was, as it were, a foreign body in the state. It was an instrument of the 
monarch, not an institution of the country. It was created as a tool of power politics in 
the foreign sphere, but at the same time it served to maintain and extend the sovereign’s 
power at home.’455
The army, strictly speaking, was the personal property of the king, at his 
disposal, under his command, and financed by him.456 The implication was that as 
‘states’ were personalised (‘L ’Etat, c ’est moiV), so were wars {‘La guerre, c ’est 
mo/!’).457 Yet, royal unlimited control and absolute discretion over the army remained 
a fiction. Max Weber commented that
‘there is a decisive economic condition for the degree to which the royal army is 
“patrimonial”, that means, a purely personal army of the prince and hence at his disposal 
also against his own political subjects: the army is equipped and maintained out of 
supplies and revenues belonging to the ruler.’458
455 Hintze 1975, 200-1.
456 Burkhardt 1997, 545.
457 Krippendorff 1986, 284.
458 Weber 1968, 1019.
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But since the French army was constantly growing, from a few thousand men in 1661 
to 72,000 in 1667 and 120,000 in 1672, to more than 150,000 in the early 1680s,459 
adding considerably to the non-productive army of civil officers, its maintenance over­
strained royal finances. Yet, since the financing of the royal army out of royal coffers 
was restricted by chronic deficits which were ultimately due to definite limits to growth 
in a pre-capitalist agrarian economy, the king had to resort to other strategies of 
maintaining ‘his’ army.
Thus, secondly, in striking parallel to the general phenomenon of office venality 
in civil administration, the sale and the trading of army offices was likewise a 
widespread occurrence in Old Regime France.460 As in civil administration, officer 
posts could only be sold by the king on the prior recognition that he was the owner of 
the army. This, meant the systematic alienation of kingly property, here the alienation of 
control over the means of violence, to private agents. From the highest echelons in the 
ministries of foreign affairs and war, via posts in civil army administration {intendants 
d'armee\ down to officers in regiments and companies and to the level of recruiting 
officers, office-holders used their quasi-irremovable position for the build-up of 
independent networks of clientelism by creating and sub-letting new posts.
‘In one respect (...), the French army remained highly conservative and backward- 
looking. In it more completely than in many other regiments and companies were still the 
property of their colonels and captains and could be bought and sold like other sorts of 
property. Colonelcies were not cheap. By the 1730s and 1740s prices of 20-50,000 
livres for infantry regiments were normal, though one at least fetched as much as 
100,000. Not until 1762 did the government lay down maximum prices which could be 
charged for them. They could also, however, be extremely profitable: in 1741 a French 
guards regiment (...) yielded its owner an income of 120,000 livres.,461
Veritable military dynasties grew inside the army, appropriating entire 
regiments whose commands were handed down from family generation to family 
generation462 Precisely because powerful office-holders staffed their respective 
institutions over which they presided with relatives and personal dependants, Muhlack 
observed in a similar vein that ‘towards the end of Mazarin’s time in government, the
459 Kaiser 1990, 145.
460 Mettam 1988, 42-4 and 217-24; Muhlack 1986,260 and 273; Gerstenberger 1990, 330 and 
333 ff.
461 M.S.Anderson 1988, 101; cf. also p.46.
462 Parker 1988, 48.
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king’s army was in fact replaced by the cardinal’s army [my translation, B.T.].’463 Also, 
recruiting officers, almost exclusively of noble origin, simply mustered soldiers from 
their own lordships, so that surviving feudal relations of dependence on lordly estates 
were carried over into the army. The desperate royal attempts to control these 
practices by various ordinances - most strikingly in the Code Michau of 1629 - by 
outlawing office venality and by insisting on the royal right of nomination ran time and 
again against the old systemic need of royal financial requirements.464 The proprietary 
character in the means of violence pervaded all levels of the army hierarchy. The 
relation of co-dependency between crown and officer class, based on kingly need for 
cash in return for lucrative and influential posts in the army, reproduced in military 
institutions the general precarious symbiosis between the members of the ruling class. 
Neither could do without the other. The net result was a new form o f military 
devolution to the benefit of private agents.
Thirdly, until the reforms of 1661 - that is, until well after the Westphalian 
Peace Treaties - the royal standing army was not the only institution of military might 
in France, even less so in other parts of Europe. Since monarchs were hardly ever able 
to raise the finances to maintain armies which matched their aggressive ambitions, they 
turned to military entrepreneurs to carry out their foreign policy objectives.465 It was 
really these condottieri which came to characterise European warfare in the period up 
to and including the Thirty Years’ War. Military entrepreneurs were wealthy private 
agents who were employed (condotta = contract) by rulers, raised, equipped, 
commanded, and paid their own armies, and received titles and land in return from 
their employers.466
463 Muhlack 1986, 269.
464 Kaiser 1990, 68.
465 Kaiser argues that upon entry in the Thirty Years’ War, ‘France had virtually no standing 
army. The only battleworthy troops available belonged to the Protestant military entrepreneur 
Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar, whom Richelieu enlisted into French service in exchange for a large 
annual subsidy and a promise of the territory of Alsace’. Kaiser 1990, 73.
466 Krippendorff 1985, 257-67. Contrary to KrippendorfFs interpretation, privately paid 
military labour power has nothing to do with modem armies, nor with capitalism. The 
organisation of the modem army and the proprietary relation of the modem soldiery to the 
means of violence are structurally incommensurate with early modem mercenary armies. 
Capitalism, in turn, presupposes a transformation of social property relations in the sphere of 
production, not the private accumulation of means of violence to effectuate gains by coercion in 
the sphere of redistribution. Cf. Krippendorff 1985, pp. 249 and 262.
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‘It has been estimated that during the Thirty Years War there were in the different 
German armies in all close to 1500 “military enterpriser” commanders, colonels and 
generals who owned regiments, and in the great majority of seventeenth-century armies 
(...) regiments were known, quite logically, by the names of their colonels.’467
Wallenstein was the most outstanding example of these men who made war 
their private business. Operating from his basis in Bohemia - the newly created Duchy 
of Friedland -, which he cheaply bought from the Emperor who had confiscated these 
lands from the rebellious Bohemian estates, he received in compensation for his 
services and credits granted to the Emperor the Duchy of Mecklenburg and was 
promised the Electorate of Brandenburg, provided he could conquer it - an act which 
would have turned him into the mightiest territorial lord in the Holy Roman Empire.
Military entrepreneurs enjoyed a considerable degree of independence from 
central control.468 These men were sometimes in complete control of armies which 
outsized regular royal troops, posing serious threats to and entailing incalculable risks 
for their nominal masters. The story of Wallenstein’s murder by Viennese agents 
illustrates the lack of public control. Yet, precisely because these entrepreneurs entered 
into private contracts, they formed essentially trans-national armed forces, freely 
employable by whoever could afford them, and always on the brink of pursuing their 
own interests. The composition of their soldiery was polyglot and trans-confessional. 
Demand for mercenaries created an international market for military labour power. As 
a rule, mercenaries came from low social backgrounds, were often criminals who had 
fled their homelands, impoverished peasants, or simply prisoners enlisted in their 
former enemy’s army. Mercenary armies commanded by unscrupulous businessmen 
and employed for private profit constituted not only powerful challenges to 
monarchical claims to absolute power by privatising war, they posed a serious threat to 
European international stability.
If we turn away from the military constitution of early modem states to the 
social relations of warfare, we find further decidedly non-modem characteristics. 
Armies, like their feudal predecessors, still ‘lived off the countryside during 
campaigns. They simply sequestrated what they could lay their hands on, confiscated
467 M.S.Anderson 1988, 47.
468 Hintze 1975, 198-9; Kaiser 1990, 2 Iff.
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goods, cattle, and food, looted homesteads, villages, and towns, demanded ‘protection 
money5 from surrounding settlements in return for letters of protection, and imposed 
ad hoc military taxes (in fact, a ransom) in the form of regular peasant contributions to 
the fighting forces. It was these confiscations which largely financed the Thirty Years’ 
War with catastrophic economic and demographic effects.
Yet, armies lived not only off the countryside, they also lived off the enemy. 
Victory meant plunder and dispossession of the enemy. In striking contrast to modem 
conventions, defeat of the enemy implied booty for each combatant.
‘A battle might produce thousands of prisoners, whose personal effects immediately 
became the property of the captor, and whose ransoms would be divided between him 
and his commanders in a fixed proportion. Even greater opportunities for gain were 
provided by the capture of an enemy town. Although there were some dissenting voices, 
most military experts agreed that towns could be legitimately sacked if they refused to 
surrender before the besiegers brought up their artillery. After that happened, if the town 
were captured, its inhabitants forfeited liberty, property and even life, thereby turning 
every soldier in the victorious army into a prince.’469
Ideally, war should pay for itself (Bellum se ipse alet). Beyond the gains from victory 
and plunder, soldiers received privately negotiated wages, not publicly stipulated pay. 
If territorial princes were in arrears, mutiny was a common occurrence and few 
scruples would stop military entrepreneurs to sell their services to the enemy. Since 
mercenaries owned their weapons470 and were not garrisoned during or after 
campaigns, they turned into a serious problem of order, continuing their marauding 
activities after wars were formally over. The lack of public discipline contributed thus 
to the prolongation of wars and their recurrent transformation into civil strife. The 
Sacco di Roma of 1527 at the hands of German unpaid mercenaries exemplifies these 
anarchical tendencies. War was still a means of private and personal enrichment.
In sum, the organisation of the military apparatus in Old Regime France could 
not qualify as a modem military constitution, in which a de-personalised state enjoyed 
a monopoly in the means of violence, entirely separate from private political actors and 
interests. Though the king sought to arrogate and centralise the means of violence, he 
(1) merely personalised and privatised them under his own command and for his own
469 Parker 1988, 59.
470 ‘In Brandenburg during the Thirty Years’ War, the soldier was still the predominant owner 
of the martial implements of his business.’ Weber 1968, 982.
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interests, which he tended to equate with those of the state, (2) was forced to re­
privatise and de-centralise the means of coercion by the systematic sale of officer posts 
or by the employment of military enterprisers beyond the king’s control, and (3) had 
thus to share military power with other domestic independent actors. In the early 
modem period, military might remained divided and personalised, if on an altered 
basis.
Conclusion: The Political Logic and Economic Ulogic of French Absolutism
The rise of absolutism destroyed the highly fragmented feudal system of
)
vassalic relations between politically independent lords. Yet, absolutism was not a 
zero-sum game in which the growth of kingly centralised power meant inevitably the 
decline of regional aristocratic, corporate or patrimonial authority. On the contrary, 
while absolutism had obliterated lordly independence, it gave rise to a variegated 
political landscape of authority-relations between a strengthened monarchy, noblesse 
d ’epee, noblesse de robe, and urban oligarchies. Intra-ruling class strife found its limits 
in internal peasant resistance as well as international threats, imposing consent and 
accommodation. Yet, absolutism’s differentia specifica vis-a-vis feudalism came to lie 
in the direct dependency of these privileged classes upon the monarchy. Thus, the 
elevation of kingship from a feudal overlord to a dynastic sovereign, monopolising the 
rights of command, and the concomitant decline of independent lordly powers meant 
that private political interests had to be defined directly in relation to the king in order 
to maintain or secure access to extra-economic means of income, as he was forced to 
govern through semi-private and semi-public channels.
‘The very system of political rule, which was in essence a royal system, required close 
collaboration with the larger monarchy and precluded any real autonomy on the part of 
the provincial ruling class. Only the king could maintain hegemony.’471
471 Beik 1985, 332.
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Inversely, sovereignty as proprietary kingship had to be signed away by various 
means. The penetration of kingly institutions into the country-side did not so much 
dislodge existing hierarchical structures, than create additional layers of patronage and 
clientelism which tied royal agents into prevailing political arrangements, while local 
nobles and town oligarchs aspired to insert themselves into these channels. The main 
axis of intra-ruling class conflict cannot be defined in terms of a clash between a rising 
capitalist bourgeoisie and a retrograde old nobility, balanced by and to the benefit of 
the crown. Rather, it was differential access to extra-economic income opportunities - 
be it in form of venal offices, royal monopolies, or landed possessions. In this, 
absolutism did not promote - intentionally or unintentionally - a capitalist bourgeoisie, 
but rather enlisted the services of a non-capitalist class of merchants, financiers, and 
manufacturers for its own ends, while co-opting these actors into the state apparatus 
through the sale of offices and royal monopoly titles for production and commerce. 
Whenever the king upset the proprietary status quo by administrative innovations and 
office-proliferation, the re-distribution of royal favours stirred significant conflict 
between the defenders of the status quo ante and newly privileged men. These conflicts 
do not follow neatly the lines of demarcation between an old nobility, a new office 
nobility, and a non-capitalist bourgeoisie; yet, these privileged classes were both united 
and set against each other in defining their respective interests in relation to the king, 
as the king was bound by the factional interests of political society. Each crisis 
translated into a half-baked re-configuration of the established modus vivendi between 
the ruling classes, without fundamentally re-defining its essential rationale.472
The debate on the nature of absolutism has greatly qualified, if not disqualified, 
the older conception of the absoluteness of absolutist rule. It has certainly shattered the 
idea that the French state of the Old Regime was in any way a modem state. Legal 
sovereignty remained divided, military power personalised and privatised, taxation and 
finance hedged by privileged regional interests, efforts towards administrative 
centralisation were undermined by de-centralised networks of patronage and 
clientelism in which the lines between public power and private advantage continued to 
be blurred, and political discourse abided by customs. Most importantly, the
472 Mettam concludes that ‘there was scarcely anything which could meaningfully be called
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persistence of political property precluded the build-up of a modem bureaucracy. 
Venality constituted a structural brake to the modernising potentials of absolutist rule.
Yet, Old Regime France did not only fail to qualify as a modem state, it was 
not even a precursor of the modem state, nor a transitional stage in the evolution 
towards a modem state, as the classical ‘equilibrist-transitional’ Marxist interpretation 
and many Weberian accounts suggest. Although the institutional structure of the 
absolutist state, whose centralising advances were radicalised by Napoleon, was the 
historical condition in which French capitalism would have to develop in the 19th 
Century, the absolutist state was not logically necessary for the development of 
capitalism. This does not imply that Old Regime France should be subsumed under the 
general type of feudal society, for the transition from a regime of lordly extra- 
economic rent-extraction to a system of royal extra-economic tax-extraction 
represented an important development. To call the absolutist state a feudal state misses 
therefore the point, because authority-relations amongst bearers of political power 
were no longer mediated militarily through vassalage, but were directly dependent 
upon the king. Immediate lordly exploitation (original fragmentation) was superseded 
by ‘generalised personal domination’ by the king, transforming feudal inter-lordly 
relations mediated through military vassalage into absolutist inter-ruling class relations 
mediated through patronage.473 The absolutist state was thus a dynastic-patrimonial 
state. Kingship was no longer a contractual affair between the mightiest lords in the 
country, but an institution which had appropriated the rights of command in a 
sovereign fashion. The legitimacy of kingship did no longer derive from the ensemble 
of pre-constituted feudal lordships, but was ‘divine’. Yet, divine kingship did not 
confer some autonomy to the absolutist state. The form and dynamic of the absolutist 
state were never external to prevailing relations of exploitation, but co-constituted and 
maintained them. Inversely, public policy options were directly governed by prevailing 
class relations. Personalism, the non-separation between public office and private 
affairs, and the dominance of patrimonialism, instead of impersonal bureaucratic 
service, manifested the thoroughly pre-modem character of dynastic kingship.
On a higher level of abstraction, however, both polities feudal and absolutist - 
operated on and were limited by the action-defining parameters set by non-capitalist
“modem” in the France of Louis XIV’. Mettam 1988, 12; cf. also Kaiser 1990, 135.
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property relations, and the corresponding internal as well as external logic of political 
accumulation driven by extra-economic coercion. Therefore, the structural similarities 
between absolutist France and feudal France are indeed much greater than those 
assumed between absolutist France and mid-19th Century France. If feudal and 
absolutist notions of property connote a complex of political rights of command and 
extraction defining the fundamental structural continuity of medieval and early modem 
modes of government, then ‘extra-economic coercion is a motif which can be applied 
both to the fundamental class relationships under feudalism and to the social and legal 
trappings of absolutist society.’474 However, this does not absolve us from identifying 
and explaining the very real differences between medieval and early modem social 
property relations and their associated forms of government. These differences, as we 
have argued, are bound up with the transformation of the feudal rent-regime to the 
absolutist tax-regime, predicated on the transformation of the direct producer, the 
peasant, from a serf to a petty proprietor. The new state institutionalised a new 
structure of exploitation.
In developmental terms, the reproductive imperatives of the ruling elite at the 
top of society, depending in their entirety upon the well-being of the king, occasioned a 
recurring crisis-ridden pattern of predatory foreign policies, punitive taxation, public 
borrowing and the systematic sale of offices. The financial long-term logic of these 
strategies of political accumulation implied an ever greater alienation of state property 
by the king to an ever growing parasitic officer-class, which - by being exempted from 
taxation - shifted the burden of taxation almost exclusively onto the peasantry, while 
endebting the king to this very officer-corps. It was this structural contradiction which 
exhausted in a cyclical form the French capacity of financial mobilisation, while 
intensifying the class antagonisms between the peasantry, the officer-class, and the 
crown. Precisely because the capacity for productivity growth of the agrarian economy 
remained governed by pre-capitalist demo-economic fluctuations in a peasant-economy 
characterised by small-holding, the logic of political accumulation had economically 
involutionary, socially conflictual and, ultimately, self-devouring effects.475 Super­
exploitation of peasant-surplus through over-taxation stalled productive re-investment
473 Gerstenberger 1990, 510-22.
474 Beik 1985, 30. Cf. also HenshaU 1996, 36.
475 Brenner 1985b.
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while inducing soil-exhaustion, entailing the persistence of Malthusian agrarian crises 
well into the 18th Century, whereas ruling class investment into the means of violence 
diverted large parts of funds into non-productive military consumption and courtly 
extravagance. The class structure of absolutism had economically counter-productive 
and politically and geopolitically crisis-prone effects.476 And it was these underlying 
contradictions which arrested consensual radical reforms and defined the limits to 
‘modernising’ the French state of the Old Regime.
That the French state was finally transformed into a modem state, so our thesis, 
cannot be deduced from developments internal to the reproduction of the Old Regime, 
but rather first presupposed the complete breakdown of the structures of social 
property relations which made up absolutist society. This process set in with 1789 but 
was, arguably, not completed until the late 19th Century.
‘The separation of the public political sphere of the state from the economic sphere of 
civil society never really occurred in France before the establishment of the Third 
Republic, by which time capitalism can at last also be said to have existed.*477
Since France could not generate a modem mode of government out of pre-modem 
socio-political relations - since each class tried to reproduce itself as it was -, and since 
the development of a mercantile bourgeoisie remained dependent on royal grants and 
charters for trading monopolies, the impetus for change was ‘externally’ imposed. It 
derived, ex hypothesis, from the geopolitically mediated pressures of an inter-state 
system, in which one state - England - had successfully transformed itself into a 
capitalist society by the late 17th Century and made its ascendancy internationally felt in 
the 18th Century.
However, until the overthrow of the Old Regime, the privileged classes tried to 
defend their position at the top of society by conventional means. While ruling class 
reproduction was domestically based on strategies of political accumulation, externally 
strategies of geopolitical accumulation held sway. And it is to these strategies of 
international relations, systematised in the Westphalian Order, that we now have to 
turn.
476 Gerstenberger 1990, 406-8.
477 Comninel 1987, 204.
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Chapter Six
Demystifying the Westphalian System of States: International Relations from
Absolutism to Capitalism
Introduction
This chapter provides a new interpretation of the nature of the Westphalian 
system of states. It challenges the core, repeatedly reproduced, constitutive myth in the 
discipline of International Relations (IR), which maintains that the Westphalian 
Settlement inaugurated the era of modem international relations among sovereign 
states. Against this cross-paradigmatic IR consensus, I argue that the Peace of 
Westphalia expressed and codified the distinctly non-modem relations between 
dynastic and other pre-modem political communities of the Old Regime. The logic of 
inter-dynastic relations structured the early modem system of states until the 19th 
Century transition to international modernity. The historical specificity o f inter-dynastic 
relations, their social rationale, and mode of operation are however positively obscured 
in standard IR macro-theories, be they of (neo-)realist or constructivist provenance, 
and cannot be adequately comprehended within their methodological frameworks.
(Neo-)Realism and Constructivism: Explanatory Divergences - Identical Outcomes
Neorealism assumes that the systemic pressures generated by anarchy impose a 
rational choice problem on international actors that explains repetitive and predictable 
patterns of conflict and cooperation.478 Systemic disequilibria, brought about by 
domestic changes in power capabilities, are automatically re-equilibrated by the balance 
of power, preventing hegemony and providing order and security even for smaller 
actors. Since anarchy, short of hierarchy, is assumed to be a transhistorical occurrence 
and since interests and preferences are axiomatically deduced from the self-regarding
478 Waltz 1979; Gilpin 1981; Mearsheimer 1995.
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nature of conflict-units, the problem of international change is reduced to switches in 
polarity that do not affect the policy-determining deep logic of anarchical competition.
Constructivism, in turn, suggests that changes in the identity and interests of 
actors explain variations in the patterns of conflict and cooperation.479 Identity- 
formation and identity-changes are either attributed to epistemic transformations 
internal to actors, or to intersubjective redefinitions of senses of self among 
international actors. Interactively constructed constitutive rules or conventions, 
international learning processes and notions of collective intentionality can either 
consciously transform anarchy or remedy its competitive effects. In this perspective, 
domestic or international ideational sources of identity-change explain variations in 
international relations and transformations in systemic structures.
In sum, while (neo-)realism derives the character of international relations ff om 
the systemic geopolitical logic among already pre-constituted unitary actors, 
constructivism claims to derive the character of international relations from the variable 
identities of the system’s constitutive units. However, in spite of these theoretical 
divergences, both approaches advance identical descriptions of the general properties 
of the Westphalian Order as they converge on the timing of the onset of international 
modernity.
Critique and Outline o f an Alternative Approach
This chapter confronts (neo-)realist and constructivist assumptions with 17th 
and 18th Century European politics. It argues that both theories (1) fail to advance a 
convincing explanation of the transition from feudal to absolutist geopolitics which 
gave rise to important variations in the operation of anarchy, (2) fail to or are unable to 
explain the time-bound general properties of the early modem system o f ‘states’ and its 
mode of operation, (3) provide no explanation of the increased frequency and intensity 
of war during the age of absolutism, (4) misperiodise the origins of the modem system 
of states, and (5) provide no convincing geographical, chronological, and theoretical
479 Substantive constructivist contributions are Ruggie 1986 and 1993; Kratochwil 1982, 1986, 
1995. For the metatheoretical background cf. Kratochwil 1989; Onuf 1989; Wendt 1987, 1992 
and 1996; Adler 1997.
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account of modem state-formation and the genesis of the modem system of states. The 
chapter further suggests that constmctivism (6), in spite of its anti-neorealist claim that 
anarchy is what states make of it, fails to challenge (neo-)realism’s fundamental 
premise that the operation of the Westphalian Order can be understood in terms of the 
pressures implied by anarchy, (7) fails to theorise the extra-ideational sources of 
identity-formation of the major constitutive actors of the Westphalian system, and (8) 
is theoretically disabled to specify the social conditions of those constitutive rules that 
governed contemporary patterns of conflict and cooperation,
These objections require the mobilization of an alternative theoretical tradition. 
The basic claim is that although the medieval, early modem, and modem systems of 
states are all characterised by anarchy, they generated fundamentally different 
principles of international relations. Although these different principles are predicated 
on the diverse identities of their respective constitutive actors, the problem of identity- 
formation is not exhausted by a reconstruction of their respective discourses and 
conventions. Theoretically, the argument is that variations in the character of 
international systems, in the identities of their constitutive actors, and in their requisite 
forms of conflict and cooperation can be theorised on the basis of varying social 
property relations. Property relations generate bounded but antagonistic strategies of 
action within and between political actors that explain the dynamic behind political 
changes and systemic change. Absolutist pre-capitalist property relations are internally 
related to the proprietary and personalized character of dynastic sovereignty. The 
dynastic principle translates into empire-building, political marriages, wars of 
succession, dynastic ‘international’ law, inter-dynastic compensatory equilibrium, and 
bandwagoning. These core institutions structure early modem modes of aggression and 
conflict resolution and the forms of territoriality, while blocking the operation of an 
automatic balance-of-power.
The decisive break in terms of international relations comes with the rise of the 
first modem state: post-revolutionary England. After the establishment of an agrarian 
capitalist property regime, the transformation of the old English militarised and land- 
holding feudal nobility into a capitalist landed class enjoying full and exclusive private 
property rights in land, and the consequent transformation of the English state in the 
17th Century revolving around the new principle of parliamentary sovereignty, post-
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1688 Britain starts to display new foreign policy techniques, while remaining 
surrounded by territorially accumulating dynastic states.
This reinterpretation of the early modem system of states entails important 
theoretical, periodical, developmental and substantive implications for IR. For if late 
17th Century England constitutes the point of departure for re-theorising and re- 
periodising the development of the modem international system, then no single event 
or date can be unequivocally singled out as marking the decisive system-wide caesura 
towards inter-state modernity. While differences in international systems can be 
conceptually clearly established, the historical exposition faces the problem of coming 
to terms with the temporal coexistence of heterogeneous international actors. Thus, re­
assessing the genesis of modem international relations involves a theoretically 
controlled re-interpretation of the geographically combined and socially uneven 
generalisation of the English state form. This state, ex hypothesis, in a series of 
geopolitically mediated international crises unsettled the viability of the Continental 
states of the Old Regime - starting with the French Revolution and ending with World 
War I - that forced these states through a series of revolutions and reforms 
(revolutions from above), to adapt their economic and political systems to the superior 
economic performance and military power of capitalist England. These processes 
replaced the old Westphalian logic of inter-dynastic relations with specifically modem 
inter-state relations.
The expository problem of theorising geopolitics among coexisting 
heterogeneous actors in a ‘mixed case’ scenario applies however also to the 
Westphalian Order. In the context of a contracting economy during the crisis of the 
17th Century, regionally uneven solutions of intensified domestic class conflicts and of 
geopolitical struggles over the politically-constituted powers of extraction spawned 
important variations in the forms of domination among European polities.480 While the 
Westphalian Settlement sanctioned the predominance of powerful absolutist states like 
France, Austria, Spain, Sweden, Russia, Denmark-Norway, Brandenburg-Prussia and 
the Papal state, some European regions evaded the pull of absolutist state-formation. 
Until 1806, the Holy Roman Empire maintained its status as a confederal elective 
monarchy in which sovereignty was shared between the Emperor and imperial
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institutions on the one hand, and the territorial princes, estates, and cities on the other. 
Whereas Bohemia had failed to set up an aristocratic state of estates (Standestaat), the 
Dutch General Estates succeeded in freeing themselves from Spanish domination and 
established an independent oligarchic merchant republic. While Poland continued to 
operate until the three Polish Partitions a ‘crowned aristocratic republic’, Switzerland’s 
status as a free confederation of cantons was confirmed. Whereas Italian merchant 
republics struggled against their transformation into monarchies, England turned after 
the Revolutions into a parliamentary monarchy presiding over the first capitalist 
economy. Yet, in spite of the diversity of coexisting 17th and 18th Century political 
communities, the character of the early modem international system came to be 
structured decisively by the numerical and power-political preponderance of dynastic 
states. Thus, a theory of geopolitics is advanced that is not predicated upon the 
homogeneity of its constitutive units, but comprehends the Westphalian Order as an 
open system dominated by dynastic states, in which system-maintenance and system- 
transformation are actively negotiated.
The chapter is divided into five main sections. Section One, exemplified by Old 
Regime France, theorises the early modem nexus between pre-capitalist domestic 
social property relations, dynastic sovereignty, economic non-development, and its 
resulting territorially expansionist geopolitical strategies of action.
Section Two shows (1) how proprietary dynasts, in spite of the de facto 
plurality of conflict-units, pursued foreign policy objectives of empire-building, while 
entertaining universal conceptions of geopolitical order. Domestically induced 
expansionism defined the inherently war-prone character of early modem geopolitical 
relations. Against conventional IR assumptions (2), dynasticism and the heterogeneous 
nature of contemporary conflict-units aborted a general recognition of formal parity 
between all sovereign actors, since the hierarchical schemes of dynastic ranking 
translated directly into the world of international politics. ‘States’ were placed on a 
descending ladder of precedence according to the princely status of their heads. 
Though the international system’s structure was de facto anarchical, hierarchical claims 
and policies of precedence were maintained, enforced and recognised. (3) Given the
480 On the 17th Century Crisis and its implications for diverging state-formations cf. Aston
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dynastic character of European politics, predatory strategies of geopolitical 
accumulation were mediated through the trans-European network of inter-dynastic 
family-relations. The systematic pursuit of strategic policies of marital accumulation 
became a central instrument of territorial aggrandisement, having as its flip-side (4) the 
disintegration of composite monarchies through inheritance disputes which directly 
destabilised international relations and brought about recurrent systemic crises in the 
form of wars of succession. (5) The attempt to contain system-threatening ‘private’ 
inter-dynastic family disputes engendered multilateral recognitions of dynastic 
succession regulations. Consequently, public international law enshrined to an 
important degree multilateral guarantees of ‘private’ dynastic family law. The 
personalised nature of international relations frustrated the codification of positive and 
abstract norms of international law.
Section Three theorises the social character of Westphalian territoriality. In the 
context of the natural monopoly character of land under non-capitalist social property 
relations as distributed through the dynastic structure of sovereignty, territoriality 
became a function of dynastic strategies of accumulation. Against conventional IR 
assumptions, early modem territoriality was non-exclusive, non-uniform and 
geographically unfixed. Dynasts bundled socially most heteroclite and geographically 
most scattered regions in personal unions, giving rise to a Europe of composite 
monarchies. Yet, although dynasts needed territories for their personal reproduction at 
the top of their courtly clienteles, no organic identity between a dynasty and ‘its’ 
territory was logically imperative. As territories circulated among European dynasts 
like economic assets - which could be conquered or forfeited, bought or sold, acquired 
through marriage or alienated as endowments or inheritances, partitioned or exchanged 
-, dynasts could readily change their thrones and therewith their landed bases.
Section Four provides a content analysis of the Westphalian Peace Treaties 
with special reference to the restorative provisions of the Treaties, the implications of 
the confessional stipulations, the meaning of the German Estates’s ‘sovereignty’ within 
the wider framework of the German Imperial Constitution, and the collective security 
character of the peace provisions themselves.
1965; Parker and Smith 1978; Brenner 1993.
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Section Five argues for a fundamental differentiation between the inter-dynastic 
practice of equilibrium and the new capitalist-parliamentary practice of active power- 
balancing pursued by post-1688 Britain. (1) Imperial ambitions of unlimited territorial 
expansion thwarted the coming into being of the modem practice of power-balancing, 
yet generated the specific inter-dynastic practice of compensatory equilibrium qua 
convenance, which governed the logic of ‘equality in aggrandizement’ among the 
major European powers to the detriment of smaller polities. (2) In contrast, in the 
wake of the Glorious Settlement, the transformation of English dynastic sovereignty to 
the principle of ‘King-in-Parliament’ de-coupled British foreign policy from dynastic 
interests and revolutionised Britain’s attitude to the Continent. Henceforth, the de- 
territorialisation of British interests in Europe went hand in hand with the conscious 
adoption of active balancing, which sought to out-balance any dynastic universal 
aspirations amongst European monarchies, while allowing the build-up of maritime 
trading hegemony in overseas based on naval supremacy, financed by a dynamic 
agrarian-capitalist economy.
The conclusion offers some preliminary thoughts on how the rise of capitalism 
in England was universalised in an already existing system of states, forcing non­
capitalist states through a series of geopolitically mediated crises and revolutions to 
adapt their internal property relations to the superior economic productivity of the 
British capitalist state.
Theoretical Foundations: Explaining Variations in International Systems
The nature and dynamics of geopolitical systems are governed by the character 
of their constitutive units, which, in turn, is predicated on specific social property 
relations prevailing within them. Variations in property-regimes translate into 
variations in state forms and, by extension, into variations in the patterns of conflict 
and cooperation. The notion of property is however conceptually not exhausted by its 
constructivist reading as a legal right or an intersubjective convention, but should be 
understood as a conflictual social relation over access to resources involving class- 
related contestation and coercion.
236
This section sets out how the character of dynastic foreign policies and 
geopolitical relations expressed most strikingly the personalised logic of early modem 
sovereignty, based on distinctly pre-capitalist social property relations.481 This thesis 
requires an account of the modernity or non-modernity of the absolutist state. The 
puzzle which has to be addressed is, how it is that the IR community repeatedly asserts 
that Westphalia marked the origins of the modem system of states, although its major 
signatory - France, which next to Sweden, ensured the Treaties as a Garantiemacht 
(guaranteeing power) - was by most accounts a pre-modem state.
Structure: Pre-Capitalist Social Property Relations, the Absolutist State, and 
Economic Non-Development
What was the basic structure of social property relations in 17th Century 
continental Western Europe?482 In the period between the crisis of the 14th Century and 
the crisis of the 17th Century, the passage from a feudal rent-regime, based on 
politically-constituted lord-peasant relations, to an absolutist tax-regime, based on the 
politically-constituted relation between free peasants and the state-qua-king, 
transformed medieval fragmented domination into centralised kingly sovereignty.483 In 
competition with the feudal nobility, the kingly monopolisation of the means of 
violence and the rights of appropriation - in the form of the standing army and 
centralised surplus extraction (taxation) - precipitated the loss of lordly direct extra- 
economic powers of extraction. However, the centralisation of sovereignty did not 
entail a separation of public and private realms, of politics and economics, since
481 Anderson 1974, 15-59; Rosenberg 1994, 123-9.
482 While the following discussion centers on France, the general lines of the argument are also 
applicable with the necessary modifications to other West European continental monarchies..
483 Brenner 1985, 258-64 and 288-90; Brenner 1993, 654 passim; Anderson 1974, 15-59 and 
85-112. While Anderson shows the non-modemity of a series of absolutist political institutions, 
I disagree with his thesis that the simultaneous commercialization of economic life inaugurated 
a gradual transition to capitalism in pre-revolutionary France.
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sovereignty was henceforth personalised by the king, regarding the realm as his 
patrimonial property. Old Regime sovereignty meant proprietay kingship.484
Politically, the transformation of France from a feudal monarchy into an 
absolutist monarchy failed to entail the establishment of modem sovereignty as defined 
by Max Weber.485 The revisionist literature on absolutism has shown convincingly that 
office venality, patronage, and clientelism blocked the establishment of a modem 
bureaucracy in Weber’s sense, as France was structurally barred from establishing 
modem political institutions:486 taxation remained non-uniform; diverse law codes 
operated in various regions and for differentiated status groups; no modem system of 
public finance was set up; the means of violence were not monopolised by the state, 
but personalised by the king, yet re-alienated to patrimonial officers through the sale of 
army posts; mercenarism further undermined royal claims to the monopoly of violence; 
noble exemption from taxation implied the non-establishment of permanent 
representative assemblies; the court became the center of patronage, intrigue, and 
faction; mercantilism was precisely the public economic policy of a pre-capitalist 
state.487 In short, all the institutional trappings of a modem state were absent in early 
modem France.
Economically, the loss of lordly feudal powers entailed the end of serfdom, 
which went hand in hand with de facto peasant possession of their plots as guaranteed 
by kingly courts over and against recalcitrant lords. Since direct producers remained 
overwhelmingly in possession of their means of subsistence, they were under no 
internal economic obligation to react to market pressures for their personal survival, 
but continued to direct production primarily to subsistence purposes, while only
^Rowen 1961, 1969, 1980; Symcox 1974, 5; Gerstenberger 1990, 287-406 and 509-22. In 
contrast, Krasner maintains that ‘no deep structure is evident in the heterogeneous and fluid 
order from the Middle Ages to the present’. Krasner 1993, 261.
485 Weber 1948, 78-83. Weber’s statements on the rise of the modem state are ambivalent. 
While he repeatedly asserts that absolutist princes initiated under geopolitical pressures 
processes of modem state formation by promoting rational bureaucracies (cf. Weber 1948, 82 
passim, and 1968, 971 and 1092-1104), he insists that absolutist states, and France in 
particular, never succeeded in separating patrimonial officials from their privately owned 
means of administration and violence. Cf. Weber 1968, 1033-4 and 1038-9.
^B eik  1985; Root 1987; Mettam 1988; Hinrichs 1989; Reinhard 1996; Henshall 1992; 
Hoffman 1994; Parker 1996; Asch and Duchhardt 1996.
487 On the non-capitalist character of merchant capital and mercantilism in general cf. Marx 
1981, 440-55; Schmoller 1897; DeVries 1976; Brenner 1977; Hinrichs 1986; Rosenberg 
1994,91-122.
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marketing random surpluses to pay taxes.488 Precisely because the peasantry was not 
yet separated from its means of subsistence, appropriation of surplus was still a 
phenomenon that occurred in the sphere of re-distribution by extra-economic means - 
though now increasingly in the form of centralised surplus extraction through kingly 
taxation - and not in the sphere of production itself. The corollary was that the 
competitive capitalist logic of cost-cutting by means of investment in the means of 
production, technological innovations, the rationalisation of land-use, and the 
specialisation of produce, so as to raise productivity and out-prize competitors in open 
markets, could not gain hold in the countryside.489
In England, in contrast, economic profits incurred by capitalist tenant-farmers 
and economic rents received by big landlords replaced politically-extracted lordly rents. 
While in the English countryside, capitalist social property relations had set off the 
Agricultural Revolution by the late 16th Century, France (and most other West- 
European continental states) continued to be a country of small peasant proprietors 
based on pre-capitalist patterns of land-tenure, involving sub-division of plots, non­
specialisation, and the persistence of Malthusian eco-demographic cycles. This 
economic structure imposed definitive limits to economic growth.490 Henceforth, the 
long-term economic and political trajectories of England/Britain and France and the 
rest of the Continent were to diverge substantially.491
Agency: Political and Geopolitical Strategies o f Accumulation
Under non-capitalist agrarian property-relations, the strategies for expanded 
economic reproduction of the ruling classes, organised in the patrimonial state, 
remained tied to the logic of ‘political accumulation’ predicated upon investment in the 
means of appropriation.492 These strategies can be analytically divided into (1) internal 
arbitrary and punitive taxation of the peasantry by the king, mediated by (2) the sale of
488 Parker 1996, 63-64 and 212-3.
489 Parker 1996, 28-74.
490 Goubert 1986, 23-34; Parker 1996, 28-74. The literature on Franco-British economic long­
term divergences is vast. For an overview cf. Crouzet 1990, 13-104.
491 Brenner 1985, 284-327, 1989, 1993; Beik 1985, 3-33; Parker 207-61.
492 On the concept of political accumulation cf. Brenner 1986.
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offices to a landless noblesse de robe in competition with a de-feudalised noblesse 
d'epee. Externally, these strategies had as their alter ego (3) geopolitical accumulation 
through war and dynastic marriage policies, and (4) politically-maintained and enforced 
unequal exchange through mercantilist monopoly mechanisms by royal sales of trading 
rights to privileged merchants. Strategies (3) and (4) constitute the necessary 
geopolitical practices of strategies (1) and (2) as the necessary domestic ones. 
Consequently, the two main contemporary war issues were struggles over commercial 
monopolies, exclusive trading routes and dynastic territorial proprietary claims.493 All 
strategies of income provision were clearly circumscribed by the degree of internal 
peasant solidarity, resistance and rebellion and external geopolitical rivalry. All 
strategies tended to prioritise investment in the means of violence - the build-up of 
standing armies, navies and militarised merchant fleets, and a police system controlling 
effective taxation - rather than in the means of production. It was these pressures of 
political accumulation, rather than systemic geopolitical competition or some 
autonomous military techno-determinism, which drove those military-technological 
innovations associated with the ‘Military Revolution’. The diversion of large funds of 
the national economic surplus into the non-productive apparatus of violence and 
courtly conspicuous consumption reproduced the politically punitive logic and 
economically involutionary illogic of the absolutist war-tax-state.494
The pursuit of (geo-)political strategies of accumulation was dictated by the 
dependency of political society upon the economic well-being of the king, who was 
thus driven to maintain and reproduce himself at the top of the ruling classes. To the 
degree that monarchs ceaselessly struggled to maintain and enhance their power bases 
at home at the risk of domestic dissatisfaction and revolt in the context of absent 
economic growth, they were driven to pursue aggressive foreign policies so as to be 
able to subsequently satisfy the territorial aspirations of their family members, to repay 
debts, to fulfill the desire for social upward mobility of the ‘sitting’ army of patrimonial 
officials and the ‘standing’ army of patrimonial officers, and to share the spoils of war 
with their exuberantly growing networks of clients and courtly favorites.495 These 
elites, in turn, pegged their fortunes to a royal warlord which heeded the absolutist
493 Empirically catalogued in Holsti 1991, 48-50 and 85-9.
494 Bonney 1981.
495 Malettke 1991.
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historical compromise of aristocratic non-taxation, was able to repay accumulated 
debts, and offered prospects and opportunities of social promotion and geopolitical 
gain. In other words, geopolitical accumulation was a necessity for the expanded 
personal reproduction of the ruling elites at the top of society, revolving around the 
monarch at the apex of the social hierarchy. The Fronde (1648-53) illustrates what 
happened if absolutist rulers failed to succeed. Given existing social property-relations 
and a non-growing national income, reducing the options for expanded personal 
reproduction to strategies of political accumulation, absolutism was not only 
domestically rapacious, it also produced a structurally aggressive, predatory, and 
expansive foreign policy. Consequently, the arrival of the permanent war state and the 
intensification and increased frequency of war during the age of absolutism cannot be 
reduced to the mere geopolitical contiguity of power-maximising unitary states, but is 
bound up with the domestic structure of pre-capitalist polities.
Implications fo r  IR: ‘L Etat, c ’est moi! ’ and Inter-Dynasticism
In Old Regime states, sovereignty was personalised by the monarch who 
regarded and treated the state as the private patrimonial property of the reigning 
dynasty. 17th Century kingship was no longer a ‘contractual’ affair, mediated by 
vassalage, between the mightiest lords in the country, but an institution which had 
appropriated the powers of command in a sovereign fashion.496 Proprietary kingship 
meant that public policy and, a fortiori, foreign policy were not conducted in the name 
of raison d'Etat or the national interest, but in the name of dynastic interests. It was 
precisely in diplomatic and foreign affairs where monarchs were most eager to impose 
their ‘personal rules’ in order to negotiate their private titles to sovereignty with fellow 
monarchs.
‘Reason of state thus closely linked the state with its monarch and dynasty, but not with 
its people or nationality; that link was only beginning to emerge in some countries. Louis 
XIV’s idea of the state as dynastic patrimony (L ’Etat, c ’est moi) still prevailed in much 
of Europe, and if the Enlightenment notion of the monarch as the first servant of the 
state was beginning to make headway, the distinction made little difference in practice, 
especially in foreign policy.’497
Beik 1985, 13.
497 Schroeder 1994a, 8; cf. also Symcox 1974, 3.
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How does this square with the argument that venal officialdom implied a de­
centralisation of authority-relations?498 The re-configuration of social power within the 
early modem state - the ascendancy of the ‘sitting army’ of patrimonial officers and the 
relative decline of the old feudal nobility - meant that, whereas the old noble strategy 
of engaging in independent foreign policies in opposition to and outside the boundaries 
of the feudal state came to be precluded, private patrimonial and aristocratic foreign 
policy interests had to be articulated indirectly through the state. 17th Century kingship 
was no longer a ‘contractual’ affair, militarily mediated through vassalage, between the 
mightiest lords in the country, but an institution which had appropriated the powers of 
command in a sovereign fashion.499 Although these sovereign kings were forced to 
alienate the rights of domination to office-holders and although these men could build 
up veritable hereditary office dynasties, they could only further their interests by 
operating within and through the state apparatus. Officers reproduced themselves by 
carrying out administrative duties which were, in the last resort, dependent upon the 
king. This ultimate dependence upon the king defined the limits to their illoyalties, for 
the king retained the right and the power to re-buy or confiscate any office and to 
demote or depose an unruly officer. The mutual fealty between lords and the 
militarised forms of conflict-resolution had given way to a hierarchical, if inter-personal 
and precarious, relationship, lubricated by patronage. To be sure, the king was not in a 
position to dispose of the class of officers in their entirety as they were organised in 
parlements, but he could certainly take on any defiant officer individually.
As access to the national surplus was henceforth mediated through the favours 
distributed and sold by the king, so was the co-determination of foreign policy making 
dependent upon access to kingly institutions. Thus, while office-holders had an interest 
in co-articulating foreign policy and while the cardinal-ministers Richelieu, Mazarin, 
and Fleury even usurped at times absolutist foreign policy in France, they never 
challenged the kingly prerogative of being in charge of foreign policy itself.500 Indeed, 
this was the period when leading patrimonial ministers in charge of the affairs of the
498 On the implication of venal officialdom for the non-absoluteness of absolutism cf. Brenner 
1985b, 289-91; Beik 1985, Root 1987; Mettam 1988; Reinhard 1975 and 1996; Hinrichs 
1989; Parker 1996.
499 Beik 1985, 13.
500 Kaiser 1990, 70-82; Bergin 1985.
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state (Olivares, the French cardinals, Oxenstiema), realising that their personal fortunes 
were directly bound up with the well-being of the king-as-state, came to conduct 
foreign policy in the name of the king.
The aristocracy, in turn, had declined in importance but was not yet a quantite 
negligeable. Its political failure to institutionalise its rights and powers was evidenced 
in the non-establishment of an estates-state (Standestaat). Decisively, however, the 
loss of its autonomous feudal status meant that its integration into a re-organised state 
apparatus - as courtiers, ministers, or venal officers - conferred a largely derivative and 
subordinate status upon them, subject to kingly control. However, if direct challenges 
to the power of the king were posed, they came from the higher aristocracy, especially 
from the princes of the blood and the princes etrangers, which still operated 
independent landed power bases. These magnates had an immediate stake in royal 
foreign policy making since they continued to marry into the princely ruling dynasties 
of foreign countries.501 But after the last great aristocratic revolts and civil wars during 
the crisis of the 17th Century, central monarchs could no longer be bypassed. Periodic 
aristocratic revolts against kingly power subsided. The aristocracy came to accept that 
its personal reproduction was now inseparable from the position of the king in the 
wider European system of states. Consequently, magnates strove to establish 
themselves in the innermost councils of the king and sought to populate royal courts in
• 502their functions as centers of patronage, intrigue, and faction.
In dynastic states, by the 17th Century, while internal sovereignty was still 
compromised by powerful factional interests, external sovereignty lay in the hands of 
kings.
Although the nexus between personal property and public sovereignty - and 
more generally: the dynastic principle - is often and increasingly acknowledged in the 
historiographical literature on state-building and early modem international relations,503
501 Parrott 1997.
502 Mettam 1988, 19.
503 Rowen 1961, 1969, 1980; Brenner 1985b and 1993, 653 passim; Symcox 1974, 2-5; 
Oresko, Gibbs and Scott 1997, 1-42; McKay and Scott 1983, 16; Bonney 1991, 345; H.Weber 
1981; Kunisch 1979 and 1987; Kaiser 1990, 140.
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though far less so in the IR literature,504 its full implications for the non-modem 
structure of the early modem system of states and its dominant forms of interaction 
have not yet been drawn out.
To conclude, by demonstrating the proprietary foundations of dynasticism and 
by showing how proprietary kingship translated into the thoroughly personalised and 
therewith pre-modem character of early modem geopolitical relations, the case is made 
for a fundamental re-theorisation of the positive content of the Westphalian Order. By 
implication, the exposition of the sui generis nature of the early modem geopolitical 
system calls for a re-periodisation of the emergence of the modem system of states. 
For instead of following the general fallacy of unearthing the earliest stirrings of the 
first modem state ascendant in ever more distant pasts - usually in relation to France or 
with reference to the ‘proto-modem’ merchant republics of Renaissance Italy or 17th 
Century Holland505 - and of antedating the origins of the modem system of states 
correspondingly, this chapter seeks to show how long European international politics 
was governed by practices and principles which remained thoroughly embedded in pre­
capitalist social relations. In spite of the ‘surface modernity’ of early modem 
international relations, their substance, instead of constituting a breakthrough to 
modernity, betrays a greater continuity with the Middle Ages.
Westphalian Geopolitical Relations: Foreign Policy as Dynastic Family Business
The nexus between centralised public power and patrimonial property meant 
that the social relations of international intercourse were largely identical with the 
‘private’ family affairs of reigning monarchs. The implication was that all the rather 
biologically determined play of chances of dynastic genealogy and family reproduction 
- like problems of succession, marriage, inheritance, childlessness - did not simply
504 The only theoretically substantiated exception is Rosenberg 1994, 135-9. Fleeting remarks 
on he dynastic principle can be found in Hinsley 1963, 164; Bull 1977, 19; Czempiel 1980, 
449; Krippendorff 1985, 284; Kratochwil 1995, 30-1. For Holsti, ‘states were primarily family 
possessions. Sovereignty was the possession of a person, the king, queen or prince, and 
territory was just part of the realm, almost a personal estate.’ Holsti 1991, 55. Although Holsti 
acknowledges the proprietary view of the state (which is explained in terms of divine 
kingship), Westphalia’s modernity is not challenged.
505 Spruyt 1994, 77-108; Arrighi 1994, 36-47; Wight 1977, 152.
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‘contaminate’ an allegedly pure political working of the balance-of-power or 
undermine the rationality of intersubjective conventions, but rather determined the very 
nature of early modem geopolitics. Since sovereignty was transmitted by birth, royal 
sex, as Marx argued in his critique of Hegel’s Philosophy o f Right, was directly 
political.
‘The highest constitutional act of the king is therefore his sexual activity, for through
this he makes a king and perpetuates his body.’506
This is the meaning of sovereignty by birth. Since public political power was still 
personalised, European politics cannot be deemed to be the affairs of states, but was 
the affairs of its ruling families. ‘Proprietary dynasticism was displayed at its strongest 
in ordinary times in the conduct of foreign affairs, with the concern for family interests 
all too obvious.’507 But since all dynastic states engaged in predatory foreign policies, 
hoping that war would pay for itself, non-monarchical states, at pain of extinction, 
were forced to comply with the competitive patterns of the inter-dynastic states- 
system. The bounded rationality of individual actors came to define the irrationality of 
the system, being in its essence a zero-sum game over territorial rights. Given the 
dynastic character of absolutist sovereignty, it is decidedly here, in the sphere of 
foreign affairs, that the non-modem character of the absolutist system of states comes 
strikingly to the fore.
Monarchia Universalis and the Persistence o f Dynastic Empire-Building: Parity or 
Ranking?
Given the political economy of territoriality as a natural monopoly under pre­
capitalist agrarian property relations, prevailing conceptions of geopolitical order 
revolved in monarchical states - well beyond 1648 - around notions of universalism and
506 Marx [1843] 1975, 40.
507 Rowen 1980, 34-5. ‘Once we understand that the state was a piece of property heritable 
within a particular family, it is easier to appreciate the dynastic basis of war and diplomacy in 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.’ Symcox 1974, 5.
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hierarchy.508 The specific concept which came to capture the self-understanding of 
contemporary rulers was monarchia universalis, which, according to Franz Bosbach, 
dominated the discourse - although with important shifts over time - between the 15th 
and the end of the 18th Century.509 Etymologically, monarchy meant rule by one, so 
that the fragmentation of the res public Christiana into a plurality of monarchies was 
conceived as a contradiction in terms. If the discourse of power-balancing started to 
challenge the idea of universal monarchy from the late 17th Century onwards, and if 
both principles of geopolitical order stood in stark tension throughout the period, it is 
the longevity of universalizing ideas which has to be explained.510 At the same time, as 
will be shown later, inter-dynastic relations and their universalising interests did not 
bring about the modem practice of power-balancing, but generated a distinct dynastic 
practice of equilibrium.511
Lingering imperial foreign policy practices and discourses vitiate any 
conventional argument that Westphalian political actors treated each other on a par, or 
recognized the fixity and legitimacy of the given territorial distribution.512 The 
contraction of a plurality of feudal pyramidal polities into coexisting sovereign 
monarchies does not eo ipso imply that the formal parity of conflict-units was generally 
accepted after the Westphalian Settlement. Quite the obverse held true. ‘The ranking 
of individual monarchs and the relative standing of their states were crucial dimensions 
of early modem international relations.’513 Clashes over precedence in diplomatic 
negotiations were symptomatic of the persistence of hierarchical conceptions of inter­
state organisation. Yet, this is not the IR concept of hierarchy implying complete 
subordination, but a dynastic convention which endorsed the formal non-equality of the
508 Burkhardt 1992, 30-63 and 1997; Bosbach 1988; Rosenberg 1994, 91-122..
509 Bosbach 1988, 12; Hinsley 1963, 167 ff.
510 Miinkler 1987, 248-59.
511 Morgenthau defines the goal of power-balancing as ‘stability plus the preservation of all the 
elements of the system’. Morgenthau 1985, 189. On the automatic conception of the balance of 
power see Waltz 1979.
5,2 On France’s claim to the arbitre de I ’Europe and Austria’s claim to the caput mundi cf. 
McKay and Scott 1983, 36; Burkhardt 1992, 33; Kaiser 1990, 148. On Sweden’s claim to the 
dominium maris baltici cf. Kaiser 1990, 105 and Lundkvist 1988, 223. On the implications of 
Peter the Great’s adoption of the Latin title imperator in 1721 cf. de Madariaga 1997. On 
ranking cf. also Hinsley 1963, 153-5.
513 Oresko, Gibbs, Scott 1997, 37. ‘The hierarchical organization of states was one that all
Europe took for granted as the outward expression of power and prestige, and changes were 
not easily made.’ Hatton 1969, 157. Cf. also Wight 1977, 135 andOsiander 1994, 82-9.
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members of the inter-dynastic society. If many polities were honoured as sovereign, 
some were less equal than others. But such inequality was not the effect of de facto 
disparities of power capabilities - leading to the non-juridical distinctions of great, 
middle, and small powers -, but a generally recognised international norm, flowing 
from princely status.
A scale of ranks placed sovereigns on a descending ladder. The Holy Roman 
Emperor was given pride of first place, followed by the ‘Most Christian King’, the king 
of France.514 Hereditary monarchs were, as a rule, placed above elective ones and 
republics ranked lower than monarchies, followed by non-royal aristocrats and free 
cities. The standing of England was seriously weakened as a result of the various 
Commonwealth governments, and serious conflict over precedence occurred wherever 
there was a mismatch between de facto  importance and title of state as in the Dutch 
and Venetian cases.515 Peter the Great’s adoption of the imperial title in 1721 aroused 
not only considerable resentment in Vienna, which would not tolerate a second 
imperial title in Europe, but also in Britain, which recognised the title only in 1742, and 
in France, which followed suit as late as 1772.516 Towards the end of the 17th Century, 
many German actors sought to gain a royal title on realising that ducal status or 
Kurfiirsten (Elector) status tended to exclude them from international politics. While 
the Hohenzollem, the Wettins, the Wittelsbach and the Welfes succeeded, the 
remainder had to resign themselves to their demoted status. Anxiety over reputation 
and dignity should not be dismissed as ceremonial quibbles, but understood as an 
outgrowth of competition over status and rank within a dynastic international society 
in which hierarchical conceptions loomed large. Acceptance of a demoted place at 
diplomatic meetings was tantamount with acceptance of inferiority which could have 
material implications for questions of precedence in inheritance struggles. It should 
thus not surprise that dynastic discourses were couched in the semantics of reputation, 
honour, and dignity. ‘In an age where rulers looked on their states as their personal 
family property, it was inevitable that they should stress their personal honor,
5.4 Kaiser 1990, 148; Bosbach 1988, 118.
5.5 M.S.Anderson 1993, 59-60; Duchhardt 1997, 31-2.
516 M.S. Anderson 1993, 66-67; de Madariaga 1997.
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reputation and prestige. This also explains why most international disputes tended to 
be over dynastic claims.’517
'States' Marrying ‘States: Dynastic Unions and Wars o f Succession
Two conflicting practices set their seal on early modem patterns of cooperation 
and conflict. On the one hand, proprietary kingship induced systematic policies of 
dynastic inter-marriage as a political instrument for the aggrandisement of territory as 
well as for securing and enhancing wealth.
‘For the ultimate instance of legitimacy was the dynasty, not the territory. The State 
was conceived as the patrimony of the monarch, and therefore the title-deeds to it could 
be gained by a union of persons: felix Austria. The supreme device of diplomacy was 
therefore marriage - peaceful mirror of war, which so often provoked it.’518
Inter-dynastic marriages not only characterised contemporary ‘international’ 
relations, they constituted the single most cost-effective and rapid strategy of expanded 
personal reproduction of absolutist rulers. Consequently, this was a geopolitical order 
in which ‘states’ could marry ‘states’. As late as 1795, Immanuel Kant found himself 
pressed to demand in his Philosophical Sketch ‘Zum Ewigen Frieden’ that ‘no 
independent nation [Staat], be it large or small, may be acquired by another nation by 
inheritance, exchange, purchase, or gift.’519 Here, Kant indicted the most quotidian 
practices of Old Regime territorial acquisition. He expanded that
‘everyone is aware of the danger that this purported right of acquisition by the marriage 
of nations [Staaten] to one another - a custom unknown in other parts of the world - has 
brought to Europe, even in the most recent times. It is a new form of industry, in which 
influence is increased without expending energy, and territorial possessions are extended 
merely by establishing family alliances.’520
517 McKay and Scott 1983, 16.
518 Anderson 1974, 39; cf. Holsti 1991, 54-7. While Holsti acknowledges the proprietary view 
of the state, he foils to theorize his catalogued war issues - territory, strategy, commerce, state 
survival, dynasticism, balance of power, colonies - on this basis.
519 Kant 1983, 108.
520 Kant 1983, 108.
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The proverbial adage ‘ 7m, felix Austria, nubeV was not only the political 
maxim of the casa d\Austria. The marital accumulation of royal and noble titles led to 
personal unions which ‘bundled’ socially most heteroclite and diverse territories into 
one political space. Spain emerged in 1469 as a result of Isabel of Castile’s marriage to 
Ferdinand of Aragon. The duchy of Burgundy which was once given by a Valois king 
to his son as an apanage turned Austrian after Mary of Burgundy’s marriage to 
Maximilan of Austria. Mazarin engineered Louis XIV’s marriage to the Spanish 
Infanta, Maria Theresa, which was the basis for French pretensions to the Spanish 
throne in 1700. In elective monarchies like Poland, alternating dynastic unions sprang 
up (between Poland and Sweden and Poland and Saxony) with newly elected kings 
eager to turn elective into hereditary monarchies. The dynastic union between Holland 
and England was followed up by a union between Hanover and Britain. Here was a 
geopolitical order in which the Prince Elector of Hanover could easily be the King of 
England, the Prince Elector of Saxony the King of Poland, and the Prince Elector of 
Brandenburg the King of Prussia. European politics was not first and foremost the 
affair of states, but the affair of its ruling Houses - the Habsburgs, the Bourbons, the 
Stuarts, the Hohenzollem, the Romanovs, the Wasas, the Orange-Nassaus, the 
Wittelsbach, the Wettins, the Famese etc.521 Yet, political marriages were not confined 
to the ruling dynasties but were equally pursued at the higher levels of the aristocracy, 
leading to a welter of criss-crossing and transnational inter-noble alliances.522 Finally, 
leading ministers engaged systematically in diplomatic marriages aiming to balance 
personal family interests with those of the kingly state.523
On the other hand and inversely, the resulting European-wide web of 
transregional dynastic family-relations and alliances simultaneously contained the seeds 
of disorder, partition, and de-stabilisation, for it translated immediately ‘private’ inter­
family and intra-family disputes, physical accidents, and pathological calamities into 
‘public’ international conflicts.524 ‘Since the ruler alone guaranteed under absolutism 
the dynastic bracket of his territory, his death led automatically to a systemic crisis.’525
521 H.Weber 1981.
522 Parrott 1997.
523 Cf. Bergin 1985 on Richelieu and Oresko 1995 on Mazarin.
524 Kumsch 1979.
525 Czempiel 1980, 448 [My translation, B.T.]. Czempiel acknowledges the proprietary 
character of absolutist kingship, but fails to uncover its social rationale. ‘Absolutist states
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But systemic crisis was not only confined to the ruler’s death. A whole range of 
dynastic family matters - structurally produced accidents - recurrently shook the inter­
state system to its bones. The end of a dynasty and the accession of a new family to the 
throne entailed almost automatically a general realignment of alliance patterns; 
minorities led to foreign claims to the throne and the takeover of foreign policy by 
strong ministers; regencies presented dangerous power vacua eagerly seized upon by 
powerful courtiers as well as queen mothers which, provided they were of non­
domestic origin, staffed offices and positions with favorites from their home countries; 
in cases of divorce, rival claims to the throne and territories abounded; multiple 
marriages with multiple heirs threw up problems of precedence; bastards came to claim 
rights of domination; in cases of childless marriages, no male heir in direct line, or of 
insanity and physical weakness through generations of inbreeding, domestic as well as 
inter-dynastic disputes arose over the legitimacy of claims to succession of the next 
male heir in line.
Claims to genealogical-hereditary precedence were usually resolved by war. 
Next to trade wars, wars of succession and, more broadly, wars over hereditary 
pretensions, became the dominant forms of international conflict.526 But since dynastic 
family disputes, mediated by the web of inter-dynastic family relations, affected almost 
automatically all European states, any succession crisis could turn easily into a 
multilateral European-wide conflagration. In 1700, the death of childless Spanish king 
Charles II and the acceptance by Louis XIV of the Spanish Empire for his grandson 
Philip of Anjou triggered the War of the Spanish Succession (1702-1713/14) which 
involved all major western and middle European powers. The War of the Polish 
Succession (1733-38) in the wake of the Saxon-Polish king’s death was largely fought 
over non-Polish issues, driven by France eager to recover its pre-Utrecht international 
territorial possessions. Sonless Emperor Charles IV’s death occasioned the War of the 
Austrian Succession (1740-48) in spite of the Pragmatic Sanction. The death of 
heirless Bavarian Elector Max Joseph in 1777 produced the War of the Bavarian 
Succession (1778-9), with Prussia and Austria fighting over the kingless territory.
were, in the strict meaning of the term, private property, beyond any political, legal, or ethical 
control.’ Czempiel 1980, 449.
526 Listed in Holsti 1991, 48-50. Cf. also Kratochwil 1995, 31. Contrary to Kratochwil’s 
argument, dynasticism was not simply a ‘background condition’ which modified an otherwise 
pure notion of indivisible sovereignty, but expressed a distinct quality of sovereignty.
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From a contemporary perspective, it must seem a world-historical irony that the 
pathological history of a child, Charles II of Spain, and his eventual recovery and 
survival postponed the division of the world for another thirty years. Yet, these 
‘follies’ were inscribed into the proprietary nature of the European dynastic system of 
states. In his critique of Hegel, Marx summarised the two elements of hereditary 
monarchy as follows: ‘the accident o f the will - caprice - and the accident o f nature - 
birth. So: His Majesty Accident. Accident is thus the actual unity of the state.'527 As 
long as proprietary kingship constituted the dominant political regime in Europe, 
international relations were to a decisive degree structured by the whims of inter- 
dynastic family relations.
Dynastic Rules o f Succession as Public International Law
Given the vagaries of dynastic family relations, the fixation of rules of 
succession and inheritance became thus by necessity a matter of international concern; 
their internationally recognised codification a form of preventive action. Contra 
constructivism, however, an exhaustive understanding of these constitutive rules 
requires a prior recognition of the pre-conventional and non-ideational proprietary 
conditions of dynastic sovereignty. In this context, ‘private’ family law became part 
and parcel not only of constitutional, but also of international ‘public’ law - indeed, a 
matter of extreme urgency and priority for European rulers. Constitutional lawyers 
studied dynastic genealogies more than positive principles of constitutional and 
international law - indeed, the latter could be read as a catalogue of the former.528 
Consequently, the ever-present concern amongst the ruling houses over regulating 
questions of succession presented a conscious strategy of imposing order over 
structurally produced property conflicts. Inheritance law, as Kunisch argued, became
527 Marx [1843] 1975, 35.
528 The transition from the medieval ins gentium to the Spanish-dominated ius inter gentes and 
the French-dominated droit public de I ’Europe failed to establish a modem body of general 
abstract norms of international law. Grewe 1984, 420-22. This failure is bound up with the 
personalized nature of dynastic sovereignty. Through an additive and issue-related series of 
peace conventions, trade agreements and coalition treaties, early modem international law 
codified to a decisive degree the inter-personal relations of the European princely fraternity.
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the linchpin of absolutist reason of state529 and, by extension, of the absolutist system 
of states.
Order in these delicate matters, however, meant to wrest testamentary control 
over the realm from each single monarch and to invest it into codified dynastic 
succession laws which thereby entered into the body of *loix fondamentcnix\ In 
Denmark, as Kunisch shows, after the state-threatening Nordic Wars (1655-60), the 
newly promulgated Lex Regia of 1665 laid down the principle of male primogeniture 
and the associated fundamental law of the indivisibility of territorial possessions. 
Dynastic continuity, not the contingent will of each ruler, should guarantee territorial 
integrity as well as political stability. In this perspective, sovereignty lay with the 
dynasty, not with each individual monarch. What we see therefore is an attempt to 
bring the whims of private family law in line with more enduring principles of raison 
d ’Etat - lex fundamentalis et immutabilis. This was the intention. The reality 
contravened these rationalising efforts decisively, precisely because the proprietary 
character of kingship was not overcome and precisely because no institution was 
powerful enough to penalise contraventions once absolute sovereignty had been 
conceded by the estates to the king. The constitutional semantics of stability, defining 
sovereignty as inalienable, unlimited, irrevocable, indivisible and imprescriptible, ran 
time and again against inherently fickle dynastic proprietary practice.
The Case o f the 'Austrian Pragmatic Sanction ’
Let us exemplify the failure of dynastic succession rules with reference to the 
famous Austrian Pragmatic Sanction of 1713.530 The Habsburg monarchy, unlike 
France, constituted a monarchical union which united three different territorial 
complexes, with three different dynastic succession laws under its umbrella. After the 
experience of the Spanish War of Succession, the partition of the Spanish Empire and 
Charles IV’s lack of a male heir, the Pragmatic Sanction unified and codified new 
female succession rules. Female succession should safeguard the integrity of the huge 
territorial gains under Charles IV’s reign. Acceptance of the Pragmatic Sanction was
529 Kunisch 1979 and 1982; Czempiel 1980, 447; Grewe 1984, 48-339.
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not only sought of the Austrian estates and the German Imperial Diet (Reichstag), but 
also of the European great dynasties so as to receive diplomatic guarantees of the 
property of the House of Habsburg. International recognition was achieved by a series 
of bilateral treaties which incorporated the Pragmatic Sanction effectively into the body 
of the Ius Publicum Europaeum. Diplomatic confirmation of dynastic succession rules 
should guarantee the territorial integrity of the state. In line with the proprietary 
character of public power, these bilateral treaties involved Austrian compensations for 
foreign acceptance - a sequence of ‘swaps’ of territories, rights of domination, and 
declarations of guarantee.
Prussia recognised the Pragmatic Sanction in 1728 in return for Austrian 
acceptance of Prussian succession rules and its support for Prussia’s claims in the 
disputed territories of Jiilich-Berg against the pretensions of the Bavarian House of 
Wittelsbach. Denmark-Norway (1732), Spain (1731) and Russia (1732) followed suit 
in return for Austrian acquiescence into their respective internal succession regulations. 
In 1731/32, the Maritime Powers Britain and the Dutch General Estates also agreed to 
guarantee the inviolability of the Pragmatic Sanction in the Second Treaty of Vienna 
on condition that (1) the Austrian Emperor’s daughter, Maria Theresia, should not 
marry a Bourbon prince, that (2) no Austrian subject should trade with east Asia, and 
that (3) the Austrian Ostende Company should be dissolved. In 1732, the German 
Imperial Diet turned the recognition of Austrian succession laws - against the votes of 
Bavaria and Saxony - into a state law. France, predictably, battled more persistently 
against the Pragmatic Sanction until recognition was given in 1738 in exchange for the 
formerly Austrian kingdom of Naples and Sicily which went to Spain.
However, on the death of Charles VI in 1740, the delicate diplomatic and 
territorial architecture largely masterminded by Walpole, imploded in the wake of the 
ensuing succession crisis between the two lines of the House of Habsburg. The 
resulting power vacuum was seized by Frederick II of Prussia, who, describing the 
situation as a ‘conjoncture favorable’, invaded Austrian Silesia in the winter of 
1740/41 with no dynastic claim to the Austrian monarchy whatsoever, but dismayed at 
Charles Vi’s decision to exclude Prussia from the Jiilich-Berg succession. Spain 
demanded Tuscany and Parma. Bavaria renewed its claim to the imperial title and
530 Kunisch 1979, 41-74; Duchhardt 1997, 79; McKay and Scott 1983, 118-77.
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made attempts to seize Bohemia, while France tried to lay its hand on the Austrian 
Low Countries. In fact, the entire Austrian lands were virtually regarded as an estate 
by European dynasts for whose appropriation far-fetched legal titles were mobilized. 
The break-up of Austria was imminent. In the absence of an international court of 
family law, the inheritance conflict turned into a European-wide military conflict. In 
spite of its misleading nomer, the War of the Austrian Succession was largely a 
Franco-British war over European hegemony. Yet, while France pursued its traditional 
territorial imperialism, Britain pursued no direct continental territorial goals, but 
heavily subsidised the anti-French coalition.531 It took eight years to put down the 
disputes in the Peace of Aachen (1748) which codified the territorial revirement, while 
Maria Theresia survived battered, but not beaten.
In sum, the ensemble of respective succession rules formed the ‘hidden’ 
European ‘public’ international law. Neither did the fact that succession rules and 
schemes of partition were often secretly agreed upon as part of the aroma imperii help 
to stabilise European politics. Conflicts of inheritance did not always provide the 
immediate casus belli, but they created the discourse of legitimacy in which many war 
declarations and peace settlements were grounded. While the language used to 
legitimise interventions and conquests was framed in terms of legality, military conflict 
constituted the ultimate accepted regulator of the absolutist system o f ‘states’.532 Since 
territory was first and foremost a source of income, ‘political Europe was like an estate 
map, and war was a socially acceptable form of property acquisition.’533 Dynastic 
succession crises as expressions of proprietary kingship translating into crises of the 
European system of states continued to be the norm, until states were to be de­
personalised, that is, until a new property-regime de-privatised political power.534
531 McKay and Scott 1983, 172.
532 ‘The nature of the European dynastic state required that rival claims of inheritance be 
defended through warfare.’ Bonney 1991, 345.
533 Hale cited in Bonney 1991, 345.
534 ‘The eighteenth century was thus indeed an ancien regime whose structure of states could 
only be broken up by an entirely new principle of order [my translation, B.T.].’ Kunisch 1979, 
79.
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Territoriality: Circulating Territories, Circulating Princes
According to John Ruggie, the modem system of territorial states rests on a 
configuration of territoriality structured by mutually exclusive, geographically fixed, 
linearly demarcated and functionally similar political spaces.535 The construction of 
modem territoriality results from the confluence of private property rights, the 
separation of public and private realms, and the king’s monopolisation of the legitimate 
use of force, generating simultaneously the spatial demarcations of internal and 
external realms, legitimised by reciprocal international recognitions. In this perspective, 
the genesis of the modem system of territorial states is located in the period between 
the Renaissance and the Baroque age.536
However, proprietary kingship imposed a rather different territorial logic upon 
the spatial configuration of early modem geopolitics. First, territoriality remained a 
function of private dynastic practices of territorial accumulation and circulation, 
frustrating a generic identity or fixity between state and territory. Second, given the 
imperfect nature of absolutist sovereignty and the survival of feudal and patrimonial 
practices, territoriality remained non-exclusive and administratively non-uniform. 
Third, the diversity of early modem sovereign actors - hereditary and elective 
monarchies, merchant republics, confederations, aristocratic republics, constitutional 
monarchy, cities, states of estates - precludes any functional similarity, not to speak of 
equality, of contemporary actors. Consequently, fourth, the periodisation of the 
formation of the modem system of states, based on exclusive territoriality operated by 
a depersonalised state, falls into the 19th Century.
The dynastic structure of inter-state relations had direct implications for the 
changing geographies of contemporary territoriality. The politics of inter-dynastic 
family relations led to supra-regional territorial constructions - especially dynastic 
unions - which defined the logic of territorial (dis-)order and defied the logic of 
territorial contiguity and stability. Marital policies and inheritance practices, mediated 
by violent conflict, led to frequent territorial re-distributions among European princes. 
Territorial fixity was thus prevented. Territorial unity meant nothing but the unity of
535 Ruggie 1993 and 1998, 875-6; Spruyt 1994, 153-5; Giddens 1985, 89-91. From a realist 
perspective cf. Gilpin 1981, 121-2.
536 Cf. also Kratochwil 1986, 51
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the ruling House, personified in its dynastic head. Territorial continuity was identical 
with the smooth transmission of the sovereign title from dynastic head to dynastic 
head. Any dynastic vacancy threatened directly the territorial integrity of the monarchy 
and opened it up to foreign claims. Territory was not constitutive of sovereignty, but a 
proprietary adjunct of the dynasty. It was thus handled like an economic asset in 
international relations, being the disposable mass for inheritances, compensations, 
exchanges, securities, cessions, donations, partitions, indemnities, satisfactions, sales 
and purchases.537 Dynastic interests, not national interests or reason of state, defined 
the logic of early modem territoriality.538
But the unity of the House was not coterminous with the geographical 
contiguity of its lands. Although these territories were nominally ‘bounded’ as they 
belonged to but one sovereign, they constituted geographical conglomerates, governed 
by diverse law codes and tax-regimes, criss-crossing the dynastic map of Europe. Early 
modem Europe was a states system of ‘composite monarchies’.539 At the same time, 
the ever-changing territorial size of early modem ‘states’ intensified the problem of 
internal administrative cohesion. Austria, Spain, Sweden, Russia or Prussia exemplified 
quite graphically the scattered and disjointed mosaic character of early modem 
territoriality, combining multiethnic provinces with different law traditions, which had 
little in common except their rulers. For example, in 1792, it was calculated that
‘the territories over which the House of Austria ruled included seven kingdoms, one 
archduchy, twelve duchies, one grand duchy, two margravates, seventeen counties 
(Grafschafteri) and four lordships. The order in which these were listed was significant, 
since the geographer and statistician adhered to the strict ranking dictated by the feudal 
hierarchy’.540
These territories did not form a geographical continuum and were governed 
according to the tenets of aeqiie principaliter - each region keeping its customary legal 
system.541 The geographical consolidation of compact territories and the administrative 
unification of these lands was time and again betrayed by the vagaries of dynastic 
family-relations as driven home by war. Consequently, early modem territoriality was
537 von Arentin 1981; Grewe 1984, 462-3; Klingenstein 1997, 442.
538 Mattingly 1988, 108-9 and 117-8; Schroeder 1994a, 8.
539 Elliott 1992; cf. Holsti 1991, 51
540 Klingenstein 1997, 449.
256
not primarily a state-centralising, national, ethnic, denominational, geostrategic, 
topographical, cultural or linguistic construction, but the protean outcome of dynastic 
nuptial policies of war-supported territorial re-distribution.
Even France’s territorial policy was not principally governed by the self- 
sufficient extension of its possessions to her ‘natural frontiers’ of the Rhine, the Alps 
and the Pyrenees, nor should the constitutive practices of early modern boundary- 
formation be equated with modem forms.542 In fact, strategic frontiers (frontieres) 
were dissociated from the jurisdictional boundaries (limites) of kingly territories.543 
The non-congruence between military frontiers and proprietary boundaries meant that 
geo-strategic concerns could operate quite independently from the regionally dispersed 
security-demands of dynastic territories. Certainly, border zones enjoyed strategic 
importance, but
‘the “natural frontiers” did not become an overriding objective of French policy till the 
French Revolution. Although seventeenth and eighteenth-century governments often 
thought in terms of defensible frontiers, their ambitions were never limited by France’s 
natural geographical boundaries and often went beyond them.’544
For Louis XIV, the annexation of Holland or Catalonia enjoyed higher priority 
than reaching the Rhine or the Pyrenees. It was more important to marry into Italian 
polities, than to consolidate the Alpine frontiers. Natural frontiers mattered not as 
natural termini of territorial consolidation, but as giving control over passages, 
strongholds, and bridge-heads for further expansion beyond them.545 If the 
transformation of zonal border regions into linear frontiers was consciously pursued 
from the 17th Century onwards, it derived largely from mercantilist policies of trade 
control and tariff setting. But this was an expandable practice.
Dynasticism implied no organic identity between a state and the geographical 
extent of state territory. A state did not possess its own territorial identity 
independently of dynastic property titles; inversely: the constitution of state-territory 
followed the actions of the monarch. A dynastic state’s territory was the ensemble of
541 Elliott 1993, 52 and 61.
542 Cf. Kratochwil 1986, 33 for a different view.
543 Sahlins 1990, 1425-6.
544 McKay and Scott 1983, 7; cf. Grewe 1984, 374-81.
545 Sahlins 1990, 1433.
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accumulated rights to specific domains, bundled together through proprietary 
kingship.546 This generic non-identity continued the mobile logic of feudal lords who 
were easily able to take up rights of lordship in most diverse places, transferring their 
family seats from one end of Europe to another. Although the frequency of dynastic 
changes receded due a growing juridical and institutional embeddedness of dynasts into 
‘their’ states, sovereignty was still not pegged to an abstract state apparatus, but 
traveled with the Crown. The Habsburg stemlands lay in North-Western Switzerland, 
yet the dynasty rose to power in Vienna and Madrid. The Hohenzollem stemlands lay 
in Wurttemberg, yet the accumulation of dynastic territories occurred around 
Konigsberg and Berlin after acceding to the Prussian throne. While the Bourbons came 
from Navarre, they built up their court at Versailles and after the Utrecht Treaty, a 
branch of the Bourbon family came to take its seat in Madrid to rule the remainder of 
the Spanish Empire. When the Scottish Stuarts were sent into exile, the Dutch 
Oranians took over in London, while the Hanoverian kings had their stemlands in 
northern Germany. The House of Savoy came from Chambery, but ‘found’ a throne 
and established its court in Turin. In principle, dynasties had little problems in ‘finding’ 
new thrones. Successions, marriages, elections or conquests were the conventional 
means of gaining a new kingdom. Territories changed frequently and legitimately their 
masters.
The personalised and imperfect nature of dynastic sovereignty as well as the 
additive logic of territorial acquisitions implied administrative non-uniformity. Even in 
the model country of allegedly successful political centralisation, France, different law 
codes, tax regimes, and privileges, eagerly defended by independent domestic centers 
of power, rendered administrative fragmentation unavoidable.547 Especially the 
distinction between pays d ’Etat and pays d'election barred any progress towards 
uniformity. Furthermore, bounded enclaves like cities, ports, abbeys, bishoprics, 
fortresses, lordships and other territories reproduced the logic of geographical non­
contiguity and administrative non-uniformity. In France, the princes etrangers, 
members of foreign dynasties at the Bourbon court, enjoyed sovereign status and
546 Sahlins 1990, 1427. Contrary to Holsti’s argument, there is no fundamental distinction to be 
made between territory qua inalienable patrimony and territory qua alienable commodity.
Holsti 1991, 90. Proprietary territory had throughout the period a commodified character.
547 Oresko, Gibbs, and Scott 1997, 8-9.
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entered into feudal contractual relations with the king, while having landed 
possessions, offices, and direct inheritance claims in France and elsewhere in 
Europe.548
At the same time, it is misleading to portray the history of dynastic state- 
formation as territorial accumulation purely in terms of a remorselessly linear and 
teleological approach. Not only did setbacks and reverses occur, the logic of dynastic 
territoriality qua political accumulation witnessed both a building-up as well as a 
building-down tendency. The succession provisos of indivisibility and inalienability 
were paper-tigers. In the merry-go-round of territorial exchanges, accumulation and 
disintegration, marriage and succession disputes, war and peace, were two sides of the 
same coin.
Any attempt to define the modernity of international relations merely in terms 
of 17th Century bounded territoriality must therefore be revised.549 Territoriality 
remained non-exclusive, administratively non-integrated, and geographically non­
permanent and fluid, being the proprietary mass of composite states. Post-feudal 
bounded territoriality is not identical with modem territoriality, since it remained first 
and foremost a function of dynastic strategies of geopolitical accumulation.
Demystifying the Peace of Westphalia
Proprietary dynasticism, sovereignty by birth, the persistence of hierarchical 
ranking, dynastic unions and wars of succession, public international law as dynastic 
family law, and circulating territories as dynastic property define the central traits of 
early modem international relations. Let us now specify how the Peace of Westphalia 
was embedded in and reflected the wider social constitution of contemporary European 
politics in order to demystify the conventional IR interpretation.
548 Parrott 1997. ‘The position of the princes Strangers within France exemplified the way in 
which individual sovereignties overlapped and intersected.’ Oresko, Gibbs, and Scott 1997, 10.
549 Argued by Ruggie 1993.
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Proprietary Dynasticism vs Sovereignty
The most obvious indicator of Westphalia’s non-modemity lies in the nature of 
the political regimes of the contracting parties. What is usually overlooked, or if noted 
dismissed as irrelevant, is the fairly straightforward observation that the Treaty was not 
concluded between states, but between rulers, or to be more precise, between private 
persons and corporate bodies. The preambulatory introductions to the Treaties first 
carefully establish the character of the major signatories: the kings of France and 
Sweden, the German Emperor and the German Estates of the Empire - the 
Reichsstande, consisting of the 9 Electors, the remainder of the German Princes, and 
the 51 imperial free cities.550 The preambles proceed to list long collections of titles of 
dominion behind each of these major parties to the Treaties, each of them enjoying 
different status indicating ‘functionally different’ rights in different territories which 
make up their internally differentiated realms. These rather lengthy listings are not 
simply symptomatic of a time-bound conception of honour and representation, but 
rather show that these rulers held bundles of rights in personal union over variegated 
dominions - each of them concluding the Treaties in multiple capacities as lords over 
different dominions. The Treaties reflect thus the fact that the basic units of 
international politics were not states, but persons and associations of persons, literally 
owning their respective realms and dominions. In other words, none of the signatories 
to the Treaties headed a modem state, nor did any contracting polity transform into 
one as a result of 1648.
The prevailing principle of proprietary dynasticism determined the bulk of the 
Treaty stipulations referring to questions, of dynastic succession, proprietary 
restitutions, and territorial changes. Let us first turn to the nature of the question over 
dynastic successions and restitutions.
If the structure of early modem international conflicts was characterised by 
dynastic personalism, it should not surprise that wars and international conflicts were 
basically intra-family as well as inter-family disputes. Since noble intermarriage was a 
dominant ruling class strategy of securing and enhancing wealth through the 
accumulation of rights over territories, most of Europe’s ruling dynasties were to some
550 Symcox, pp.40-41. Generally Dickmann 1972.
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degree related. It follows that the ever-present concern amongst the ruling Houses 
over the regulation of successions and inheritance presented a conscious strategy of 
imposing order over structurally produced property-conflicts. The dynastic principle 
carried time and again inter-family disputes into the sphere of ‘international relations’. 
Indeed, it would semantically be more precise to substitute the term ‘international 
relations4 by the term ‘inter-dynastic relations’.
Westphalia was precisely set in this context. It did not abandon the dynastic 
principle so as to remove the root cause for recurring destabilisations of the system, 
but could only impose a very short-lived surface regulation by laying down strict rules 
of succession, namely primogeniture, which should ensure the stability of returned 
proprietary titles.551 The necessary failure of this project was demonstrated by the fact 
that there were few wars within 17th and 18th Century Europe which were not wars of 
succession. And in a system of states, were ‘states’ could marry ‘states’, it should not 
surprise that the honeymoon turned quickly into a nightmare.
This leads to the issue of territorial changes. As the Treaties were concluded 
between personal rulers rather than between abstract states, territory did not refer to 
administratively uniform geographical space, but rather to bundles of rights of 
domination over differentiated dominions. These are carefully listed in the Treaties as 
rights, privileges, properties - in short: regales - over cities, bishoprics, abbacies, 
lordships, ports and roads, garrisons and jurisdictions. France received the bishoprics 
of Metz, Toul, and Verdun as well as the right-rhenanian fortress of Breisach and, 
most importantly, Alsace.552 Sweden gained the archbishopric of Bremen, the bishopric 
of Verden, the Baltic port of Wismar and, most importantly, the Western part of the 
duchy of Pomerania. These territories were ceded as Imperial fiefs, so that the Swedish 
crown became a vassal of the Emperor. Thus, it was not that these territorial rights 
were given to France and Sweden qua states, rather they were incorporated by their 
respective rulers into their dominions.
551 Cf., for example, articles 18, 19, 48 IPM.
552 Although it is often pointed out with reference to clauses 71-82 (IPM) that the Habsburg 
dominions of Alsace were given in ‘full sovereignty’ to France (Osiander 1994, 68-70; for the 
opposite view see Symcox 1974, 39), clause 112 (IPM) qualifies this transfer in that the 
bishoprics of Strasbourg and Basel, various abbacies, the ten Alsacian imperial cities and the 
nobility of lower Alsace remained in immediate dependence upon the Empire.
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Both, with reference to the problem of dynastic succession and the return of 
property as well as with reference to territorial changes, the peculiar intermingling of 
what we perceive today as elements of civil law, public law, and international public 
law did not constitute an unfortunate contamination of a pure sphere of inter-state 
relations with family law and constitutional law, nor did the Treaties effectuate a clear 
break with these interlacing spheres of law. Rather, this perceived legal untidiness 
corresponded precisely to prevailing pre-capitalist property relations, in which public 
political power was equivalent to private rights of dominion over personal property.
Restoration vs Modernity
Contrary to conventional assumptions on 1648’s essential modernity, a closer 
reading of the Treaties reveals the ubiquity of such terms as ‘restoration’, ‘re­
establishment’ and ‘restitution’ - in sum a re-affirmation of ‘ancient rights and liberties’ 
which the signatories and especially the German estates had long enjoyed before the 
outbreak of the Thirty Years’ War. The semantics of restoration reflected the 
prevailing consensus that the Treaties should not enact new principles of international 
public law, but should rather codify the reversal to the status quo ante bellum. The 
Thirty Years’ War was not regarded as the great geopolitical convulsion which forced 
decision-makers to adopt new rules of international relations, but rather as a deplorable 
diversion from pre-war international customs which had to be restored.553
Let us exemplify these restorative tendencies in relation to three phenomena: 
(1) territorial redistributions, (2) confessional regulations, and (3) the ‘sovereignty’ of 
the German estates.
First, the afore-mentioned territorial redistributions throw up a difficult 
question. If the leitmotif of the peacemakers was to restore international order to the 
status quo ante, how were these territorial changes to be dealt with? The apparent
553 ‘There was a consensus among them [sc. the peacemakers, B.T.] that the settlement should 
bring a return to the status quo ante bellum, the main problem then being to define the 
terminus ante quern. The Emperor pressed for a date around 1630, but this would have 
introduced change with regard to the pre-war state. His opponents carried the day, essentially 
turning the clock back to 1618 in temporal and to 1624 in religious matters.’ Osiander 1994,
44.
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contradiction is resolved if we come to understand how the victorious powers came to 
legitimise their undeniable territorial gains. France and Sweden did not receive these 
lands due to their ‘rights of conquest’, but rather as indemnities or ‘satisfactions’ for 
the services they had rendered to their German allies. At first sight, this distinction 
seems to be hair-splitting. However, the terminology of indemnities and satisfactions is 
not an auxiliary legal construction, but points to the fact that the rights to these lands 
were indeed purchased. The French agreed at Munster to pay three million livres in 
line with the convention that the purchase of land was an acknowledged form of pre­
modem international relations between personal rulers. Furthermore, the insertion of 
what amounts virtually to a contract of purchase into the Peace Treaties shows the 
enormous importance attributed at the Peace Congress to the principle of legality in 
concord with ancient customs.554 If a right of conquest was to be admitted as a 
principle of international public law, it would have undermined the dominant orienting 
principle of international stability.
Stability and restoration were also the leitmotif in the treatment of confessional 
issues. In the IR literature, there is recurring agreement on the Augsburg Peace of 
Religion of 1555 as a precursor of modem statehood in so far as the maxim cuius 
regio eius religio allowed each ruler to impose and change the religion in his lands at 
will (ius reformandi). Religious autonomy in the German territories over and against 
the Charles V broke the ‘Spanish Servitude’. In so far as this principle did break the 
Empire’s monopoly on determining the official faith in the wake of the Reformation, it 
does, of course, present a major change in 16th Century European politics. The 
question is, a change in which direction? To the degree that rulers gained the right of 
religious self-determination, that of their subjects within their territories was lost. To 
this extent, the maxim cuius regio eius religio remained decidedly absolutist in 
character. Subjects were forced to adopt the faith of their rulers. If anything, 1555 
points to the persisting non-separation between politics and religion in the 16th 
Century, that is: the non-secularisation of the state, even if it allowed for 
denominational pluralism within the Empire. Spanish religious universalism was 
replaced on a territorial basis by plural religious absolutisms.
554 Osiander 1994, 49.
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To which degree did Westphalia dissolve this nexus? The principle that each 
ruler could decide and impose his faith on his lands was abandoned and replaced by the 
rule that every territory was to retain “in perpetuity” the religion it had on 1 January 
1624 - the famous Normaljahr (reference year) which served as a standard for 
determining the restoration of pre-war territorial religious allegiances. What we see 
therefore, is nothing less than an international prescription of the territorial distribution 
of different confessions. This was, in fact, a reversal of Augsburg. The implication was 
that whereas henceforth rulers could change their creeds, the official faith of the land 
was there to stay.555 In this case, the Estates became the guardians of the religious 
status quo. This meant that the ins reformandi of the territorial princes was severely 
restricted. In specific cases, as in the bishopric of Osnabriick, the Treaties fixed an 
alternation between catholic and protestant rulers. What we see again is an attempt to 
‘freeze’ the distribution of confessions so as to minimise conflict. However, an 
international treaty which imposes religion on territories can hardly be deemed to 
constitute a step towards internal sovereignty. Although the followers of the respective 
minoritarian faiths were allowed to exercise their religion in privacy, most of them 
emigrated to lands of their faith.556 In sum, 1648 constituted the internationalisation of 
territorial confessional status - a turning back of the religious clock to 1624, and in 
constitutional terms to pre-1555 - not in order to achieve self-determination, be it 
either princely or popular, but in order to ensure peace.
Restoration was also reflected in the nature of the international order laid down 
in the peace provisions. The partisans of the modernity thesis usually refer to the key 
provision of Article 8 of the Treaty of Osnabriick (IPO) and Articles 64 and 65 of the 
Treaty of Munster (IPM), laying down the right for the German Estates to conclude 
treaties, enter into alliances, and declare war {ius foederis et ius belli ac pacem). The 
rights to treat, declare war, legislate, levy armies, and impose taxation are held to fulfil 
the criteria of modem sovereignty. However, there are a series of important 
qualifications to be made.
First, even this icon of international modernity did not constitute an innovation. 
As Andreas Osiander pointed out,
555 Asch 1988, 124.
556 Burkhardt 1992, 176.
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‘contrary to what is sometimes implied or asserted, this was really a clarification of the 
existing legal custom. The faculty for the estates to conclude alliances had been legally 
established since the Middle Ages.’557
The Estates’ ius foederis was recognised as early as 1356 in the Golden Bull. While 
this right had a long pedigree, it was also never absolute, but subject to certain 
classically feudal reciprocal limitations vis-a-vis the emperor, the feudal overlord. 1648 
re-affirmed and further qualified both. This should not be taken to imply the proto- 
modernity of the pre-1648 German medieval estates, but points rather to the sui 
generis dual character of the German imperial constitution, in which the ‘liberty’ of the 
Estates and the territorial Princes - their ius armorum - was a well-recognised part 
which antedated and outlasted 1648.558 The codified right to conclude alliances 
conformed with prevailing constitutional practice in the German Empire. In this sense, 
the ius foederis was part and parcel of inter-personal medieval conceptions of 
reciprocal fealty among two or more semi-independent lordly actors.559 Its roots lay in 
the medieval lordly right of resistance, based on the arms-bearing status of lords within 
the wider context of feudal relations of exploitation. The medieval right of resistance 
and the right to treat were of a pair.
Second, these rights were decisively hedged by further stipulations. Most 
centrally, the Estates’ ius belli ac pacem  and the ius foederis were restricted to 
defensive alliances and operations, excluding offensive actions. Further provisions 
prohibited the conclusion of alliances against the Reichslandfrieden (Imperial Peace) 
and against the Westphalian Settlement itself. These limits were perfectly in line with 
the principle of ius territoriale (Landeshoheit!territorial lordship) enjoyed by the 
Estates, but not with the modem notion of sovereignty. The repeated transgression of 
these provisions points to social and political processes which lie outside the 
interpretive reach of normative-legal interpretations. Further express conditions were 
enjoined. The Treaties forbade, for example, intervention by the parties to the Treaty in 
the Burgundian Circle of the Empire, viz. the Spanish Netherlands (Clauses 3 and 4).560 
In other words, neither the Emperor nor the German polities were allowed to join the
557 Osiander 1994, 47; cf. also Dickmann 1972, 325-32.
558 Burkhardt 1992, 101 and especially 105.
559 Bockenforde 1969, 458-63; classically Brunner 1992.
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Spanish in their war against the French in this theatre of war. This reflected an essential 
French war aim, namely the insulation of Spain from its imperial ally. Thus, from the 
French perspective, the Westphalian Treaties represented a separate peace 
(Separatfrieden/Sonderfrieden), prohibiting interference in Franco-Spanish relations, 
which gave France a free hand to deal with Spain on a one to one basis. France and 
Spain, of course, signed a separate bilateral agreement eleven years later (Treaty of the 
Pyrenees, 1659).
Third, at the same time that the German Estates and Princes re-affirmed their 
alliance-concluding powers, they continued to enjoy the ‘ius suffragii\ that is, the 
right to co-decide imperial foreign policy through the pan-German institution of the 
Imperial Diet (Reichstag) (clause 65 IPM).561 It started to meet from 1663 onwards in 
Regensburg as a permanent assembly of representatives of the Estates until 1806, 
guarding over the preservation of their liberties and co-determining imperial internal 
and foreign policy. If the sub-imperial German actors remained embedded in imperial 
institutions, it is not surprising to find that their alleged sovereignty was further 
compromised by Treaty provisions which disallowed the conclusion of alliances against 
the Emperor (clause 65) - re-asserting the old custom of imperial loyalty (Reichstreue) 
- 562 and which formally prohibited warfare between the Estates (clause 116 (IPM)) 
obliging them to submit inter-Estates disputes to adjudication to the two supreme 
courts of the Empire, the Reichskammergericht (Imperial Cameral Court) and the 
Reichshojrat (Imperial Aulic Council), in a process known as Reichsexekution. It is 
worth to note that these courts did not only settle disputes between Estates, but also 
received complaints and suits brought by subjects against their direct territorial lords. 
The referral of inter-Estates disputes to a higher authority clearly implied inter-actor 
hierarchy in the imperial sub-system. While the Reichstag stalled Germany’s 
transformation into an absolutist Empire, it equally stalled Germany’s complete 
fragmentation into independent small-scale mini-absolutisms. The Empire was and 
remained a multi-layered semi-feudal and semi-monarchical federation and the
560 Symcox 1974, 40.
561 See Burkhardt on the Empire as a ‘third way’ of early modem state organisation. Burkhardt 
1992, 108-25.
562 Burkhardt even evaluates the explicit acknowledgement of Reichstreue in relation to the 
right to conclude alliances as a success for the Emperor. Burkhardt 1992, 106.
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constitutional status of the German Princes and Estates was and remained embedded 
within it.
Dynastic Collective Security System vs. the Balance o f Power
The implication of the German Estates’ limited ‘sovereignty’ (territorial 
lordship) was that Westphalia was not only an international settlement, but also a 
direct intervention into the ‘internal’ structure of the imperial constitution. The 
Treaties had thus a dual character, being at once instruments of international as well as 
German constitutional law in their function of Basic Laws (leges fundam entals).563 As 
the Thirty Years’ War was also a constitutional struggle within Germany between 
centralising-absolutist and particularistic-representational principles of state- 
organisation, so was 1648 also a constitutional settlement of the peculiar mixed 
German constitution which remained a halfway house between corporative- 
representational privileges supported by the estates and absolutist prerogatives claimed 
by the Emperor. In IR terms, the German sub-system retained a sui generis structure, 
based on particularistic and thus ‘anarchical’ principles’ and universal and thus 
‘hierarchical’ principles.
Crucially, however, this settlement was not a purely internal German affair. 
Rather, the elevation of the German constitution to an element of public international 
law meant the internationalisation of German politics - the constitutional independence 
of German states and princes over and against the Emperor was to be guaranteed by 
France and Sweden.564 Both powers assumed the task of guaranteeing the post- 
Westphalian Order. Thus, 1648 represented in essence the victory of France over the 
repeated attempts by the House of Habsburg to turn the German Empire into a 
hereditary absolutist state. In order to maintain German disunity, France reserved the 
right to intervene in German affairs if Westphalian clauses were to be infringed. When
563 Bockenforde 1969; Oestreich 1982c.
564 Inversely, the Peace Treaties of Westphalia were incorporated into the corpus of German 
imperial law as a basic constitutional law.
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the Empire dissolved under Napoleonic pressure in 1806, it incurred Sweden’s protest, 
since she was not consulted as a guarantor of the Peace of Westphalia.565
It follows that the core idea of the Treaty was not the establishment of full 
internal and external legal sovereignty for all actors involved, nor even the ‘liberty’ or 
autonomy of the sub-imperial German polities, but rather the establishment of peace in 
the interest of and supervised by France.566 At the same time that political self- 
determination in the form of the right to conclude alliances was re-affirmed, its use was 
severely limited. Although the signatories were formally elevated to agents of peace 
and war, their licence to warring was heavily circumscribed.567 In other words, 1648 
did not put forward principles of international public law which recognised the 
absolute internal and external sovereignty of the signatories, but rather established a 
system of collective security which tried to ‘freeze’ the legal and territorial status quo 
favourable to and guaranteed by the two victorious powers France and Sweden 
(clauses 115-17 IPM and article 18, clauses 5-7 IPO).568 What this means is that power 
politics was not yet acknowledged as a legitimate maxim of foreign policy conduct in a 
rulerless society. Concomitantly, the regulative idea behind international politics was 
not yet conceived in terms of the balance-of-power, through which the independence 
of any one actor would be ‘naturally’ guaranteed by the free play of shifting 
alliances.569 On the contrary, 1648 was an attempt to fix the territorial status quo ‘for 
perpetuity’ of an international system which was imagined in highly static terms.570 
Thus, 1648 constituted the juridification (Verrechtlichung) of European politics, 
guaranteed by the two Garantiemachte France and Sweden. Both powers had 
superordinate rights of arbitration and intervention over and against those actors which 
contravened or violated Treaty stipulations. In fact, the Treaty provides evidence that 
we do not see the removal of universal/hierarchical claims to international authority,
565 Oestreich 1982c, 243.
566 Duchhardt 1989b.
567 Burkhardt’s contrary assertion that the Westphalian Peace was ‘neutral of peace and war’ 
over-emphasises the actual behaviour of post-1648 states over and against the intentions and 
legal ideas of its drafters. Burkhardt 1992, 203.
568 Duchhardt 1989b, 533; Osiander 1994, 40-42.
569 Both, Duchhardt and Osiander point to embryonic ideas of international equilibrium 
amongst the plenipotentiaries to the Peace Congress, but are equally agreed that power politics 
and the balance-of-power were not acknowledged as principles of the Treaty. Duchhardt 1989, 
536; Osiander 1994, 80-82. Cf. also Burkhardt 1992, 202 and Repgen 1988.
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but rather the re-legalisation and re-normafication of European politics with specific 
consideration of the German sub-system in a system of functionally differentiated 
actors. Whereas the core idea of 1648 was peace, not self-determination, the core idea 
of the balance of power is self-determination, not peace.
In sum, the nature of the political regimes of the parties to the Treaties, the 
restorative and backward-looking substance of the Treaty provisions, and the 
collective security intentions of the peace-makers, provide considerable evidence of the 
pre-modem nature of the Westphalian Peace Treaties. Far from establishing the 
classical model of international relations based on modem sovereign states, as the IR 
literature repeatedly falsely asserts, they enshrined the constitutional relations among 
the actors of the German sub-system and their relations with decidedly non-modem 
dynastic states. To this extent, 1648 was more of an end than a beginning.
Principles of Geopolitical Order: Dynastic Equilibrium and the Balance of Power
Were there any systemic limits to the impetus behind absolutist geopolitical 
expansion? Can we identify any generally acknowledged and pursued principles of 
geopolitical order in the early modem period? These questions may be answered by 
setting them within the context of the two great rivaling contemporary conceptions of 
geopolitical order, empire and the balance of power.
Dynastic Equilibrium qua Territorial Compensations
We argued that dynastic actors, in spite of the existence of a collectivity of 
independent polities, clung to universal schemes of geopolitical order which legitimised 
their aggressive foreign policies. Yet, the terminology of power-balancing emerged for 
the first time, after the Italian prelude, as a distinct discourse in the 17th Century and 
became a recognised norm, enshrined in the Peace of Utrecht, during the 18th
570 The ‘ideal was a settlement that would be definitive and final, restoring the public peace of
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Century.571 Does this negate the thesis of Europe’s multiple universalisms? Much 
depends here on the time-bound meanings of the balance of power and a historical 
contextualisation of the identity of its respective protagonists. In contrast, Hans 
Morgenthau’s, Martin Wight’s, Herbert Butterfield’s and Hedley Bull’s contributions, 
in spite of the historical examples adduced, are thoroughly ahistorical in character, 
since the authors first establish an ideal type of the balance of power as a ‘universal 
concept’ and then proceed to subsume most diverse historical cases under it, forcing 
them to modify, subdivide, and dilute the ideal-type in an ad hoc fashion.572 In 
addition, the ahistorical and socially disembodied character of realist theories of the 
balance of power presupposes what has to be explained. For example, Morgenthau’s 
assumption that actors seek ‘territorial aggrandizement’ turns into a transhistorical 
and, thus, naturalised law, preventing him from theorising the fundamental difference 
between dynastic equilibrium and modem power-balancing.573 Constructivist accounts 
of early modem equilibrium, while infirming neorealism, fail to spell out the social 
sources of dynastic interests which drive its construction as a time-bound convention, 
while also underestimating its aggressive consequences.574
Two opposed, yet temporarily simultaneous, practices of the balance of power 
- respectively operated by the continental dynastic powers and the British 
parliamentary-constitutional monarchy - can be discerned: Equilibrium vs. Active 
Balancing.575 Although both conceptions operated on the basis of incommensurable 
premises, in international political practice, they were fused as the British conception 
manipulated and governed the continental one.
On the side of absolutist powers, power-balancing during the 18th Century did 
not rest on the idea that each political actor enjoyed a priori its own internationally 
recognised legitimacy and independence based on natural law, which was to be
the Empire and, if possible, extending it to Europe as a whole.’ Osiander 1994, 43.
571 Fenske 1975; Butterfield 1966.
572 Morgenthau 1985, 187-240; Wight 1966 and 1978, 168-90; Butterfield 1966; Bull 1977, 
101-26. On the multiple meanings of the balance of power cf. Claude 1962, 25-39.
573 Morgenthau 1985, 222.
574 Kratochwil 1982, 12-20.
575 With the exception of Rosenberg 1994, 139-42, the IR literature conflates the difference 
between dynastic equilibrium and active balancing. Cf also Claude 1962; Aron 1984, 133-56; 
Sheehan 1996. While Kratochwil and Schroeder acknowledge the difference between a 
‘political balance of power' and ‘moral and juridical equilibrium' as a convention, they fails to 
lay out their respective social rationales. Kratochwil 1982; Schroeder 1992.
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preserved by an alliance against any aggressor, nor was it the automatic, law-like, and 
de-personalised function of anarchy, which mechanically stabilised a given and re­
equilibrated an altered distribution of power and territory.576 Rather, it was an inter- 
dynastic technique of territorial expansion through proportional aggrandizement.
In this respect, it obeyed au fond  the same social logic as feudal ‘power 
balancing’, while appearing in new disguise.
‘Feudal geopolitics was anything but impersonal: it revolved around personal (dynastic) 
claims to property in land, and wars were fought by armies levied through ties of 
personal allegiance. While everyone, no doubt, calculated his own advantage, there was 
no sense in stabilizing the system territorially through a military balance, for war and 
political expansion were a major mechanism of surplus appropriation. (...) In feudalism, 
the last thing anyone wanted was a balance: that would have stopped the game.’577
Yet, continuing the game and achieving equilibrium are mutually exclusive 
goals, unless we conceive of a dynamic equilibrium, which re-establishes itself in ever- 
renewed territorial configurations. This, of course, is precisely what happened in 
Europe during the early modem period. Yet, while the extreme fragmentation of feudal 
political power was overcome in favour of larger proprietary kingdoms - reducing the 
number of players while enhancing their stakes -, the game of dynastic power balancing 
was played on a much larger scale and with more drastic consequences: it meant the 
europeanisation, if not universalisation, of dynastic power politics, where military 
conflict in any regional sub-theatre could no longer be ignored by the central players.
Individually, each dynastic actor sought to maximise wealth and territories. 
Since none of the leading absolutist-dynastic powers consciously wanted a balance in 
Europe - the goal being universal monarchy -,578 dynastic equilibrium, while its 
realisation remained a chimera, resulted from antagonistic interests. Equilibrium, 
however, implied practices which are incommensurable with the conventional 
understanding of the balance of power. Systemically, since no single actor was strong 
enough to impose its universal schemes on Europe, aggression provoked responses 
which went far beyond simple balancing and the re-establishment of the status quo 
ante. The objective of the early modem coalition-building was, as Mattingly suggests,
576 Morgenthau 1985, 189 and Waltz 1979.
577 Rosenberg 1994, 140.
578 Bosbach 1986.
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not balancing, but outweighing.579 Outweighing implied the chance of completely 
destroying the aggressor, followed by its territorial dismemberment amongst the allying 
members. If these practices appeared in the guise of ruthless power politics, they were 
usually rationalised by dint of far-fetched legal claims to lands which were to be 
ingeniously constructed or invented with the help of the European-wide network of 
often recondite dynastic genealogical connections.
Schemes of partition and the complete break-up of even the mightiest polities 
were common currency.580 In 1668, a secret partition treaty was signed by France and 
Austria over the Spanish Empire. After the War of the Spanish Succession, the Utrecht 
Settlement effectively dismembered the Spanish monarchy. During the War of the 
Austrian Succession, the very existence of the Habsburg state was at stake. In the First 
Treaty of Vienna (1725), Austria and Spain agreed to partition France if there was 
war. During the Seven Years’ War, Russia considered the complete division of Prussia. 
The three Polish partitions of 1772, 1793 and 1795 eclipsed Poland. As the war 
objective of coalitions was outweighing to the degree of complete partition, so were 
the war objectives of the attacking power geared towards unconditional conquest. 
During the War of the North (1655-60), Sweden intended the complete destruction of 
the Danish monarchy and aristocracy as it sought total victory over Russia during the 
Great Northern War (1700-1721).581 In turn, Peter the Great and August of Saxony 
sought the elimination of the Swedish Empire. Louis XTV sought total defeat of the 
enemy in the Dutch Wars and the forcible seizure of Dutch commerce. Prussia sought 
to swallow up Saxony and Austria Bavaria. As a rule, wars were brought to an end not 
by self-restraint or by the recognition of the international legitimacy of any one power, 
but by mutual economic, financial, and military depletion. The diplomatic semantics of 
saturation expressed tactical arguments by ascending powers, like Prussia, eager to 
gain international recognition for the fa its accomplis of already annexed lands, and did 
by no means indicate a strategy of self-restraint. Moderation was sought as a 
temporary respite for economic, financial and military recovery. Peaces were peaces of 
exhaustion.582
579 Mattingly 1988, 141 and 150.
580 Holsti 1991, 94; McKay and Scott 1983, p. 22 passim.
581 McKay and Scott 1983, 83.
582 Duchhardt 1997, 56.
272
If the Carthaginian objectives of outweighing or total victory could not be 
achieved, dynastic power-balancing was directly linked to the idea of convenance, 
which demanded a consensus among the major powers over territorial alterations.583 
The desired objective was ‘just equilibrium’, consciously negotiated by the leading 
powers. The operative principle was that each territorial gain by any one power 
justified claims to territorial or other equivalents.584 To be left out in any round of 
territorial aggrandisement was to fall behind. Few dynasts could thus afford to stay 
neutral. Convenance became thus the regulative principle of the dynastic conception of 
the balance of power585 or, as Martin Wight suggested, ‘the diplomatic counterpart of 
hereditary absolute monarchy’.586
The dynastic idea of the balance of power stood thus in clear affinity to the 
mercantilist balance of trade. As wealth was conceived of as an absolute and finite 
sum, so that any trade deficits had to be compensated with the inflow of bullion or was 
regarded as an absolute loss, so was territory finite and any acquisition demanded 
compensation for the re-establishment of a ‘just equilibrium’. The territorial equivalent 
of mercantilism came thus to be cameralism which gauged state power in terms of 
taxable population and territory in terms of soil fertility.
Convenance did more to intensify war and territorial changes than peace and 
stasis, for each territorial gain of one power induced immediately claims to equivalents 
in order to offset the perceived disadvantage. Equilibrium was thus redressed, if on a 
different level. It thereby directly frustrated the principle of non-intervention. Yet, non- 
recognition of the principle of non-intervention did not infringe a maxim of 
international law, it was regarded as legitimate behavior.587 The implication was that 
bilateral wars occasioned immediately a multilateral renversement of positions, driven 
by the search for territorial equivalents. Legitimate claims for compensation set in train 
a series of practices which are incommensurable with the preservation of or a return to 
the status quo ante. Territorial exchanges, cessions, indemnities, pensions, and 
subsidies negotiated through outright haggling were the mark of the age and
583 Duchhardt 1997, 17 and 1976, 51. The biased views of the Huguenot de Rohan are 
particularly inept to illuminate the real nature of French foreign policy. Kratochwil 1982, 12- 
14.
584 McKay and Scott 1983, 212, 214 and 228; Schroeder 1994a, 6-7.
585 Generally see Butterfield 1966 and Fenske 1975, 972.
586 Wight 1966, 171 and 1978, 186.
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contemporary peace congresses. Usually, the arithmetic of convenance meant that 
weaker powers were carved up to the convenience of the leading powers. Successive 
peace treaties codified the disappearance of smaller states as pawns in the international 
game of territorial compensation.
The Case o f the ‘Polish PartitionsB alance o f Power or Compensatory Equilibrium?
The three Polish Partitions of 1772, 1793 and 1795 pursued by Prussia, Austria 
and Russia classically exemplify the compensatory dynamic of the inter-dynastic idea of 
equilibrium. According to (Neo-)realist predictions, power-balancing should have 
prevented Poland’s break-up. Yet, no counter-balance emerged, nor did any prevailing 
norms restrain the Eastern Powers. The first partition was justified and carried through 
by Prussia and Austria in compensation for Russian acquisitions in the Balkans over 
and against the Ottoman Empire. The second and third partitions were regarded as a 
just indemnity for Prusso-Austrian anti-French war efforts in the Wars of Revolution 
after the defeat at Valmy (1792), while Russia claimed to put down ‘Jacobinism’ in 
Warsaw in the interest of the European dynastic fraternity.588 Parliamentary Britain 
remained neutral, having no direct interests in the region. Nor was it purely 
geographical circumstances which permitted the break-up of Poland. Poland’s social 
property regime generated a constitutional regime where power lay with the 
aristocrats, enjoying individually the famous liberum veto which enabled any member 
of the Polish Diet to exercise a personal veto over legislation. Poland’s elective 
monarchy - the ‘crowned aristocratic republic’ - was thus barred from developing the 
absolutist administration and military centralisation enjoyed by its neighbors.589 The 
inherent weakness of the aristocratic constitution opened Poland up to foreign 
dismemberment since it was regarded as a power vacuum in eastern Europe.
The tripartite seizure of Polish territory did not restore the balance to the status 
quo before the Russian acquisitions in the Balkans and before the French Wars of
587 Grewe 1984, 392-3.
588 McKay and Scott 1983, 248.
589 On the theoretical implications of the Polish case for the domestic-international problem cf. 
Gourevitch 1978, 898.
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Revolution, but adjusted the balance on the basis of a new territorial settlement 
amongst the major East European powers to the detriment of Poland. Balance of 
power failed, but equilibrium worked. Dynastic equilibrium promoted war, not peace. 
Yet, war did not re-equilibrate the distribution of power, but led to the systematic 
eclipse of smaller states. And it was this dynastic equilibrium conception, not the 
modem balance of power, which incurred in 1793 the censure of Enlightenment 
philosophers like Immanuel Kant:
‘The maintenance of universal peace by means of the so-called Balance of Power in 
Europe is - like Swift’s house, which a masterbuilder constructed in such perfect accord 
with all the laws of equilibrium, that when a sparrow alighted upon it, it immediately 
collapsed - a mere figment of the imagination.’590
The Polish episode did not destroy the spirit of dynastic power-balancing, but 
was its clearest expression.591
As an explanatory device, the balance of power theorem is indeterminate since 
it accounts for any outcome, depending upon whether a systemic or a unit-level 
perspective is adopted. If a state survives, it is due to the stabilising and protective 
function of the balance of power; if it perishes, it is due to the necessity of a new 
systemic balance. Neither realist, neorealist, nor constructivist theory is able to 
understand the historical character of the Polish Partitions, the forces which caused it, 
nor the outcome. As long as the time-bound meanings of power-balancing are not 
taken seriously, IR theories will have difficulties to make sense of historical 
diversity.592
590 Kant cited in Wight 1966, 170-1.
591 von Arentin 1981; Grewe 1984, 395-7; Morgenthau opines that the Polish Partitions 
‘reaffirmed the essence’ of the balance of power, since Poland was divided to equal parts; later, 
he affirms that it failed, since it could not protect Poland from destruction. Morgenthau 1985, 
199 and 222. Wight argues that the partitions discredited the balance of power. Wight 1966, 
157 and 1978, 189. For Bull, ‘the partition of Poland was not a departure from the principle of 
balance of power but an application’. Bull 1977, 108. Schroeder calls them a ‘system 
conforming behaviour’. Schroeder 1994a, 18; Sheehan indicts them as an ‘aberration’. Sheehan 
1996,61.
592 Compensations are not simply a ‘different method of the balance of power’ (Morgenthau 
1985, 198-200), understood as a universal category, but express a different quality of power- 
balancing.
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In sum, the preservation of the status quo or the re-establishment of the status 
quo ante was not the goal of Westphalian power-balancing, but the prospect of 
territorial gains in compensation for the acquisitions made by other actors. As such, it 
was a consciously implemented technique of expansion, driven by dynastic interests, 
which de-stabilised and re-stabilised the territorial distribution in ever-changing 
configurations, and not an automatic mechanism operating behind the backs of political 
actors.593 If the aggressor did not face complete partition, convenance ensured 
proportional aggrandisement to his detriment. But dynastic equilibrium did not even 
need aggressors, it needed victims. It thereby invited bandwagoning rather than 
balancing.594 The dramatic decline in the number of European sovereign actors 
between 1648 and the late 19th Century did not come about in spite of the balance of 
power, but because of the policy of predatory equilibrium and bandwagoning. Dynastic 
power-balancing did not mean the preservation of an even distribution of power, nor 
did it become ‘a means of maintaining state independence’,595 nor did it put ‘a break on 
territorial changes’,596 but implied equality in aggrandizement.597 The logic of dynastic 
anarchy generated a dynamic system of collective wealth maximisation amongst 
predatory monarchs qua expansion, not a static system of collective security. The 
balance of power is not the natural and universal function of any anarchy, its nature is 
the outgrowth of the specific identity and interests of the members which constitute 
diverse geopolitical system. Given the persisting logic of geopolitical expansionism, it 
is doubtful whether the system of dynastic states could ever generate a general interest 
in the preservation of the status quo. The dynastic practice of equilibrium qua 
convenance was an instrument of geopolitical accumulation.
This was to change significantly with Britain’s new post-1688 foreign policy.
British Uniqueness: Capitalism, Parliamentary Sovereignty, and Active Balancing
593 Rosenberg 1994, 139-42.
594 While Schroeder’s survey of the historical record confirms the prevalence of bandwagoning, 
he offers no theoretical explanation. Schroeder 1994b.
595 Holsti 1991, 69.
596 Butterfield 1966, 144.
597 Wight 1966, 156 and 1978, 187.
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The new practice of power balancing is directly linked to the formation of 
capitalism and the growth of the modem state in England. In the period between the 
end of the Glorious Revolution and the accession (1714) of the first Hanoverian king, 
George I, the pattern of British foreign policy shifted on the basis of a capitalist social 
property regime which had revolutionised the institutional set-up of the British state.598 
Sovereignty lay no longer with the king, but with the ‘King-in-Parliament’. The 
historical presupposition of Britain’s new attitude towards Europe was the de-coupling 
of foreign policy from dynastic interests brought about by Parliament’s right - gained in 
1701 (Act of Settlement) - to coarticulate and even determine British foreign policy.599 
After these constitutional changes, British foreign policy was no longer conducted 
exclusively on the basis of dynastic interests as formulated in Kabinettpolitik, but 
increasingly on the basis of the ‘national interest’ as formulated by the propertied 
classes self-organised in Parliament. This was a world-historical novum. The decisive 
new regulator of Britain’s readiness to go to war was, next to the excise, the land tax, 
through which the landed and commercial classes taxed themselves.600 The personal 
union of the United Kingdom with Hanover, which wedded the German stemlands to 
the British Isles, was regarded as a disturbing continental legacy among the Tories and 
the Whigs and caused much resentment in Parliament.601 Britain’s monarchical interests 
as German Electors, ran time and again against those of changing parliamentary 
majorities. Whereas the British-Hanoverian dynasty remained enmeshed in the Old 
Regime territorial game of inter-dynastic relations, Parliament sought to de- 
territorialise British policy on the Continent.602
During this transition, the first manifestation of the new British attitude to war 
came with the Nine Years’ War (1688-97), in which the post-revolutionary 
constitutional settlement and the Protestant Succession were tested in the struggle 
against the Bourbons who supported the restoration of the Stuarts.603 Britain’s ability
598 Brenner 1985, 296-95 and 1993; Wood 1991; Parker 1996, 217-61.
599 Black 1991, 13-20 and 43-58. While the monarchy remained, of course, an important actor 
in post-revolutionary diplomacy, the differentia specifica of the British system was the 
constitutionally enshrined parliamentary right to co-decide foreign policy making.
600 Parker 1996,218ff.
601 Black 1991, 31-42; McKay and Scott 1983, 104.
602 Duchhardt 1995, 182-3; Sheehan 1988, 28; Schroeder 1994b, 136.
603 Sheehan 1988, 30; Duchhardt 1989, 33.
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to sustain the war against absolutist France was predicated on the Parliament-backed 
creation of the first modern financial system by setting-up the National Debt (1693) 
and the Bank of England (1694). Wars were no longer to be financed out of the 
‘private’ war-chest of the dynastic ruler, but by a reliable credit system superior in 
raising funds, since public debts in the form of government loans were henceforth to be 
guaranteed by Parliament.604 Investment in these government loans had the effect of 
uniting the propertied class behind the British war-effort. Credit security was 
guaranteed by the self-taxation of the capitalist classes in Parliament. ‘During the Nine 
Years’ War the commercial and landed classes represented there managed to double 
the country’s revenues by effectively taxing their own wealth for the first time.’605
The uneven development of different state/society complexes in early modem 
Europe implied that while dynastic continental states continued to operate absolutist 
regimes of domestic tax-extraction and dynastic foreign strategies of geopolitical 
accumulation, England developed a dual strategy of foreign policy behavior.606 While it 
continued its aggressive mercantilist ‘blue water’ policies overseas fanned by an 
expanding capitalist economy which financed naval superiority, it took on the new role 
of the balancer of the European pentarchy and disengaged from any further direct 
territorial claims on the Continent after the Treaty of Utrecht. Utrecht exemplified not 
simply Britain’s rise as a great power, but also its willingness and ability to regulate 
European affairs on a new principle (active balancing), yet on the old territorial basis 
(continental equilibrium). The British peace plans were a major departure from earlier 
schemes.607 The strategy was to contain France by keeping her militarily occupied on 
the Continent while defeating her overseas through Britain’s superior naval forces. 
Significantly, the only territorial gains on the Continent which Britain negotiated for 
herself at Utrecht were the strategic posts of Gibraltar and Minorca, while the 
acquisition of trading posts and commercial rights overseas, like the asiento, 
dominated her peace agenda.608 While her security interests lay in Europe, her 
economic interests lay in the extra-European arena.
604 Parker 1996,217-21.
605 McKay and Scott 1983, 46.
606 Black 1991, 85-6; Duchhardt 1997, 302.
607 For a contrary view see Holsti 1991, 80.
608 Cf. Rosenberg 1994, 38-43; Schroder 1994b, 142.
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After 1713, British foreign policy no longer operated on the principle of 
‘natural allies5 - the ‘Old System5 which allied England, the Dutch Republic and 
Austria against France -, but on the fluid principle of rapidly changing coalitions which 
earned her on the Continent the epithet ‘Perfidious Albion5.609 This nickname was as 
much due to a failure by dynasts to grasp the nature of changing majorities in a 
parliamentary system, as it was due to a failure to understand the logic of a post- 
dynastic foreign policy and active balancing in the context of an overwhelmingly 
dynastic system of states. The idea was to stop fighting once the weaker allied partner 
had recovered (e.g. Prussia), rather than to eliminate the common enemy. This was, as 
Sheehan explains, a policy of achieving minimal aims, rather than the maximal aims of 
dynastic coalition building in the form of partitions.610 The logical choice of Britain's 
continental partners against France were those land-based powers - like Austria, 
Prussia, and Russia - which had no direct ambitions overseas. Austria's only foray in 
this direction - the Austrian Ostende Company - was squashed by Walpole in exchange 
for British recognition of the Austrian Pragmatic Sanction. Prussia's promotion of the 
tiny port of Emden sent alarm bells ringing in London’s merchant community. Russia’s 
pre-dominance as a trading power in the Baltic was of more concern to Parliament 
than her vast territorial gains in Siberia. Even a rapprochement with France was 
possible in the 1730s on the realization that Austria could again dominate European 
politics. ‘To paraphrase a statement of Palmerston: While the holder of the balance has 
no permanent friends, it has no permanent enemies either; it has only the permanent 
interest of maintaining the balance of power itself.’611 But what was to be balanced 
here were not modem but dynastic states, which explains why the balance of power did 
not assume the form of the automatic ‘invisible hand5 reminiscent of Adam Smith’s 
idea of market self-regulation, but was manipulated by a structurally privileged 
conscious balancer: Britain’s hand holding the scales.612
This meant that during the 18th Century, two regimes of power-balancing were 
in operation in Europe. While Old Regime states continued the policy of territorial
609 ‘The British participation in the War of the Spanish Succession, the War of the Austrian 
Succession, and the Seven Years War, all ended with Britain abandoning her major ally.’ 
Sheehan 1996, 63.
610 Sheehan 1996, 64.
611 Morgenthau 1985, 214.
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equilibrium and compensations amongst themselves, parliamentary Britain sought to 
manage the balance of the European sub-system by indirect interventions in the form of 
subsidies and pensions to smaller powers while also operating a balance of threat to 
counter any imperial-hegemonic ambition.613 Britain’s neutrality in the War of the 
Polish Succession (1733-8) was a clear indicator of Britain’s disengagement from the 
fruits of the convenance system of territorial compensations on the Continent, while 
power-balancing operated primarily through the payment of huge subsidies and 
diplomacy. The War of the Austrian Succession ‘cost Britain £43 million, of which £30 
million was added to the National Debt. With the land tax at 4s in the pound, alarmists 
in the government raised the cry of national bankruptcy’.614 Yet, while Britain 
sustained the huge financial burden, the French financial system, in spite of its greater 
taxable population, collapsed. Territorial gains on the Continent - apart from strategic 
posts which allowed the policing of the main European trading routes - were of little 
interest for a commercial nation. If Britain’s direct military interventions on the 
Continent were already significantly reduced after 1713, they veered towards zero after 
the Seven Years’ War, which established Britain overseas as the hegemonic naval 
power. At the same time, Frederick the Great was heavily subsidised by Britain which 
guaranteed Prussian survival.
‘Continental Powers have always noted that while Britain traditionally claimed to hold 
the balance of Europe with her right hand, with her left hand she was establishing 
oceanic hegemony which refused for two centuries to admit any principle of 
equilibrium.’615
In other words, Britain became the balancer of the balance based on a 
productive capitalist economy which financed naval supremacy. She was no longer 
placed in either of the two scales but held the balance itself in her hands.616 Britain was
612 Although the balance of power was already discussed in England prior to 1688, it became 
only a foreign policy maxim after 1688. Cf. Sheehan 1988, 33.
613 McKay and Scott 1983, 96. Towards the end of the War of the Austrian Succession, ‘the 
Austrians increasingly felt they were becoming British mercenaries in an Anglo-French war.’ 
McKay and Scott 1983, 172.
614 McKay and Scott 1983, 172-3.
615 Wight 1966, 164.
616 While this is often acknowledged, its causes are either attributed to Britain’s insularity, to 
political skills, or they are not explained at all. Claude 1962, 47-8 and 59-60.
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not the accidental insular tertius gaudens of dynastic power-balancing,617 but the 
conscious regulator of a system of European politics from which she was socio­
economically, not geographically, set apart. The chronological simultaneity of 18th 
Century European politics hides dyachronic conceptions of geopolitical order 
respectively held and operated by capitalist Britain on the one side and the continental 
dynastic powers on the other.
Conclusion
Given the diverse, yet overwhelmingly dynastic, nature of the constitutive units 
of the Westphalian Order, it featured a series of system-defining phenomena which set 
it structurally apart from its modem successor.
Theoretically, these phenomena are bound up with the persistence of non­
capitalist property-relations which blocked the genesis of modem sovereignty. IR’s 
failure to correctly theorise and periodise the Westphalian Order rests thus on its 
fundamental conflation of absolutist with modem sovereignty. Consequently, 
demystifying Westphalia requires a re-theorisation of absolutist sovereignty. 
Proprietary statehood implied the regulation of contemporary inter-actor relations on 
the basis of predatory dynasticism and inter-personalism. European early modern 
international relations, codified in the Westphalian Settlement, evinced a determinate 
‘generative grammar’, developed a distinct territorial logic of political space, and 
generated historically specific patterns of conflict and cooperation. Pre-capitalist 
property relations required domestic strategies of political income provision that 
translated into external strategies of geopolitical accumulation, explaining the 
frequency of war and the persistence of empire-building. Proprietary and personalised 
sovereignty promoted political marriages, wars of succession, and the elevation of 
dynastic ‘private’ family law to the status of ‘public’ international law. The proprietary 
nature of state territory turned territoriality into an exchangeable appendage of
617 Wight 1978, 171.
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dynastic interests and fortunes. Inter-dynastic compensatory equilibrium invited 
bandwagoning, while smaller states were liquidated.
In terms of IR theory, the specificity of the Westphalian Order cannot be 
adequately theorised on the basis of naturalised great power rivalries driven by 
realpolitik and regulated by a universalised balance-of-power, nor by the pure 
pressures exerted by an anarchical and competitive system of states in abstraction from 
the internal character of its constitutive conflict-units, as demanded by neorealism. The 
argument also questions the plausibility of constructivist approaches which conceive of 
international relations primarily in terms of the intersubjectively negotiated quality of 
institutions qua conventions, which, in turn, may alter the identity of political actors 
and policy-outcomes. Without a systematic inquiry into the property-related social 
sources of identity-formation, which define determinate sets of interests and generate 
specific institutions, constructivist claims remain underexplored. While all social 
phenomena are mediated by language and intersubjective norms, the extra-ideational 
conditions sustaining the rise, reproduction, and fall of specific constitutive rules 
remain outside the theoretical scope of constructivism.
Chronologically, the fundamental break with the old territorially accumulative 
logic of international relations comes with the rise of capitalism in England. The onset 
of agrarian capitalism in 16th Century England, the conversion of dynastic sovereignty 
into parliamentary sovereignty in the late 17th Century, and the post-Utrecht adoption 
of a new foreign policy, resulted in the gradual de-territorialisation of British interests 
on the Continent. At the same time, Britain began to manipulate the old inter-dynastic 
practice of equilibrium qua territorial compensations by dint of a new conception of 
active balancing.
Yet, developmentally, 18th Century world order was not yet a capitalist system. 
As long as the majority of the dominant European powers were dynastic states based 
on pre-capitalist social property relations, Britain remained engulfed in a hostile world 
of politically accumulating states. This explains why Britain’s struggle in overseas with 
Spain and France retained a military-mercantilist character. During the formation of the 
absolutist inter-dynastic world system, Britain was the ‘third hand’ which consciously 
balanced the respective imperial pretensions of pre-capitalist states. Ex hypothesis, this 
suggests that it was only under pressure of geopolitical competition among France and 
Britain, that a financially exhausted France was violently forced to alter its internal
282
social property relations. While thriving on its expanding capitalist economy, Britain 
continued to play off non-capitalist actors, until they were financially and economically 
exhausted and forced to go through a series of geopolitically mediated crises - the 
French Revolution, the Napoleonic Wars, the Wars of Liberation, and a sequence of 
further ‘Revolutions from above’ - which entailed agrarian reforms and state 
transformations. Only after the European-wide spread of capitalism, after the series of 
European revolutions during the late 18th and 19th Centuries and after the ‘freeing’ of 
markets in favor of a world market, did the new logic of British-sponsored free trade 
amongst capitalist states impose a non-territorial logic of international surplus 
appropriation, based on non-political contracts between private citizens.
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